X (a Minor) (Hague Convention 1980, Article 13(b); Article 13(2)), Re [2026] EWHC 400 (Fam)

[2026] EWHC 400 (Fam)Case No FD25P00688
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 24/02/2026
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE HAYDEN
Between
MApplicantFRespondentsXRespondent
Re X (a Minor) (Hague Convention 1980, Article 13(b); Article 13(2))
Mark Jarman KC (instructed by Hughes Fowler Carruthers LLP) for ApplicantFirst Respondent appeared in person for in personAmean Elgadhy (instructed by Creighton & Partners Solicitors LLP) for Second RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 16 th and 17 th February 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 24 th February 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE HAYDENThis judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.
[1]The Court is concerned with X, a 14-year-old young male. His mother (M) makes application for his summary return to South Africa, pursuant to the Hague Convention 1980. X has been joined as a party to the proceedings and has a Guardian appointed on his behalf. M is represented by Counsel, as is X. The father (F), although previously represented, appears in-person. F seeks to defend the Hague application relying on Article 13(b) (Grave Risk of Harm); and Article 13(2) (Child’s Objections). The former is predicated on the strains that South African society is currently facing, particularly in policing serious crime. However, Johannesburg is X’s home, his mother, grandparents, nephews and extended family members live there. In this context, I do not consider that the Defence of grave risk of harm emanating from the wider political context gains any traction as an Article 13(b) Defence. This is a South African family. Though F has maintained the Defence, the real focus of this case lies in evaluating the strength and authenticity of X’s strongly expressed objections to return. The Applicable Legal Framework[2]Re IG (Child Abduction: Habitual Residence: Article 13(b)) [2021] EWCA Civ 1123:
“(1) The terms of Article 13(b) are by their very nature restricted in their scope. The defence has a high threshold, demonstrated by the use of the words “grave” and “intolerable”. (2) The focus is on the child. The issue is the risk to the child in the event of his or her return. (3) The separation of the child from the abducting parent can establish the required grave risk. (4) When the allegations on which the abducting parent relies to establish grave risk are disputed, the court should first establish whether, if they are true, there would be a grave risk that the child would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation. If so, the court must then establish how the child can be protected from the risk. (5) In assessing these matters, the court must be mindful of the limitations involved in the summary nature of the Hague process. It will rarely be appropriate to hear oral evidence of the allegations made under Article 13(b) and so neither the allegations nor their rebuttal are usually tested in cross-examination. (6) That does not mean, however, that no evaluative assessment of the allegations should be undertaken by the court. The court must examine in concrete terms the situation in which the child would be on return. In analysing whetherthe allegations are of sufficient detail and substance to give rise to the grave risk, the judge will have to consider whether the evidence enables him or her confidently to discount the possibility that they do. (7) If the judge concludes that the allegations would potentially establish the existence of an Article 13(b) risk, he or she must then carefully consider whether and how the risk can be addressed or sufficiently ameliorated so that the child will not be exposed to the risk. (8) In many cases, sufficient protection will be afforded by extracting undertakings from the applicant as to the conditions in which the child will live when he returns and by relying on the courts of the requesting State to protect him once he is there. (9) In deciding what weight can be placed on undertakings, the court has to take into account the extent to which they are likely to be effective, both in terms of compliance and in terms of the consequences, including remedies for enforcement in the requesting State, in the absence of compliance. (10) As has been made clear by the Practice Guidance on “Case Management and Mediation of International Child Abduction Proceedings” issued by the President of the Family Division on 13 March 2018, the question of specific protective measures must be addressed at the earliest opportunity, including by obtaining information as to the protective measures that are available, or could be put in place, to meet the alleged identified risks.”
[3]F has not indicated the need for nor sought any protective measures in South Africa. M sets out in detail, the circumstances in which X will be living in South Africa should a return order be made, some of which will emerge from the analysis below. X’s school, where he was boarding, has confirmed that a place remains available for him.

