Adele Nicola Rainsford v David Protheroe-Beynon [2026] EWHC 1226 (KB)

[2026] EWHC 1226 (KB)Case No KB-2026-001090Venue IN THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICEKING’S BENCH DIVISIONVenue Royal Courts of JusticeStrandLondonWC2A 2LLDate 16 April 2026
Before
MRS JUSTICE STEYN
Between
ADELE NICOLA RAINSFORDApplicantDAVID PROTHEROE-BEYNONRespondent
MISS JUNE VENTERS KC (instructed by Venters Solicitors) for Applicant for The Respondent did not appear and was not represented
Approved Judgment
If this Transcript is to be reported or published, there is a requirement to ensure that no reporting restriction will be breached. This is particularly important in relation to any case involving a sexual offence, where the victim is guaranteed lifetime anonymity (Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992), or where an order has been made in relation to a young person.This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd.2 nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP.Telephone No: 020 7067 2900. DX 410 LDEEmail: info@martenwalshcherer.comWeb: www.martenwalshcherer.com

Introduction

[1]This is a without notice application for an interim injunction made by notice filed on 9th April 2026. The applicant also seeks to be joined as a party to proceedings brought by Kayleigh Thorne against the respondent.[2]The context is that the respondent is a party to Children Act 1989 proceedings in which the applicant Ms Rainsford, a practising barrister, represented another party at hearings on 19th June 2024 and 17th July 2024. The respondent is the applicant father, and the applicant’s lay client is the respondent mother in those Family Court proceedings. The applicant was instructed by Kayleigh Thorne of Venters Solicitors who represent the respondent mother in the Family Court.

Without Notice Hearing

[3]Section 12(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998 applies because the relief sought affects the respondent’s right to freedom of expression. Section 12(2) provides:
“If the person against whom the application for relief is made (‘the respondent’) is neither present nor represented, no such relief is to be granted unless the court is satisfied‒ (a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or (b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified.” (a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or (b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified.”
[4]The applicant only relies on limb (b). The applicant contends that there is a compelling reason why the respondent should not be notified, namely that giving him notice would risk defeating the purpose of the relief sought. The applicant relies on the menacing tone of his communications and threats of public exposure, as well as his expressed intention to disregard court orders in support of the contention that, if put on notice, he would be likely to further escalate his harassing acts directed against her.[5]The applicant refers to the email of 2nd April 2026 from the respondent to Ms Thorne in whose favour Obi J granted a without notice interim injunction on 2nd April 2026. In that email, the respondent threatened to put into the public domain allegations that he made against Ms Thorne. He said he had his own outlet and editorial control. He repeatedly referred to a machete and said “I’m going to do to all of you what you did to my children, my mother, me”; he referred to the fact that it was the Easter weekend, and said “If I decide to do something, there will be nothing you can do until TUESDAY! By then, the damage will be done to your personal reputation. Who needs a machete?” He said “You want to think I’m delusional. It’s wonderful what you can do with a REALLY good script and YOUR OWN new channel. In a weekend. Knowing that even during the week, court admin staff are overworked and VERY slow to answer. It takes years to build a reputation, and seconds to destroy. I have a whole WEEKEND to work on yours.”[6]Although that email was not directly addressed to the applicant, he referred to her, saying “And to help you enjoy the Easter break, I thought you should see what I have done about Adele.” That was a reference to TikTok videos in which he accuses the applicant of being a dishonest barrister. He has published three such videos about the applicant. I infer that his statement in the 2nd April email as to what he intended to do “to all of you” (to which I have referred) encompassed the applicant.[7]On 14th April 2026 (that is two days ago), the respondent sent an email to Ms Thorne’s solicitors in which he threatened “Whatever distress you were under when you contacted Surrey Police … 12 days ago is going to increase a hundredfold within the next few hours.” In the same email, he said “I will print Ms Justice Obi’s order and tear it apart in front of her, like that MP did in the New Zealand Parliament.”[8]It is fair to say that that has not been the respondent’s consistent response to the order. In other emails, he has indicated his intent to comply. Nevertheless, having regard to the evidence before me, which includes the statements of Ms Rainsford, Ms Thorne and Ms Fiander, I am persuaded that there is a real risk that the respondent would take steps to frustrate the application if he were given notice of it, and so there is a compelling reason to hear the application without notice.

Joinder

[9]The applicant seeks permission to be joined as second claimant in the claim brought by Miss Thorne. As I pointed out during the hearing, in accordance with CPR 17.1(1), a party may amend their statement of case, including by adding a party, at any time before it has been served on the other party. Ms Thorne’s claim form has not yet been served on the respondent or indeed sealed, and so the court’s permission is not required to amend it to join the applicant.

