Alexander Valeryevich Timokhin v Anna Anatolyevna Timokhina [2026] EWHC 439 (KB)

“MARRIAGE CONTRACT Saint Petersburg, this sixth day of June in the year of two thousand seventeen, We, citizen Alexander Valeryevich Timokhin, born on December 18, 1969, place of birth: city of Leningrad, citizenship: Russian Federation, gender: male, … registered at:2 Dinamovskaya Ulitsa, Apartment 12, Saint Petersburg, hereinafter referred to as “the Husband”, and citizeness Anna Anatolyevna Timokhina, born on May 22, 1975, , place of birth: city of Leningrad, citizenship: Russian Federation, gender: female, … registered at: 14 Khudozhnikov Prospect, Apartment 343, Saint Petersburg, hereinafter referred to as “the Wife”, hereinafter together referred to as “the Spouses” or “the Parties”, married, the marriage having been registered by the Wedding Palace No 1 of the Civil Status Registry Department of the Saint Petersburg Government on January 11, 2004 (certificate of marriage 1-АK No 700293 issued on January 11, 2004, marriage registration entry No 95), with the purpose of strengthening and preservation of marriage relations, fair settlement of property relations, both during the marriage, and in case of termination thereof, as well as for protection of the interests of each of the Spouses, have voluntary, on their mutual consent and acting according to Sections 40, 41, 42 of the Russian Federation Family Codes, entering into this marriage contract (hereinafter referred to as “the Contract”), as follows: … 5. PROCEDURE OF INCURRING OF FAMILY EXPENSES BY THE SPOUSES AND OF PAYMENT OF A COMPENSATION TO THE WIFE IN CASE OF TERMINATION OF THE MARRIAGE; THE SPOUSES' RESPONSIBILITY UNDER OBLIGATIONS Clause 5.1 5.1. During the marriage: The Spouses have come to an agreement and have agreed that the amount of total monthly family expenses shall be thirty two thousand five hundred pounds sterling (Ј 32,500) according to the exchange rate fixed by the RF Central Bank. The family expenses include, in particular, payment for municipal services, provision of the entire family, including the Spouses and children, with meals and clothes, maintenance of children, including, but not limited to, their training, "insurance, payment for services of child nurses, resident tutors and tutors, as well as other expenses allocated to the family's needs. Incurrence of such expenses is assigned to Alexander Valeryevich Timokhin. With the purpose of compliance with this procedure of incurring the family's expenses during 36 months following the moment of entering into of this Contract, the Husband shall transfer within 5 calendar days from the date of the Agreement to the Wife's account the funds in rubles of the Russian Federation according to the exchange rate fixed by the RF Central Bank in the amount equivalent to one million one hundred seventy thousand pounds sterling (Ј 1,170,000) which she is entitled to spend exclusively for the family's needs. Upon expiration of 36 months, the balance on the account shall be replenished by the Husband for the next 12 months, proceeding from the family budget agreed upon by the Parties, but not less than the amount fixed by this clause. Anna Anatolyevna Timokhina undertakes to provide the Husband with the account details for transfer of the funds at the moment of signing of this Contract. In case of termination of the marriage within 36 months from the moment of signing of this Contract, Anna Anatolyevna Timokhina shall have the right not to return to the Husband the funds remaining on the account. If the funds allocated towards the family's needs are saved, Anna Anatolyevna Timokhina shall have the right not to return to the Husband the funds remaining on the account. Clause 5.2 5.2. In case of termination of the marriage, Alexander Valeryevich Timokhin undertakes to pay Anna Anatolyevna Timokhina the funds in rubles according to the exchange rate fixed by the RF Central Bank on the day of payment equivalent to one million pounds sterling (Ј1,000,000). The said amount shall be transferred to Anna Anatolyevna Timokhina as a lumpsum in rubles of the Russian Federation according to the exchange rate fixed by the RF Central Bank on the day of payment in the amount equivalent to one million pounds sterling (Ј1,000,000) not later than within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of termination of the marriage by banking transfer to Anna Anatolyevna Timokhina's account. Anna Anatolyevna Timokhina undertakes to provide the Husband with the account details for transfer of the funds at the moment of signing of this Contract. Clause 5.3 5.3 The Parties confirm that the funds specified in clause 4.1.9, 5.1 and 5.2. of this Contract are not maintenance obligations. In view of the above-said terms of separation of the property, the Parties have decided that during the marriage, as well as in case of termination thereof for any reason, Alexander Valeryevich Timokhin shall have no obligations to pay any maintenance and (or) alimony in favor of Anna Anatolyevna Timokhina. Timokhin Alexander acknowledges that Anna Anatolyevna Timokhina has the rights of claim within the amounts specified in clauses 4.1.9, 5.1. and 5.2, of this Contract. If the Husband breaches the obligations to pay the fiscal compensation stipulated in clause 5.2. of this Contract, the Husband shall pay in favor of the Wife a fine equal to 0.1% of the debt amount per each day of delay in payment. Clause 6.2 6.2. Each of the Spouses undertakes to perform his/her duties under this Contract in good faith, and to refrain from causing any harm to the other Spouse of, in particular, not to distribute data discrediting honor, dignity and/or business reputation of the other Spouse. Clause 6.9 6.9. This Contract shall be considered entered into as of the moment of certification thereof by notary, and shall remain in effect till the moment of termination of the marriage between the Parties, except for the obligations which have been stipulated by the Contract for the period after termination of the marriage.”

“judgments of foreign courts have, as such, no legal effect in England, for foreign judges have no authority in England… As judicial adjudication is an exercise of state sovereignty, this is obvious: state sovereignty ends at the border of the state, and while international comity may certainly require that respect be given to exercises of that power within the sovereign’s own territory, that is where the conventional obligations of comity end.”

“A successful litigant with a foreign judgment in his favour cannot enforce that judgment in England. No measures of execution may be taken on the strength of it. The claimant must instead bring original proceedings before the English court, in order to obtain, speedily or eventually, an original English judgment, which alone is the judgment which can be enforced.”

“Sovereigns act on their own plane: they are responsible to their own peoples, but internationally they are responsible only in accordance with international law and internationally recognised norms. Courts, however, are always responsible for their acts, both domestically and internationally. Domestically they are responsible up to the level of their supreme court, and internationally they are responsible in the sense that their judgments are recognisable and enforceable in other nations only to the extent that they have observed what we would call substantive or natural justice, what in the United States is called due process, and what internationally is more and more being referred to as the rule of law. In other words the judicial acts of a foreign state are judged by judicial standards, including international standards regarding jurisdiction, in accordance with doctrines separate from the act of state doctrine, even if the dictates of comity still have an important role to play.”

“The most one can say is that the duty of positive law first identified in Schibsby v Westenholz . . . must stem from an acknowledgement that the society of nations will work better if some foreign judgments are taken to create rights which supersede the underlying cause of action, and which may be directly enforced in countries where the defendant or his assets are to be found.”

“RULE 46—(1) Subject to the Exceptions hereinafter mentioned and to Rule 63 (international conventions), a foreign judgment in personam given by the court of a foreign country with jurisdiction to give that judgment in accordance with the principles set out in Rules 47 and 48, and which is not impeachable under any of Rules 52 to 55, may be enforced by a claim or counterclaim for the amount due under it if the judgment is (a) for a debt, or definite sum of money (not being a sum payable in respect of taxes or other charges of a like nature or in respect of a fine or other penalty); and (b) final and conclusive, but not otherwise.” but not otherwise.”

“RULE 51—A foreign judgment which is final and conclusive on the merits and not impeachable under any of Rules 52 to 55 is conclusive as to any matter thereby adjudicated upon, and cannot be impeached for any error either (1) of fact; or (2) of law.”

“the judgment is conclusive in England (unless it is impeachable for reasons of fraud, public policy or the like) and not merely prima facie evidence of the defendant’s liability as had at one time been supposed.”

“RULE 54—A foreign judgment is impeachable on the ground that its enforcement or, as the case may be, recognition, would be contrary to public policy.”

“For many years, there were very few reported cases in which foreign judgments in personam had been denied enforcement or recognition for reasons of public policy at common law, reflecting the exceptional nature of this defence.”

“RULE 55—A foreign judgment may be impeached if the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained were opposed to natural justice.”

“Once again one would expect that the foreign court's views would logically be neither conclusive nor relevant as to the propriety of its own proceedings. If the English court considers that the foreign court did not observe the rules of natural justice—for example, the rule audi alteram partem or nemo judex in rem suam —why should it make any difference that the foreign court thought that it was observing the rules of natural justice?”

“As to natural justice, first, a defendant must be given the opportunity so that they can put their case in response: Jacobson v. Frachon (1927) 138 L.T. 386; Adams v. Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433, 563G. A mere procedural defect in the proceedings will not be sufficient. What is required is a substantial denial of justice: Aeroflot v. Berezovsky [2012] EWHC 3017 (Ch), [54], per Floyd J. However, a defendant must take all available defences in the foreign court and if they are at fault in not doing so, may not impeach the foreign judgment in England: Israel Discount Bank v. Hadjipateras [1984] 1 WLR 137, 144 C-H, per Stephenson LJ. A corollary of this is that a defendant may not impeach a foreign judgment by raising defences before the English court where the foreign court has considered and rejected them.”

