“(1) The Claimant has engaged upon, supported and encouraged a campaign of online abuse and harassment of a 16-year-old girl, conduct which has also incited her followers to make death threats towards her. (2) By so doing, the Claimant is a serial abuser and has acted (a) hypocritically: by complaining about being the victim of online abuse and death threats herself whilst at the same time committing serial abuse of someone who has in consequence herself now been subjected to death threats (but someone who, unlike the Claimant, cannot afford additional security protection); (b) recklessly and irresponsibly: by provoking her followers to subject the 16-year-old to further abuse and harassment, including death threats; and (c) obscenely.”
“By 4pm on23 June 2021 the Defendant do file and serve an Amended Defence. Such Amended Defence must not rely on sections 2 or 3 of theDefamation Act 2013 . No permission is given to make any amendments other than the deletion of reliance on those defences. If permission to amend is to be sought an application must be made to the court of first instance.”
“The basis of our objection to these parts of the AmDef and the corresponding parts of your client’s statement is that they are impermissible pleading of – and witness evidence as to – allegations not complained of, particulars that are not admissible under the Burstein principle, and an attempt at pleading inadmissible particulars of general bad reputation. If you do not agree to remove the parts of the AmDef and witness statement as above, we reserve the right to apply for their strike out at the start of trial.”
“The defence also pleads matters relating to Ms Riley’s pleaded particulars as to publication, serious harm to her reputation (section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 ), and remedy. Unlike the substantive defences, these are matters which it [is] Ms Riley’s responsibility to establish in due course, if so advised, and Mr Sivier is entitled to put her to proof. They were not canvassed in detail before me, and I am not satisfied of a clear basis for a ruling at this stage relating to these aspects of Mr Sivier’s defence.” (Emphasis added.)
“Celebrate good times, come on!” adding a celebration emoji and a link to an article with the headline “Lord Sugar says he will leave the country if Jeremy Corbyn is PM”
“This is disgusting. A Jewish man says he will leave the country out of concern for the safety of his children and grandchildren if @jeremycorbyn takes power @OwenJones84 wants to celebrate ‘good times’. He thinks it is funny? 4.3k likes? What has this country become?”
“Mocking Alan Sugar has absolutely nothing to do with him being Jewish and it is absolutely disgraceful that you would imply this.” (Tweet 2) [Tweet 1] “I love comedy. Equal opportunities offensive works for me… Seriously.”
“The Jewish man was @Lord_Sugar, the commentator @OwenJones84. Out of context, this could have nothing to do with antisemitism. For the thousands agreeing with Owen, many, as they’ve said, had no idea he was Jewish, just think he’s a #%*$. To those people, fine. No AS, obviously” “But IN context, Alan Sugar, has echoed the voices of 40% of British Jews who’ve said they would seriously consider leaving if Corbyn was elected. IN context 85% of British Jews (along with over 30%+ of others) have said they believe JC is an antisemite, and they worry about it.”
“The fact that Alan Sugar is Jewish has nothing to do with him being nasty. Also, a little reminder that Jeremy Corbyn is a PACIFIST and has won peace prizes. Do you really think that man would willingly persecute and spread racial abuse towards Jews? The Tories are racist enough”
“It’s not being ignored. You will find that the majority of the Labour Party stand with Jewish people, including Jeremy Corbyn. As I’ve said before, it’s the media and people like Rachel who wrongly use their platforms to spread the propaganda against Corbyn.” (Emphasis added.)
