“There are reasonable grounds for suspecting that, during his work for Telia, Mr Amersi had been involved in deals on its behalf which he knew or should have known were corrupt, or involved corrupt payments.”
“The governing principles require the Court to put itself, so far as possible, in the position of the hypothetical reasonable viewer or reader. Several points flow from that: i) First, the ordinary reasonable viewer will have watched the Television Report once. Although modern technology now makes it possible for many viewers to pause or rewind and replay live television broadcasts, few will do so. The important consequence of this, when assessing the meaning of a television broadcast, is that the ordinary reasonable viewer has a limited opportunity to analyse what s/he is viewing and hearing. The overall impression created by the broadcast is likely to be more important, and the Court should be careful not to pore over a transcript, which no viewer would have had. ii) That principle is relaxed, to an extent, in relation to publications delivered in text. There, the ordinary reasonable reader has a greater opportunity to absorb what s/he is being told. Nevertheless, the principle is still that s/he will read the text once and will not subject it to any form of textual analysis. iii) Second, no reader or viewer has someone at their shoulder making submissions as to what s/he should make of the broadcast/text, highlighting particular sentences or phrases. iv) Finally, proper regard to the overall context and presentation of the words complained of is probably the most important principle to be applied in the assessment of meaning.”
“(i) The governing principle is reasonableness. (ii) The intention of the publisher is irrelevant. (iii) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve. (iv) Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task. (v) Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties. (vi) Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected. (vii) It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense. (viii) The publication must be read as a whole, and any ‘bane and antidote’ taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic “rogues’ gallery” case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (eg bane and antidote cases). (ix) In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication. (x) No evidence, beyond publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning. (xi) The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication’s readership. (xii) Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader. (xiii) In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the claimant’s pleaded meaning).”
“Finally, I need to refer to what are called the Chase levels of meaning. They come from the decision of Brooke LJ in Chase –v- News Group Newspapers Ltd [2003] EMLR 11 [45] in which he identified three types of defamatory allegation: broadly, (1) the claimant is guilty of the act; (2) reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant is guilty of the act; and (3) grounds to investigate whether the claimant has committed the act. In the lexicon of defamation, these have come to be known as the Chase levels. Reflecting the almost infinite capacity for subtle differences in meaning, they are not a straitjacket forcing the court to select one of these prescribed levels of meaning, but they are a helpful shorthand. In Charman -v- Orion Publishing Group Ltd[2005] EWHC 2187 (QB) , for example, Gray J found a meaning of “cogent grounds to suspect” [58])”
“There are strong grounds for suspecting that, during his work for Telia, Mr Amersi had been involved in deals on its behalf which he knew or should have known were corrupt, or involved corrupt payments”
“[…] (B) The Defendant proposed a trial of meaning as a preliminary issue on27 March 2023 . The Claimant was invited to agree. He did not. In his solicitors’ letter of26 April 2023 , the Claimant suggested that it was for the Court to decide what directions should be given for the trial of any preliminary issues. (C) Thereafter, the Defendant issued the PIT Application. Following issue, at no point has the Claimant modified his position. He has not consented to the application, nor has he proposed alternative directions. This is unhelpful. It also causes delay, which most claimants in defamation proceedings want to avoid. (D) I considered whether, in light of the lack of engagement, I should simply make the directions that I think are appropriate. However, I do not presently understand the basis on which the Court is being asked to determine whether, if the relevant publication bears more than one imputation concerning the Claimant, whether those imputations are distinct or have a common sting. Whilst I recognise the point, I am not aware of a preliminary issue being directed in these terms before. On one view, if the Defendant advances a ‘common sting’ meaning, that would become apparent from its case (ordered as part of the PIT directions) and the Court would consider this as part and parcel of the determination of the natural and ordinary meaning. (E) So I have ordered a hearing. If the Claimant wants to engage more constructively in the interim, and the parties are able to provide agreed joint directions for the trial of preliminary issues, then I will consider them (when time over the vacation permits) and may vacate the Hearing. (…) (G) I should sound a warning about costs. Directions for preliminary issue trials are routinely made without a hearing. If I were to conclude that the hearing that I have directed was unnecessary, then I would go on to consider whether that was as a result of the conduct of one of the parties and whether that party ought to be sanctioned with an order for costs.” g. In response to this, on26 August 2023 , the defendant’s solicitors wrote to the claimant’s solicitors inviting them once again to agree to the application. The defendant also offered to remove the second limb of its application, being the one highlighted in paragraph D of the explanatory section of Nicklin J’s order (above). h. The claimant’s solicitors confirmed their agreement to this way forward by letter dated29 August 2023 . i. By an order dated4 September 2023 , Nicklin J vacated the application hearing and directed a trial of the preliminary issues. He also directed that “costs of the Application are to be reserved to the Judge hearing the Trial of the Preliminary Issues.”
