Mohanned Asif Khan v North of England Coachworks Limited [2026] EWCA Civ 656
[2026] EWCA Civ 656Case No CA-2026-000870
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KINGS BENCH DIVISION
Mr Justice Jay
QB-2019-003298
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 21/05/2026
Before
LORD JUSTICE SINGHLORD JUSTICE COULSON
Between
(1) Mohanned Asif KhanAppellantNorth of England Coachworks LimitedRespondentSamuel Cuthbert (instructed by Sherrards Solicitors) for AppellantEmma Read (instructed by Janes Solicitors LLP) for RespondentHearing Hearing date: 21 May 2026Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down in court at 12.15pm on 21 May 2026 in person to the parties and their representatives and released to the National Archives. for in person.............................
[1]Mr Mohammed Asif Khan is the first defendant in long-running proceedings in which the underlying allegations are of fraud. I shall him “the appellant” throughout. The proceedings were brought by the North of England Coachworks Limited, whom I shall call “the respondent” throughout. It was whilst the appellant worked for the respondent as a finance director between January 2010 and July 2017 that it is alleged that he diverted significant funds for the use and benefit of himself and other third parties.
The Procedural History
[2]On 17 September 2019, Jacobs J granted a pre-action freezing injunction against the appellant and the second defendant. Both filed affidavits which, amongst other things, disclosed that the appellant owned a Rolex watch said to be worth £22,000. The freezing order was continued until trial by order of Pepperall J on 25 September 2019. Amongst other things, that order specified that the prohibition on dealing with assets included dealing with the Rolex watch.[3]The respondent brought a civil claim against the appellant alleging substantial fraud, and identifying numerous instances when money was paid by the appellant to himself, his wife (the second defendant), his sister and to other third parties who were providing him personally with goods and services. The appellant replied in December 2019, serving counter-schedules which claimed that the individual payments in issue were, in one way or another, legitimate company expenses. The counter-schedules were verified by a statement of truth.[4]Following consideration and checking by the respondent, it became apparent that numerous entries in the counter-schedule were false. To take just one example: a total of £68,319.13 was paid to “G.Massey/Massey Enterprises”. Far from this being a legitimate business expense, it transpired that Ms Massey was a prostitute and had provided personal services to the appellant.[5]The respondent brought proceedings for contempt on the basis of the false statements, pursuant to CPR r.81.18(1)(a). The appellant accepted that the statements were false and that he was therefore in contempt of court. However he sought repeatedly to delay the contempt proceedings, and they were not resolved until the judgment of Griffiths J on 2 October 2020 ([2020] EWHC 2596 (QB)). The appellant was sentenced to 10 weeks imprisonment, suspended for one year.[6]Eventually, the respondent’s claim against the appellant and the second defendant was settled. Judgment was entered by consent on 23 July 2024, providing that the sum of £500,000 was to be paid by the appellant to the respondent. The consent order noted that the appellant’s liability to pay this sum arose out of the fraud and fraudulent breaches of trust which had been alleged in the underlying proceedings. This court has been told that very little of this sum had been paid, such that the judgment debt (including interest) now stands at over £500,000.[7]In addition, it was agreed that the freezing injunction would continue against the appellant until further order and that it would allow him to use the assets covered by the injunction for the purposes of making payments to the respondent towards the sum payable under the judgment. The freezing order against the second defendant was discharged, save in respect of income and assets that had been transferred to her directly or indirectly by/from the appellant since the commencement of proceedings and/or income and assets that were transferred to her via the appellant at any date after the date of the order.