“No Rosie it’s still being ignored by the LP and if you really think that Jewish people believe Corbyn would stand with them, you are deluded. Not even your own Jewish MPs are protected within the party – look at the abuse @lucianaberger and @RuthSmeeth get in a daily basis”
“Being anti-Israel doesn’t = antisemitism. Being anti-Israel is because of this. As @tania_shew has said, Israel is a country that many Jewish people have never visited and is far away but simply shares the same ethnicity of many British Jews [link to Guardian article ‘Palestinian minister delivers Israel ‘war crimes’ referral to ICC’]”
“On a separate note, a HUGE, MASSIVE heartfelt thank you to each and every person calling #Antisemitism out, showing your support, challenging the ignorant or the bigoted, or even just by fact checking what you’re reading in this whole awful tale. It's been a long weekend. [heart emoji]”
“… You must see that what she tweeted was wrong. I’d be happy to delete my tweets if she deletes hers and apologises to Rachel. I’ll even point her towards some reading on modern antisemitism. What I won’t do is ignore it when I see it”
“Before I have a break from Twitter, I would like to say this. Yesterday, I made a mistake in confusing religion and ethnicity by saying Rachel wasn’t Jewish as she’s an atheist, which caused offence. For that, I apologise – mistakes happen and I take responsibility for that.”
“I got death threats this morning. Will it stop us? Nope. We’re young people fighting for a better future and nobody will silence us. Solidarity guys x”
“Me: : I don’t think I could get anymore pissed off tonight Rachel Riley: [gif]”
“How come I blocked Rachel Riley but she’s still replying to me?!? [frowning face emoji] What have I done wrong?”
“Rachel Riley releases a podcast about antibullying when she … • Encouraged a pile on – I had people calling me an antisemite to my face • Continued to pester me • Told her I could never be antisemitic – people calling me a dark spot on my relatives who fought against holocaust”
“105. … A 16-year-old girl named Rosie has an account called [Rose’s Twitter handle]. Wise well beyond her years, she, like me, had been disgusted at Riley’s promotion of vicious bullies such as GnasherJew, and called her out on it. [Ms Riley’s tweet at paragraph 35 above and Rose’s tweet (Tweet 9) at paragraph 36 above.] 106. As is her wont, Riley rather dodged the point altogether. Rosie responded. Aged 16, she has a grasp of events miles in advance of our global laughing stock of a media. [Mr Lawson inserted a tweet from Ms Riley which was not part of her thread addressed to Rose, in which she said, “Or Ruth Smeeth was the victim of racism and for that she was abused. Meanwhile Wadsworth is eventually expelled by the NCC following a 2 year enquiry and you spout this inflammatory rubbish. [link to YouTube video]”
“Don’t you dare suggest that I, the all-seeing, all-knowing Rachel Riley, am wrong on any of this. I would appreciate an apology. And my views are more important than yours.” [The underlined words were hyperlinked to Tweet 72 (paragraph 48 above).] 108. Wisely, Rosie went on to block Rachel. Unfortunately though, the way Twitter works, if you block someone with a large following, you still receive replies from everyone else commenting on the same thread. Not only that, but Riley’s supporters were offended, so a pile-on began. Against a 16-year-old child. 109. This was not Riley’s responsibility exactly; not at this stage, at least. She never wrote directly to Rosie again; she didn’t directly encourage the dogpiling. But as a public figure, the lack of responsibility or remorse she’s demonstrated for the horrendous bullying Rosie has experienced has been horribly instructive. And as I noted above, she has no compunction with encouraging it towards … more or less the entire Labour support on Twitter either. 110. Poor Rosie pleaded for Riley to do something. Instead, Riley took a screenshot of Rosie’s latest comments, posted them for her followers, doubled down on the Palestinian flags, red roses and GTTO hashtags, and quite unbelievably, decided to include Rosie’s original comments to her in a tweet saying “every week @LabourAgainstAS does a review of the last 7 day’s worth of AS, if you’re interested, follow them”
“Debating issues is one thing. Bullying, aggressive, & insulting is something entirely different. To have left wing views is not a crime, nor is supporting Corbyn. By all means debate, but keep it within acceptable boundaries.”