(b) Child’s Objections

[4]The leading case in relation to child’s objections is set out in the judgment of Black LJ (as she then was) in Re M (Republic of Ireland) (Child's Objections) (Joinder of Children as Parties to Appeal) [2015] EWCA Civ 26.[5]Williams J summarised the applicable considerations in: Re Q and V (1980 Hague Convention and Inherent Jurisdiction Summary Return) [2019] EWHC 490 (Fam) as follows [at paragraph 50]:
“The law on the 'child's objection' defence under Article 13 of the Convention is comprehensively set out in the judgment of Black LJ in Re M (Republic of Ireland)(Child's Objections)(Joinder of Children as Parties to Appeal) [2015] 2 FLR 1074 (and endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Re F (Child's Objections) [2015] EWCA Civ 1022). In summary, the position is as follows: i) The gateway stage should be confined to a straightforward and fairly robust examination of whether the simple terms of the Convention are satisfied in that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of his or her views. ii) Whether a child objects is a question of fact. The child's views have to amount to an objection before Article 13 will be satisfied. An objection in this context is to be contrasted with a preference or wish. iii) The objections of the child are not determinative of the outcome but rather give rise to a discretion. Once that discretion arises, the discretion is at large. The child's views are one factor to take into account at the discretion stage. iv) There is a relatively low threshold requirement in relation to the objections defence, the obligation on the court is to 'take account' of the child's views, nothing more. v) At the discretion stage there is no exhaustive list of factors to be considered. The court should have regard to welfare considerations, in so far as it is possible to take a view about them on the limited evidence available. The court must give weight to Convention considerations and at all times bear in mind that the Convention only works if, in general, children who have been wrongfully retained or removed from their country of habitual residence are returned, and returned promptly. vi) Once the discretion comes into play, the court may have to consider the nature and strength of the child's objections, the extent to which they are authentically the child's own or the product of the influence of the abducting parent, the extent to which they coincide or at odds with other considerations which are relevant to the child's welfare, as well as the general Convention considerations (Re M [2007] 1 AC 619). I also note that in some cases an objection to a return to one parent may be indistinguishable from a return to a country.”
[6]In P (A Child) (Abduction: Child’s Objections) [2024] EWCA Civ 1569, the Court of Appeal overturned a first instance decision where a court declined to order the return of a 15 year old who was found to have objected to a return to Spain, In delivering the lead judgment, Moylan LJ referred to In re D (A Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] 1 AC 619 and the judgment of Lady Hale:
“As any parent who has ever asked a child what he wants for tea knows, there is a large difference between taking account of a child's views and doing what he wants”
. She repeated the latter point, at [58]:
“Hearing the child is, as already stated, not to be confused with giving effect to his views”.”
Background[7]Both parties are South African nationals. There is a 23-year disparity in their ages. They met when M was 24 and F was 47. For the avoidance of doubt, I state this as part of the background facts, no disapproval or disparagement should be inferred. After a career in the Air Force, F founded a technology company which expanded into a multibillion-pound corporation. He played polo, competitively, and is reported as having competed in the World Cup, winning prestigious titles. Tragedy struck in 2007 when he suffered severe traumatic spinal injuries in a polo accident. These were life-changing and include quadriplegia. The parties married and lived in South Africa until 2013 when they moved to the United Kingdom. The marriage was to be a short one. The parties separated in 2015 and divorced.[8]In September 2017, F indicated that he was no longer able to pay maintenance to M, which had been ordered in the sum of £8000 per month. M has now issued enforcement proceedings in the Central Family Court and has obtained a Freezing Injunction. There are a number of outstanding costs Orders against the father, none of which has been paid. Though F has been a very wealthy man, his financial position is presently unclear, at least to this Court.[9]Following bitterly contested proceedings in the UK, M and X returned to South Africa in April 2018, permission to relocate having been granted by Recorder Ullstein. The Recorder delivered a written judgment, dated 3rd April 2018. In that judgment, he registered his ‘concerns’ about X’s sleeping arrangements with his father. X was then 6 years of age. The sleeping arrangements, which I will consider below, continue and I have been told by F that X has slept in his bed on at least one occasion during the course of this hearing. F amended his evidence to say that it had not been the same bed but merely the same room. I am afraid I was not convinced by that revision. X is a 14-year-old adolescent boy. These are wholly inappropriate arrangements. Indeed, though I do not believe they are expressly sexual, they are nonetheless abusive and require to be identified as such. The sleeping arrangements impede X’s emotional and psychological progression to adulthood, they compromise his ability to establish appropriate boundaries, and they undermine his development to maturity. I use unambiguous language because the father tells me he prefers plain speaking and I consider he needs to absorb this message. Recorder Ullstein made the following observations:
“55. I found it of concern that [X] told Ms Ware [Independent Social Worker] that he sleeps with his Father because his father likes him to. It does not seem to me that is sensible or reasonable for a Father to share a bed with a six year old child other than on occasions when the child creeps into the parent’s bed because he is unwell or distressed by a nightmare or similar cause. 56. Equally, it is illuminating that after speaking to Ms Ware, [X] was worried that he had said the wrong thing and that his father might be unhappy with him.”
[10]For the avoidance of any possible doubt, my concerns are far greater, for obvious reasons, than those expressed by the Recorder. X is now 14. It is also important to note that the Recorder was extremely critical of F’s behaviour more generally: “he lashes out indiscriminately at those who disagree with his point of view”; “he lacks insight into what is in the best interests of [X]”; “he was placing far too great a burden on the shoulders of a six year old boy who plainly worried about his father”; X became tired and “probably overwhelmed by his Father saying how much he would miss him” [after contact]; “[X] told Ms Ware that he understands what pleases his father and tries to please him and is worried if he says the wrong thing”.[11]All this led to the Recorder concluding:
“69. Overall, I was left with the clear impression that the Mother was right when she said in cross-examination that the Father uses [X] to fulfil his own needs, rather than considering what is in his best interests... 70. ... She came across as a sensible, good mother who gave careful consideration to her evidence. 71. I also consider that the concerns she raised over sexual matters were raised out of a genuine concern and not out of any malice. Indeed, as it transpired, staff admitted to Ms Ware that two of them had dressed up in provocative lingerie for the Father and allowed photographs to be taken of them.”
