“I am reminded by the slides accompanying my presentation in Dubai on22 September 2003 (at pp.3-4) that in 2003, we initially assumed GDP growth of 5.3% for 2003 and then 4% for the 2004-2006 period. As those slides also show, our macroeconomic working assumptions in approaching the restructuring (at p.25) were that the Argentine economy would grow, on average, 3.8% for the next five years (i.e. 2004 through 2009) and 3% thereafter. These assumptions for the growth of Argentina’s economy, which projected repayment capacity, did not change very much from the inception of the process.”
“When I arrived at MECON, discussions about a proposed restructuring of the Republic’s debt had already begun. The Republic’s aims in the restructuring were to align its payment commitments with the likely payment capacity of the Argentine economy. What we wanted was for Argentina to be able to enter a process of moderate but sustained growth, avoiding the recurrent episodes of volatility and pronounced macroeconomic imbalances which had characterized the growth of the Argentine economy in the past. … The restructuring negotiations with creditors and other international institutions were relatively informal. The process was run by the Secretariat of Finance, which acted as the representative of Argentina in this context. I was not formally part of the negotiations, although I participated in certain meetings at the request of then-Finance Secretary Guillermo Nielsen, to explain the macroeconomic scenarios that supported the restructuring proposal to different groups of investors and creditors.”
“When I joined MECON in early 2004, I was briefed by my colleagues on the status of the discussions. I recall being advised that a key difficulty in the negotiations was that there were diverse groups of creditors with different views, some of whom expressed their opinions frequently and firmly. I understood from my discussions with colleagues on the negotiations team that the main disputed issue in the negotiations was that the Republic estimated that its GDP could grow at 3% per year, whereas some groups of creditors said that GDP could grow at 4.5 or 5% per year, which would increase the Republic’s payment capacity. We needed to bridge this gap and reassure the creditors that our projections were reliable. That was when the idea started to emerge that we could offer something similar to an equity instrument. The central idea was to design an instrument that would share the upside with the creditors if the economy did indeed perform better than the Republic’s projections. That is where the idea of the GDP-linked bonds came from. … I do not remember the exact origin of this idea, or whether it was first proposed by the Republic or by one of the banks. However, I participated in the process of analysing that idea. The team under my charge was in charge of preparing the macroeconomic scenario, which was the analysis of the rate at which Argentina’s GDP could be expected to grow safely. I was not involved in the drafting of the GDP-linked bonds, but I saw many iterations of the instrument that the Ministry was starting to consider. I also participated in technical discussions with a group of domestic and international banks, which advised the Republic through the process of developing the GDP-linked bonds. These banks, and the individuals who represented them, are identified in a presentation dated11 March 2004 , which I was shown by S&C, and I remember them well. My main interaction was with José M. Barrionuevo (who was then at Barclays) from the Economic Modelling Team that managed the sustainability and macroeconomic model of the group of advisory banks. Mr Maia, Mr Simpson and I had several meetings with him. The advisory banks and Economic Modelling Team had their own economic models but they interacted and exchanged views with me and with the team that I supervised. The local advisory banks in Argentina also had their own models, and Mr Sebastián Vargas of Banco Galicia was a member of those teams. I recall that Mr. Barrionuevo’s analysis was very aligned with our projections. Some of the external advisors started out with slightly different views. But, in the end, all the advisory banks were aligned with MECON’s projections. … .”
“Prior to my arrival at the Argentine Ministry of Economy, Mr Maia had been working with Mr Nielsen’s team on the macroeconomic analysis required for the proposed debt restructuring. In early 2004, I took over this process and built upon their work to generate a reasonable macroeconomic scenario under which the restructuring could take place. Mr Maia and his team remained involved in the process alongside me, and I was ultimately responsible for supervising the work that was done. By a ‘reasonable macroeconomic scenario’, I mean a scenario that would allow for sustainable growth, without the extremely high volatility and recurrent episodes of over-indebtedness and inflationary acceleration of the past; a scenario in which payment capacity would arise from a sustainable growth process not punctuated by recurring episodes of crisis, so that the Republic’s financial commitments would be manageable. In this context, it was important for the restructuring negotiations and policy decisions of the Argentine Ministry of Economy to be informed by a sustainability analysis, i.e. an assessment of the likely future growth of the Republic’s economy under various conditions and a corresponding analysis of the level of debt that it could reasonably be expected to bear. My team prepared a reasonable macroeconomic framework for the restructuring, which emerged from our analyses of different economic scenarios. I have been shown a press release dated27 April 2004 which refers to a ‘sustainability model’. Whilst I did not draft this press release, I understand the reference to a ‘sustainability model’ to be a reference to the macroeconomic framework prepared by my team. There was no formal ‘model’ as such (in fact, nothing that was prepared for publication); these were internal working models based on different macroeconomic scenarios. The sustainability analysis involved considering the future evolution of the Argentine economy. This emerged from an analysis of long-term growth trends and a concept that economists call ‘potential output’ or ‘potential GDP’, based on the notion of production function. Potential GDP is a method of estimating the medium and long-term growth capacity of an economy. It is a calculation of the aggregate potential output capacity of the economy, based on the accumulation over time of factors of production (physical and human capital, labour, natural resources) and the evolution of the aggregate productivity of those factors, arising from technical progress. The production function takes account of these components and enables an aggregate growth rate to be determined in a context of full employment and efficient allocation of the factors. All of this stems from econometric analyses which may be carried out on the time series of the Argentine economy in order to estimate the rate of evolution of each of these components of the aggregate production function (i.e., the resources or factors of production and the total productivity of the factors). Ultimately, we came to the conclusion that 3% was a reasonable growth rate for Argentina to commit to as a medium- to long-term projection. Of course, growth was expected to be higher in the years immediately following the recession because following an adverse economic shock, such as the one that Argentina had experienced and which had created a very significant negative gap between actual and potential GDP, short term growth is generally faster than the longer-term outlook. Following the years of economic recovery, we concluded that growth would then taper down to a stable 3%.”