[8]In April 2025, the respondent obtained a writ of control with the purpose of levying execution on the appellant’s Rolex watch specified in the order of 25 September 2019, and any other valuable assets which he might own. The enforcement officers attended the appellant’s home and gained access, but were unable to locate the watch or any other assets of the appellant. They asked him where it was and, although he knew, he did not tell them.[9]By an application dated the 7 May 2025, the appellant sought to suspend the writ of control. Shortly thereafter, and before his application had been heard, the appellant pawned both his Rolex, and a second Rolex watch belonging to the second defendant, to Ramsdens Financial Limited (“Ramsdens”), who carry out business as pawn brokers.[10]On 27 June 2025, the respondent’s solicitors invited the appellant to deliver up his Rolex watch prior to the hearing of the appellant’s application to suspend the writ of control. The appellant declined that offer, and the respondent was obliged to issue a cross-application for an information order in relation to the watch. At the hearing on 17 July 2025, Master Gidden dismissed the application to suspend the writ of control, and granted the respondent’s application for an information order.[11]By an email of 21 July 2025, and a subsequent affidavit sworn on 4 August 2025, the appellant indicated that his Rolex watch was being held by Ramsdens at their business premises in North Shields. It was said that it was held by Ramsdens as a security for a loan of £20,000 that Ramsdens had made to the appellant. The appellant said he was the owner of the watch and that the market value was somewhere between £20,000 and £26,000.[12]The affidavit purported to exhibit a copy of the loan agreement. However, this was the incorrect loan agreement because it related to the second defendant’s watch. Moreover, the document had been redacted by the appellant and, as noted below, it was to become apparent that the redactions were made so that the respondent would not know that the watches had been pawned after the first attempt to execute the writ of control, and after the appellant’s application to suspend it.[13]Following direct communication with Ramsdens, in July 2025, a copy of the correct loan agreement that related to the appellant’s Rolex watch was provided, together with details of the appellant’s Revolut bank account into which they had paid the loan monies of £20,000. The Revolut account had not been previously disclosed by the appellant.[14]On 14 October 2025, the respondent issued two applications. The first was for the delivery up the two pawn receipts and permission to redeem the pawns. The second was an application for contempt. At a directions hearing on 10 November 2025, Cotter J ordered delivery up and gave directions in the contempt application. On 14 November, the appellant subsequently offered to admit contempt and pay the respondent’s costs as part of a proposed offer to the respondent. By an order dated 26 November 2025, that offer was encapsulated into a consent order, pursuant to which Cotter J vacated the hearing of the liability for contempt and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent £26,000 in respect of its costs of the application. Despite payment of these costs being a term of the appellant’s original offer, this sum has not been paid.[15]On 23 January 2026, the respondent notified the court and the appellant that it wished to list a further hearing of the contempt application to consider sanctions against the appellant. The matter was listed for a hearing before Jay J (“the judge”) on 27 March 2026. During that period, the respondent’s solicitors indicated that they would be prepared to compromise the sanctions hearing if their costs were paid by the second defendant. The appellant and/or the second defendant did not accede to that request.[16]The day before the hearing on 27 March, the judge asked counsel to consider whether oral evidence from the appellant was appropriate. At the hearing, the appellant elected to give such evidence, and was cross examined by Ms Read. Part way through that hearing, after he had given his oral evidence, the appellant disclosed yet further documentary material which showed that the appellant had paid the £20,000 he received from Ramsdens to a company controlled by the second defendant, which had then been paid onwards to the second defendant personally, and was subsequently used for the purchase of property by the second defendant.[17]At a further hearing on 31 March 2026, the judge gave judgment and sentenced the appellant to six months immediate imprisonment. It is against that order that the appellant now appeals.
