“There is no evidence to support your client’s application for the order that you seek. There is also no evidence or explanation to show why your client, who was applying for a visa, did not know on21st October 2022 that the FCDO in [country X] was dealing with your client’s application for a visa”
“There is no reason to talk about him in a bad way, in the end he is my son’s father, and he is holding his name. Even if we disagree, these things happen and it does not mean he is bad or I am bad, but we could not agree with each other…”
“i) The burden of proof lies, throughout, with the person making the allegation. In this case, both the mother and the father make allegations (in some respects overlapping) against each other on which they seek adjudications; ii) In private law cases, the court needs to be vigilant to the possibility that one or other parent may be seeking to gain an advantage in the battle against the other. This does not mean that allegations are false, but it does increase the risk of misinterpretation, exaggeration, or fabrication; iii) It is not for either parent to prove a negative; there is no ‘pseudo-burden’ on either to establish the probability of explanations for matters which raise suspicion; iv) The standard of proof is the civil standard – the balance of probabilities. The law operates a binary system, so if a fact is shown to be more likely than not to have happened, then it happened, and if it is shown not to cross that threshold, then it is treated as not having happened; this principle must be applied, it is reasonably said, with ‘common sense’; v) Sometimes the burden of proof will come to the judge's rescue: the party with the burden of showing that something took place will not have satisfied him that it did. But, generally speaking, a judge ought to be able to make up his/her mind where the truth lies without needing to rely upon the burden of proof; vi) The court can have regard to the inherent probabilities of events or occurrences; the more serious or improbable the allegation the greater the need for evidential 'cogency'; vii) Findings of fact in these cases must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation; it is for the party seeking to prove the allegation to “adduce proper evidence of what it seeks to prove”; viii) The court must consider and take into account all the evidence available. My role here is to survey the evidence on a wide canvas, considering each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence. I must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the person making the allegation has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof; ix) The evidence of the parties themselves is of the utmost importance. It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability; x) It is, of course, not uncommon for witnesses to tell lies in the course of a fact-finding investigation and a court hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, and distress. I am conscious that the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything (see R v Lucas[1981] QB 720 ); I have borne firmly in mind what Lord Lane CJ said in Lucas, namely that: “To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family. Fourthly the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated, that is to say by admission or by evidence from an independent witness." xi) That my function in resolving disputes of fact in the family court is fundamentally different from the role of the judge and jury in the Crown Court. As the Court of Appeal made clear in Re R[2018] EWCA Civ 198 : “The primary purpose of the family process is to determine, as best that may be done, what has gone on in the past, so that that knowledge may inform the ultimate welfare evaluation where the court will choose which option is best for a child with the court's eyes open to such risks as the factual determination may have established” ([62] Re R). A point which I myself considered in F v M[2019] EWHC 3177 , in a judgment which was referenced with approval in Re H-N (see §69/70). xii) At all times, I must follow the principles and guidance atPD 12J of theFamily Procedure Rules 2010 .” 40. When assessing the allegations of domestic abuse, I have endeavoured not to make stereotypical assumptions about how alleged victims of domestic abuse tell their story and present to others and, indeed, in a courtroom. My focus was on listening very carefully to the contents of the mother’s evidence and cross-checking her evidence against that from other sources rather than allowing myself to be influenced by generalised assumptions about her behaviour. That approach is not novel and accords with the Court of Appeal decision in SS (Sri Lanka), R (On the Application Of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department[2018] EWCA Civ 1391 . In paragraph 41, the Court of Appeal stated as follows: “Rather than attempting to assess whether testimony is truthful from the manner in which it is given, the only objective and reliable approach is to focus on the content of the testimony and to consider whether it is consistent with other evidence (including evidence of what the witness has said on other occasions) and with known or probable facts.” 41. I have also reminded myself of the comments of Peter Jackson LJ in paragraph 61 of Re L (Relocation: Second Appeal)[2019] EWCA Civ 2121 , cited with approval in Re H-N[2021] EWCA Civ 448 , to the general effect that: “… not all directive, assertive, stubborn, or selfish behaviour, will be ‘abuse’ in the context of proceedings concerning the welfare of a child; much will turn on the intention of the perpetrator of the alleged abuse and on the harmful impact of the behaviour.”