“[The injunction] applies to all of the Defendant’s assets … whether or not they are in his own name and whether they are solely or jointly owned and whether the Defendant is interested in them legally, beneficially or otherwise or if they are controlled by him directly or indirectly. For the purposes of this Order, the Defendant’s assets include any asset which he has the power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of or to deal with or control as if it were his own. The Defendant is to be regarded as having such power if a third party holds or controls the asset in accordance with his direct or indirect instruction”
“… If, say, the “unless” order required a person or company to pay a sum of money, and the court subsequently refused relief from sanctions when the money remained unpaid, the payment of money thereafter might be capable of constituting a material change of circumstances, provided that it was accompanied by other facts. For instance, if the late payment was explained by the individual having inherited a sum of money subsequent to the hearing of the first application which enabled him to pay; or if the company had gone into liquidation since the hearing of the first application and, unlike the directors, the liquidator was now able to raise the money. These are merely possible examples, and I am far from saying that such events would always constitute a material change of circumstances, or, even if they did, that they would justify a second application for relief from sanctions...”
“161. Authority aside, it seems to me that it may, in principle, amount to an abuse of process for a party to seek to reopen an interlocutory order on the basis of treating as a material change of circumstances a development that is wholly within that party’s own control. Ex hypothesi, if the matter is within that party’s control, it is a change they could have chosen to effect before the order was first made. Otherwise a party could test its position on one set of facts, and then, if unsuccessful, subject the other party to a series of further interlocutory hearings to see whether it can arrive at a more favourable result on variants of those facts, all of which were within its own power to bring about at the outset, had it so chosen. It cannot be right that a party can freely move the goalposts around in that way, to award itself the opportunity for a rematch. Rather, to mix metaphors, having, as it were, made its bed, by choosing on which set of facts to have the first battle, the party must usually then lie in it.”
“176 …the position is that Berenger (and Mr Meier in respect of Olympic) chose not to exclude Mr Skurikhin or otherwise to contest the making of the Receivership Order at the time, but stood by whilst it was made, looked on for three years whilst the receivers incurred expenses in seeking to realise the assets, and then when they got close to success, excluded Mr Skurikhin and sought to rely on that exclusion to lift the Receivership Order. That in itself, it seems to me, has something of the quality of an abuse of process.”
“177. ….The starting point here is that prior to the exclusions Mr Skurikhin had control in such a way that the assets of Berenger and Olympic were exposed to enforcement…The exclusion of Mr Skurikhin was, as I find, undertaken to further Mr Skurikhin’s interests in defending the assets within Berenger and Olympic from VTB’s attempts to recover its judgment debts through the bankruptcy proceedings in Russia and through these proceedings, to remove the assets within the trusts from the scope of the bankruptcy and to protect [the Properties] from the receivers’ efforts to realise those assets. It was most probably a step taken at his instigation (acting through Mr Meier) or at least with his knowledge and approval. Far from being a hostile move towards Mr Skurikhin, its purpose was to serve his interests by throwing obstacles in the way of enforcement and, ultimately, to pave the way not only for discharging the Receivership Order but also for removing Pikeville and other assets held within Berenger and Olympic from the scope of the [WFO]…”
“.. the inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people. The circumstances in which abuse of process can arise are very varied…It would, in my view, be most unwise if this House were to use this occasion to say anything that might be taken as limiting to fixed categories the kinds of circumstances in which the court has a duty (I disavow the word discretion) to exercise this salutary power.”
“The underlying public interest is…that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the court is satisfied (the onus being on the party alleging abuse) that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all. I would not accept that it is necessary, before abuse maybe found, to identify any additional element such as collateral attack on a previous decision or some dishonesty, but where those elements are present the latter proceedings will be much more obviously abusive, and there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceedings involves what the court regards as unjust harassment of a party. It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before. As one cannot comprehensively list all possible forms of abuse, so one cannot formulate any hard and fast rule to determine whether, on given facts, abuse is to be found or not.”