“(1) The fact that a foreign court decision is manifestly wrong or is perverse is not sufficient (see for example Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws 15th Ed at 14-163, OJSC Bank of Moscow v Chernyakov [2016] EWHC 2583 (Comm) and Erste Group Bank AG (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October) [2013] EWHC 2926 (Comm) (“Erste Group Bank”)). The decision must be so wrong as to be evidence of bias, or be such that no court acting in good faith could have arrived at it. (2) The evidence or grounds must be ‘cogent’. (3) The decision of the foreign court must be deliberately wrong, not simply wrong by incompetence.”

“It is not contrary to English public policy to refuse to recognise a judgment which is obviously wrong. However, if there is evidence of a perverse refusal by the foreign court to apply the law in a judicial manner, it may be possible to oppose recognition on the ground that the behaviour of the court infringed natural justice: Professor Adrian Briggs, Private International Courts in English Courts, 2014, p.480.”

“… If an English court has a statutory duty to ensure that a person’s right to a fair trial is not infringed, it must follow that it cannot recognise a foreign judgment if its recognition, and the making of a judicial order which is consequent upon that recognition, would have the effect of adopting into its legal order something which the Act prohibits. … [I]t cannot be correct that an English court may recognise a judgment given in proceedings which fell short of what Article 6 guarantees, for otherwise the protections guaranteed by Article 6 could be set at naught by suing first in a country which pays less regard to such principles.”

“the Court reiterates that its jurisdiction to verify that domestic law has been correctly interpreted and applied is limited and that it is not its function to take the place of the national courts, its role being rather to ensure that the decisions of those courts are not flawed by arbitrariness or otherwise manifestly unreasonable. This is particularly true when, as in this instance, the case turns upon difficult questions of interpretation of domestic law.”

“In addition to the position at common law, there is a right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) ECHR, which arises by reason of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. It means that there is a duty directly on an English court not to give effect in England to the judgment of a foreign court where to do so would violate fair trial standards. Russia is a party to the ECHR, and so there is a strong presumption that its courts comply with the procedures of the Convention: see Maronier v. Larmer [2003] QB 620 (CA), [24]-[25], per Lord Phillips MR; Merchant International Co Ltd v. Naftogaz Ukrainy [2012] EWCA Civ 196, [2012]1 WLR 3036, at [71], per Toulson J, Joint Stock Co., Aeroflot-Russian Airlines v. Berezovsky [2014] EWCA Civ. 20, [57]-[58], per Arden LJ.”

“[45] The role of foreign law experts in relation to issues of contractual interpretation is a limited one. It is confined to identifying what the rules of interpretation are. [46] It is not the role of such experts to express opinions as to what the contract means. That is the task of the English court, having regard to the foreign law rules of interpretation.”

“[60] … Where the applicable law of the contract is foreign law, questions of interpretation are governed by the applicable law. In such a case the role of the expert is not to give evidence as to what the contract means. The role is “to prove the rules of construction of the foreign law, and it is then for the court to interpret the contract in accordance with those rules”: King v Brandywine Reinsurance Co [2005] EWCA Civ 235, [2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 1 (at [68]); Dicey, paras 9–019 and 32–144 (“the expert proves the foreign rules of construction, and the court, in the light of these rules, determines the meaning of the contract”).’”

“It was common ground that it was for the experts to identify the relevant substantive principles of Russian law, and for the court to apply those principles to the facts. At times the experts sought to express their views on the facts of the case. Such views were irrelevant. It was also common ground that where the experts disagreed on the effect of Russian law authorities, the court was entitled, and indeed bound, to look at those authorities to decide the matter for itself. As is stated in Dicey, Morris & Collins at paragraph 9-017: “If the evidence of several expert witnesses conflicts as to the effect of foreign sources, the Court is entitled, and indeed bound, to look at those sources in order itself to decide between the conflicting testimony.”” “If the evidence of several expert witnesses conflicts as to the effect of foreign sources, the Court is entitled, and indeed bound, to look at those sources in order itself to decide between the conflicting testimony.””

“Clause 5.1 Interpretation of clause 5.1 of the marriage contract Ms Yablokova Regarding Clause 5.1 of the PNA, applying the contractual rules of interpretation, the literal wording is very clear: W was entitled to retain the sums paid to her under Clause 5. I in the event that the marriage terminated within 36 months from the date of signing the contract (as occurred). Ms Zakordonskaya The wording directly indicates that the funds are being transferred for specific purposes - expenses for four people for specific period - 36 months since the conclusion of the marriage agreement (until 06.06.2020). There are no words about the agreement of the parties that the legal nature of money changes in the event of a divorce or the obligation of Ms Timokhina to spend money on specific expenses terminates in case of divorce. The parties agreed the term of the obligation - 36 months from the date of the conclusion of the marriage agreement - and did not bind the termination of this obligation with the termination of the marriage. This obligation continues, the funds are not a gift or Ms Timokhina's personal property - there are no such words in clause 5.1. Motivation regarding the recovery of unjust enrichment Ms Yablokova There was no basis for the Russian courts' resort to unjust enrichment. The clear provisions of the PNA mean that there could not be a claim for unjust enrichment. H was seeking the return of the relevant sums after the termination of the "parties' marriage (which had terminated within 36 months of the PNA). That is the very scenario that was governed by Clause 5.1 which clearly showed that in such circumstances W had the right not to return the money. That right was unconditional. Ms Zakordonskaya The acquisition or saving of property without the grounds established by law at the expense of another person. Unjust enrichment applies to contract if one party transfers funds for certain purposes but the funds were not spent for those purposes. A recipient of funds to be used for the purpose of family expenses must provide an account of expenditure for those purposes. The provisions on unjust enrichment are applied to the contracts (Article 1103 of the Civil Code). The funds under clause 5.1 were transferred for a specific purpose - family expenses. Since Ms. Timokhina had not paid any family expenses since May 2018, that was, she had not spent money for its intended purpose, these funds are unjustified enrichment and are subject to refund. The courts gave detailed reasons for this conclusion. Application of the rules on unjust enrichment in the presence of the contract Ms Yablokova The concept of unjust enrichment is irrelevant in this case because the rules of unjust enrichment are not applicable as between civil parties if the money is transferred under a contractual obligation which is valid and is not set aside. Clause 5. I was not set aside and the PNA was not amended to exclude it. (para 120) Art. 1102 of the RCC prescribes that a person who, without grounds established by law, other legal acts or a transaction, has acquired or saved of property (acquirer) at the expense of another person (victim), is obliged to return to the latter the unjustly acquired or saved property (unjust enrichment), except for the cases provided for in Article 1109 of the RCC. Ms Zakordonskaya Article 1103 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation regulates the ratio of contractual and contingent obligations (obligations arising from unjust enrichment) and provides for the application of norms on unjust enrichment to contracts. Clause 5.2 Whether there is a proper legal basis in Russian law for the £100,000 reduction applied by the VCC in its decision dated 24 January 2023. Ms Yablokova The VCC’s reasoning is “unclear and confused”

“Article 431. Interpretation of a contract While interpreting the terms of the contract, the court takes into account the literal meaning of the words and expressions contained in it. The literal meaning of a contract term, if it is unclear, is determined by comparing it with other terms and the meaning of the contract as a whole. If the rules contained in part one of this article, do not make it possible to determine the content of the contract, the actual common will of the parties shall be found out, taking into account the purpose of the contract. All corresponding circumstances are taken into account, including prior negotiations and correspondence, habitual practices in the relationships between the parties, the customs, and subsequent behavior of the parties.”

“In case of termination of the marriage within 36 months from the moment of signing of this Contract, Anna Anatolyevna Timokhina shall have the right not to return to the Husband the funds remaining on the account. If the funds allocated towards the family's needs are saved, Anna Anatolyevna Timokhina shall have the right not to return to the Husband the funds remaining on the account.”

“… in paragraph 5.3 of the marriage agreement, the parties confirm that the funds specified in paragraphs 4.1.9, 5.1 and 5.2 of the marriage agreement are not alimony obligations.”

“By paragraph 5.1 of the marriage agreement, the parties agreed that upon dissolution of marriage within 36 months from the date of signing the marriage agreement, Timokhina A.A. has the right not to return the funds remaining in her account intended to pay for family expenses. Also, by virtue of clause 5.1 of the marriage agreement, Timokhina A.A., in case of saving money directed to the needs of the family, has the right not to return them to her spouse.”

“Thus, by virtue of clause 5.1 of the agreement, the funds remaining on Timokhina A.A.'s account intended to pay for family expenses retained their intended purpose after the dissolution of the marriage and were subject to spending exclusively on the needs of children in accordance with the procedure and amount agreed with Timokhin A.V. In such circumstances, the court rejects Timokhina A.A.'s argument that from the date of the dissolution of the marriage, her obligation to spend the funds received on the basis of paragraph 5.1 of the marriage agreement for their intended purpose exclusively for family needs ceased, as not conforming to the terms of the marriage agreement.”

