Case No KB-2026-002172NCN: [2026] EWHC 1777 (KB)IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICEKINGS BENCH DIVISIONINTERIM APPLICATIONS COURTVenue Royal Courts of JusticeStrandLondon WC2A 2LLDate Thursday, 18 June 2026
SPI SPIRITS (UK) LIMITEDYURI SHEFLERRespondents/DefendantsMR S PAUL appeared for ClaimantJUDGMENTDigital Transcription by Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JEWeb: www.epiqglobal.com/en-gb/Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.
[1]MRS JUSTICE STACEY: This matter comes before the Court on an urgent without notice interim application with a time estimate of one hour for a worldwide freezing order. The hearing has overrun, so I shall keep my judgment as brief as possible to avoid delaying other urgent applications to be considered both in court and on the papers.[2]The applicant in this matter obtained an award in the Employment Tribunal for unfair dismissal and public interest disclosure detriment, and received an award of £1,626,452 against both the respondents to this application who were found to be jointly and severally liable. The applicant was a former employee of the first respondent and the Employment Tribunal found that the second respondent was the first respondent’s agent and also liable to the claimant employee. The Employment Tribunal also made an order for £3,000 costs. The first and second respondent in these proceedings were also the first and second respondents before the Employment Tribunal. The first respondent is now in liquidation.[3]That order was made by the Employment Tribunal on 24 June 2022. Attempts to appeal the Employment Tribunal decisions was unsuccessful. To date, the steps taken by the applicant to enforce the judgment debt have so far been unsuccessful. The sum now owed on the judgment debt, inclusive of interest, (excluding the £3,000 for unfair dismissal), stands at £2,148,019.61.[4]The second respondent is an international businessman and the ultimate beneficial owner of the Stoli Group of beverage companies.[5]The Employment Tribunal award was registered at the Central London County Court on 1 September 2025 for enforcement against the second respondent, and the enforcement proceedings were transferred to the High Court on 3 December 2025.[6]The applicant has provided a wealth of documentation in the first and second affidavit of Mr McCormick, with exhibits and helpful and clear written submissions. There is a multitude of detail in this case which is not necessary to recite for the purposes of this short judgment and I shall set out the evidence in so far as is relevant under the headings of the legal principles to be considered.[7]I have considered the principlesrelevant to the grant of a post-judgment worldwide freezing injunction summarised in Petrichor Energy FZCO v Alhaji Abdulrahman Musa Bashar & Anor [2026] EWHC 914 (Comm).[8]I am satisfied that the judgment debt from the Employment Tribunal is evidence of a good arguable case on the merits. It is clear from the Employment Tribunal decision that, unusually, an individual, Mr Shefler who was not the applicant’s employer but the second respondent in the Employment Tribunal proceedings, was made jointly and severally liable as an agent for the applicant’s former employer: thus both respondents to this application are liable for the judgment debt.[9]It is also clear that the appeal rights have been exhausted.[10]The next matter to consider is whether or not the respondent has assets against which the judgment can be enforced and which would enable the judgment to be satisfied. In this case, the assets of the second respondent are complicated and worldwide. They are complicated for a number of reasons. Firstly, the jurisdictions in which they are held, including trusts, currency assets in Latvia, corporate entities and shareholdings in Latvia, properties in France including Cap St Jean Feret, a hunting lodge in Scotland (Tulchan) and properties in Belgravia, in England, shares in companies across many jurisdictions, and a worldwide fleet of over 40 vehicles, some of them of greater value than others. Actually many of the assets are directly owned by the second respondent, and he has asserted that those in trust he has total freedom and discretion and is in effect the owner, other than the property in Belgravia in which his ex-wife lives and the paintings in that property .[11]His assets and the source of those assets were addressed on 21 April 2026 when he was formally interviewed and required to answer questions before Master Byass in the enforcement proceedings. Mr Paul accepted that the picture is a little murky as to what assets are in the jurisdiction of England and Wales and what is elsewhere as was the ownership structure. The murkiness has been caused by a lack of disclosure and candour in the information provided by the second respondent, notwithstanding a number of court orders which I will deal with in more detail under the heading of risk of unjustified dissipation.[12]There is a complexity of ownership, of loan structure, of changes and amendments to various trusts and corporate structures. Contradictory information was provided at various times by the second respondent, and uncertainty as to level of encumbrances from the information provided by him. However in spite of the lack of clarity I am satisfied that he has significant assets both within and outside the jurisdiction and considerable worldwide assets. They include, for instance, the hunting estate in Scotland valued at £67 million, (although perhaps optimistically, since there is a further valuation for a speedier sale more in the arena of £30 million).[13]It is not entirely clear the extent to which all the assets are easily accessible within England and Wales, and those which are much harder to enforce against overseas, partly because of the structure and the nature of the assets, but also the confusing information provided by the second respondent. But I am satisfied that he has the assets within his empire in order to satisfy the judgment debt.