“The court therefore has to consider, by intense focus on the facts of the particular case, whether in broad terms the proceedings that it is sought to strike out can be characterised as falling under one or other, or both, of the broad rubrics of unfairness or the bringing of the administration of justice into disrepute.”
“… the institution of proceedings with an ulterior motive is not of itself enough to constitute an abuse: an action is only that if the Court’s processes are being misused to achieve something not properly available to the plaintiff in the course of properly conducted proceedings. The cases appear to suggest two distinct categories of such misuse of process: (i) The achievement of a collateral advantage beyond the proper scope of the action… (ii) The conduct of the proceedings themselves not so as to vindicate a right but rather in a matter designed to cause the defendant problems of expense, harassment, commercial prejudice or the like beyond those ordinarily encountered in the course of properly conducted litigation.”
“179…The issue is whether, although he is still a mandatory, the fact that he is now no longer himself named as a beneficiary removes the basis for the order. I accept that the trustee could not properly make a distribution directly to Mr Skurikhin himself, on his direction, in circumstances where he is no longer a beneficiary. However, his ability to direct that assets be distributed to any other beneficiary that he may choose (and, conversely, to prohibit any distribution to any other beneficiary that does not accord with his wishes) is undiminished. 180. The effect of Mr Skurikhin’s exclusion from Berenger is that all of the assets are currently held by Berenger on trust for Olympic, which in practice puts them under the control of Mr Meier (who, as I have found, is his trusted adviser and acts on his instructions), through Accreda Trustees. There is no bar to a distribution being made, via Olympic, to a new corporate entity established for that purpose, which the trustees have power to include amongst the class of beneficiaries of Olympic. Equally, Berenger can be instructed under the mandate to add a new “juristic person or institution” as a beneficiary. Mr Skurikhin has shown himself adept at using complex structures which have the effect of obscuring the beneficial ownership of assets and would have no difficulty at all in ensuring that he could still access the assets if he chose to do so. More straightforwardly, distributions can be made to another family member who is named as a beneficiary, Mr Skurikhin having agreed with that other beneficiary that they will take the assets as his nominee and pass them on as and when instructed and distributions can be withheld from any beneficiary who is not willing to accept a transfer on those terms. In those circumstances, I am not prepared to find that the basis for the Receivership Order has been destroyed by the exclusions …”
“Whether assets legally vested in a company are beneficially owned by its controller is a highly fact-specific issue. It is not possible to give general guidance going beyond the ordinary principles and presumptions of equity, especially those relating to gifts and resulting trusts.”
“Masri (No 2) confirms or established the following principles: (1) the demands of justice are the overriding consideration in considering the scope of the jurisdiction under section 37(1) [of theSenior Court Act 1981 ]; (2) the court has the power to grant injunctions and to appoint receivers in circumstances where no injunction would have been granted or receiver appointed before 1973; (3) a receiver by way of equitable execution may be appointed over an asset whether or not the asset is presently amendable to execution at law; and (4) the jurisdiction to appoint receivers by way of equitable execution can be developed incrementally to apply old principles to new situations.”
“(c) The jurisdiction [to appoint receivers] will not be exercised unless there is some hindrance or difficulty in using the normal processes of execution, but there are no rigid rules as to the nature of the hindrance or difficulty required, which may be practical or legal, and it is necessary to take account of all the circumstances of the case… ……. (e) A receiver will not be appointed if the court is satisfied that the appointment will be fruitless, for example because there is no property which can be reached in law or equity. That is an aspect of the maxim that equity does not act in vain. However, a receiver may be appointed if there is a reasonable prospect that the appointment will assist in the enforcement of a judgment or award. It is unnecessary, and will generally be pointless, for the court to attempt to decide hypothetical questions as to the likely effectiveness of any order. That applies with even greater force where such questions involve disputed issues of foreign law. It will be sufficient that there is a real prospect that the appointment of receivers will serve a useful purpose.”