“In case of divorce within 36 months from the date of signing this agreement, Timokhina A.A. has the right not to return the remaining funds in the account to the spouse. In case of saving funds aimed at the needs of the family, Timokhina A.A. has the right not to return the remaining funds in the account to her spouse.”

“In such cases the language, either by itself, or at any rate once read in context, can be seen to give rise to rival possible interpretations. To resolve which of the rival interpretations is to be preferred the court has recourse to a number of familiar tools and techniques in accordance with the guidance from the Supreme Court cases. This guidance includes the fact that the aim is to ascertain what a reasonable person armed with all the background knowledge reasonably available to the parties would have understood them to have meant; that textualism and contextualism are both tools available for that purpose; that the exercise is a unitary and iterative one; and that the court is entitled to prefer the construction which is consistent with business common sense.”

“… by virtue of clause 5.1 of the agreement, the funds remaining on Timokhina A.A.'s account intended to pay for family expenses retained their intended purpose after the dissolution of the marriage and were subject to spending exclusively on the needs of children in accordance with the procedure and amount agreed with Timokhin A.V. … In such circumstances, the court rejects Timokhina A.A.'s argument that from the date of the dissolution of the marriage, her obligation to spend the funds received on the basis of paragraph 5.1 of the marriage agreement for their intended purpose exclusively for family needs ceased, as not conforming to the terms of the marriage agreement. By virtue of paragraph 1 of Article 1102 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, a person who, without grounds established by law, other legal acts or a transaction, acquired or saved property (acquirer) at the expense of another person (victim), is obliged to return to the latter unreasonably acquired or saved property (unjustified enrichment), except for the cases provided for in Article 1109 of the said Code.”

“Timokhina A.A. did not agree with the legality and validity of the decision of the Vsevolozhsky City Court of the Leningrad Region dated January 24, 2023, in the part in which her claim was denied, and in the part in which the counterclaim claims were satisfied, filed an appeal, in which she asks to cancel the court's decision in the part in which her claim was denied, to satisfy her demands in full and to deny Timokhin a counterclaim in full as well.”

“Having checked the case materials and discussed the arguments of the appeal, the judicial board for civil cases of the Leningrad Regional Court comes to the following conclusion.”

“After the dissolution of the marriage, the spouse's obligation to bear expenses for the spouse in accordance with the procedure established by the marriage agreement ceased. In addition, in paragraph 5.3 of the marriage agreement, the parties confirm that the funds specified in paragraphs 4.1.9, 5.1 and 5.2 of the marriage agreement are not alimony obligations. By paragraph 5.1 of the marriage agreement, the parties agreed that upon dissolution of marriage within 36 months from the date of signing the marriage agreement, Timokhina A.A. has the right not to return the funds remaining in her account intended to pay for family expenses. Also, by virtue of clause 5.1 of the marriage agreement, Timokhina A.A., in case of saving money directed to the needs of the family, has the right not to return them to her spouse. Thus, by virtue of clause 5.1 of the agreement, the funds remaining on Timokhina A.A.'s account intended to pay for family expenses retained their intended purpose after the dissolution of the marriage and were subject to spending exclusively on children in accordance with the procedure and amount agreed with Timokhin A.V. Accordingly, Timokhina A.A.'s argument that from the date of the dissolution of the marriage, her obligations to spend the funds received on the basis of paragraph 5.1 of the marriage agreement for their intended purpose exclusively for family needs have ceased is untenable, as it does not comply with the terms of the marriage agreement.”

“The judicial board agrees with the conclusion of the court of first instance, considers it correct, in accordance with the requirements of the law and the circumstances established in the court session.”

“The judicial board generally agrees with the conclusions of the court of first instance on the partial satisfaction of the claims of the parties, believes that during the consideration of the case by the court, the norms of substantive law were correctly applied and the circumstances relevant to the case were correctly established.”

“1. The marriage contract may be amended or dissolved at any time by an agreement between the spouses. The agreement on the amendment or on the dissolution of a marriage contract shall be made out in the same form as the marriage contract itself. A unilateral refusal to execute a marriage contract shall not be admissible. 2. Upon the claim of one of the spouses, the marriage contract may be amended or dissolved by a court decision on the grounds and in conformity with the procedure established by the Civil Code of the Russian Federation for the amendment and the dissolution of a marriage contract. 3. The operation of the marriage contract shall cease as from the moment of termination of the marriage (Article 25 of the present Code), with the exception of those obligations which are envisaged by the marriage contract for the period after the termination of the marriage.”

“Mr. Crookenden, in his courageous argument for the second defendant, has submitted that none of the judgments in those cases stresses the fact that the foreign law differed from our own; but there was no reason why they should. But for that fact, the judges would not have had the cases to consider or any question of public policy to decide. It is that fact which distinguishes those cases from the present case, because the law of New York must be assumed to allow undue influence as a defence to the agreements which the second defendant wants to argue are invalid; and, because he thinks he can do better defending the bank's claim in England, he has deliberately chosen not to argue that defence in the New York court, where it was available. But a defendant must take all available defences in a foreign court. The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in Ellis v. M'Henry (1871) L.R. 6 C.P. 228, 238, is old authority for this rule, and the judgment of Leggatt J. in Tracomin S.A. v. Sudan Oil Seeds Co. Ltd. (No. 2) (1983] 2 All E.R. 129 is a very recent illustration of it. In Ellis v. M'Henry, L.R. 6 C.P. 228, Bovill C.J., giving the judgment of the court which consisted of himself, Willes, Keating and Brett JJ., said, at p. 238: “The first action, however, is upon a judgment which was recovered after the deed was completed. In the view which we take of this case, the deed might have been set up as a defence to the action brought in Upper Canada; and it is averred, as a matter of fact, in the third replication, and not denied, that it might have been so pleaded. The question then arises, whether it can now be brought forward in the proceedings as an answer to the judgment. When a party having a defence omits to avail himself of it, or, having relied upon it, it is determined against him, and a judgment is thereupon given, he is not allowed afterwards to set up such matter of defence as an answer to the judgment, which is considered final and conclusive between the parties.”

“The court of first instance also found and the case file confirms that on 12.06.2017 Mr Timokhin transferred GBP 1,170,000 in monthly expenses for 36 months to Ms Timokhina in accordance with clause 5.1 of the prenuptial agreement. As mentioned above, pursuant to clause 5.1 of the prenuptial agreement, the amount of monthly expenses include all family expenses for all family members: mother, father, two children and is GBP 32,500 (GBP 8,125 per month (GBP 270.83 per day) for each family member). The enforceable court judgement in civil case o 2-857\2017 established that the actual marital relationship between the spouses had terminated since 18.07.2017; they did not live together and did not maintain a common household. Part 2 of Article 61 of the Civil Procedural Code of the Russian Federation stipulates that the circumstances established by an enforceable judgment in an earlier case are binding on the court. These circumstances shall not be proved again and shall not be challenged in another case involving the same persons. Accordingly, since 18.07.2017, Ms. Timokhina, who held money for the maintenance of all four family members in advance for three years, had not incurred any expenses for Mr. Timokhin's life and necessities, and the previously transferred amount had not been repaid by her. ln addition, since that date Ms. Timokhina had not incurred any expenses for the maintenance of her minor children. Based on an order of the Central Family Court of London dated 16.05.2018 in case ZC17P0064L [the text then identifies the two children] have resided with Mr Timokhin since 17.05.2018 to date which the parties have not disputed, and all child maintenance costs are borne by Mr Timokhin. (emphasis provided) In partially satisfying Mr Timokhin's claim for recovery of the money from Ms Timokhina, the court of the first instance had reasonably proceeded from the existence of a set of conditions for an obligation to arise out of unjust enrichment, which included: the existence of enrichment at the expense of another person and the absence of a legal ground for such enrichment. The judicial board also agrees with the submitted debt calculation, as does the court's conclusion to reject Mr Timokhin's claim to delete clause 5.2 and its reference in clause 5.3 from the prenuptial agreement dated 06.06.2017, as there is no legal ground for doing so.”

“1. A person who, without the grounds established by law, other legal acts or a transaction, acquired or saved property (the acquirer) at the expense of another person (the victim), is obliged to return to the latter the unreasonably acquired or saved property (unjust enrichment), except for the cases provided for in article 1109 of this Code. 2. The rules provided for in this chapter apply regardless of whether the unjust enrichment was the result of the behavior of the property’s acquirer, the victim himself, third parties, or occurred against their will.”

“the provisions on unjust enrichment are applicable insofar as the rules on the relevant contract and the contract itself do not provide otherwise. … the rules on unjust enrichment … are subsidiary in relation to the rules on the relevant contract.”

“Timokhina A.A. did not provide any confirmation of the expenditure of funds for general family needs in accordance with the procedure established by the agreement to the court and the defendant, as well as evidence of coordination of expenses with Timokhin A.V.”

“In accordance with the peculiarity of the subject of proof in cases of recovery of unjustified enrichment, the plaintiff is obliged to prove the fact that the defendant acquired (saved) property at the expense of the plaintiff and the absence of legal grounds for such enrichment, and the defendant is obliged to prove the existence of legitimate grounds for the acquisition (saving) of such property or the existence of circumstances in which unjustified enrichment in The force of the law is non-refundable.”

