“The Patent Holder believes that it holds granted and/or pending applications for Patents the use of which would be required to implement [an ITU-T Recommendation] and hereby declares, in accordance with the Common Patent Policy for the ITU-T/ITUR/ISO/IEC, that … The Patent Holder is prepared to grant a license to an unrestricted number of applicants on a worldwide, non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable terms and conditions to make, use and sell implementations of the [ITU-T Recommendation].”
“…we have commenced legal action against Amazon for the unauthorized use of Nokia’s video-related technologies in its streaming services and devices. Cases have been filed in the US, Germany, India, the UK, and the European Unified Patent Court. Amazon Prime Video and Amazon’s streaming devices infringe a mix of Nokia’s multimedia patents covering multiple technologies including video compression, content delivery, content recommendation and aspects related to hardware.”
“(1) Nokia’s RAND Commitment includes the following obligations, as a matter of Swiss law, to (a) enter into good faith negotiations in respect of, and to offer, a worldwide licence to the Nokia Codec SEPs on RAND terms; (b) refrain from seeking to enjoin, prevent or otherwise restrict a beneficiary of the RAND Commitment from using the Nokia Codec SEPs and/or the patents in the Nokia Video Portfolio (including the Alcatel NEPs); (2) Nokia has sought to enjoin Amazon in various other jurisdictions from using the Nokia Codec SEPs and/or other patents in the Nokia Video Portfolio; (3) Where Amazon is prepared to give an unconditional undertaking to enter into a licence determined to be RAND in these proceedings, and to make an early (adjustable) royalty payment on an interim basis, Nokia’s conduct in continuing to seek injunctive relief is ‘inconsistent with its obligation to perform the RAND Commitment in good faith’; (4) The foreign court would, in considering whether to grant an injunction, take into account such things as the parties’ respective efforts to reach a licensing agreement, including the adequacy of the dispute resolution mechanisms in which the parties are currently engaged to settle a RAND licence; (5) In the circumstances, the RAND Commitment requires Nokia to agree to enter into, and to enter into, an Interim Licence as determined by the court (on the basis that all of its terms could be adjusted once the court has determined the final RAND licence at trial); (6) Further or alternatively, a willing licensee such as Amazon should in any event have the right or ability to apply to the court for a determination of an appropriate licensing framework at an interim stage, including payments into court, to enable that licensee further to demonstrate and manifest its willingness to enter into a licence on FRAND terms settled by the court.”
“79. In my judgment, there is no sufficiently arguable case that the premise (i.e. the Swiss law principles identified) leads to the conclusion that Nokia is obliged to enter into an Interim Licence. 80. The two principles of Swiss law identified in this part of the pleading are that the RAND Commitment obliges Nokia (1) to enter into negotiations in good faith for a RAND licence and (2) to refrain from seeking to enjoin Amazon in the meantime. A third principle of Swiss law also said to be relevant is that the intended third party beneficiary, C, of a contract between A and B can enforce that contract. 81. Assuming that the RAND Commitment gives rise to an enforceable obligation to enter into negotiations for a RAND licence in good faith, I do not see how that leads to the conclusion that Nokia – in addition to entering into good faith negotiations to enter into a licence on RAND terms, which is to have retrospective as well as prospective effect – must agree to enter into a licence at an early stage (whether that is, or is not, characterised as a second licence), covering at least part of the same period that will be covered by the final licence, pending resolution of the terms of the final licence.”
“Irrespective of the lack of merit in the claim, I would have been inclined to refuse – on case management grounds – to give directions for the resolution of the terms of an Interim Licence. On Amazon's argument, the Interim Licence would have to be on RAND terms: the RAND Commitment could not conceivably oblige Nokia to enter into even an interim licence on terms which were not RAND, even if Amazon wanted that on an interim basis. I do not see how the complexities (including on the crucial issue of scope) which arise in determining a final RAND licence can be avoided in determining the Interim Licence. The notion that the latter exercise could be undertaken in a few days is wholly unrealistic. It would be a waste of the parties' and the court's resources to hold two RAND trials.”
“1. A person who, acting in his own name, has entered into a contract whereby performance is due to a third party is entitled to compel performance for the benefit of said third party. 2. The third party or his legal successors have the right to compel performance where that was the intention of the contracting parties or is the customary practice. 3. In this case the obligee may no longer release the obligor from his obligations once the third party has notified the obligor of his intention to exercise that right.”
“... courts are not the best way to determine RAND terms and [it is not] contemplated by the standard-setting organisations that litigation should be the way in which people determine RAND terms. Negotiation is the key. ... we have been negotiating with Amazon since 2009 and we have not been able to obtain agreement. So, we consider that our actions are entirely appropriate in the context of those negotiations.”