“I shall direct myself in accordance with this succinct and helpful statement of the law, and will make only one additional comment. In the passage just cited, Swanwick J drew a distinction between a recognised practice followed without mishap, and one which in the light of common sense or increased knowledge is clearly bad. The distinction is indeed valid and sufficient for many cases. The two categories are not, however, exhaustive: as the present actions demonstrate. The practice of leaving employees unprotected against excessive noise had never been followed “without mishap.”
“However, where an employer cannot know the extent of any particular employee’s exposure over the period of his employment, knows or ought to know that exposure is variable, and knows or ought to know the potential maximum as well as the potential minimum, a reasonable and prudent employer, taking positive thought for the safety of his workers, would have to take thought for the risks involved in the potential maximum exposure. Only if he could be reassured that none of these employees would be sufficiently exposed to be at risk could he safely ignore it.”
“Before 1965 neither the industry generally, nor those responsible for safety and health, nor the Factory Inspectorate, nor the medical profession, suggested that it was necessary, or even that it would be prudent, for risks arising from familial exposure to be addressed by the industry. In truth, the alarm did not sound until late 1965, when it began to be appreciated that there could be no safe or permissible level of exposure, direct or indirect, to asbestos dust. Thereafter, the learning curve about the risks arising from familial exposure was fairly steep. In my judgment, however, Morland J’s conclusion that the risk of serious injury to Mrs Maguire’s health was ‘reasonably foreseeable, indeed obvious’ to her husband’s employers is not sustainable.”
“Mr Rawlinson criticises Aikens LJ’s formulation of the test because it includes the phrase ‘unacceptable risk of asbestos-related injury’. He says that the word ‘unacceptable’ should be omitted. I reject that submission. Anyone who works or lives in proximity to asbestos faces some risk of mesothelioma. It is possible to reduce that risk by taking available precautions. It is not possible to eliminate it altogether. The residual risk or the risk which remains after taking all proper precautions may be regarded as an ‘acceptable’ risk.” 32. In formulating the test of foreseeability, there was some difference between members of the court about the appropriateness of the concept of an “acceptable risk”
“(a) The first question is whether Anglia should at any time during Mr Bussey’s employment – that is, between 1965 and 1968 … - have been aware that the exposure to asbestos dust which his work involved gave rise to a significant risk of asbestos-related injury. (I say ‘significant’ only so as to exclude risks which are purely fanciful: any real risk, albeit statistically small, of a fatal illness is significant.) That will depend on how quickly the knowledge, first widely published in 1965, of the fact that much lower exposures than had previously been thought to be dangerous could cause mesothelioma was disseminated among reasonable and prudent employers whose employees had to work with asbestos. One aspect of this question is whether, even though Anglia may have been aware of the risk in general terms, it was reasonable for it at the material time to believe that there was a level of exposure below which there was no significant risk, and that Mr Bussey’s exposure was below that level. (b) If the answer to the first question is that Anglia should have been aware that Mr Bussey’s exposure gave rise to such a risk (including that there was no known safe limit) the second question is whether it took proper precautions to reduce or eliminate that risk.” 33. Finally, the weight to be attached to TDN13 was also considered. Three conclusions are relevant: (a) As Jackson LJ put it in para. 47 of the judgment, TDN13 did not establish a “bright line” to be applied in all cases arising out of the period 1970 to 1976. In other words, TDN 13 should not be read as a “universal test of foreseeability in mesothelioma cases.”
“it is necessary to look at the information which a reasonable employer in the defendant’s position at the relevant time should have acquired and then to determine what risks such an employer should have foreseen.”
“When a victim contracts mesothelioma each person who has, in breach of duty, been responsible for exposing the victim to a significant quantity of asbestos dust and thus creating a ‘material increase in risk’ of the victim contracting the disease will be held to be jointly and severally liable for causing the disease.”
“107. Liability for mesothelioma falls on anyone who has materially increased the risk of the victim contracting the disease. What constitutes a material increase of risk? The parties were, I think, agreed that the insertion of the word “material” is intended to exclude an increase of risk that is so insignificant that the court will properly disregard it on the de minimis principle … 108. I doubt whether it is ever possible to define, in quantitative terms, what for the purposes of the application of any principle of law is de minimis. This must be a question for the judge on the facts of the particular case. In the case of mesothelioma, a stage must be reached at which, even allowing for the possibility that exposure to asbestos can have a cumulative effect, a particular exposure is too insignificant to be taken into account, having regard to the overall exposure that has taken place. … 111. The reality is that in the current state of knowledge about the disease, the only circumstances in which a court will be able to conclude that wrongful exposure of a mesothelioma victim to asbestos dust did not materially increase the victim’s risk of contracting the disease will be where the exposure was insignificant compared to the exposure from other sources.”
“… the Newhouse and Thompson report and The Sunday Times article raised concerns to much lower levels of exposure to asbestos than had previously been understood. He accepted it was then suggested there was no safe level of exposure and the report had identified concerns with exposure at very low levels, causing very serious illness.”