“2. In case if only part of the decision is appealed in the course of appeal proceedings, the court of appeal instance examines the legality and validity of the decision only in the appealed part. The court of appeal, in the interests of legality, has the right to examine the decision of the court of first instance in full.”

“Article 450. Grounds for amendment and termination of the contract 1. The amendment and termination of the contract is possible by agreement of the parties, unless otherwise provided by this Code, other laws or the contract. A multilateral contract, the execution of which is related to the implementation of entrepreneurial activities by all its parties, may provide for the possibility of changing or terminating of such a contract by agreement of both all and most of the persons participating in the said contract, unless otherwise established by law. The contract specified in this paragraph may provide for the procedure for determining such a majority. (paragraph was introduced by Federal Law No. 42-FZ dated 08.03.2015) 2. At the request of one of the parties, the contract may be amended or terminated by a court decision only: 1) in the event of a significant breach of contract by the other party; 2) in other cases stipulated by this Code, other laws or a contract. A violation of the contract by one of the parties is considered significant, which entails such damage to the other party that it is largely deprived of what it was entitled to expect when concluding the contract. … 4. A party to whom this Code, other laws, or a contract grants the right to unilaterally amend the contract must act in good faith and reasonably within the limits provided for by this Code, other laws, or the contract when exercising this right.”

“2. A party that has relied upon unreliable assurances of the counterparty, which are of major importance to it, has the right to demand compensation for losses or a penalty, and also has the right to withdraw from the contract, unless otherwise provided by the agreement of the parties.”

“The fact of giving false assurances at the conclusion of a marriage agreement regarding fairness, profitability, and the absence of circumstances preventing the spouse from concluding a marriage agreement on extremely unfavorable terms by Timokhina A.A. is not disputed. Under such circumstances, Timokhin A.V.'s argument that at the conclusion of the marriage agreement Timokhina A.A. gave her spouse false assurances should be recognized as justified.”

"Timokhina A.A., referring to the false assurances given by her at the conclusion of the marriage agreement, appealed to the court with a claim for recognition of the marriage agreement as an invalid transaction and the application of the consequences of its invalidity. This circumstance indicates the guilt of the spouse in giving false assurances and the absence of grounds for restricting the right of Timokhin A.V. to unilaterally withdraw from the agreement on the basis of Article 401 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation."

“Timokhin A.V. also stated that Timokhina A.A. had not fulfilled the obligation set out in paragraph 6.2 to faithfully fulfil her obligations under the agreement and refrain from causing any harm to the other spouse, including not spreading information discrediting the honor, dignity and/or business reputation of the other spouse. The case file contains the verdict of the Moscow District Court of St. Petersburg dated 05.09.2018 in case No. 1-632/18, which established that Timokhina A.A. admitted her guilt in committing a criminal offense in the form of transferring a bribe to an official. At the same time, Timokhina A.A. on 15.03.2018 appealed to an official of the OEB and IIK of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia in the Moscow district of St. Petersburg to file a crime report. At the same time, Timokhina A.A. explained that she needed to create difficulties for her husband Timokhin A.V. in carrying out his commercial activities, as well as put pressure on him in connection with lawsuits between them. Explanations on the above-mentioned criminal case were requested from the spouse.”

“Also, as evidence of the dissemination by the spouse of information discrediting his honor, dignity and reputation, Timokhin A.V. indicated the statements of Timokhina A.A. when considering the dispute on the invalidity of the marriage agreement in case N-2-2734/2020 about the commission by the spouse of intimidation, violence and threats against the spouse, which in the framework of the trial in case No. 2-2734/2020 has not been confirmed, which indicates the premeditation of Timokhina A.A.'s actions.”

“Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 3 dated 24.02.2005 “On judicial practice in cases of violation of the honor and dignity of citizens, as well as the business reputation of citizens and legal entities” clarified that the very fact of a citizen contacting the authorities with a statement in which he provides certain information (for example, to law enforcement agencies with a message about an alleged, in his opinion, or committed or impending crime) cannot serve as a basis for concluding that he abused his right, however, if the court established, that the appeal to these bodies had no grounds and was dictated not by the intention to fulfil one's civic duty or protect the rights and legally protected interests, but solely with the intention to harm another person, then there was an abuse of law (paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 10 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation).”

“In such circumstances, the court recognizes Timokhina A.A.'s failure to fulfil the obligations assumed on the basis of paragraph 6.2 of the marriage agreement.”

“Timokhin A.V. declared a partial refusal to perform the agreement, namely, he asks to exclude paragraph 5.2 from the agreement, or to change the amount of compensation established by paragraph 5.2 of the marriage agreement, reducing it to 100,000 pounds, as well as to refuse to collect a penalty or reduce the amount of the penalty established by paragraph 5.3 of the agreement due to its obvious disproportionality.”

“Having assessed the proportionality of Timokhina AA's liability for the violations committed by her, the court finds it reasonable and justified to amend paragraph 5.2 of the marriage agreement, namely, to reduce the amount of compensation established by paragraph of the marriage agreement to 900,000 pounds.”

“In paragraph 5.3 of the Marriage Agreement, the parties established that in case of violation by the spouse of the obligation to pay the amount of money specified in paragraph 5.2, the spouse pays the spouse a penalty in the amount of 0.1% of the amount owed for each day of delay (contractual penalty).”

“At the same time, the spouse undertook to pay the monetary payment established by clause 5.2 of the agreement according to the details provided by the spouse within 30 days from the date of divorce. Timokhina A.A. provided the details for the transfer of the payment on 09/23/2019, which was submitted to the case file by a letter dated 04.09.2019, which was received by Timokhin A.V. only on 23.09.2019. Based on the above, for the period from 24.09.2019, a penalty was accrued for the unfulfilled obligation of the spouse to pay 900,000 pounds sterling on the basis of clause 5.3 of the marriage agreement. At the hearing, the representative asked to collect a penalty from Timokhin A.V. for the period from 27.03.20l8 on 24.01.2023 before the actual fulfilment of obligations, reducing the amount of the penalty to 56,567,662,19 rubles. In this situation, the court considers that the penalty is subject to collection only from 24.09.2019 and until the day of the decision, which amounts to 768,600 pounds (900,000 pounds x 0.1% x 854 days). Timokhin A.V. filed a motion to reduce the amount of the penalty in accordance with Article 333 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. In accordance with Part 1 of Article 333 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, if the penalty payable is clearly disproportionate to the consequences of the violation of the obligation, the court has the right to reduce the penalty.” violation of the obligation, the court has the right to reduce the penalty.”

“Assessing the evidence presented by the parties, the court takes into account the defendant's argument that the amount of the claimed penalty is disproportionate to the violated obligation, whereas the penalty is a measure of responsibility for violating the fulfilment of obligations, is educational and punitive in nature for one party and at the same time compensatory (i.e. It is a means of compensating losses caused by violation of obligations) for the other party, and cannot be a way of enriching one of the parties, when determining the amount of the penalty, the court must proceed from observing the balance of interests of both parties. Taking into account the above circumstances, taking into account the provisions of Article 333 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the court considers it possible to reduce the total amount of the penalty to be collected to 50,000 pounds sterling.”

“Timokhina A.A., referring to the false assurances given by her at the conclusion of the marriage agreement, appealed to the court with a claim for recognition of the marriage agreement as an invalid transaction and the application of the consequences of its invalidity, which indicates the presence of her guilt in giving false assurances and the absence of grounds for limiting the right of Timokhin A.V. to unilaterally withdraw from the agreement according to the requirements of Article 401 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. The case materials also confirm Timokhina A.A.'s failure to fulfil the obligation set out in paragraph 6.2 to faithfully fulfil her obligations under the agreement and refrain from causing any harm to the other spouse, including not spreading information discrediting the honor, dignity and/or business reputation of the other spouse.”

“At the hearing, she explained that she needed to create difficulties for her husband Timokhin A.V. in carrying out his commercial activities, as well as put pressure on him in connection with the lawsuits between them. Explanations on the above-mentioned criminal case were requested from the spouse.”

“When considering the dispute on the invalidity of the marriage agreement in case No. 2-2734/2020, she also indicated that the spouse Timokhin A.V. had committed intimidation, violence and threats against her, which, was not proved in the framework of the trial in case No. 2-2734/2020, which also indicates the premeditation of Timokhina AA's actions.”

“Agreeing with the conclusions of the court of first instance in general, the judicial board, taking into account the proportionality of Timokhina A.A.'s responsibility for the above violations committed by her and taking into account proven guilt in her actions, considers it possible to reduce the amount recovered by the court of first instance to 500,000 pounds”

“The judicial board generally agrees with the conclusions of the court of first instance on the partial satisfaction of the claims of the parties, believes that during the consideration of the case by the court, the norms of substantive law were correctly applied and the circumstances relevant to the case were correctly established. At the same time, not agreeing with the court's decision regarding the reduction of the change in the amount of money specified in clause 5.2 of the marriage agreement, by virtue of the above-mentioned norms of civil legislation, the judicial board also does not agree with the conclusion of the court of first instance that it is impossible to offset the funds collected from the parties.”