“88. In my article, I suggested that Riley “wanted Rosie taught a lesson”; which probably explains her standing back and watching her great pal Oberman harass Rosie to within an inch of her life, before interjecting to support the aggressor. … 95. But entirely true to form, she reserved her absolute, contemptible worst for, yet again, poor Rosie… and her father. On Tuesday, Riley authored an execrable thread which can only be described as targeted harassment towards both of them. … 96. First, she attacked Rosie’s Dad for the obviously damnable crime of … standing up for his daughter against Riley and Oberman’s disgusting bullying. [Ms Riley’s Tweets 217 and 218 (paragraph 89 above.] 97. Then she defended Oberman, lying through her teeth in so doing. Remember: Riley had been privy to a huge number of tweets which Oberman had sent Rosie. She knew exactly what was going on. [The underlined words are hyperlinked to Ms Riley’s 15 January thread (Tweets 216-218; paragraphs 89-92 above).] … 99. And then she turned her attentions towards Rosie herself. Limbo dancing under a lower bar than ever, Riley used a 16-year-old child’s mental health issues against her: repeating Oberman’s vile slurs, before concluding with probably the worst, most disgusting tweet I’ve ever seen from a public figure not named Donald Trump. [Ms Riley’s Tweets 224, 225 and 227 (paragraphs 90 and 92 above).] 100. No Rachel. No adults are ‘using a child’s profile’; it’s you who is abusing a child. In public. In plain sight. While your pathetic, amoral followers watch on. ‘Social workers’? Shame on you. 101. Rosie’s teachers have, thank heavens, already stepped in. The consequences of Riley and Oberman’s obscene conduct have been as follows: (1) Rosie’s Twitter account has been hacked several times, by people trying to delete screenshots. Now why might that be…? (2) People have tried to track down her family address and her devastated mother’s Facebook page. (3) Someone eavesdropped on Rosie in class and tried to sell the story to The Sun. Which in keeping with its reputation of being lower than vermin, printed something … before deleting it hours later. (4) She has people in college believing she’s an anti-Semite. (5) She, a 16-year-old child, has received death threats. 102. Thanks entirely to Riley, Rosie was subjected to yet another pile-on from the effluent tendency. She spent all Tuesday evening in floods of tears … and later, a friend issued the following heartbreaking tweets: [Rose’s Tweets 237-239 (paragraph 94 above).]” [Ms Riley’s Tweets 217 and 218 (paragraph 89 above.] [Ms Riley’s Tweets 224, 225 and 227 (paragraphs 90 and 92 above).] (1) Rosie’s Twitter account has been hacked several times, by people trying to delete screenshots. Now why might that be…? (2) People have tried to track down her family address and her devastated mother’s Facebook page. (3) Someone eavesdropped on Rosie in class and tried to sell the story to The Sun. Which in keeping with its reputation of being lower than vermin, printed something … before deleting it hours later. (4) She has people in college believing she’s an anti-Semite. (5) She, a 16-year-old child, has received death threats. [Rose’s Tweets 237-239 (paragraph 94 above).]”