The Judgment Below
[18]Having set out the factual background, the judge came on to consider the appellant’s oral evidence. The appellant had said in his affidavit that, whilst he had in mind the prohibition of selling the watch, he did not have in mind the prohibition on “dealing with” the watch. He maintained that he was not trying to hide it. He agreed in cross examination that he knew he could not take steps which might reduce the value of the watch, and that the only way that the watch would be returned to him was by redeeming or repaying the loan. He also knew that the enforcement officers had come to collect the watch and he agreed that he did not tell them where it was. He was asked where the loan monies had gone and he said simply that they had been spent.[19]As the judge noted at [32], the appellant could not be asked questions about the further documents he disclosed after he had given evidence, which showed what had happened to the £20,000. He also noted that the appellant had not identified in his oral evidence the intended source of the funds.[20]Having identified counsel’s submissions, and the relevant legal principles at [37]-[41], the judge set out the law. This included references to two important cases. The first was to the judgment of Jackson LJ in JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko & Others (2) [2011] EWCA Civ 1241, where at [51] he held that a knowing, deliberate and substantial breach of a freezing order was a serious matter which would “normally attract an immediate custodial sentence, which is measured in months rather than weeks and may well exceed a year”.[21]The second was the decision of Lawence Collins J (as he then was) in Crystal Mews Ltd v Metterick [2006] EWHC 3087 (Ch), where he identified the following factors relevant to sentencing in contempt cases which included:(i) Whether the applicant has been prejudiced by virtue of the contempt and whether the prejudice is capable of remedy;(ii) The extent to which the contemnor has acted under pressure; (ii) Whether the breach of the order was deliberate or unintentional; (iv) The degree of culpability; (v) Whether the contemnor has been placed in breach of the order by reason of the conduct of others; (vi) Whether the contemnor appreciates the seriousness of the breach and; (vii) Whether the contemnor has cooperated.[22]The judge’s analysis, in which he applied what might be called the Crystal Mews factors to the circumstances of the case, included the following important findings. First, he rejected the appellant’s evidence that he was not aware that pawning the Rolex watch was a breach of the freezing order [42]. Secondly, he found that disposing of the loan monies from his Revolut account was a knowing breach of the freezing order and that the seriousness of that was compounded by the fact that Ramsdens had paid the money into an account, the existence of which the appellant had not previously disclosed [44]. Thirdly he rejected the appellant’s stated reasons for not informing the enforcement officers of the location of the watch, and found that the timing of the transaction was dictated by a rising market and the appellant’s intention to place it out of the reach of the respondent [45]-[46].[23]Fourthly, the judge at [47] drew a further adverse inference from the redactions to the loan agreement relating to the second defendant’s Rolex. The judge found that, even if the appellant had provided a copy of the correct agreement, he would still have redacted it, because the purpose of the redactions was to prevent the respondent from understanding the timing of the transaction. Fifthly, at [48], the judge rejected the appellant’s evidence that he was, in some way, in negotiations with the respondent’s solicitors over the watch before 2025. Instead, the judge said, “he was stringing them along”.[24]Accordingly, concluding this section of the judgment at [48], the judge found that this was “an extremely serious, contumacious breach of the freezing orders and the [appellant], in the context of defending this application, has given untrue evidence about it.” None of these critical findings, including the finding that the claimant had lied on oath before the judge at the hearing, are challenged on appeal.[25]The judge then considered the remaining Crystal Mews factors. At [50] he considered the matter was so serious that only a custodial sentence was appropriate. He said he had in mind a notional term of 9 months, reduced to 6 months to reflect credit. He then considered whether or not he should suspend that sentence ([51]) but concluded that he would not be performing his public duty if he did suspend the sentence. He acknowledged the appellant’s personal mitigation, but said that the critical factor that went against that was the appellant’s previous conviction for contempt, and his receipt of a suspended sentence of imprisonment on that occasion. The judge found at [53] that even if the recent presumption in favour of suspending sentences of less than 12 months had applied, he would still have declined to impose a suspended order because of what he said were the “exceptional circumstances in the overall history of this litigation”.
The Points on Appeal
[26]Mr Cuthbert advanced five grounds of appeal. Ground 1 was that the judge failed to give any or any appropriate weight to the lack of harm caused to the respondents by the contempt. Ground 2 was that the judge erred by disregarding the lack of private interest that the respondents had in maintaining the contempt application to sanctions. This was tied up with an assertion that the judge failed to give any or appropriate weigh to the fact that there had been attempts to compromise the sanction hearing, and that those had founded on the basis of costs. Ground 3 was that the judge misdirected himself by not taking onto account the criminal sentencing guidelines on suspended sentences. It is said that if had done so, he would have inevitably reached the conclusion that the sentence should be suspended. Ground 4 was that the judge placed undue weight on the previous conviction for contempt of court. Ground 5 was something of a catch-all, suggesting that the overall sentence was manifestly excessive “when compared with generality of cases for breach of an injunction where there has been limited harm to the respondent”.