[12]It is necessary to emphasise that these are findings made following a contested hearing. They are, accordingly, established facts. They have not been appealed. They therefore constitute a compelling feature of the evidential canvas at this hearing and provide a secure factual matrix from which to consider the issues raised in this application, which are strikingly similar.[13]M’s parents are financially comfortable and have supported her and her son both financially and more generally. As I understand it, they live in a gated community with the maternal uncle living nearby, in the same development. X has been very close to his Italian born grandmother, whose company and cooking he plainly enjoyed. Though he had a different relationship with his grandfather, that too was a close one. I was told that they both enjoyed solving maths problems together. X enjoyed a full and active life in South Africa, which involved swimming, cycling and playing golf with his uncle. X is also a keen chess player, quickly outstripping his uncle’s aptitude for the game (his uncle told me this in evidence in these proceedings, which I will turn to below). X also had a gentle and nurturing relationship with his uncle’s younger son. M told the social worker, undertaking a Section 37 Report ordered within these proceedings (Report dated 10th February 2026), that X is a “sociable child” and was “House Captain” at school. He enjoyed “sleepovers and spending time with friends”.[14]M said that her aspiration is for X to be “a normal teenager”. That, superficially, contrasts with F’s Olympian ambitions for X. In my assessment of the evidence however, it is normality that M sees as the priority but not inconsistent with X’s aspirations to compete in clay pigeon shooting at Olympic level. Indeed, the stability, security and support of his loving extended family might very well prove to be a stronger platform from which to promote X’s sporting ambitions. M considers that X’s London life consists of “daily shooting, eating at fancy restaurants and non-sociable things”. Though that is not entirely accurate, it nonetheless captures the essence of X’s London life, which I have heard about over the last two days. Life for X in London is in stark contrast to his busy and sociable South African life, populated, as it is, with such wide and secure support for him.[15]Though F copes with his disability with quite remarkable and, in many ways, inspiring phlegmatism, it inevitably tethers him in practical ways. This too impacts on X, whose own life becomes more circumscribed in consequence of his unhealthy dependence on F. The two, I am satisfied, spend a great deal of time together. This has on the overwhelming evidence filed, become a mutually unhealthy and interdependent relationship. Though the word toxic is much overused, it is a singularly apposite word to describe this distorted father-son relationship. The 14-year-old X cannot recognise this; it has now become too entrenched a pattern. What he did not have the guile to conceal at 6-years-old when he “told Ms Ware that he understands what pleases his father and tries to please him and is worried if he says the wrong thing”, he now conceals and denies. The same dynamic however, manifestly, continues. It is plain that X has read a great of the papers in this case, or at least had their contents extensively revealed to him by his father. Exposure to conflict of this kind, in such detail and for such duration, has demonstrably taken its toll on X’s mental health. F appears entirely oblivious to this. I have no doubt that that F will ensure that X reads this judgment and will seek to nullify and traduce it. There is some evidence that F intimidates X by telling him that if the Court returns him to South Africa, “it will be his fault”. It is important that X hears this loudly and clearly; none of this is his fault. F’s own manoeuvrings in the litigation frequently mean that the most cogent evidence against him is provided by himself.[16]In January 2025, F commenced proceedings in South Africa seeking to relocate X to England. In February 2025, Dr. Lynette Roux, Clinical Psychologist, was jointly instructed to undertake a psychological assessment in respect of X, his best interests and the proposed relocation to England. The report was filed on 23rd June 2025. In May 2025 before Adams J, sitting in the High Court, Johannesburg refused F’s application for X to be separately represented.[17]The report of Dr. Roux extends to 159 pages. It is a thorough and detailed piece of work. As part of her assessment, Dr. Roux travelled to London and saw F at his home with X. Her report is a blistering critique of F’s parenting style and behaviour. Factoring in that she was assessing a young person of 14, it nonetheless echoes much of the analysis in Recorder Ullstein’s judgment, some 8 years earlier. In it, she makes the following findings:
“[F] has a turbulent personality style of functioning which means that he can be quite charismatic and charming and will easily convince others of his views. This extends to [F] also being able to convince others to believe in things they ordinarily would not believe in, or to do things that they ordinarily would not agree to. This is highly functional in the workplace and [F] has a history of having been very successful in business. However, it is evident that this style of functioning has negatively played out in [F]’s relationships. His tendency towards compulsivity also means that he will relentlessly pursue his wishes and goals. It appears that this tendency has resulted in [F] disregarding court orders based on his reasoning.” “[F]’s insatiable appetite for recognition and affirmation appears to have filtered into his parenting of [X]. It is evident that [X] and others have come under [F]’s allure and in order to gain his approval they must comply with his demands and give him the recognition and affirmation that he requires. An example of this is when [X] did not want to comply with the stringent training schedule for his cycling that [F] demanded and [F] then threatened to remove his bicycle, and support. Furthermore, [X] was led to believe that he deserved this withdrawal of approval. The concern raised is that this dynamic leads to an emmeshed relationship. It appears that [I], [F]’s adult daughter also experienced a similar dynamic with [F].” “Considering the above, [F] has a very strong psychological need for [X] to come and live with him, to pursue a career in clay pigeon shooting, and to be extremely successful in this in order for [F] to fulfil his psychological needs. [F] firmly believes that in pursuing this it is in [X]’s best interests, and that [F] is only doing this in order to help [X] fulfil his own dream. In pursuing this [F] has embarked on a process of alienating [X] from his mother and maternal family.”