[14]Of course, there are many judgment debts that parties have some difficulty in enforcing. Sadly it is often the case. I am mindful that the application for a worldwide freezing order must be for some legitimate purpose to aid the judgment creditor in execution, and not simply just to facilitate or place leverage on a judgment creditor. On the evidence before me I am satisfied that there is a legitimate purpose and that the applicant has proved a “real risk supported by solid evidence that a future judgment will not be met because of unjustifiable dissipation by a defendant” (Petrichor Energy FZCOat [55]-[59])[15]I am satisfied that there is a risk of unjustified dissipation so that the judgment will go unsatisfied. It is based on a number of strands of the evidence and occurred over a significant period of time, from the start of the Employment Tribunal proceedings. It is not just evidence of a classic pattern of behaviour by the second respondent of seeking to avoid, obfuscate, delay, prevaricate and frustrate the steps taken thus far to enforce. There has been a catalogue of half-truths, some demonstrable untruths, for example the reason why he did not attend to give evidence at the Employment Tribunal hearing must have been untrue (he said he was unable to travel to London for the hearing when the hearing was held remotely via CVP). There have not just been stalling tactics with his lawyers coming on and off the record, but a false explanation given based an assertion that he had no money to instruct lawyers, which was contradicted by the pattern of expenditure going in and out of the disclosed accounts. There has been a failure to comply with Court orders (see, for example the initial asset disclosure order, his failure to attend the examination on 17 February 2026, failure to comply fully with the asset disclosure order before the 21 April 2026 examination and failure subsequently to comply with the order made that day). Failure accurately to disclose assets, so that, for example, only through the diligent investigative work of the applicant’s solicitors, it was discovered that artwork that was owned by the second respondent but had already been sold and the proceeds not declared, and that other artwork that was listed, was not disclosed as being on the market with Richard Green Gallery. There were also inconsistent explanations about the Scottish Tulchan estate and the availability of the proceeds of sale for satisfaction of the judgment debt, followed by a refusal to disclose details of the sale process on spurious grounds.[16]I paid particular attention to one aspect, which is whether the judgment debt of some £2.5 million is such a tiny drop in the ocean of the second respondent's estimated billion pound wealth that a world-wide freezing order would be a disproportionate measure. Should the order be restricted to part only of the assets or jurisdictions? However I am satisfied and I accepted the explanation of the evidence that has been put forward in Mr McCormick’s affidavit, that the way in which the second respondent’s affairs are structured, with extensive use of complex corporate and trust structures to hold assets, makes obtaining information difficult, and it appears that he has deliberately structured in such a way as to make enforcement of judgments hard and transparency difficult and very expensive, requiring a creditor to have both deep pockets and tenacity. The overall impression is of an individual who has deliberately sought to obfuscate himself from enforcement. This is reinforced by some of the comments the second respondent made during 21 April evidence before Master Byass in the High Court. As I said, the pattern of behaviour is consistent with doing everything to frustrate the applicant and avoid payment. Given the shortcomings in the information provided and the lack of confidence in its accuracy, it would be difficult to know what assets or jurisdictions should and should not be included or excluded.[17]I should, for the avoidance of doubt, say that I do not infer the risk of dissipation from the complex structures themselves, but it is relevant to the cost and complexity and the practicalities of enforcement. I have no doubt that the second respondent may have many other reasons for wishing to conduct his affairs in the way that he does, and not just to avoid a judgment debt which may be relatively small compared to some of his other business transactions. I also do not make a finding of dishonesty, but of obfuscation so as to make enforcement more difficult.[18]I also paid careful attention to the second respondent’s witness statement in the enforcement proceedings, his third witness statement, and his assertion that his wealth may not be quite what it once was. He has described the difficulties he has with his relationship with the Russian state and authorities, the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of one of his companies in the States, his marital breakdown, the birth of a new child and a difficult business climate in the beverage industry. I accept that that might well be the case, but none of that suggests to me that he is not good for the judgment debt, given the scale of his assets and the size of the debt.[19]So, as to the fourth matter to be considered: has the applicant satisfied me it would be just and convenient to make the order? I am satisfied that the important policy consideration of enforcing judgment debts coupled with the evasive behaviour of the second respondent to date is sufficient for me to find that it would be both just and convenient for a worldwide freezing order to be imposed, in order to prevent the risk of unjustified dissipation. With the caveat that there are important amendments to be made to the standard order, set out in the guide, that would protect the interests of the second respondent who is not here to make them himself.[20]I have considered arguments that he might put forward had he been represented, I am grateful to Mr Paul for having thought of those also. I am satisfied that the impact on him will not be disproportionate, given the protections that will be built into the order and the care that has been taken to, for example, make sure that any prejudice to the sale of the Scottish property would not occur by ensuring confidentiality and ring fencing that so that any potential purchasers would not be put off by knowledge of these proceedings.