Interim Injunction - Applicable Principles

[10]When considering whether to grant an interim injunction, the court will usually apply the well-established test from American Cyanamid Co (No 1) v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396. The applicant’s draft order implicitly refers to that test (see, e.g., the reference to there being a serious issue to be tried). However, a more exacting test is required in certain types of cases. Where the injunction sought may interfere with freedom of expression, section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 applies. In accordance with section 12(3) read with section 12(1), “relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression” must not be granted “so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed.” “Likely” in section 12(3) means “more likely than not”: Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee & Ors [2005] 1 AC 253.[11]Interim injunctions to restrain defamatory publications are subject to an even higher threshold than section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998, known as the rule in Bonnard v Perryman or the Defamation Rule: see Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269; Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1462, [2005] QB 972).[12]In LJY v Persons Unknown [2017] EWHC 3230 (QB), [2018] EMLR 19, Warby J observed at [42]:
“As a matter of legal policy, the court applies the more demanding defamation rule if it detects ‘cause of action shopping’. By that, I mean that the rule will be applied in cases where, although another cause of action is relied on, the court concludes that the claimant’s true purpose is to prevent damage to reputation. The policy was described in this way in the breach of confidence case, McKennit v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 [79] (Buxton LJ): ‘If it could be shown that a claim in breach of confidence was brought where the nub of the case was a complaint of the falsity of the allegations, and that that was done in order to avoid the rules of the tort of defamation, then objections could be raised in terms of abuse of process.’” ‘If it could be shown that a claim in breach of confidence was brought where the nub of the case was a complaint of the falsity of the allegations, and that that was done in order to avoid the rules of the tort of defamation, then objections could be raised in terms of abuse of process.’”
[13]In Pacini v Dow Jones [2024] EWHC 1709 (KB) at [76]-[91], in the context of a strike out on abuse of process grounds, HHJ Richard Parkes KC addressed the question “What is the ‘nub’ of a complaint?” At [80], he referred to Hannon v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2015] EMLR 1, and said:
“Mann J found that although there was a heavy reputational element to the claims, that did not describe the essence of the claims: there were other claims as well (in privacy and confidence), which were not de minimis. The judge was unable to find that the ‘nub’ or reality of the claims was based on damage to reputation only.”
[14]It follows that where an applicant seeks to restrain publication at an interim stage, the court has to ask itself “What is the essential purpose of the application?” Where the purpose of the application is the protection of reputation and the gravamen of the underlying complaint concerns damage to reputation, then the application for interim relief must be assessed by reference to the defamation rule. See Dixon v North Bristol NHS Trust [2022] EWHC 3127 (KB) [62] (Nicklin J), and Khan v Khan [2018] EWHC 241 (QB) [72] (Nicklin J).[15]As summarised by the authors of Gatley on Libel and Slander (13th Edition, 2022) at 27-002, and adopted by Tugendhat J in Coys Ltd v Autocherish Ltd [2004] EMLR 25 [37] (with reference to the 10th Edition of Gatley), where the defamation rule applies, the court will only grant an interim injunction where each of the following conditions is met:
“(i) the statement is unarguably defamatory; (ii) there are no grounds for concluding the statement may be true; (iii) there is no other defence which might succeed; (iv) there is evidence of an intention to repeat or publish the defamatory statement.”