[18]Dr. Roux describes how F’s personality and parenting style has had an adverse impact on X’s ability to assert his own autonomy:
“It is deeply concerning that in [F]’s attempt to have [X] relocate to the UK, he has effectively manipulated and seriously influenced [X]’s authentic ‘voice’ in various ways. The influencing of [X] is reported by various collateral sources and includes [F] informing [X] that he will hate his mother, that he will not have time for his mother, that he must fight his mother, etc. This cannot be seen to be in [X]’s best interest in any way.”
[19]As a Litigant in Person and one confident in his own intellectual strengths, comfortable speaking in public, F’s questions to the Cafcass Officer were, for the most part, assertions of his own case. In that process, he postulated that children, certainly up to their teenage years, had to be “guided by their parents’ decision making”. He appeared to see this in linear terms, i.e. that a child might take decisions at a particular age, but not before. He did not appear to recognise that these concepts might be more subtle and nuanced. As F’s ‘questions’ evolved, it struck me that he appeared to regard it is his role to decide all X’s significant choices and in every sphere of his life. This resonates entirely with Dr. Roux’s assessment.[20]Though M’s confidence as a parent has undoubtedly been bruised by F’s behaviour and X’s appallingly disdainful treatment of her, she has managed to retain a capacity to cope. Dr. Roux notes:
“There is no evidence of serious psychopathology in [M]’s psychological profile. Compulsivity is a dynamic in her functioning that was revealed by her psychological assessment along with some anxiety. However, neither of these findings were found to be at a level that would significantly compromise her daily functioning.”
[21]There is abundant evidence, as I have foreshadowed, that F has embroiled X in these proceedings to an alarming degree. By contrast, M has kept silent in an attempt to reduce conflict. However, as both Dr. Roux and X’s Guardian have noted, this generated a paradox which is difficult for M to resolve. Dr. Roux expresses it thus:
“[M]’s attempts at shielding [X] from various dynamics relevant to [F]’s functioning have resulted in [X] being drawn into [F] manipulations to obtain the adoration he requires. [M]’s attempts at trying to do what is correct has contributed to the current scenario where [X] has effectively been alienated from her.”
[22]In the South African proceedings, X said F wanted “his own attorney to fight my mother”. This, as Mr Jarman KC, Counsel on behalf of M submits, encapsulates the degree to which X has become hostile to M. It reflects, entirely, F’s own approach to M. The occasional positives peppered into his discussions about M, when talking to the professionals, are platitudinous, insincere, and self-serving, contrasting markedly with the bullying and patronising tone he uses to her in the private correspondence by email (which has continued right up to this judgment). Lamentably, this tone is also heard in X’s references to M. His behaviour towards his mother is shameful. It is not the attitude of a ‘gentleman’, which he regards as his “brand” (according to F), it is boorish and coarse. Though it is all done to slate F’s needs, he nonetheless lets himself down badly. My short meeting with him, his Counsel attending, convened at his request, revealed him to be a young man of far greater quality and potential. I repeat, I recognise that all this behaviour stems from F’s malign influence. Nonetheless, X is an intelligent and articulate boy who can recognise the vulgarity of his behaviour towards his mother. I feel instinctively confident that he would not speak to her in these demeaning terms if I, as the judge, were in the room. If I am correct, it follows that he knows his behaviour is wrong.[23]Dr. Roux analyses the impact on X thus:
“It is evident that [X] is very concerned about his father, that he wants his father’s approval and at the same time feels responsible for his father’s emotional well-being. Being an anxious child [X] is particularly anxious that he will lose his father’s affection if he does not comply with his father’s requirements and demands. [X] has experienced this previously when his father has removed his approval and affection when [X] has not complied with his demands.”
[24]I interpose at this point that this is exactly what Recorder Ullstein recounts in his judgment. Dr. Roux continues:
“There is also serious concern about the nature of [X]’s relationship with his father. It appears that in order to fulfil his own psychological needs, [F] has developed an enmeshed relationship with [X] which has serious implications for [X]’s ongoing psychological well-being. Due to all of these dynamics [X]’s voice is not authentic and has been seriously influenced by [F].”