“The Countdown co-presenter Rachel Riley has revealed she is to be given extra security on the Channel 4 game show after being abused online for her criticism of antisemitism in the Labour party. Riley, who is Jewish, said she had been targeted by Labour supporters on Twitter for her criticisms of the party and its leader, Jeremy Corbyn. She has already spoken about being trolled online, but said the problem had worsened and included physical threats. …”
“i) The protection of reputation is the primary function of the law of defamation and section 1 is concerned with harm to the reputation of the claimant, being harm of the kind represented by general damage, rather than special damage: Lachaux, Lord Sumption JSC (with whom all members of the court agreed), [15] and [19]. ii) Section 1 imposes a higher threshold of seriousness than the common law rules ‘which were seen unduly to favour the protection of reputation at the expense of freedom of expression’: Lachaux, Lord Sumption [1], [12]; Turley, Nicklin J, [107(i)]. The provision was intended to effect ‘a substantial change to the law of defamation’: Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [16]. As Saini J emphasised in George v Cannell[2021] EWHC 2988 (QB) ; [2021] 4 W.L.R. 145, [117], it is important not to lose sight of the statutory qualifier serious harm. iii) The court should assess whether the serious harm test is met in respect of each statement individually, not cumulatively: Sube v News Group Newspapers Ltd[2018] EWHC 1961 (QB) ; [2018] 1 W.L.R. 5767, Warby J, [22]. iv) There is no presumption of serious harm. A claimant must demonstrate as a fact that the publication of the statement he complains of has caused or is likely to cause harm to his reputation that is ‘serious’: Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [12]-[16], [21]; Turley, Nicklin J, [107(iv)]. v) The propositions that (i) the publication ‘has caused’ serious harm to the claimant’s reputation and that (ii) it ‘is likely to’ cause such harm are each propositions of fact which necessarily call for an investigation of the actual impact of the statement. When determining whether a statement ‘has caused’ serious harm, the focus is on historic harm. What were the consequences for the claimant’s reputation, in terms of the actual impact on those to whom the statement was communicated? When determining whether a statement ‘is likely to’ cause serious harm, the focus is on probable future harm. Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [14]-[15]; Turley, Nicklin J, [107(ii)-(iv)]. vi) Whether a publication causes serious harm depends on the reactions of others, rather than the perception of the claimant: Economou v De Freitas[2016] EWHC 1853 (QB) ; [2017] E.M.L.R. 4 , Warby J, [131]. The assessment of harm to the claimant’s reputation may take account of the impact of the publication on those who do not know the claimant but might get to know him in the future: Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [25]. vii) A claimant who has the burden of proving that a statement caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to his reputation may do so by evidence directly going to prove such harm, or by inference from other facts. A claimant may produce evidence from those who watched, heard or read the statement complained of about its impact on him, but his case will not necessarily fail for want of such evidence: Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [21], Turley, Nicklin J, [107(vi)]. The difficulties of obtaining such evidence from those in whose eyes the claimant’s reputation was damaged are obvious and well-recognised: Sobrinho v Impresa Publishing SA[2016] EWHC 66 (QB) ; [2016] E.M.L.R. 12 , Dingemans J, [48]; Economou v De Freitas[2018] EWCA Civ 2591 ; [2019] E.M.L.R. 7, Sharp LJ (with whom all members of the court agreed), [28] and [31]; Turley, Nicklin J, [109(ii)]. Comments posted online by those who have watched, heard or read the publication ‘can be evidence of reputational harm, to the extent they can be said to be a natural and probable consequence of the publication complained of’: Economou, Warby J, [129]. viii) Sometimes inference may be enough, but it cannot always be so. The evidence may or may not justify an inference of serious harm. Inferences of fact as to the seriousness of harm done to a claimant’s reputation may be drawn from the evidence as a whole, including the meaning of the words, the scale and circumstances of publication, the claimant’s situation and the inherent probabilities: Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [21]; Turley, Nicklin J, [107(vi)-(vii)] and [108] (citing Warby J’s judgment in Lachaux, which Lord Sumption considered to be ‘coherent and correct, for substantially the reasons he gave’: Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [20]). Even a seriously harmful allegation about a person may not cause serious harm to their reputation if those within the jurisdiction to whom it has been made consist only of people whose opinion of the claimant is of no consequence to the claimant and/or those who are unlikely to have believed the words complained of: see Ames v Spamhaus Project Ltd[2015] EWHC 127 (QB) ; [2015] 1 W.L.R. 3409, Warby J, [92(8)]; Economou, Warby