Interim Injunction - Application of the Principles

[16]The application seeks an interim injunction “pursuant to section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, restraining the defendant from harassing the claimant and from publishing or threatening to publish allegations concerning the claimant or professional conduct”, and an “order requiring the defendant to immediately remove defamatory and harassing material already published on TikTok and any other platform.”[17]On behalf of the applicant, Miss Venters KC informed me the proposed claim is brought solely in harassment, not in defamation.[18]On any view, it is clear that the order sought, if granted, would interfere with the respondent’s freedom of expression. In written submissions, the applicant submitted that the American Cyanamid test would apply insofar as the harassment complained of is by methods other than publication. However, it seems to me that all of the acts of harassment relied on (whether sending emails, making complaints to the Bar Standards Board or contempt applications, not just posting TikTok videos) are forms of harassment by speech, and an interim injunction to restrain such acts is subject to section 12 of the Human Rights Act.[19]As was the case in Hannon, there is a substantial reputational element to the claim. Nonetheless, on the evidence currently before me, I am persuaded that the focus on harassment genuinely reflects the alarm and distress caused by the respondent’s actions. The applicant has not engaged in cause of action shopping. She candidly acknowledged concerns for her reputation, and undoubtedly the potential impact on her reputation of the respondent’s publications is a factor contributing to her distress. But I consider that at its core, this is a harassment claim, and so the section 12(3) and Cream Holdings test applies. Ms Venters submitted that in any event, if it were applicable, the defamation test would be met.[20]The course of conduct relied on consists of:(a) The respondent reporting the applicant to the Bar Standards Board in 2024 for alleged breaches of her Core Duties. The Bar Standards Board concluded, as stated in a letter to the respondent dated 22nd October 2024, that there was no breach. The applicant was informed of the complaint after the Bar Standards Board had concluded no further action was required.(b) The respondent filed a contempt application against the applicant in December 2025 in relation to the same or similar complaints as those outlined in his complaint to the Bar Standards Board. The applicant has not been served with the application and is unaware of what, if anything, has happened to it.(c) The respondent reported the applicant to the Bar Standards Board again in December 2025 in relation to the same matters. The applicant has not been asked to respond to that complaint or notified of the outcome. But the respondent’s TikTok video indicates that it was dismissed by a letter dated 20th March 2026.(d) The respondent has posted three TikTok videos about the applicant of which she became aware at about 5.23 p.m. on 1st April 2026. One of the videos is about nine minutes long. The words “Tactics of the dishonest barrister courtesy of a dishonest barrister” appear on the screen throughout, along with a photograph of the applicant. Throughout the video, the respondent asserts that the applicant is a dishonest barrister with a “track record of deceiving the court”. One of the videos publishes parts of a letter from the Bar Standards Board and refers to the applicant as a barrister whose “honesty is called into question”, alleging she “has a proven track record of making statements she knows from the instructing solicitor to be dishonest.” The audio cover is “London Calling” by The Clash, with lyrics such as “Now war is declared and battle come down”. A third video again accuses the applicant and another of being “dishonest barristers”. A voiceover asserts that the “truth is surfacing” and that those responsible are “gripped with fear”. The tone is menacing.[21]Pursuant to section 1(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, a claim for harassment gives rise to three issues on which the claimant bears the burden of proof, namely:(i) did the defendant engage in a course of conduct;(ii) did any such course of conduct amount to harassment; and(iii) did the defendant know or should he have known that the conduct amounted to harassment. See Hourani v Thomson & Ors [2017] EWHC 432 (QB), Warby J [129]). Section 1(3) provides potential defences.[22]On the evidence before me, I am satisfied that the applicant is more likely than not to succeed at trial and to establish that the publication of the three TikTok videos or any similar allegations should be restrained. The acts to which I have referred amount to a course of conduct. The evidence is that the acts, and in particular the emails and publication of the videos, have caused the applicant alarm and distress. It is probable, on the material before me, that the court would find that the respondent’s conduct, even if not necessarily every action relied on, amounted to harassment and that he ought to have known that. It is unlikely that any section 1(3) defence would succeed. I emphasise that I am only expressing a view on the material currently before me, and in circumstances where I have not heard from the respondent.[23]If contrary to my conclusion the defamation rule were applicable, it seems to me that it would be met. The publications are undoubtedly defamatory, indeed gravely so. There is no evidence, including in any of the reports of the respondent’s complaints or his TikTok videos, such as gives rise to any grounds for believing that the statements may be true, nor that any other defence might succeed. And it is clear that the respondent intends, unless restrained, to continue publishing his defamatory statements.[24]Although it is exceptional to grant an interim injunction where the defamation rule applies, this is a case where the respondent seems to be publishing outrageous allegations with a view to putting illegitimate pressure on those representing an opposing party in Family Court proceedings. In those circumstances, I consider that the court should step in and restrain publication.[25]Accordingly, I will grant an interim injunction.

Terms of the Order

[26]The final issue concerns the terms of the order. I drew the applicant’s attention to the practice guidance Interim Non-Disclosure Orders [2012] 1 WLR 1003, and adjourned the hearing to the afternoon to enable the applicant to reconsider the draft order having regard to the terms of the model order.[27]The original draft order sought to restrain the respondent from, among other acts, harassing the applicant. In Canada Goose UK Retail Ltd & Anor v Persons Unknown & Anor [2019] EWHC 2459 (QB), [2020] 1 WLR 417, Nicklin J observed at [78]:
“There can be (and often is) reasonable disagreement between lawyers as to what amounts to harassment (see [51] above). The terms of an injunction should not leave it to a layperson to make that difficult assessment him/herself, on pain of imprisonment if s/he gets it wrong. The position is not saved if the prohibition continues ‘…including in particular the following acts’ which are then specified. The order must specify the particular acts, clearly and unambiguously, which the court is prohibiting.”
[28]It is also important that the order should specify with precision any videos that the respondent is compelled to remove and by when. And as I mentioned during the hearing, in accordance with the model order, it should include an undertaking as to damages.[29]I will consider the amended draft order that the applicant is going to provide me with after the conclusion of this hearing and, applying the principles to which I have referred, make an order restraining the respondent from contacting the applicant and from publishing statements such as those to which I have referred, and also ensuring that he takes down and does not republish the three TikTok videos to which I have referred and any similar material.[30]So in conclusion, for the reasons I have given, I will grant the application for an interim injunction until the return date. -------------------- (This Judgment has been approved by the Judge.) Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd 2nd Floor, Quality House, 6-9 Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP Telephone No: 020 7067 2900 DX: 410 LDE Email: info@martenwalshcherer.com Web: www.martenwalshcherer.com