[25]Dr. Roux’s report is clear and cogently reasoned, but it is a paragraph in M’s Affidavit, in the South African proceedings, which seems to me to capture the weight of evidence in respect of F’s personality. M states:
“The applicant has an exceptionally forceful character and is strong-willed and strong-minded in a way I have never experienced in any other human being. This is how he was so successful in business, and how he overcame the devastating impact of his polo accident. He also does not tolerate disagreement or resistance. He relentlessly pursues his objectives with laser focus and tireless planning, wearing down anyone in his path, until he achieves the outcome he wants. This is both extraordinarily impressive and also most concerning, for [X]’s emotional well-being. The applicant is intimidating and overbearing to a degree that is difficult for adults to resist, but impossible for a child.”
[26]I find that to be a measured, reflective and intellectually rigorous assessment. Notwithstanding the force of her conclusions, I consider that the paragraph is entirely free from rancour or bitterness. It is the voice of a mother determined to rescue her son.[27]There are two further statements which cast light on X’s relationship with F. The first is that from Ms Zsuzsanna Ruszkai. Ms Ruszkai worked for F as his carer for 6 months, between May and November 2025. A statement from her has been filed in the proceedings before me. F strenuously refutes the accuracy and honesty of both statements. However, as will become obvious in the excerpts below, they chime with much of the evidence already considered, though they paint an even more troubling picture. In evaluating them, I of course, caution myself that they may be tainted by the perspective of a disgruntled employee. F suggests that Ms Ruszkai has been paid by M to give false evidence. That is a completely ludicrous suggestion and entirely inconsistent with the integrity that M has shown throughout these extensive proceedings. It is the last redoubt of this desperate father. The following passages make disturbing reading; they also require to be set out extensively:
“...Even before [F]’s relationship with [C] ended, [X] began sleeping in [F]’s bed, as [F] and [C] were no longer sleeping in the same room. At that time, [X] was 13 years old. In my view, this arrangement was not appropriate for a child of his age. Following the end of [F] & [C]'s relationship, [X] continued to sleep in [F]’s bed whenever he stayed at [F]’s property. At 14 years old, and this arrangement remains ongoing. [F]’s morning personal-care routine would usually begin around 06:00 and typically end at approximately 09:30. [X] was generally not awake during this process. After the personal care was completed around 9.30am, [F] and [X] would usually have what they called “cuddle time” in [F]’s bed. At night-time, [F] and [X] would frequently cuddle in bed. [X] slept wearing a T-shirt and underwear with an incontinence pad, which often had an unpleasant smell. [X] slept wearing only his underwear. This resulted in prolonged bodily contact, which I found inappropriate. ... there are many situations where it becomes clear that [F] wanted he and [X] to be constantly together. The “cuddle time”, calling [X] into the bathroom and the fact that they spend most of their days alone in the house, aside from the carer and the cleaner, is not healthy for [X]. [F] very rarely meets anyone or has visitors. Apart from going to restaurants in the evening and going shooting, they are together all the time. As part of my duties I would drive them where they needed to go. On multiple occasions, [X] would stand up behind the front seat to hug [F]. I told both of them how dangerous this was, particularly on motorways, but they would ignore me. ...[X] would be crushed by any negativity from [F] and once [F] asked for a kiss or a hug [X] would immediately comply. This need for contact was not only in person. When [X] was not with [F], they were constantly on the phone. They would call back every 15 minutes or so. Both appeared desperate to speak to each other. It is not only the frequency that concerns me, but also the content of what [F] says to [X]. I have seen [F] shower [X] with gifts, including guns and clothes. He allows [X] to drink alcohol, both at home and in restaurants, which in my view gives [X] a false sense of freedom and maturity. [F] will tell [X] that he loves him repeatedly throughout the day and then, if [X] does something [F] does not approve of, he will tell [X] that if they lose the court case it will be [X]’s fault, that [X] will have to return to South Africa and that he will never be allowed to come back. On 19 November 2025, while [X] was in [M]’s care, [X] was on the phone with [F] whilst working on his statement to the court or letter to the judge. [M] entered [X]’s room during this time and [X] spoke to his mother in a manner [F] had previously instructed him not to. [F] became angry and shouted, “I told you no to talk to your mother like that – it is damaging our case. If we lose the case it is going to be your fault completely. Do you hear me? Then you can blame only yourself”
. I did not hear the entire conversation, but it was clear to me that [F]’s concern was not the way [X] spoke, but the potential effect on the court proceedings. I am aware that [F] amended [X]’s statement and that communications relating to it were sent via WhatsApp and later deleted.”[28]I have no doubt that if F had genuinely and sincerely indicated to X that he did not want him to be rude to his mother, then the behaviour would have ceased at once. F’s behaviour is shrouded in artifice. These are mind games where F’s focus is always on the litigation advantage. To adopt M’s phrase (see paragraph 25 above), it is a “laser focus” with “tireless planning”.[29]On an occasion when Ms Ruszkai suggested that F was sabotaging X’s overnight contact with M, she records the following:
“Both [F] and [X] were laughing. [F] asked [X] what [M]’s facial expression had been like and whether she had cried. X said that she had cried and said she always cries. They laughed together, [F] stated that he would have liked to have seen it and appeared pleased that [M] was upset. I have heard [F] boast to [X] about the cost of the litigation to [M]’s family and speculate about when she would be forced to stop the proceedings, encouraging X to bet on what would happen.” “[X] imitates [F]’s behaviour and has adopted a degrading way of speaking to women, including the cleaner. He has also learned how to make an alcoholic drink that [F] prefers so they can share it.”