The Applicable Test on Appeal
[27]CPR r.52.21(3) states:
“The appeal court will allow an appeal where the decision of the lower court was— (a) wrong; or (b) unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court.”
Serious irregularity is not alleged here.[28]In Liverpool Victoria Insurance Company Limited v Dr Asef Zafar [2019] EWCA Civ 392, the Master of the Rolls affirmed that the determination by a judge as to the appropriate sentence in committal proceedings was a classic multi-factorial judgment. Accordingly, when deciding whether the decision of the lower court was “wrong” for the purposes of CPR r.52.21(3)(a), the appellate court would only intervene in limited circumstances, namely when the judge below: i) made an error of principle; ii) took into account immaterial factors or failed to take into account material factors; or iii) reached a decision which was plainly wrong in that it was outside the range of decisions reasonably open to the judge. The same or very similar principles have also been set out in Mersey Care NHS Trust v Ackroyd [2007] EWCA Civ 101 at [35]-[36], Aldi Stores Ltd v WSP Group PLC [2008] 1 WLR 748 at [16], Stuart v Goldberg Linde [2008] 1WLR 823 at [76] and [81] and Financial Conduct Authority v McKendrick [2019] EWCA Civ 524.[29]A decision as to the appropriate level of penalty will be “plainly wrong” where it “is so lenient, or so excessive, that it is outside the range of reasonable decision making”: Liverpool Victoria Insurance at [45]. The Master of the Rolls observed that that was similar to the circumstances in which the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division would interfere with a sentence, namely where it was unduly lenient or manifestly excessive; he adopted the words of Lord Lane CJ in Attorney-General's Reference (no 4 of 1989) [1990] 1 WLR 41 at p46A, that an appellate court will intervene when “it [the sentence] falls outside the range of sentences which the judge, applying his mind to all the relevant factors, could reasonably consider appropriate”. Accordingly, “there will be few cases in which a decision as to the appropriate sentence for contempt will be open to challenge in this court, whether on grounds of undue leniency or of undue severity”: Liverpool Victoria Insurance at [71]; FCA v McKendrick at [38].[30]In reviewing the decision of the lower court judge, the appellate court will have in mind that the decision to impose a sanction for contempt is fact-specific, and that the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct must be considered in the context of the specific case: Khawaja v Stefanova [2023] EWCA Civ 1201.[31]In my view, the following three further points should be made: i) A contemnor currently has the right to appeal without the need to obtain permission: s.13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. There is therefore no permission filter. But that does not mean that the contemnor can abuse that entitlement by seeking to rerun all the arguments on which he or she lost at first instance. ii) This court will regard the consideration and imposition of sanctions for contempt of court as primarily a matter for the first instance judge. In particular, all matters of evaluation, and all questions of weight, are a matter for them, not for this court. That is particularly true in circumstances such as this, where the appellant chose to give oral evidence at the sanctions hearing, but which the judge found to be untrue. iii) On the issue of sanction, it is unlikely that the appeal court will be assisted by the citation of other first instance cases where particular sanctions were imposed on particular contemnors on particular facts. The law of contempt is so broad, and arises in so many different ways, that the precise sanctions imposed in other cases are usually unilluminating.
Errors of Principle
[32]In my view, there is no discernible error of principle in the judge’s judgment. He had regard to the leading cases in this area of the law, including the factors set out in Crystal Mews. Moreover, he had regard to this court’s conclusion in JSC BTA Bank, that a knowing deliberate and substantial breach of a freezing order – which is what this was - will normally attract an immediate custodial sentence, measured in months rather than weeks.[33]Accordingly, that leaves the individual grounds of appeal and whether, when taken singly or together, they demonstrate that the sentence of six months immediate custody was manifestly excessive. We should express our gratitude to Mr Cuthbert for his clear submissions on these five grounds.