J, [68]. ix) If it is shown that the claimant already had a bad reputation in the relevant sector of his life, that will reduce the harm: see, albeit in the context of assessment of damages: Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd[2021] EWHC 1797 (QB) ; [2022] E.M.L.R. 2 , Nicklin J, [209]; and Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [16] (and see the recognition that assessment of whether the serious harm test is met and assessment of the measure of general damage ‘raise a similar question of causation’: Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [24]). The evidence that is admissible is limited to evidence of general bad reputation in the sector: Gatley on Libel and Slander, 13th ed., 34.081-34.091. Rumours are not admissible: Umeyor v Innocent Ibe[2016] EWHC 862 (QB) , Warby J, [78]. x) Evidence of damage to the claimant’s reputation done by earlier publications of the same matter is legally irrelevant to the question whether serious harm was caused, or is likely to be caused, by the publication complained of: Lachaux, Lord Sumption, [24] (accepting that Warby J was entitled to apply the Dingle rule in applying s.1 of the 2013 Act). However, in circumstances where a claimant ‘points to some hostile remark or other adverse event in his life as evidence of harm to reputation caused by the publication complained of, and there are other possible causes of the remark or event, in the form of other publications to the same or similar effect’, the Dingle rule has no bearing in determining causation: Economou v De Freitas, Warby J, [19]. xi) The court should not ‘consider the issue of serious harm in blinkers’. Directly relevant background context (see Burstein v Times Newspapers [2001] 1 W.L.R. 579 , May LJ, [47]) may be relevant to the assessment of whether the serious harm test is met: Umeyor v Innocent Ibe, Warby J, [77]-[78]. xii) In general, a libel has greater potential to cause harm if it is published to the world at large, and if it has been published repeatedly, than if it has been published to a single person on a single occasion: Cairns v Modi[2012] EWCA Civ 1382 ; [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1015, Lord Judge CJ, [24]. But assessment of harm to reputation is not a ‘numbers game’: ‘one well-directed arrow [may] hit the bull’s eye of reputation’ and cause more damage than indiscriminate firing: King v Grundon[2012] EWHC 2719 (QB) [40], Sharp J. Very serious harm to reputation can be caused by publication to a relatively small number of publishees: Sobrinho [47]; Dhir v Saddler[2017] EWHC 3155 (QB) ; [55(i)]; Monir v Wood[2018] EWHC 3525 (QB) [196]: Turley, Nicklin J, [109(iii)]. Moreover, in an appropriate case, a claimant ‘can also rely upon the likely ‘percolation’ or ‘grapevine effect’ of defamatory publications, which has been ‘immeasurably enhanced’ by social media and modern methods of electronic communication: Cairns v Modi, Lord Judge CJ, [26] and Slipper v British Broadcasting Corporation [1991] 1 Q.B. 283, Bingham LJ, at 300’: Turley, Nicklin J, [109(i)]. xiii) A vindictive or vengeful motive for bringing the claim is not relevant to the assessment of whether the test in s.1 of the 2013 Act is met: see Economou v De Freitas, Warby J, [134].”
“… A person can have a low opinion of another and yet the other’s reputation can be harmed by a fresh defamatory allegation. An example is provided by serious allegations made against a politician of a rival party. I have recently held that it does not follow from the fact that a publishee is a political opponent of the claimant, that they will think no worse of the claimant if told that he or she has covered up sexual abuse: Barron v Collins[2017] EWHC 162 (QB) at [56]. The same line of reasoning is applicable to the different facts of this case. As Mr Bennett puts it, if someone is hated for their sexuality or their left-wing views, that does not mean that they cannot be libelled by being accused of condoning the vandalisation of a war memorial. It can add to the list of reasons to revile her.”
“I would consider a belief to be reasonable for the purposes of section 4 only if it is one arrived at after conducting such inquiries and checks as it is reasonable to expect of the particular defendant in all the circumstances of the case.” vi) A failure to invite comment from the claimant prior to publication will “no doubt always at least be the subject of consideration under subsection (1)(b) and may contribute to, perhaps even form the basis of, a conclusion that the defendant has not established that element of the defence”
“Reputation is an integral and important part of the dignity of the individual. It also forms the basis of many decisions in a democratic society which are fundamental to its well-being: whom to employ or work for, whom to promote, whom to do business with or to vote for. Once besmirched by an unfounded allegation in a national newspaper, a reputation can be damaged for ever, especially if there is no opportunity to vindicate one’s reputation. When this happens, society as well as the individual is the loser. … Protection of reputation is conducive to the public good. It is in the public interest that reputation of public figures should not be debased falsely.”