“1. The exercise of civil rights solely with the intention of harming another person, actions circumventing the law for an unlawful purpose, as well as other deliberately unfair exercise of civil rights (abuse of law) are not allowed.”

“Taking into account the provisions of Article 10 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the actions of Timokhina A.A., who initially accepted performance under the contract and then filed a claim to challenge it, should be recognized as bad faith. A statement made in any form about the invalidity (voidability, contestability) of the transaction and the application of the consequences of the invalidity of the transaction (a claim filed with the court, the defendant’s objection to the claim, etc.) has no legal significance if the person referring to the invalidity acts in bad faith, in particular, if his behavior after the conclusion of the transaction gave other persons grounds to rely on the validity of the transaction.”

“The circumstances established by a court ruling that has entered into legal force in a previously considered case are binding on the court. These circumstances are not proved again and are not subject to dispute when considering another case involving the same persons, as well as in the cases provided for by this Code.”

“English Courts never investigate the propriety of the proceedings in the foreign Court, unless they offend against English views of substantial justice. There are obvious sound reasons for this approach. The Court accepts that different courts will proceed in different ways, and it would be both arrogant and wrong to proceed on the basis that if the same result is not achieved in a foreign court something must have gone wrong.”

“The validity of the marriage contract is terminated from the moment of termination of the marriage (Article 25 of the present Code), with the exception of those obligations that are provided for in the marriage contract for the period after the termination of the marriage.”

“Contrary to the arguments of the cassation appeal, the courts had grounds for changing the marriage agreement. … As established by the courts and follows from the case materials, paragraph 6.2 of the marriage agreement the parties established an obligation to faithfully fulfil their obligations under the agreement and refrain from causing any harm to the other spouse.”

“This circumstance, related to the commission of a crime by Timokhina A.A., with the aim of harming her former spouse, is significant, allows us to believe that if Timokhin A.V. had known about it at the conclusion of the agreement, the terms of the agreement for the payment of 1,000,000 pounds sterling would not have been included in the agreement. The arguments of the cassation complaint that changes to the marriage agreement cannot be made after the termination of the marriage are based on the applicant's misinterpretation of the norms of substantive law.”

“The marriage agreement is terminated from the moment of termination of the marriage (paragraph 3 of Article 43 of the Family Code of the Russian Federation), with the exception of those obligations provided for in the marriage agreement for the period after the termination of the marriage.”

“As follows from the materials of the case, Timokhin A.V. in the framework of this case filed a request to amend paragraph 5.2 of the marriage agreement, which was reviewed by the court and satisfied. The arguments of the cassation appeal on the unjustified application by the courts of provisions 333 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation contradict the content of the appealed court decisions, in which the courts applied the appropriate motives and conclusions on the reduction of the penalty. The judicial board finds no grounds to disagree with them. … Contrary to the arguments of the cassation appeal, the courts duly established and assessed the factual circumstances of the case, referred to the norms of law to be applied, as a result of which they made reasonable conclusions.”

“The very fact of the existence of such a violation by virtue of Article 450 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation cannot serve as a basis for termination of the contract. Contrary to this provision of the law, the court based the argument about a material breach of the contract only on the fact of the defendant’s failure to perform the contract and did not refer to any other circumstances evidencing a material breach of the terms of the contract by the defendant. The plaintiff did not refer to them and did not provide relevant evidence in this regard, as required by Article 50 of the Civil Procedure Code of the RSFSR.”

“It follows from the concept of a material breach of a contract by one of the parties contained in Clause 2 of Article 450 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (a breach of the contract by one of the parties is recognized as material, which entails such damage to the other party that it is largely deprived of what it was entitled to expect when entering into the contract), that the party filing a claim with the court for termination of the contract on this ground, must provide evidence confirming this particular nature of the violation. Meanwhile, the plaintiff did not provide the court with any evidence of causing significant damage within the meaning of Clause 2 of Article 450 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, as required by Part 1 of Article 56 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation…”

“When assessing the materiality of the violation, it is necessary to assess the entire range of circumstances, trying to measure such a radical sanction as termination of the contract with the consequences and nature of the violation and to find the most fair solution. In particular, the amount of losses is taken into account; objective loss of interest in the actual performance of the contract; unfair and intentional nature of the breach of contract”

“acting intentionally, for the purpose of giving a bribe to an official on a large scale - to the senior investigator of the Department of economic security and counteraction to corruption of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia in Moskovskiy district of St. Petersburg … … knowing public danger and illegal nature of her actions, whereof she, Timokhina A. A., was warned by the above police officer, personally handed to Budnevich D. M., i.e. an official, a bribe in the form of money in the amount of 10,000 USD that in accordance with the exchange rate of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation on 27.04.2018 was equivalent to 626,027 rubies, i.e. in a large size, who took part in the criminal intelligence and surveillance operation “sting operation”, put the above amount on the desk of Budnevich D. M., located in the specified office …”

“In the course of personal conversation Timokhina A. A. also explained that she needs to create difficulties for her husband in the implementation of his commercial activities as well as to put pressure on him in connection with the trial between them, taking place in the UK.”

“In assessing the evidence, the court proceeds from the fact that none of the evidence given - nor the testimony of witnesses Budnevich D.M.1 Timokhin A.V., Khvorov E.N.. Gasanov R.N., Sokolov A.L., Kudryavtseva B.A., Mukuchyan A.V., nor any other evidence given above and laid in the basis of the verdict, do not have a pre-determined force in themselves, but in their totally, confirming and supplementing each other, testify to the guilt of the defendant Timokhina A.A. in the commission of the crime that she is charged with.”

“Under such circumstances, the defendant Timokhina A.A. the court considers established and proved, and qualifies its actions under item “b” of m.4 st.291 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - as giving bribes to an official personally in large scale.”

“…the relevance of the existence of the remedy and the weight to be attached to it must depend upon factors which include the nature of the procedural defect itself, the point in the proceedings at which it occurred and the knowledge and means of knowledge of the defendants of the defect and the reasonableness in the circumstances of requiring or expecting that they made use of the remedy in all the particular circumstances.”

“taking into account the proportionality of Timokhina A.A.'s responsibility for the above violations committed by her and taking into account proven guilt in her actions.”

“Contrary to the arguments of the cassation appeal, the rules of interpretation of the agreement established by Article 431 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation have been observed by the courts, and cannot be re-litigated now by way of further appeal.”

“A penalty in this sense normally means a sum payable to the State, and not to a private claimant”

“In terms of the mother’s evidence the court has not been able to hear the mother’s oral evidence. There is clear evidence, however, of the mother endeavoring to mislead the court. The mother knew the passports were in the safe at Harrods but did not come out and say so, merely saying that only she could access them. That was a lack of candour, even more concerning is the situation in relation to the St Kitts Nevis registration documents and [the son’s] original birth certificates. All these documents were in the Harrod’s safe box. Yet the mother made an application on 28 September 2017 for delivery up of original birth certificates and St Kitts and Nevis citizenship documents. In her statement she explains in detail how the father came to hold the documents and suggests they may be used to obtain travel documents and remove the children from her care. This was not spur of the moment lying but calculated deceit.”

“On 14 May 2018 the High Court in this jurisdiction made an order requiring the mother to produce the children’s passports. The mother failed to produce the passports, the mother contending that the father was in possession of, and withholding the children’s passports and also their St Kitts registration documents and original birth certificates. On 5 June 2018 Hayden J made an order requiring the mother’s safety deposit box at Harrods to be opened. The children’s passports, St Kitts registration documents, and [the son’s] original birth certificate were discovered in the mother’s safety deposit box. Within the context of the present proceedings, the father relies on these facts as evidence that the mother has sought, and continues to seek, to mislead and manipulate this court.”

“4. The motivational part of the court's decision must specify: 1) the factual and other circumstances of the case established by the court; 2) the court's conclusions arising from the circumstances of the case established by it, the evidence on which the court's conclusions about the circumstances of the case and the arguments in favor of the decision are based, the reasons why the court rejected certain evidence, accepted or rejected the arguments of the persons involved in the case in support of their claims and objections; 3) the laws and other normative legal acts that guided the court in making the decision, and the reasons why the court did not apply the laws and other normative legal acts referred to by the persons involved in the case.”

“The arguments put forward in the cassation appeal cannot be recognised as grounds for annulling the court judgments in this case, since they are based on an incorrect interpretation of both substantive and procedural law.”