Ground 1: Failure To Take Into Account Harm
[34]Mr Cuthbert correctly submits that there are two elements when considering sanctions for contempt: culpability and harm (see, by way of example, Wigan Borough Council v Lovett [2023] EWCA Civ 1631 at [46] – [49]). He said that the judge had regard to the former, but not to the latter. The complaint is that the judge failed to mention harm at all, and therefore failed to give any weight to the lack of harm caused to the respondent by the appellant’s contempt. For the following reasons, it seems to me that that submission must fail at every level.[35]First, the fact that a particular word – here, the word ‘harm’ – was not specifically mentioned by the judge is not itself a ground of appeal. What matters is whether the judge took the relevant subject matter into account.[36]Secondly, the submission assumes that there was a lack of harm to the respondent. That is based on the fact that the contempt was admitted within no more than a month of the committal application. But that wrongly ignores the long history before that admission, and the events that occurred thereafter.[37]As the judge explained, the appellant has failed to pay the £500,000 that is owing to the respondent: less than £600 has been paid to satisfy the judgment debt. In order to try and recover some of the outstanding amount, the respondent has had to put in place a freezing order to prevent the further dissipation of assets. The appellant has endeavoured to avoid the consequences of that freezing order and, certainly in relation to the Rolex watch, has tried to cheat his way out of its effect.[38]So in my judgment, the harm to the respondent was considerable. The respondent has had to police the appellant’s compliance with the freezing order which has involved, amongst other things, the need to obtain a writ of control, the sending of enforcement officers to the appellant’s property to search for the watch, seeing its request for delivery up before the hearing refused, working out that the appellant had redacted information from the (incorrect) loan agreement and, ultimately, the need to seek sanctions. The time, effort and costs involved have been considerable. There is simply no basis to say that the respondent has suffered no or minimal harm.[39]That can be demonstrated by Mr Cuthbert’s own proposition that, if the respondent had not got the watch back, there would plainly have been significant harm. But the watch was worth around £20,000. By reason of the appellant’s contempt of court, the respondent has had to incur costs of more than that, just to get the watch back.[40]Thirdly, the judge fully acknowledged the harm suffered, by setting out the background to all these events in such detail in his judgment. It was that background which caused the judge to say, in my view rightly, that this was an exceptional case.[41]Finally, questions of weight were quintessentially a matter for the judge in any event. Mr Cuthbert stressed that the contempt was purged. So it was: but only after the appellant had been pursued up hill and down dale by the respondent. As I have indicated, the suggestion that the harm was minimal because the contempt was purged so promptly is wrong on the facts. The appellant pawned the watch after the writ of control had been obtained, and refused to deliver up the watch when requested. He took steps to cover that up. It was only when the respondent’s tenacity revealed the deception that the appellant admitted the contempt. Even then, the judge was obliged to conclude that the appellant had lied on oath in front of him when seeking to minimise his actions. It is emphatically not for this court to interfere with the weight accorded to these matters by the judge.[42]For these reasons, I conclude that there is nothing in ground 1.
