“In many WFO cases where the Claimant seeks to show risk of dissipation, there is some positive evidence which supports risk of dissipation, and that evidence is bolstered by other evidence which, although not directly showing risk of dissipation, suggests that the defendant is the sort of individual or entity which by its conduct may dissipate assets. In such circumstances the strength of the Claimant’s case on the merits, the fact there is evidence of fraud by the defendants, that there is evidence of low standards of morality, or lack of frankness may provide the necessary material from which the court can infer risk of dissipation. But it all depends. The problem for the Claimant in the present case is that there is no primary evidence which shows risk of dissipation...”
“...much of the value of the assets is real property, and whilst I do not have evidence as to how easy it is to dispose of property in the UAE, it is obvious that there would be significant problems in disposing of a large number of properties.”
“11. On15 March 2026 , I received a call from an unknown Nigerian telephone number. I answered the call and it was Mr Bashar. This call was not conducted on a without prejudice basis, with neither me nor Mr Bashar mentioning that the call should be conducted on such a basis or in any other confidential manner. 12. Mr Bashar insisted that the offer that had been made at the meeting on14 March 2026 should be accepted and requested that I overrule Mr Humphreys-Davies. I said I was unwilling to do this, and I demanded that Mr Bashar make a significant payment in March of the sums that were outstanding. 13. In response, he said that this was not possible and if I insisted on this he would ‘default on my payment obligations’ and would start to ‘dispose of my assets’ in order to make pursuing him impossible. 14. In response to that, I said that if that is the path he chose, we (as in the Applicant) would take all our legal rights including taking steps to protect the Applicant.”
“However, as a matter of discretion, such orders will in practice no doubt be made much more readily after judgment.”
“The principles which I now state can broadly be taken from those authorities, save where I say otherwise. Those principles are: • The ultimate question is whether it is just and convenient to grant a freezing order, bearing in mind that it has ‘the nuclear effect of prohibiting the affected party from dealing with its assets’ and carries a reputational stigma. • It is critical to remember the burden is on the applicant to satisfy the threshold for granting a freezing order and if an applicant has not adduced sufficient evidence, the application will fail. • It follows that unless an applicant has made a prima facie case to support a freezing order, the claimant is not obliged to provide any explanation or to answer any questions posed. • The applicant must prove a real risk supported by solid evidence that a future judgment will not be met because of unjustifiable dissipation by a defendant. • Relevant factors in determining whether there is a real risk of dissipation include the ease with which any assets may be moved or disposed of, the defendant’s past or existing credit record or whether there is a history of default in honouring debts, the running up of liabilities and not paying them or incurring liabilities beyond the defendant’s means. Evidence of dishonesty or behaving within unacceptably low standards of commercial morality giving rise to a feeling of uneasiness about the defendant. (Bank and Clients Plc v King[2017] EWHC 3099 , paragraph 5). • Claims or even evidence of dishonesty by the defendant which may establish a good arguable case so far as the substantive case goes do not, by themselves, support a freezing order. The court must in each case ‘scrutinise with care whether what is alleged to have been dishonesty of a person against whom the order is sought in itself really justifies the inference that that person has assets which he is likely to dissipate and unless restricted’. • If and to the extent the substantive claims cast any light on the risk of dissipation, the fact that a defendant has respectable defences to those claims has a bearing on the existence of a real risk of dissipation. (Linsen International Ltd and Others v Humpuss Sea Transport PTE Ltd[2010] EWHC 383 Comm at paragraph 71 by Christopher Clarke J). • There is nothing implicit in complex off-shore corporate structures which evidences an unjustifiable risk of dissipation. It is not uncommon for international businessmen and, indeed, quoted UK companies to use offshore vehicles for their operations, particularly for tax reasons. • The stable door point: that if there has been a real risk of the defendants unjustifiably dissipating their assets, it would have materialised by the time of the application is a ‘powerful factor militating against any conclusion of real risk of dissipation’. • Even if a real risk of dissipation is established, considerations of confidentiality and commercial stigma and the impact on the defendant’s commercial interests can weigh heavily in any assessment of justice and convenience.”
“(1) The claimant must show a real risk, judged objectively, that a future judgment would not be met because of an unjustified dissipation of assets. In this context dissipation means putting the assets out of reach of a judgment whether by concealment or transfer. (2) The risk of dissipation must be established by solid evidence; mere inference or generalised assertion is not sufficient. (3) The risk of dissipation must be established separately against each respondent. (4) It is not enough to establish a sufficient risk of dissipation merely to establish a good arguable case that the defendant has been guilty of dishonesty; it is necessary to scrutinise the evidence to see whether the dishonesty in question points to the conclusion that assets are likely to be dissipated. It is also necessary to take account of whether there appear at the interlocutory stage to be properly arguable answers to the allegations of dishonesty. (5) The respondent’s former use of offshore structures is relevant but does not itself equate to a risk of dissipation. Businesses and individuals often use offshore structures as part of the normal and legitimate way in which they deal with their assets. Such legitimate reasons may properly include tax planning, privacy, and the use of limited liability structures. (6) What must be threatened is unjustified dissipation. The purpose of a freezing order is not to provide the claimant with security; it is to restrain a defendant from evading justice by disposing of, or concealing, assets otherwise than in the normal course of business in a way which will have the effect of making it judgment proof. A freezing order is not intended to stop a corporate defendant from dealing with its assets in the normal course of its business. Similarly, it is not intended to constrain an individual defendant from conducting his personal affairs in the way he has always conducted them, providing of course that such conduct is legitimate. If the defendant is not threatening to change the existing way of handling their assets, it will not be sufficient to show that such continued conduct would prejudice the claimant’s ability to enforce a judgment. That would be contrary to the purpose of the freezing order jurisdiction because it would require defendants to change their legitimate behaviour in order to provide preferential security for the claim which the claimant would not otherwise enjoy. (7) Each case is fact specific and relevant factors must be looked at cumulatively.”
“...the detail given is often more limited than would ideally be the case, and indeed, in some cases, less than that required under the terms of the WFO...”