“corruption is a very, very heinous crime. Every stolen dollar robs the poor of an equal opportunity in life.”] Richard Bilton – You might have heard of Mr Amersi because he recently revealed he paid for meetings with Prince Charles, but we’re interested in the money he’s given to the Conservative Party. More than half a million pounds. [clip of Boris Johnson: “the campaign is over and the work begins, thank you all very much.”] Richard Bilton – Ten thousand pounds went to Boris Johnson’s leadership campaign. His cash also bought him facetime with leading Conservatives. Critics say this kind of access damages democracy. Peter Oborne – What is completely fascinating under Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party, is that if you give enough you are having dinner with the Prime Minister, you meet the top chap, the Prime Minister, or various cabinet ministers and you get access, it’s crony capitalism, it’s capitalism for the super-rich. Richard Bilton – We’ve been looking at Mohamed Amersi’s past and where his money comes from. Well some of it comes from this company in Sweden. A company fined almost a billion dollars for bribery. Richard Bilton – Telia employed Mr Amersi as a consultant. He earned big fees for helping them structure telecoms deals in some notoriously corrupt countries. Like Uzbekistan. In 2007 Telia worked with Gulnara Karimova, the daughter of the then president of Uzbekistan. Her family, the Karimovs, had a reputation for corruption. Prof Kristian Lasslett (Uzbekistan Expert) – In order to gain access to the golden goose there was a gatekeeper and that gatekeeper was the eldest daughter of the president. Gulnara Karimova ran a umm racket in Uzbekistan, it was an organised crime racket and if you wanted to make a load of money you had to go and be her business partner. Richard Bilton – Telia became Gulnara Karimova’s partner by giving shares to an offshore shell company she secretly controlled. Three years later Telia bought most of the shares back for$220 million dollars. The American authorities say this was a$220 million dollar bribe. We have now obtained documents that show how Mr Amersi was involved in the deal. In one email the Telia boss writes “I do not want to be involved in [sic] the day to day negotiations so maybe you can handle it”
"You would have thought… that there should be some sort of obligation placed on them in law, to enquire a little bit into where that large sum of money comes from. In recent months, Mr Amersi has been drawn into a "cash for access" row centred around claims that high-spending Tory donors were able to gain regular meetings with the prime minister and chancellor. [Photo of Gulnara Karimova] [Caption: A company owned by Gulnara Karimova was linked to the deal] Mr Amersi's name is featured in a leak of almost 12 million documents and files known as the Pandora Papers. They detail the workings of offshore financial firms in locations including the British Virgin Islands, Panama and Singapore. On Sunday, the BBC revealed how documents showed the King of Jordan amassed a secret property empire, and the Azerbaijani president and his associates have been involved in property deals in the UK worth more than£400m . The leaked documents also showed how the former UK prime minister Tony Blair and his wife, Cherie, bought a London property for£6.45 million in an offshore deal that saved them£312,000 in stamp duty. The documents show Mr Amersi purchased two properties in the UK – a Mayfair townhouse and country home in Gloucestershire using secretive offshore companies. Further investigations by the BBC and its media partners have indicated Mr Amersi was involved in negotiations that resulted in$220m being paid to a Gibraltar-based company. The firm was secretly owned through an offshore company by Gulnara Karimova, the daughter of the then president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov. Telia had given her shares in one of its companies in 2007 and three years later agreed to buy most of the stock back for$220m - a move US authorities described in a criminal prosecution as a "bribe payment... in order to continue its telecoms business in Uzbekistan"