Ground 2: The Allegedly ‘Low’ Private Interest
[43]Mr Cuthbert’s argument is that, once the contempt had been admitted, the respondent was prepared to compromise the contempt application without pursuing further sanctions, on condition that the second defendant paid the respondent’s costs. Although that offer was not accepted by the appellant, it is now said on his behalf that this is evidence of both a lack of harm and what Mr Cuthbert called “a low private interest” in the outcome of the sanctions hearing. He said that that should have been taken into account when identifying the sanction.[44]I have already dealt with the question of harm under ground 1. As to the allegedly “low private interest” on the part of the respondent, I consider that this complaint is unfounded. The respondent had a proper private interest in the contempt proceedings, including pursuing it through to a sanctions hearing, as the only means available of ensuring that the appellant would properly comply with court orders in the future. That is in accordance with the authorities: see Navigator Equities Ltd v Deripaska [2021] EWCA Civ 1799; [2022] 1 WLR 3656 at [135]. There is no authority for the proposition that the alleged extent of that private interest is or can be relevant to the sanction to be imposed. Nicklin J’s comments in MBN v McGivern [2022] EWHC 2072 at [97] were dealing with a wholly different point.[45]The fact that the respondent was prepared to compromise the sanctions hearing on a condition that was not in fact accepted is, in my view, irrelevant to the sanction actually imposed. In a case where such a tiny proportion of the judgment sum has so far been repaid, the respondent was quite entitled to seek to compromise any part of the contempt proceedings, so as to minimize their costs outlay. The respondent may have felt that it was throwing good money away by pursuing this appellant any further, and that any option which would reduce their future costs expenditure should be explored. That was a perfectly sensible commercial attitude. That does not dilute the respondent’s private interest in the sanctions hearing. It is certainly not a reason for the actual sanction against the appellant to be in any way reduced.[46]Finally, the private interest can only ever be one element in a committal application and an assessment of the appropriate sanction. Equally important is the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the court system and the rule of law by ensuring that its orders are complied with. That remained the case here.[47]For these reasons, I would reject ground 2 of this appeal.
Ground 3: Failure To Take Into Account The Sentencing Guidelines
[48]Ground 3 is a complaint that the judge failed to take into account the applicable sentencing guidelines (Imposition of community and custodial sentences). It is said that, had he done so, he would have suspended the sentence that he imposed. There are a number of reasons why I consider that that submission is unsustainable.[49]First, the sentencing guidelines do not strictly apply to this case, although I accept that, in cases such as this, it is always a good idea for the judge to consider them, at least as a guide: see Liverpool Victoria Insurance at [30] and [58].[50]Secondly, although the judge did not expressly refer to the guidelines by name, he was very clear in his judgment that he had regard to all the points that are made there. Thus, he identified the power to suspend at [51]; he had regard to the serious impact of a prison sentence upon the appellant’s family at [51]; he had regard to the seriousness of the breach at [48] and [51]; and he had regard to the appellant’s previous conduct at [52]. Those were all matters that were, on any view, relevant to the question of suspension. It cannot therefore be said that, merely because the judge did not expressly refer to the guidelines by name, he did not have regard to the principles that they encapsulate.[51]Thirdly, I consider that, if express regard is had to the factors set out in the table of the guidelines under the heading ‘Can the sentence be suspended?’, they do not lead to the conclusion that the sentence should have been suspended. On the contrary, they lead to the opposite conclusion. Of the factors indicating that suspension might be appropriate, the only one that is in play in this case is the harmful impact on the appellant’s family. As I have said, the judge had express regard to that. Of the remainder, I do not regard the appellant’s other mitigation as strong; I consider that there is a high risk of reoffending, given the history in this case; and I do not consider that there is a realistic prospect of the appellant’s conduct being rehabilitated in the community. None was urged by Mr Cuthbert.[52]As to the factors that indicate that it would not be appropriate to suspend the sentence, the question of a risk to any person is not relevant to a civil contempt. The other two factors are present. There is a history of poor compliance with court orders. I also consider, given the history, there is a real risk that the appellant will not comply with orders in the future. Finally, and this is the thread that runs throughout the judge’s judgment, the appellant’s persistent breaches in this case mean that the only appropriate punishment was immediate custody. That was the judge’s ultimate conclusion, and he arrived at it correctly following the guidance set out in JSC BTA Bank.[53]I should add for completeness that, as the judge noted, the presumption at s.277A of the Sentencing Act 2020, in favour of suspension for those convicted after 22 March 2026, does not apply to a non-criminal case like this. In any event, the appellant accepted that he was guilty of contempt prior to that date. But most important of all, as the judge made clear at [53], even if the presumption was in some way applicable, the fact that only immediate custody was appropriate in the exceptional circumstances of this case provides a complete rebuttal of the presumption in any event.