“2.1. Recognition and enforcement of the Russian Decisions (as to the meaning, effect and operation of the post-nuptial agreement (“PNA”) between the parties dated 6.6.17 including the net award of substantial sums to the Claimant) would be contrary to and/or subvert and/or interfere with mandatory English law principles and/or public policy as to the treatment and legal effect of PNAs (as stated by the UK Supreme Court in Radmacher v Granatino [2011] 1 AC 534; [2010] UKSC 422). The effect of such principles and/or public policy is that in English matrimonial proceedings, the Court is the ultimate arbiter of whether and to what extent the terms of a PNA should be upheld, applying the principle that “the court should give effect to a [PNA] that is freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement.” (para. 75 in Radmacher v Granatino) Those principles and public policy apply not only in English ancillary relief proceedings concerning financial claims between ex spouses following divorce pursuant to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, but also in other family law proceedings including under Part III of the Matrimonial & Family Proceedings Act 1984, in which any question is raised as to the legal effect and enforceability of a PNA. 2.2. The Russian Decisions were pronounced without consideration of whether the PNA had been “freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications” and without consideration of whether it would be “fair to hold the parties to their agreement” in the PNA. In any event, the question of whether the PNA had been so freely entered into, and whether it would be fair to hold the parties to it, is one which is exclusively for the English Family Courts. 2.3. Therefore, the English Court should not give direct legal effect and operation to the Russian Decisions.”

“I confirm that we agree to a dismissal of my client's petition. That dismissal will be by consent and the correct order is no order as to costs. I enclose an amended order in tracked changes and also a clean version which I have signed. I have also signed the joint letter to court. Please countersign and lodge both documents with the court, copying in this firm.”

“The mother seeks an urgent hearing to consider her application for the father's application for financial orders pursuant to Schedule 1 be struck out and/or summarily dismissed and/or stayed pending the outcome of the on-going financial proceedings between the parties in Russia. A draft order is enclosed containing proposed case management directions to determine the mother's application.”

“Potentially the Court in Russia could make various orders relating to the division of the matrimonial assets. It is the mother's position that this court should not entertain the father's application. First, it has no jurisdiction to make the order sought in relation to the mother's property under schedule 1 of the Children Act. Secondly, the father has vast wealth and no need for any financial order against the mother whose resources are far more limited. Thirdly, the Court in Russia is seized with matters relating to: (i) The post nuptial agreement and its enforceability in terms of payments agreed to be made and whether these should reduced to reflect the father’s care of the children since July 2018; (ii) The validity of the post nuptial agreement and the possible re-opening of the division of the matrimonial assets (which include the mother’s property in London).” (i) The post nuptial agreement and its enforceability in terms of payments agreed to be made and whether these should reduced to reflect the father’s care of the children since July 2018; (ii) The validity of the post nuptial agreement and the possible re-opening of the division of the matrimonial assets (which include the mother’s property in London).”

“That stay was put in place “until such time as the Russian litigation is concluded including the determination of any appeal or appeals by either party from decisions made in that litigation.””

“71. “Public policy” as referred to in section 103(3) of the Arbitration Act means the public policy of England and Wales (as the country in which enforcement is sought) in maintaining the fair and orderly administration of justice. The classic formulation as to what is seen as contrary to public policy is “contrary to the fundamental conceptions of morality and justice” of the forum. IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd v Nigerian National Petroleum Corp [2005] EWHC 726 (Comm); [2005] 1 CLC 613 [13]; Deutsche Schachtbau- understanding Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co [1987] 3 WLR 1023, 1035.”

“where a husband obtained a decree of divorce from a Russian court in defiance of an order that no step be taken in those proceedings until after the hearing of a matrimonial matter before the English court, the Court of Appeal held in Golubovich v Golubovich that the statutory obligation [Family Law Act 1986, s.53(1)(c)] to recognise the divorce prevailed over the contention that the wrongful behaviour of the husband meant that recognition would be manifestly contrary to public policy.”

“The easy but unreal examples of when recognition of a foreign judgment would offend English public policy are an order to pay damages for breach of a contract to kidnap, or to sell narcotics, or those based on racist or similarly disgraceful laws. … Where the judgment, or the cause of action on which it was based, appears to be the product of bribery or other corrupt practice, it is pretty clear that public policy should refuse recognition, for the public policy against such depravity is universal, not mere local idiosyncrasy. … it is, after all, hard to believe that a judgment ordering damages for breach of a contract to smuggle alcohol, pornography, religious tracts, narcotics, or weaponry, into a foreign country which prohibits such imports would be recognised or enforced at common law.”

“16 Duty of the court to consider whether England and Wales is appropriate venue for application. (1) ... Before making an order for financial relief the court shall consider whether in all the circumstances of the case it would be appropriate for such an order to be made by a court in England and Wales, and if the court is not satisfied that it would be appropriate, the court shall dismiss the application.” (1) ... Before making an order for financial relief the court shall consider whether in all the circumstances of the case it would be appropriate for such an order to be made by a court in England and Wales, and if the court is not satisfied that it would be appropriate, the court shall dismiss the application.”

“131. The issue in this case is simple: what weight should the court hearing a claim for ancillary relief under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 give to an agreement entered into between the parties before they got married which purported to determine the result?”

“75. White v White and Miller v Miller establish that the overriding criterion to be applied in ancillary relief proceedings is that of fairness and identify the three strands of need, compensation and sharing that are relevant to the question of what is fair. If an ante-nuptial agreement deals with those matters in a way that the court might adopt absent such an agreement, there is no problem about giving effect to the agreement. The problem arises where the agreement makes provisions that conflict with what the court would otherwise consider to be the requirements of fairness. The fact of the agreement is capable of altering what is fair. It is an important factor to be weighed in the balance. We would advance the following proposition, to be applied in the case of both ante- and post-nuptial agreements, in preference to that suggested by the Board in MacLeod: “The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement.””

“78. The reason why the court should give weight to a nuptial agreement is that there should be respect for individual autonomy. The court should accord respect to the decision of a married couple as to the manner in which their financial affairs should be regulated. It would be paternalistic and patronising to override their agreement simply on the basis that the court knows best. This is particularly true where the parties’ agreement addresses existing circumstances and not merely the contingencies of an uncertain future.”

“79. Often parties to a marriage will be motivated in concluding a nuptial agreement by a wish to make provision for existing property owned by one or other, or property that one or other anticipates receiving from a third party. The House of Lords in White v White and Miller v Miller drew a distinction between such property and matrimonial property accumulated in the course of the marriage. That distinction is particularly significant where the parties make express agreement as to the disposal of such property in the event of the termination of the marriage. There is nothing inherently unfair in such an agreement and there may be good objective justification for it, such as obligations towards existing family members.”

“83. So far as concerns the general approach of the court to ante-nuptial agreements, Wilson LJ at para 130 endorsed the following comments of Baron J at first instance 111. I am certain that English courts are now much more ready to attribute the appropriate (and, in the right case, decisive) weight to an agreement as part of ‘all the circumstances of case’ [within the meaning of section 25(1) of the Act of 1973] … 119. Upon divorce, when a party is seeking quantification of a claim for financial relief, it is the court that determines the result after applying the Act. The court grants the award and formulates the order with the parties’ agreement being but one factor in the process and perhaps, in the right case, it being the most compelling factor …”

“1. When a court grants a decree of divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation it has the power to order ancillary relief. Ancillary relief governs the financial arrangements between the husband and the wife on the breakdown of their marriage. Sometimes the husband and wife have already made an agreement governing these matters. The agreement may have been made before the marriage (“an ante-nuptial agreement”) or after the marriage (“a post-nuptial agreement”). Post-nuptial agreements may be made when the husband and wife are still together and intend to remain together, or when they are on the point of separating or have already separated. The latter type of post-nuptial agreement can be described as “a separation agreement”

“7. There can be no question of this Court altering the principle that it is the Court, and not any prior agreement between the parties, that will determine the appropriate ancillary relief when a marriage comes to an end, for that principle is embodied in the legislation. What the Court can do is to attempt to give some assistance in relation to the approach that a court considering ancillary relief should adopt towards an ante-nuptial agreement between the parties. … 22. The principles to be applied to the grant of ancillary relief have twice been considered by the House of Lords, in cases involving substantial assets.”

“28. The implications of these two decisions were considered by the Court of Appeal, Sir Mark Potter P, Thorpe and Wilson LJJ in Charman v Charman (No 4) [2007] EWCA Civ 503; [2007] 1 FLR 1246. The court observed that in Miller the House had unanimously identified three main principles which governed distribution of property in ancillary relief proceedings – “need (generously interpreted), compensation and sharing” and that each of the matters set out in sub-paragraphs (b) to (h) of section 25(2) of the 1973 Act could be assigned to one of the three (paras 68-69). 37. Although separation agreements do not override the powers of the Court to grant ancillary relief, they have been held to carry considerable weight in relation to the exercise of the court’s discretion when granting such relief.” 43. Judges sitting in the Family Division were prepared to give some weight to ante-nuptial agreements, but certainly not to the extent of holding that they should govern the terms of ancillary relief unless there were strong reasons for departing from them. 62. Is it important whether or not post-nuptial or ante-nuptial agreements have contractual status? The value of a contract is that the court will enforce it. But in ancillary relief proceedings the court is not bound to give effect to nuptial agreements, and is bound to have regard to them, whether or not they are contracts. 63. In summary, we consider that the Board in MacLeod was wrong to hold that post-nuptial agreements were contracts but that ante-nuptial agreements were not. That question did not arise for decision in that case any more than in this and does not matter anyway. It is a red herring. Regardless of whether one or both are contracts, the ancillary relief court should apply the same principles when considering ante-nuptial agreements as it applies to post-nuptial agreements. 72. …We have already explained why we do not consider it material in English ancillary relief proceedings whether the nuptial agreement under consideration is or is not a contract. The court can overrule the agreement of the parties, whether contractual or not, and applies the same criteria when considering whether to do so.”

