“the mother seeks to vacate the final hearing listed for29 February 2024 , until the date after the next appeal hearing on8 April 2024 . Until such time as the Court of Appeal motion about the father’s appeal of the order of the 16th of January 2024. Any alternative the mother set out that she sought a Hadkinson order as referred to above. For clarification the appeal hearing which is referred to in the mother’s application is in relation to the ongoing application by the father to appeal. The primary decision of the 16th of January 2023, that the children live with their mother in Nigeria. This is found as a decision that the mother has the custody of the children in Nigeria.”
“[34] It is clear law that the court in this jurisdiction will determine an application for a summary return of a child to a non-Hague Convention country by reference to the child’s best interests. My attention has been drawn to what Lord Wilson (in Re NY at [30]) and Baroness Hale (in Re J at [26]) both described as the “classic” observations, the “locus classicus”, of Buckley LJ in his judgment in Re L (Minors) (Wardship: Jurisdiction)[1974] 1 WLR 250 , (obviously a pre-1980 Hague Convention decision but with evidently enduring relevance and standing). “To take a child from his native land, to remove him to another country where, maybe, his native tongue is not spoken, to divorce him from the social customs and contacts to which he has been accustomed, to interrupt his education in his native land and subject him to a foreign system of education, are all acts (offered here as examples and of course not as a complete catalogue of possible relevant factors) which are likely to be psychologically disturbing to the child, particularly at a time when his family life is also disrupted. If such a case is promptly brought to the attention of a court in this country, the judge may feel that it is in the best interests of the infant that these disturbing factors should be eliminated from his life as speedily as possible. A full investigation of the merits of the case in an English court may be incompatible with achieving this. The judge may well be persuaded that it would be better for the child that those merits should be investigated in a court in his native country.” [37] I was then taken to the current definitive statement of the law pronounced by the House of Lords in Re J (A Child) (Child Returned Abroad: Convention Rights)[2005] UKHL 40 . I have extracted from the speech of Baroness Hale the following 11 key quotes which I have borne firmly in mind in reaching my conclusions: i) “... any court which is determining any question with respect to the upbringing of a child has had a statutory duty to regard the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration” [18]; ii) “There is no warrant, either in statute or authority, for the principles of The Hague Convention to be extended to countries which are not parties to it” [22]; iii) “...in all non-Convention cases, the courts have consistently held that they must act in accordance with the welfare of the individual child. If they do decide to return the child, that is because it is in his best interests to do so, not because the welfare principle has been superseded by some other consideration.” [25]; iv) “... the court does have power, in accordance with the welfare principle, to order the immediate return of a child to a foreign jurisdiction without conducting a full investigation of the merits. In a series of cases during the 1960s, these came to be known as ‘kidnapping’ cases.” [26]; v) “Summary return should not be the automatic reaction to any and every unauthorised taking or keeping a child from his home country. On the other hand, summary return may very well be in the best interests of the individual child” [28]; vi) “... focus has to be on the individual child in the particular circumstances of the case” [29]; vii) “... the judge may find it convenient to start from the proposition that it is likely to be better for a child to return to his home country for any disputes about his future to be decided there. A case against his doing so has to be made. But the weight to be given to that proposition will vary enormously from case to case. What may be best for him in the long run may be different from what will be best for him in the short run. It should not be assumed, in this or any other case, that allowing a child to remain here while his future is decided here inevitably means that he will remain here for ever” [32]; viii) “One important variable ... is the degree of connection of the child with each country. This is not to apply what has become the technical concept of habitual residence, but to ask in a common sense way with which country the child has the closer connection. What is his ‘home’ country? Factors such as his nationality, where he has lived for most of his life, his first language, his race or ethnicity, his religion, his culture, and his education so far will all come into this” [33]; ix) “Another closely related factor will be the length of time he has spent in each country. Uprooting a child from one environment and bringing him to a completely unfamiliar one, especially if this has been done clandestinely, may well not be in his best interests” [34]; x) “In a case where the choice lies between deciding the question here or deciding it in a foreign country, differences between the legal systems cannot be irrelevant. But their relevance will depend upon the facts of the individual case. If there is a genuine issue between the parents as to whether it is in the best interests of the child to live in this country or elsewhere, it must be relevant whether that issue is capable of being tried in the courts of the country to which he is to be returned” [39]; xi) “The effect of the decision upon the child's primary carer must also be relevant, although again not decisive.” [40] Baroness Hale summarised her views: 71. “These considerations should not stand in the way of a swift and unsentimental decision to return the child to his home country, even if that home country is very different from our own. But they may result in a decision that immediate return would not be appropriate, because the child's interests will be better served by allowing the dispute to be fought and decided here.” [41] 72. [38] I was then taken to Re NY (A Child)[2019] UKSC 49 , a case in which the Supreme Court set aside an order made by the Court of Appeal under the court’s inherent jurisdiction in what are accepted to be very different circumstances to those obtaining here. Mr Khan argued that I should give (as the judgment suggests) “some consideration” ([55]) to the eight linked questions posed by Lord Wilson in that case: i). The court needs to consider whether the evidence before it is sufficiently up to date to enable it then to make the summary order ([56]); ii). The court ought to consider the evidence and decide what if any findings it should make in order for the court to justify the summary order (esp. in relation to the child’s habitual residence) ([57]); iii). In order sufficiently to identify what the child’s welfare required for the purposes of a summary order, an inquiry should be conducted into any or all of the aspects of welfare specified in section 1(3) of the 1989 Act; a decision has to be taken on the individual facts as to how extensive that inquiry should be ([58]); iv). In a case where domestic abuse is alleged, the court should consider whether in the light ofPractice Direction 12J , an inquiry should be conducted into the disputed allegations made by one party of domestic abuse and, if so, how extensive that inquiry should be ([59]); v). The court should consider whether it would be right to determine the summary return on the basis of welfare without at least rudimentary evidence about basic living arrangements for the child and carer ([60]); vi). The court should consider whether it would benefit from oral evidence ([61]) and if so to what extent; vii). The court should consider whether to obtain a Cafcass report ([62]): “and, if so, upon what aspects and to what extent”; viii). The court should consider whether it needs to make a comparison of the respective judicial systems in the competing countries – having regard to the speed with which the courts will be able to resolve matters, and whether there is an effective relocation jurisdiction in the other court ([63]).” 81. “I would only add the remainder of [39] of the judgment of Baroness Hale in Re J, 82. “If those courts have not choice but to do as the father wishes, so that the mother cannot ask them to decide with an open mind, whether the child will be better off living here or there, then our courts must ask themselves whether it will be in the interests of the child to enable that dispute to be heard. The absence of a relocation jurisdiction must do more than give the judge pause ... it may be a decisive factor. On the other hand, if it appears that the mother would not be able to make a good case for relocation, that factor might not be decisive. There are also bound to be many cases where the connection of the child and all the family with the other country is so strong that any difference between the legal systems here and there should carry little weight.”
“No reasonable or adequate explanation has been advanced by the Mother’s legal team as to why they failed to raise any of these issues during the hearing or submissions and are seeking to relitigate the issues following the delivery of the court’s judgment.”
“the father seeks a variation to paragraph 10 & 11 of the draft order to provide that the father will reimburse the mother the costs of economy one way tickets to Nigeria limited to a maximum of£2000 (in light of the quote that has already been provided by the Mother) within twenty-four hours of evidence of the flight bookings having been provided. There is a significant risk that the mother will seek to frustrate the orders made by the court if this amendment is not made by failing to board the scheduled flight to exploit the fact that the father does not have the financial means to pay for repeat flight bookings.:”