Ground 4: The Appellant’s Previous Contempt
[54]This ground complained that the judge placed undue weight on the appellant’s previous criminal conviction for contempt of court. The argument was that that previous contempt was in respect of a different type of allegation to a civil contempt, and that the judge wrongly gave it too much weight. Mr Cuthbert agreed that, in summary, his point was that the contempts were not identical in nature.[55]I reject that submission for a number of reasons. First, as I have already said, matters of weight were a matter for the first instance judge. Secondly, I do not consider that the fact that the previous conviction was for a criminal contempt should make any significant difference to the weight to be attached to it when considering the sanction for a further contempt. In any event, in this case, the fact that the previous contempt was criminal was simply a function of the false statements of truth that the appellant had provided to support his pleadings; to my mind, the important thing is that those false statements were made in the same civil proceedings which have given rise to this second contempt. They are plainly closely connected.[56]Thirdly, what the previous contempt demonstrates is that, in these proceedings, the appellant had a cavalier attitude to rules and orders of the court from the beginning. He lied in his counter-schedules at the outset of the proceedings, in direct contravention of the Civil Procedure Rules. Later he flouted the terms of the freezing order. In addition, he lied to the judge below in his oral evidence in March, when trying to minimise his second contempt and the appropriate sanction. The fact that he received a suspended sentence 6 years ago has not deterred him from disregarding the court’s rules or orders again.[57]Finally, there were other breaches of the freezing order which the judge was also entitled to take into account in arriving at the sanction, such as paying the £20,000 to his wife’s company, and failing to disclose the existence of the Revolut bank account into which Ramsdens had paid that loan. The previous conviction and these more recent breaches are all of a piece: they all demonstrate that the applicant is not prepared to comply with court rules or orders. The factual circumstances may be different, but the appellant’s underlying attitude remains the same.
Ground 5: Manifestly Excessive
[58]The argument was that, taking into account all the previous points, the sentence was manifestly excessive. I have explained above why there is nothing in any of these previous complaints. This was a deliberate and contumacious contempt by a man who had not complied with court rules before. The sanction of 6 months immediate custody was justified.[59]That view is unaffected by any consideration of the sanctions imposed in other cases, for the reasons I have given. But if other cases are of any relevance, I would suggest that the case most similar to the present one is JSC BTA Bank where an appellant who deliberately refused to comply with a freezing order and who aggravated the contempt by giving false evidence at the hearing, received a term of 21 months imprisonment. Cases where there was a much less severe sanction were very different on the facts. One example in the bundle is Amarfio v Abrahams [2018] EWHC 891 (Ch), where there had been no previous contempt and the defendant’s conduct was not found to be deliberate.[60]I have given some anxious thought to whether the 9 months starting point taken by the judge, reduced to 6 months to reflect the admission, was too high. This was not a feature of the case on which Mr Cuthbert spent much time. He argued that the 6 months was too long because it could only be concerned with the punitive aspect of the sanction, not the coercive element. But I consider that it had a coercive element too: a belief that a term of imprisonment might make it more likely that the appellant would comply with the orders of the court in future. I also note that 9 months was the irreducible minimum period of imprisonment for punitive purposes identified in JSC BTA Bank at [69], a case with many similarities to this one. So in that case, even if the contempt was purged, this court indicated that the sentence should not be reduced below 9 months.[61]I also note that the judge gave the appellant full credit for his guilty plea when, as Mr Cuthbert properly accepted, he did not accept liability at the directions hearing so cannot be said to have pleaded guilty at the first opportunity. Moreover, by the time the committal application was made, I consider that, in the light of the previous events which I have set out in detail above, the appellant had no real option but to accept liability.[62]Finally, although Mr Cuthbert was quite right to point out that the judge made no express mention of the current overcrowding in prisons, so experienced a judge in both civil and criminal matters as Jay J would inevitably have had it in mind.[63]So for these reasons, although the 9 months was perhaps a stern starting point, I do not consider that the eventual 6 month term that resulted was manifestly excessive. In accordance with the principles noted above, I do not therefore consider that this is one of those rare cases where this court should conclude that the sanction was manifestly excessive.[64]Accordingly, if my Lord agrees, I would dismiss this appeal.