[30]Though I have set this statement out in detail, I have deliberately excluded passages which involve references to the extensive and intimate personal care F requires whilst X remains in the bed with him. I have done this to respect F’s privacy, but it nonetheless underscores the absence of boundaries noted by others. The second statement, foreshadowed above, is that of Ms Ana Puntea. She is studying to obtain a degree in Global Banking and undertakes care work to support her studies. She worked as a carer for F for 8 days in November 2025 but handed-in her resignation at the conclusion of that period. She comments on F and X’s physical intimacy and how horrified she was by the way X spoke about M. She recalled him saying “she’s a pig”, that she had been “crying like a donkey” and accompanying the narrative by imitating a donkey’s braying. I have already said how these statements are thematically consistent with the broad evidential picture. The arresting detail of these particular remarks strikes me as conferring on them the hallmark of truth. They reveal X to be, quite literally, dehumanising his mother for his father’s delight.[31]Ms Puntea makes the following observation, which is plainly pertinent:
“[X] mentioned hating [M] in front of me many times during my time there. I do not know if he really means it, but I do know that he knows it makes [F] happy.”
[32]This latter observation is insightful and again, its veracity reinforced by the recollection of detail. Ms Puntea recalls an episode when following F having a telephone call with his lawyers, he told X that “if they lost the case, he’d have to go back to South Africa and he would then never return”. Ms Puntea stated “I could not believe how much pressure he was placing on [X]. The weight of [F]’s words clearly got to [X], he was visibly very upset”. This is again, strikingly similar to the findings of Recorder Ullstein who noted both F’s tendency to ‘lash out’ and blame others and his manipulative “burdening” of his son with an emotional weight which was unbearable to him. I note that Ms Puntea was obviously concerned for X’s mental health. She reports that on this occasion, as on 3 or 4 others, X stated he wanted to kill himself. Nothing of this kind is reported in X’s life in South Africa. I regard it as a very real indicator of his mounting emotional distress.[33]The following passage needs to be highlighted. It is poignant and resonates with some of the behaviours that have unfolded in the course of this hearing, to which I will turn shortly:
“I was talking to [X] telling him he should try not to hate his mother and in order to stop me [F] began telling [X] things he needed to do. I took a moment to hug [X] and said, “your mum is not bad”, and I could tell he liked that I had said that and responded with affection. To me this showed that underneath [X] still cares about his mum and that all the horrible things I heard him say to [F] about her, that she's like a pig and cries like a donkey, are to make F happy.”
[34]Ms Puntea also relates seeing F spending a whole day re-writing X’s statement to the Court. I am, again, reminded of M’s account of F’s “relentless pursuit of his objectives”. Later, the statement talks of how F showers X with gifts, calling for his attention constantly, telling him he loves him and asking for hugs or kisses. Ms Puntea notes how this behaviour is interwoven with high levels of criticism. She refers to this as “dominating” behaviour, “controlling” and “unhealthy”. More broadly, regarding F’s credibility, Ms Puntea recounts F asking her to provide a urine sample so that he could submit it in place of his own, to ensure that he would be given the all clear to attend Court the next day. She declined to comply. It is unnecessary to burden this judgment with further extracts from the statement. I record that I find them, for the reasons I have indicated, to be reliable. In many ways, both these statements have enabled the Court to look behind a door that would have otherwise have been closed.[35]At this point, I propose to address an issue that arose during the course of this hearing. Largely in consequence of non-compliance with Orders, this case has been considered by no fewer than 5 judges of this Division. The Orders regulating contact during the course of this hearing were made by Henke J and provided for overnight contact between X and M whilst she was in the UK. There was an application by F to vary the Order made on the first day of the hearing. In my meeting with X, which commenced at 4.40pm, I told him that I was not going to change the arrangements in place and could see no reason to revisit Henke J’s Order. X could not have been more charming, “yes, I agree”, he said.[36]In no time at all, the arrangements started to fall apart. X’s uncle had been staying in London to support his sister. To ease the tension and mindful of the easy and comfortable relationship that they have always enjoyed in the past, he suggested that he and X went out to dinner alone. They did so. X chose one of his favourite Chelsea restaurants and selected one of his favourite dishes, steak tartare. However, throughout the whole of the meal, this articulate young man who quite obviously loves his uncle remained monosyllabic, exchanging messages with F on his smartphone. The uncle struck me as behaving sensitively, he told me that he effectively just “talked at him”. Those messages, or at least some of them, have been made available at Court.