“128. Like Lady Hale, para 138 (1) and (2) and para 156, I go no further and express no view on the binding or other nature of an ante-nuptial agreement. It is not difficult to envisage circumstances in which, if such an agreement were to be regarded as having contractual force, its enforcement could be sought before a court, particularly an overseas court, lacking the jurisdiction under Part II of the 1973 Act which applies only when the forum is an English divorce court.”

“(4) I disagree with the way in which the majority have formulated the test to be applied by a court hearing an application for financial relief, which I believe to be an impermissible gloss upon the courts’ statutory duties. However, I agree that the court must consider the agreement in the light of the circumstances as they now exist and that the way the matter was put by the Privy Council in MacLeod v MacLeod [2008] UKPC 64, [2010] 1 AC 298, was too rigid, and in some cases, too strong; and I broadly agree with the majority upon the relevant considerations which the court should take into account.”

“… the broader question which is before us now: what is the weight to be given to an agreement between a husband and a wife as to the financial consequences of their separation or divorce by a court which is invited to make orders about it?”

“(4) However, the court has power to vary the financial arrangements for their separation, made in agreements between husbands and wives, under sections 35 and 36 of the 1973 Act. (5) None of these agreements can oust the jurisdiction of the court to make financial orders should the parties separate or divorce. (6) Even if the parties have agreed what the court’s order should be, the order derives its authority from the court and not from the parties’ agreement. (7) The court therefore has its own independent duty to check the arrangements agreed between the parties and to evaluate them in the light of its statutory duties under section 25 of the 1973 Act.”

“2. A court when considering the grant of ancillary relief is not obliged to give effect to nuptial agreements – whether they are ante-nuptial or post-nuptial. The parties cannot, by agreement, oust the jurisdiction of the court. The court must, however, give appropriate weight to such an agreement. This appeal raises the question of the principles to be applied by the court when considering the weight that should be attached to an ante-nuptial agreement.”

“6.3. Each of the Parties confirms that he/she possesses all necessary information on all circumstances which are required to enter into this Contract. Each of the Parties confirms that the other Party has provided he/she with all requested and necessary information on the said circumstances. 6.3.1 The Wife assures and confirms that she has received all necessary and exhaustive advice, as well as qualified explanations as to the text and the content of this Contract from lawyers and solicitors under the RF laws, as well as under the laws of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland within the territory of corresponding states. 6.4. The Parties acknowledge that the terms of this Contract are fair and mutually beneficial, and do not derogate the rights and lawful interests of either of the Parties. Each of the Parties confirms that the terms of this Contract for each of the Parties necessary conditions of life, as well do not violate the rights and lawful interests of the children. 6.5. The Parties confirm, before the notary, that they are not limited in their capacity, are not under trusteeship, guardianship, or custodial care, that they, by their state of health, are able to exercise their rights and to perform their duties independently, that they do not suffer any diseases which prevent from awareness of the essence of the Contract signed and the circumstance of entering into thereof, that the Parties have no circumstances which compel them to enter into this Contract on the terms highly disadvantageous for them.”

“32. In Hyman v Hyman the husband had left the wife for another woman. Adultery by the husband was not at the time a ground for divorce unless there were aggravating circumstances, such as incest. The parties had entered into a deed of separation under which the husband had paid two lump sums and agreed to make weekly payments of £20 for the life of the wife. The deed included a covenant by the wife that she would not institute any proceedings to make him pay more than this. When the Matrimonial Causes Act 1923 gave the wife the right to petition for divorce on the grounds of her husband’s adultery alone, the wife divorced her husband and applied to the court for maintenance pursuant to section 190(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925. This gave the court the power, on any decree for divorce, to order the husband to pay maintenance. The husband argued that the wife was precluded by her covenant from bringing this claim. The House rejected this argument. Lord Hailsham LC held at p 614 that: “the power of the court to make provision for a wife on the dissolution of her marriage is a necessary incident of the power to decree such a dissolution, conferred not merely in the interests of the wife, but of the public, and that the wife cannot by her own covenant preclude herself from invoking the jurisdiction of the court or preclude the court from the exercise of that jurisdiction.”” “the power of the court to make provision for a wife on the dissolution of her marriage is a necessary incident of the power to decree such a dissolution, conferred not merely in the interests of the wife, but of the public, and that the wife cannot by her own covenant preclude herself from invoking the jurisdiction of the court or preclude the court from the exercise of that jurisdiction.””

“… where a consumer contract has a close connection with the UK, the consumer rights issues that fall under the scope of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 should be dealt with under that UK statute rather than any foreign law.”

“Part of the purpose of s 71 itself is so that decisions on consumer rights are made in public. They may have precedential value. The decisions are not only for the benefit of the individual consumer in the instant case but for the benefit of the consumers as a class (see Oce´ano Grupo Editorial SA v Roccio´ Murciano Quintero (Joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98) EU:C:2000:346, [2000] ECR I-4941, [2002] 1 CMLR 1226 (at para 28)).”

“The proper approach 71 To take up some of the points made in the preceding paragraphs, the proper approach to Part III simply depends on a careful application of sections 16, 17 and 18 in the light of the legislative purpose, which was the alleviation of the adverse consequences of no, or no adequate, financial provision being made by a foreign court in a situation where there were substantial connections with England. There are two, interrelated, duties of the court before making an order under Part III. The first is to consider whether England and Wales is the appropriate venue for the application: section 16(1). The second is to consider whether an order should be made under section 17 having regard to the matters in section 18. There are two reasons why the duties are interrelated. First, neither section 16(2) nor section 18(2)(3) refers to an exhaustive list of matters to be taken into account. Section 16(1) directs the court to have regard to “all the circumstances of the case” and section 16(2) refers the court to certain matters “in particular”

“47. Whilst the proper application of the Agbaje principles is not always straight forward, it is clear for the purposes of the present case that: i) The legislative purpose is to alleviate the adverse consequence of no, or no adequate financial provision having been made by a foreign court in a situation.”

“that Part III of the 1984 Act cannot be deployed to top up a foreign award in order to make it equate to an English award (see Zimin at [47(iii)]) – a reference to Lord Collins’ judgment in Agbaje at [65] and [70].”

“Suffice it to say that I am content to decide this case on the simple basis that the courts of this country are not compelled to recognise the decree of the court of another country when it offends against our ideas of justice.”

“Add to this that such a decree is pronounced in favour of a husband who deserted her and his children and has left them to be supported by the taxpayer in this country, save for a few shillings a week he has condescended to pay for one only of his three children. A case more clamant for the exercise of a just discretion could hardly be conceived, and on that ground I would disregard the Maltese decree.”

“In that era our courts not infrequently refused to recognise a foreign decree pronounced in a jurisdiction in which the respondent wife would have scant right to ancillary relief. This problem was considered by the Law Commission in its report Financial Relief After Foreign Divorce (Law Com. No. 117).”

“It is difficult to predict whether the decision in Joyce v Joyce and O’Hare will encourage parties to invite the courts to refuse recognition of foreign divorces not for lack of jurisdiction but because of considerations of public policy. The courts have in the past been reluctant to refuse recognition on such grounds as can be seen from cases such as Hack v Hack and Newmarch v Newmarch. Furthermore the speech of Lord Scarman in Quazi v Quazi suggests that he would not favour such a development: “1. The trial judge considered that the facts of the case did not justify him in refusing recognition. It was a matter for his discretion….. Even if I might have exercised the discretion differently it would be wrong to interfere; but, in truth, I think he was right.”

“53. This highly significant statutory power had a fundamental impact on the flow of cases in which refusal of recognition of a foreign divorce was sought.”

“… [if] the only reason for the husband’s going to Kashmir for his divorce was to obtain the collateral advantage of preventing the wife from obtaining financial relief to which she would be entitled under an English divorce, then in my judgment, the recognition of such a divorce would be manifestly contrary to public policy. (I note, in passing, that because of the recent change in the law, it would not now be possible for the husband to obtain such a collateral advantage, even without recourse to the doctrine of public policy.”

“What I have to look at is the decree which was pronounced in Pakistan. It would be contrary to public policy to recognise it, according to Choudhary, if both the motive and the effect were to deprive the pursuer of her rights in Scotland. That however is not the position because her rights are preserved under section 28 of the 1984 Act. There can therefore, in my view, be no public policy objection to written recognition of this divorce based on deprivation of the pursuer’s financial rights. As I understood the submission made to me, it was only on the basis that she would be deprived of such rights that it was argued that there was a public policy objection to recognition.”

“The recognition of the Moscow decree does not deprive the wife of her claims to financial relief in this jurisdiction. Plainly, given the history, the grant of leave under section 13 of Part III would be a foregone conclusion. The court’s jurisdiction is not dependent on the wife’s presence. Her application is well founded under section 15(1)(b) and or (c). Some of the provisions of section 16(2) would need to be carefully thought through. The wife clearly has a right of application in Moscow.”