[21]I do not accept that there has been any delay so as to militate against the granting of the order. Of course, it can be said that one person’s delay is another person’s patience, but in this case, the steps taken by the solicitors for the applicant are consistent with seeking to enforce the judgment debt as effectively and efficaciously as possible, whilst having an appropriate eye to the costs likely to be incurred in the making of this application. The applicant has quite reasonably given extensions of time when apparently plausible reasons and promise of payment have been given. The applicant has also pressed in ways such as third-party charging orders to obtain recovery, none of which have been successful. The applicant sought to engage in without prejudice discussions, to no success. An open offer made by the second respondent was self-evidently unsatisfactory as being too vague and uncertain and risked recovery of the judgment debt to continue to be frustrated.[22]The central difficulty for the second respondent is his behaviour to date in this litigation and the insouciance with which he has treated the orders of the Court and the appointments to attend and explain himself. The explanations he has provided in his witness statements lack plausibility. It is significant also that there has been a total failure to pay any part of the judgment debt, when even the disclosed assets demonstrate that the second respondent has the means to make at least part payment.[23]I consider that the applicant has taken sufficient appropriate enforcement steps to date and could not be criticised for not having pursued matters in other jurisdictions including in relation to the Scottish property. It is not, as was suggested by King’s Counsel for the second respondent at the hearing, that the money is to be paid out of the sale of that estate. The solicitors for the applicant have looked into the matter and, under Scottish law, it is extremely complex, extremely difficult and would be extremely expensive. I can understand and share their view that this is yet another stalling tactic.[24]So I am satisfied that an order should be made. Let me now return to the specific matters in the draft order before me that deviate from the standard wording and explain why I am allowing the deviations sought.[25]In paragraph 3, I am satisfied that this deviation, to increase confidentiality is a matter to protect the second respondent and it mirrors the previous order made by Master Byass on 21 April 2026, about which there has been no objection by the second respondent, which was a hearing made on notice.[26]I order the return date to be 15 July 2026 at 10.30 am, which will provide sufficient time for the second respondent to be able to be represented and here. It is no longer than is necessary to enable his legal team to get up to speed and is consistent with the availability of court resources.[27]In relation to both amendments proposed to paragraphs 7(3) and 7(5), I have considered carefully the case of JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov (Respondent) [2009] EWHC and note that what is being sought is an exception to the general rule. I am satisfied that the test set out in paragraph 42 of that judgment is met in this case. This is one of those cases where, on the basis of the specific facts before me and the way in which the second respondent has behaved and responded to the reasonable steps taken by the applicant to enforce the judgment, justify such an order. There is a difficulty in enforcing in many of the jurisdictions where the assets have been held, as already stated. As to (5) it is appropriate to exempt the properties in Eaton Square, Belgravia where the second respondent’s former partner, and possibly some children too, are living at the moment.[28]As to the provision in paragraph 8 that refers to the respondent’s interests both legally, beneficially or otherwise, this is a bold assertion and one I have considered extremely carefully. I am satisfied that it is justified in this case for two reasons. Partly the behaviour of the second respondent hitherto, as already canvassed above. Secondly, the assurances the second respondent provided on 21 April 2026 in the oral examination by Master Byass about his wide powers and beneficial ownership of assets. He stated that his assets and beneficial interest in all the trusts and companies with majority control were to all intents and purposes, his assets for him to dispose of as and how he wished with an unfettered discretion. So, given that lack of clarity over the precise mechanism of ownership and the powers he could give to those, that wider definition is in my view justified.[29]The amendment sought in 10 paragraph 3 concerning the Tulchan Estate in Scotland is a sensible deviation from the order so as not to prejudice or prevent sale of the property by the second respondent, and is one that he would welcome, but if not, it can be revisited at the return date. I agree to its inclusion at this without notice hearing as it protects the second respondent.[30]As to the amendments made to the provision of information paragraphs to the standard order, firstly, I say that there should be four working days, not the requested two. The second is that I agree that the request for information should be tied to the information the second respondent has provided earlier and his earlier answers to questions and the information provided by lawyers. It is sensible and appropriate in this case.[31]Paragraph 13, I order that this will be provided, in other words this is an affidavit to be provided by the second respondent within nine working days, not the seven days after which the documents were sent. The further amendments as to the contents of the affidavit should simply reflect the amendments made to the previous paragraph 12 about the information and is consistent with that.[32]Finally I have considered the submissions as to the cross-undertaking, I agree with Mr Paul that at this stage the cross-undertaking provided is sufficient to meet any concerns or risks that this order having been made further down the line. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Email: civil@epiqglobal.co.uk