“The Claimant is a hypocrite. She complains in national print and broadcast media interviews about online abuse and receives extra protection at her TV recordings whilst at the same time, on Twitter, she abuses her power and status as an adult and a celebrity to harass and bully a defenceless child with anxiety problems, including references making it possible for onlookers to believe the child is an anti-Semite. As a consequence of her irresponsibility and recklessness, others have felt encouraged to subject the child to abuse, including death threats.”
“(1) Online bullying and harassment including death threats. (2) The power of an adult celebrity compared to the relative powerlessness of a vulnerable child suffering anxiety. (3) Mental Health. (4) Anti-Semitism. (5) The public conduct of the Claimant, a prominent public figure and, in particular statements she had made or caused to be made publicly a) in national print and broadcast media and b) on Twitter.”
“Mr Justice Nicklin said my article had asserted that Ms Riley “has engaged upon, supported and encouraged a campaign of online abuse and harassment of a 16-year-old girl, conduct which has also incited her followers to make death threats towards her.”
“I did not believe that, even had I approached Ms Riley for comment, that she would have commented. I also did not want to encourage a further tirade of abuse to be hurled at Rose. Therefore, knowing that the adage that “a lie can circle the world before the truth has got its shoes on” is a truism in the modern world of the internet, I knew that an article presenting a counter-view would need to appear as soon as possible so that its impact and relevance was not lost. I therefore published my Article on the same day as the Guardian article.”
“Rose’s own response to Ms Riley’s tweets, and in the ensuing exchange, is instructive. She gracefully acknowledged her own mistake in assuming ‘Jewish’ and ‘atheist’ mutually exclusive. She articulates her political viewpoint, and acknowledges Ms Riley’s perspective without sharing all of it. She notes the role of others including in the mainstream media in degrading the conduct and tone of the wider political debate. Rose’s reaction is cordial, engaged and self-possessed. She says herself in a later tweet of 9th January that this conversation had been ‘amicable’.”
“1. That the Defence be struck out in its entirety, alternatively that the following paragraphs of the Defence be struck out, on the grounds set out at paragraph 2 below: 1.1 the final sentence of §1; 1.2 §§8 to 35 inclusive; 1.3 §§48 to 50 inclusive. 2. The grounds for striking out the Defence in its entirety or alternatively striking out the paragraphs listed in paragraph 1 above are: 2.1 The defence of truth and its particulars are impermissibly and/or irrelevantly pleaded and disclose no proper defence. 2.2 The particulars of truth specified in the application notice do not allege primary facts in relation to the Claimant’s conduct that are properly arguable, or are impermissible as not alleging primary facts at all, or are irrelevant, or seek to reverse the burden of proof, and ought not to have been pleaded. 2.3 The impermissible inclusion in the Defence at §1 and §50 of matters pleaded being neither related to the claim nor admissible as Burstein particulars. These ought not to have been pleaded.” 1.1 the final sentence of §1; 1.2 §§8 to 35 inclusive; 1.3 §§48 to 50 inclusive. 2.1 The defence of truth and its particulars are impermissibly and/or irrelevantly pleaded and disclose no proper defence. 2.2 The particulars of truth specified in the application notice do not allege primary facts in relation to the Claimant’s conduct that are properly arguable, or are impermissible as not alleging primary facts at all, or are irrelevant, or seek to reverse the burden of proof, and ought not to have been pleaded. 2.3 The impermissible inclusion in the Defence at §1 and §50 of matters pleaded being neither related to the claim nor admissible as Burstein particulars. These ought not to have been pleaded.”