“(a) the meanings of each of the publications complained of; (b) whether each of those meanings is a statement of fact or a statement of opinion; and (c) whether each of those meanings is defamatory of the Claimant at common law.”
“i) The governing principle is reasonableness. ii) The intention of the publisher is irrelevant. iii) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve. iv) Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task. v) Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties. vi) Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected. vii) It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense. viii) The publication must be read as a whole, and any 'bane and antidote' taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic "rogues' gallery" case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (e.g. bane and antidote cases). ix) In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication. x) No evidence, beyond publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning. xi) The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication's readership. xii) Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader. xiii) In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the claimant's pleaded meaning).”
“9. Leading Counsel for Mr French was right to submit that although political speech does not require special rules of interpretation, a political context nevertheless has an impact on the way in which the question of meaning must be approached. I accept that reasonable readers understand that political discourse is often passionate and is not as precise as, say, financial journalism. There is a particular need to avoid over-analysis when determining the meaning of political speech.”
“when determining whether the words complained of contain allegations of fact or opinion, the court will be guided by the following points: (i) The statement must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact. (ii) Opinion is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation etc. (iii) The ultimate question is how the word would strike the ordinary reasonable reader. The subject matter and context of the words may be an important indicator of whether they are fact or opinion. (iv) Some statements which are, by their nature and appearance opinion, are nevertheless treated as statements of fact where, for instance, the opinion implies that a claimant has done something but does not indicate what that something is, ie the statement is a bare comment. (v) Whether an allegation that someone has acted ‘dishonestly’ or ‘criminally’ is an allegation of fact or expression of opinion will very much depend upon context. There is no fixed rule that a statement that someone has been dishonest must be treated as an allegation of fact.”
“The statutory test refers to the ‘statement complained of’, not the meaning of that statement, or the imputation it conveys. It is common ground that for this reason the wording of the preliminary issue in this case was not quite right. Btu Mr Hudson accepts that the judge asked himself the right question: whether the words used were a statement of opinion or of fact.”
“At common law, a meaning is defamatory and therefore actionable if it satisfies two requirements. The first, known as ‘the consensus requirement’, is that the meaning must be one that ‘tends to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally’. The judge has to determine ‘whether the behaviour or views that the offending statement attributes to a claimant are contrary to common, shared values of our society’: Monroe v Hopkins[2017] EWHC 433 (QB) ;[2017] 4 WLR 68 at [51]. The second requirement is known as the ‘threshold of seriousness’. To be defamatory, the imputation must be one that would tend to have a ‘substantially adverse effect’ on the way that people would treat the claimant: Thornton v Telegraph Media Group[2010] EWHC 1414 (QB) ;[2011] 1 WLR 1985 at [98] (Tugendhat J).”
“the Claimant has been misusing his position as a journalist by reporting news which he knows to be false and making allegations which he knows to be baseless for the purpose of misleading his audience and creating attention for himself.”
“Please sign this petition to stop [link to the Petition]”
“Please sign this petition to stop negative reporting [link to the petition]”
“the Claimant has been misusing his position as a journalist by reporting news which he knows to be false and making allegations which he knows to be baseless for the purpose of misleading his audience and creating attention for himself and had been engaged in a filthy campaign of reporting fake news which he knew had no basis in reality, including the reporting of distorted facts and shockingly baseless claims, in breach of the rules of the UK media watchdog Ofcom, and by reason of which he deserved to be exposed, especially in the UK, and action taken against his employers by the Pakistani government.”
“the Claimant had knowingly distorted the facts in his reporting, including publishing a video with others which contained many lies.”
“the Claimant was a corrupt journalist.”
“the Claimant had been knowingly misleading people through his journalism and is corrupt and a traitor to his home country of Pakistan.”
“the Claimant had been knowingly misleading people through his journalism and is corrupt and a traitor to his home country of Pakistan and had been misusing his position as a journalist by reporting news which he knows to be false and making allegations which he knows to be baseless for the purpose of misleading his audience and creating attention for himself.”