“12 Applications for financial relief after overseas divorce etc. (1) Where— (a) a marriage has been dissolved or annulled, or the parties to a marriage have been legally separated, by means of judicial or other proceedings in an overseas country, and (b) the divorce, annulment or legal separation is entitled to be recognised as valid in England and Wales, either party to the marriage may apply to the court in the manner prescribed by rules of court for an order for financial relief under this Part of this Act.”

“Returning to a point made earlier, about the need to balance competing public policies within English law, it is also arguable that English public policy works differently according to whether the court was one to whose jurisdiction the parties had agreed in advance to submit. As there is a strong, legislated, public policy in favour of giving effect to jurisdiction (and arbitration) agreements, it would not be unprincipled for a court, called upon to find that recognition of a judgment would be contrary to English public policy, to say that a countervailing public policy of upholding jurisdiction agreements overrides the objection raised. It all depends on how the balance is struck, and that will be a fact- and case-sensitive issue.”

“19-154 It was thought at one time that the public policy ground might be successfully invoked where a husband ordinarily resident in England obtained a divorce abroad (perhaps a talak, where the wife would have few if any procedural rights) in an attempt to avoid financial or other consequences attaching to a divorce obtained in England. It is now recognised that the enactment of Pt III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 prevents there being any public policy issue so far as financial consequences are concerned.”

“As follows from the marriage contract, Timokhina A.A. in June 2017 received, under the marriage contract, monetary funds in the amount of 3,742,000 pounds sterling in one payment, an apartment of 189.3 square meters and a garage in St. Petersburg, an apartment of 294.4 square meters in London, paintings, design and interior items, a collection of jewellery, and various movable property. Under these circumstances, the court rejects the plaintiff’s argument that the terms of the marriage contract placed the spouse at an extremely unfavorable position.”

“Under such circumstances, the court cannot agree that the spouse's announcement of his intention to apply to the court with claims for divorce, division of property, determination of the place of residence of children, as well as his performance of this lawful action, can be regarded as a threat to the plaintiff with the aim of forcing her to conclude the disputed marriage contract. Evidence of the existence of any other real, significant and feasible threats as a result of which the plaintiff was forced to enter into the disputed marriage contract contrary to her wishes, is not presented. Based on the above, the court agrees with the defendant's arguments regarding the absence of coercion/duress of the plaintiff to enter into the disputed marriage contract, either by the defendant himself or by other persons. Based on the fact that the facts of coercion/duress of the plaintiff to enter into a marriage contract through violence and threats have not been confirmed, the plaintiff's arguments about their ongoing nature are also subject to rejection. Taking into account the above, the court comes to the conclusion that, when concluding the disputed agreement, Timokhina A.A. acted at her own discretion, of her own will and in her own interests, and was free to choose the subject and terms of the agreement. The agreement was signed personally by Timokhina A.A. and certified by a notary.”

“By virtue of paragraphs 2 and 5 of Article 166 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, a statement on the invalidity of a transaction has no legal significance if the person referring to the invalidity of the transaction acts in bad faith, in particular, if his behavior after the conclusion of the transaction gave grounds for other persons to rely on the validity of the transaction. A party whose behavior indicates its will to maintain the validity of the transaction does not have the right to challenge the transaction on the grounds of which this party knew or should have known when expressing its will. As follows from the case materials, when concluding the contract and in the process of subsequent legal relations of the parties within the framework of the disputed contract, the plaintiff did not declare the existence of obstacles to the execution of the contract, did not indicate its invalidity on the grounds stated in court. In addition, Timokhina A.A. actively used the property received under the marriage contract, insisted on its validity when considering case No. 2-4463/2018 of the Petrogradskiy District Court of St. Petersburg on the claim of Timokhin A.V. against Timokhina A.A. on the recognition of clause 5.2 of the marriage contract as invalid, where the claims were denied, as well as when considering case No.2-5117/2019 of the Vsevolozhskiy City Court of the Leningrad Region on the claim of Timokhina A.A. to Timokhin A.V. for the recovery of funds under a marriage contract, where the claims of Timokhina A.A. were satisfied. Thus, the actions of Timokhina A.A. testify to the approval of the transaction, the presence of an expression of will to execute and preserve the force of the marriage contract, which gave the defendant grounds to rely on its validity. A party to a transaction, from whose behavior it is evident the will to preserve the force of a voidable transaction, has no right to challenge this transaction on the basis of which this party knew or should have known when it expressed the will to preserve the transaction. Taking into account the provisions of Article 10 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the actions of Timokhina A.A., who initially accepted performance under the contract and then filed a claim to challenge it, should be recognized as bad faith. A statement made in any form about the invalidity (voidability, contestability) of the transaction and the application of the consequences of the invalidity of the transaction (a claim filed with the court, the defendant’s objection to the claim, etc.) has no legal significance if the person referring to the invalidity acts in bad faith, in particular, if his behavior after the conclusion of the transaction gave other persons grounds to rely on the validity of the transaction.”

“By the ruling of the Judicial Board for Civil Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated 27.09.2022, Timokhin A.V.'s cassation appeal against the ruling of the Third Cassation Court of General Jurisdiction dated 12.07.2021 was satisfied, and the ruling of the Third Cassation Court of General Jurisdiction dated 12.07.2021 was cancelled, and the decision of the Vsevolozhsky City Court of the Leningrad Region dated 15.07.2020 and the appeal ruling of the Leningrad Regional Court dated 24.02.2021 were upheld.”

“40. First, this is not a question of enforcing a contract. It is a question of enforcing a judgment given by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction. The two are not the same: Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation SA v Hilmarton Ltd [1999] 2 Ll Rep 222, 224. There are sound justifications for taking a different approach to substantive claims and enforcement claims, reflecting the different role performed by the court in each circumstance: RBRG Trading (UK) Ltd v Sinocore International Co Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 838 [“RBRG”]; [2018] 1 CLC 874 [26](3). The judgment of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction creates an obligation to pay the judgment sum enforceable in this jurisdiction as a debt, irrespective of the underlying cause of action: Williams v Jones (1845) 13 M & W 628, 633; Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433, 513. It is common ground that the Dubai court was such a court.”

“What is the argument on the other side? Only this, that no case has been found in which it has been done before. That argument does not appeal to me in the least. If we never do anything which has not been done before, we shall never get anywhere. The law will stand still whilst the rest of the world goes on; and that will be bad for both.”

“…judges themselves have a legitimate law-making function. It is a function they have long exercised. In common law countries much of the basic law is still the common law. The common law is judge-made law. For centuries judges have been charged with the responsibility of keeping this law abreast of current social conditions and expectations. That is still the position. Continuing but limited development of the common law in this fashion is an integral part of the constitutional function of the judiciary. Had the judges not discharged this responsibility the common law would be the same now as it was in the reign of King Henry II. It is because of this that ‘the common law is a living system of law, reacting to new events and new ideas, and so capable of providing the citizens of this country with a system of practical justice relevant to the times in which they live’: see Lord Goff of Chieveley in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349, 377.”

“When a court grants a decree of divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation it has the power to order ancillary relief. Ancillary relief governs the financial arrangements between the husband and the wife on the breakdown of their marriage.”

“To a similar effect is the next case Re Macartney [1921] 1 Ch 522 at pp.527-528 Astbury J held that this passage ‘applies directly to the non-enforceability of foreign judgments founded on contracts contrary to public policy or rights of that character.’”

“In Rousillon v. Rousillon it was held that “If an agreement contrary to the policy of the English law is entered into in a country by the law of which it is valid, an English Court will not enforce it” and Fry J. said “[counsel] has insisted that, even if the contract was void by the law of England as against public policy, yet, inasmuch as the contract was made in France, it must be good here, because the law of France knows no such principle as that by which unreasonable contracts in restraint of trade are held to be void in this country. It appears to me, however, plain on general principles that this Court will not enforce a contract against the public policy of this country, wherever it may be made. It seems to me almost absurd to suppose that the Courts of this country should enforce a contract which they consider to be against public policy simply because it happens to have been made somewhere else.”

“First, the power in question is a power to prevent misuse of the court's procedure. It follows that the power cannot be exercised if the claimant is making proper use of the civil jurisdiction of the court to protect his rights. Secondly, the court's procedure must be being misused in a way which would be "manifestly unfair" to one or more of the parties or would otherwise "bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people.”

“Secondly, we consider a transfer to the Family Division to consider the matter to be eminently sensible; the Family Division has knowledge and history of the litigation and issues between these parties including relating to the post nuptial agreement. In fact we are bemused by your objection to a transfer. However, the last thing that our client wishes to do is to waste court time or incur unnecessary costs and if the position is that your client, for whatever reason, resists such transfer, then our client is content for the Part 8 Claim to be determined by a judge of the King’s Bench Division to avoid the need for a hearing on the issue. If and to the extent that the case is determined by such a judge and questions arise as to why your client was resistant to a transfer to the Family Division, then we will refer to this letter. We look forward to hearing from you further in this regard.”