[37]The tenor of the exchanges is that of a young man absolutely desperate to see his father and to stay with him overnight. F, on the face of it, appears to be discouraging him, though the focus is all on the litigation and not on the child. Towards the end, there is a voice call. The uncle was present when this call was received and is quite clear that it was F speaking. He recognised F’s distinctive voice and heard him say “come home my love”. That expression “my love” is a regular term of endearment used by F and much in evidence in the papers. The phone records reveal that he did telephone X and at about that time. His evidence was not entirely clear, but I think that he accepted phoning X though denied that he had said what the uncle had reported. At the close of the hearing, F asked if he could submit further written submissions. Ordinarily, I would have refused that, but F felt that he had been disadvantaged at submissions both by his being a litigant in person and by the challenges of his disability. I granted him the opportunity to submit a further document. He has addressed this allegation at some length in his written document. He states that X’s uncle is not telling the truth and that it is “inherently improbable” that X “would have allowed [the uncle] to overhear any part of his conversation with me”.[38]The uncle gave evidence before me. I find him to be a very reliable witness, not only is he instinctively attuned to X, but he has steadfastly endeavoured to remain neutral in and separate from the litigation. That is not only his assertion, it is borne out by the papers. In his evidence, he was open, reflective and courteous. I have no doubt that he is telling the truth. Where his evidence is inconsistent with that of F, I reject F’s account. It bears repetition that there is no doubt that a phone call was made by F to X and at about this time.[39]As Mr Jarman points out, the uncle’s account of the short phone call is in stark contrast to the contents of the WhatsApp messages, i.e. it delivered exactly the opposite message from that conveyed in the texts. Mr Jarman submits that it is very easy to see what has happened. He contends that F is crafting the typed messages to generate a false evidential picture that he was supporting the contact when in truth, he was not. He had assumed that the phone call would be private, but he was effectively caught out. I agree and note that this is an identified pattern of behaviour already discussed in this judgment. It is important that I identify this evidence as what it represents, namely a deliberate sabotage of X’s contact with M and a calculated breach of my Order. Again, as the Orders by previous judges reveal, this is an established pattern. F has shown complete disdain for Orders of the Court. These are Orders made to progress contact by X with M. They are predicated on the conclusion of the judges that such contact is in X’s best interests. F undermines the contact because he believes that it is contrary to his son’s best interests, he repeatedly substitutes his own judgment for that of the Court. In determining this application, I have to consider whether I could have any confidence that F would comply with court orders in the future and promote X’s contact with M. The answer to that is a resounding no, I could not.[40]I turn to the Guardian’s position. Ms Callaghan is an experienced Guardian. She has spoken with X on no fewer than 6 occasions. That is encouraging but also highly unusual. I cannot recall any case in recent years where a Guardian has met with a child so frequently. Ms Callaghan opposes M’s application for her son’s return to South Africa. In her report, she states as follows:
“Both of his parents are proud of [X]’s achievements, and he is a credit to them both. As well as recognising his intelligence and sporting abilities, his father was able to accept that [X] has a caring side to his nature, which [F] admits is likely to come more from his mother. It is unfortunate that at age fourteen, a stage of development when [X] is wishing to become more independent and to have his views taken seriously, that he is feeling angry and is convinced that his mother wants to deny him opportunities that he believes are available to him. Whilst I fully accept the concerns raised by [M], based on her experiences of his behaviour, I do not agree that it is in [X]’s best interest for her to sacrifice her relationship with [X] by forcing his return to South Africa.”
[41]With respect to the Guardian and having regard to the evidence, I am not sure what she can mean by referring to M sacrificing “her relationship with X by forcing his return to South Africa”. In the light of the evidence that I have analysed, it strikes me that X’s relationship with his mother has been comprehensively dismantled. Further, when she talks of M “forcing” X’s return, it implies that his objections are authentically his own rather than ones indoctrinated by F. The evidence does not permit of that possibility.[42]Later, Ms Callaghan states: The potential consequences of a decision being made that is against [X]’s wishes is the risk that he will be left totally despondent, feeling that his views are considered irrelevant due to him being immature and as him having been so influenced by his father that he is unable to have any control over his own life. This could have a detrimental impact on [X]’s self-esteem. I am mindful that [F] has likely convinced [X] that if he has the opportunity to have his voice heard, that it would be taken seriously by the court. [X] is therefore unable to contemplate any decision other than him being able to remain in England.”[43]Finally, she concludes:
“If a decision is made for a Return Order, consideration will need to be given to [X]’s emotional wellbeing and as to how he will travel to South Africa. [X] has consistently stated that he will refuse to board a plane and he did not change his position, even when told that there is a possibility that his father would be held responsible for his refusal and a court order not being followed. Unfortunately, if the prospect of his father facing prosecution for him refusing to return to South Africa was a possibility, it is likely that this would increase the resentment and anger that [X] feels toward his mother and could damage their relationship permanently.”
