“… the procedure will almost inevitably amount to either torture or to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning, not only ofarticle 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights , but also of article 1 or 16 of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and article 37(a) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.”
“FGM has been condemned as cruel, discriminatory and degrading by a long series of international instruments, decorations, resolutions, pronouncements and recommendations… Therefore, those cultural practices that involve “severe pain and suffering” for the woman or the girl child, those that do not respect the physical integrity of the female body, must receive maximum international scrutiny and agitation. It is imperative that practices such as female genital mutilation, honour killings, Sati or any other form of cultural practice that brutalises the female body receive international attention, and international leverage should be used to ensure that these practices are curtailed and eliminated as quickly as possible.”
“In contrast, the present case turns on the credibility of the Applicant. She has not suggested that FGM is so prevalent in Nigeria or in southern Nigeria/Lagos where she was living that it is the simple return to Nigeria which poses the risk. Her case is that the risk is posed by the Father’s family as set out in the emails I have referred to above. That is a matter of assessing the evidence that she has produced and her oral evidence. If the court accepts her evidence then the order may well be made, if her evidence is not accepted then the child has no separate interest or case to be advanced. Dr Proudman argued that it is important that the child is not disadvantaged by the taint that exists on the Applicant’s credibility. However, on the facts of this case, the Applicant’s credibility is central to the existence or otherwise of the risk. In that sense it is different from Re A where there was strong reason to believe the risk existed quite independently of the credibility of the mother. It is clear in the light of the Suffolk County Council case that in assessing the Applicant’s credibility the Family Court must consider the matter for itself and not simply adopt or follow the view of the FTT. For the avoidance of doubt, I make absolutely clear that the Family Court must address the Applicant’s credibility wholly independently from the findings of the FTT.”
“i) The burden of proof lies, throughout, with the person making the allegation. In this case, both the mother and the father make allegations (in some respects overlapping) against each other on which they seek adjudications; ii) In private law cases, the court needs to be vigilant to the possibility that one or other parent may be seeking to gain an advantage in the battle against the other. This does not mean that allegations are false, but it does increase the risk of misinterpretation, exaggeration, or fabrication; iii) It is not for either parent to prove a negative; there is no ‘pseudo-burden’ on either to establish the probability of explanations for matters which raise suspicion; iv) The standard of proof is the civil standard – the balance of probabilities. The law operates a binary system, so if a fact is shown to be more likely than not to have happened, then it happened, and if it is shown not to cross that threshold, then it is treated as not having happened; this principle must be applied, it is reasonably said, with ‘common sense’; v) Sometimes the burden of proof will come to the judge's rescue: the party with the burden of showing that something took place will not have satisfied him that it did. But, generally speaking, a judge ought to be able to make up his/her mind where the truth lies without needing to rely upon the burden of proof; vi) The court can have regard to the inherent probabilities of events or occurrences; the more serious or improbable the allegation the greater the need for evidential 'cogency'; vii) Findings of fact in these cases must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation; it is for the party seeking to prove the allegation to “adduce proper evidence of what it seeks to prove”; viii) The court must consider and take into account all the evidence available. My role here is to survey the evidence on a wide canvas, considering each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence. I must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the person making the allegation has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof; ix) The evidence of the parties themselves is of the utmost importance. It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability; x) It is, of course, not uncommon for witnesses to tell lies in the course of a fact-finding investigation and a court hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, and distress. I am conscious that the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything (see R v Lucas[1981] QB 720 ); I have borne firmly in mind what Lord Lane CJ said in Lucas, namely that: “To be capable of amounting to corroboration the lie told out of court must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth. The jury should in appropriate cases be reminded that people sometimes lie, for example, in an attempt to bolster up a just cause, or out of shame or out of a wish to conceal disgraceful behaviour from their family. Fourthly the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who is to be corroborated, that is to say by admission or by evidence from an independent witness." xi) That my function in resolving disputes of fact in the family court is fundamentally different from the role of the judge and jury in the Crown Court. As the Court of Appeal made clear in Re R[2018] EWCA Civ 198 : “The primary purpose of the family process is to determine, as best that may be done, what has gone on in the past, so that that knowledge may inform the ultimate welfare evaluation where the court will choose which option is best for a child with the court's eyes open to such risks as the factual determination may have established” ([62] Re R). A point which I myself considered in F v M[2019] EWHC 3177 , in a judgment which was referenced with approval in Re H-N (see §69/70). xii) At all times, I must follow the principles and guidance atPD 12J of theFamily Procedure Rules 2010 .” 40. When assessing the allegations of domestic abuse, I have endeavoured not to make stereotypical assumptions about how alleged victims of domestic abuse tell their story and present to others and, indeed, in a courtroom. My focus was on listening very carefully to the contents of the mother’s evidence and cross-checking her evidence against that from other sources rather than allowing myself to be influenced by generalised assumptions about her behaviour. That approach is not novel and accords with the Court of Appeal decision in SS (Sri Lanka), R (On the Application Of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department[2018] EWCA Civ 1391 . In paragraph 41, the Court of Appeal stated as follows: “Rather than attempting to assess whether testimony is truthful from the manner in which it is given, the only objective and reliable approach is to focus on the content of the testimony and to consider whether it is consistent with other evidence (including evidence of what the witness has said on other occasions) and with known or probable facts.” 41. I have also reminded myself of the comments of Peter Jackson LJ in paragraph 61 of Re L (Relocation: Second Appeal)[2019] EWCA Civ 2121 , cited with approval in Re H-N[2021] EWCA Civ 448 , to the general effect that: “… not all directive, assertive, stubborn, or selfish behaviour, will be ‘abuse’ in the context of proceedings concerning the welfare of a child; much will turn on the intention of the perpetrator of the alleged abuse and on the harmful impact of the behaviour.”
“This is a highly complex and emotive case from both sides of the family. The interviews with all family members revealed a concerning lack of knowledge of FGM. Given the prevalence levels, particularly in relation to Osun and Lagos, it is unlikely that family members would have no knowledge. The denial of knowledge made risk hard to assess however the family living arrangements and lack of connection with Osun and traditional Yoruba marks suggests that it is very possible they do not observe FGM. However, the mother’s fears must be taken seriously not least because of the high prevalence in Osun. We therefore recommend that if the daughter is to travel to Nigeria to see her father and his family she should be accompanied by an anti-FGM trained advocate who must remain with her at all times. Furthermore, we recommend all members of the family undergo FGM awareness training. This should include the mother who needs to understand the enabling/protective options available in Lagos. She should be encouraged to reach out to make contact with stakeholders who may be able to offer her support and give her confidence that her daughter can be kept safe. Having this greater understanding of the risks of FGM as well as the protective options in Nigeria will serve to help her to empower her daughter as she grows.”