[44]Again, none of this engages with the compelling evidence that X’s capacity to make independent decisions has been suborned by F’s manipulating behaviour over much of his childhood and adolescence. Neither does it address the complex and unhealthy dynamic of their disturbingly interdependent relationship, which I have identified as abusive. For Ms Callaghan to have arrived at her conclusion, she could not have balanced her own discussions with X alongside the broad canvas of the evidence: Recorder Ullstein’s careful judgment; the detailed report of Dr. Roux; the written evidence of both the carers; and the history of F’s cavalier disregard for court orders. Her suggestion that F might support the relationship of X with M in the future if X stays with him, cannot be rooted anywhere in the evidence. Indeed, considering the history, the reverse is more likely. Mr Jarman submits that the Guardian is naive on this point. For my part, I cannot reconcile this “optimism” with what I find to be the corrosive emotional harm that F has inflicted on his son for many years, driven by his own rapacious emotional needs.[45]Though I am driven to reject Ms Callaghan’s recommendation, I have given it great thought. X can be an engaging and articulate young person. However, I have already indicated above that F has been involved in writing and correcting his son’s statements for the Court. This influence is not only direct but at work during the course of their extensive discussions about the case. By way of example, following the recent incident at dinner with his uncle, discussed above, X sent a message to his Guardian. F told me that he had only “slightly amended it” before it was sent. I am left with an uncomfortable impression, which is not intended to be a criticism of Ms Callaghan, that in her many visits with X, she had become gradually desensitised to the extent to which X’s voice has become a conduit for F’s views. As Dr. Roux, a clinical psychologist, concluded that X’s voice has been “compromised” and “contaminated”. Insofar as the Guardian appears to disagree with that conclusion, I prefer the analysis of Dr. Roux. I also note that F, in his cross-examination of the Guardian, elicited a concession from her that she had not had any training in psychology since qualification.[46]I have no doubt that X has expressed a strong wish to go to boarding school in England, has entirely absorbed F’s Olympian aspirations for him, and has accepted F’s view that the only prospect of achieving this is by training and tuition in England. Despite F’s efforts, I am not persuaded that X’s Olympic hopes are scuppered by a return to South Africa nor, without wishing in any way to dampen X’s ambition, do I consider at 14, his undoubted talents with a gun are necessarily as prodigious as F believes. There is still a long way to go. F’s almost obsessive commitment to this Olympic goal carries the significant bonus that his son remains tied to him. Far more important, at this juncture, is protecting and promoting X’s right to a relationship with M and his wider family. I do not consider this to be a forlorn objective. M and the wider family generally have only X’s best interests at heart. Decompression from the emotional turmoil of his London life into the heart of his South African family has every real prospect of revealing their sincere and unconditional love for him. It is authentic. Sadly, and by contrast, F’s relationship with his son is driven by his own desperate need for love, company and intimacy, and perhaps also his fear of loneliness. On some level, it appears that X knows this and feels obliged to provide that which his father wants and has no right to. Not only is X’s cognitive and emotional freedom compromised by F, but so too is his physical autonomy. At 14, he does not have even the privacy of his own bedroom and bed, and by day, when not at school, he is in constant physical contact with F, bombarded by intimate protestations and displays of affection on which he has now become dependent.[47]Since concluding the hearing, it has been possible to coordinate X having contact for a whole day with his uncle. Inevitably, I am afraid, F communicated with X on a number of occasions. Nonetheless, uncle and nephew enjoyed their day. Though it was strained and awkward, X also stayed at M’s home overnight, leaving by taxi at 7am. Alone with his uncle, X was relaxed and chatty. He even managed to be polite to M, albeit icily. These important relationships have been badly damaged but with the uncle’s intersession, I consider that there is a real prospect for their repair. I also note that X has maintained contact with his school friends in South Africa, as he told me in our meeting.[48]In his confined and, in my judgement, lonely world with F, X’s mental health has plainly been under strain. The evidence indicates suicidal feelings on several occasions. Dr. Roux considers that X needs therapeutic help. In the light of what I have analysed above, that is hardly surprising. However, X is resistant to it and denies the need for it, notwithstanding his own threats to kill himself. The environment that I have described with F is inimical to therapeutic engagement. Perhaps, supported by his family in South Africa and back amongst his friends, X might review his position on this. In any event, the availability of his grandparents, his uncle and his family, his mother and the familiarity of what is ultimately his home may itself deliver some therapeutic benefit.[49]Finally, though F’s plan is for X to attend an English public school, the proposal strikes me as fragile. On the first day of the hearing, F sent a raft of documents to the Court, which included an “affidavit” from one of F’s friends and admirers in South Africa. The author of the statement asserted that he would pay for X’s school fees. I have no way of assessing the stability of this proposal.[50]It follows that X should be returned to South Africa. I consider that should be arranged expeditiously, and I would appreciate the input of M’s team, in particular, to see how the inevitable initial distress for X can be ameliorated to whatever degree is possible.