“When one looks at the past history of the Argentine economy, average growth during the 20th century as a whole is around 3%. Of course, the Argentine economy had good moments and bad moments during this period and the growth rate was higher or lower than 3% at different stages and in different growth cycles. But, over the course of a century, the average has not been much higher than 3% per year, and, indeed, in the last quarter of the last century the rate was lower. That is the reason why, provided the country deployed sound economic policies, 3% was considered a reasonable upper limit for sustainable growth for the purposes of Argentina’s medium- and long-term commitments. This projected growth rate that we arrived at formed the base case growth scenario for the purposes of assessing the Republic’s payment capacity in the context of the restructuring. Our projections for what would constitute a future base case growth scenario were based on real growth and were not linked to any particular base year or series of prices.”
“The draft prospectus for the restructuring was consistent, in its macroeconomic assumptions, with our internal working models that projected Argentina's capacity to pay. I remember that Mr Nielsen asked me to confirm this, which I did, because the prospectus reflected the estimates and the projections that we had made in the macroeconomic analysis team. S&C has shown me a note I drafted and sent to Mr Nielsen on30 November 2004 to this effect. I remember this note and the analysis it was based on. The base case growth scenarios which my team developed were also reflected in the roadshow presentations being delivered to creditors at that time. I attended some of these presentations and I remember travelling to the United States to attend a roadshow presentation in January 2005. S&C has shown me a slide deck from this presentation and the base case figures (on p. 19) correctly reflect what I remember of our work on the macroeconomic analysis team. There may possibly have been some final corrections to the decimals by the time the final prospectus was published - I have not checked whether these figures match up exactly - but the figures in this presentation are aligned with the projections we had and our thinking on the macroeconomic analysis team at that time. I have also been shown an excerpt from a presentation on debt sustainability, which appears to be undated. Based on the typeface and the language used, I believe that I drafted it, although I do not specifically recall doing so. If I remember correctly, it is a presentation we made at a public seminar in Argentina in 2005 after the public presentation of the offer. I think the event was organised by the newspaper El Cronista Comercial at the Hilton Hotel or the Hyatt in Buenos Aires. The contents of the presentation are an example of my team's work on the macroeconomic scenario and reflect our view that 3% was a sustainable base case growth rate for the Argentine economy. Based on my team’s macroeconomic analysis, I believed that Argentina would be in a condition to pay its debts following the restructuring. This was on the assumption, implicit in our analysis, that the macroeconomic environment, economic policies and the external scenario would not evolve in an adverse way.”
“In general, constant price series should not be allowed to run for more than five, or at the most, ten years without rebasing.”
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary hereunder, Holders of this Security shall not be entitled to receive any payment pursuant to this Security in respect of any Reference Year unless (i) Actual Real GDP for such Reference Year is greater than Base Case GDP for such Reference Year [the Level Condition], (ii) Actual Real GDP Growth for such Reference Year is greater than Base Case GDP Growth for such Reference Year [the Performance Condition], and (iii) the aggregate amount of all payments made by the Republic hereunder, when added to the amount of such payment, does not exceed the Payment Cap [the Payment Cap Condition].”
“for any Reference Year, the amount set forth in the chart below for such year: Reference Year Base Case GDP (in millions of constant 1993 pesos) Reference Year Base Case GDP (in millions of constant 1993 pesos) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 287,012.52 297.211.54 307,369.47 317,520.47 327,968.83 338,675.94 349,720.39 361,124.97 372,753.73 384,033.32 395,554.32 407,420.95 419,643.58 432,232.88 445,199.87 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 458,555.87 472,312.54 486,481.92 501,076.38 516,108.67 531,591.93 547,539.69 563,965.88 580,884.85 598,311.40 616,260.74 634,748.56 653,791.02 673,404.75 693,606.89 provided that, if the Year of Base Prices employed by INDEC for determining Actual Real GDP shall at any time be a calendar year other than the year 1993, then the Base Case GDP for each Reference Year shall be adjusted to reflect any such change in the Year of Base Prices by multiplying the Base Case GDP for such Reference Year (as set forth in chart above) by a fraction, the numerator of which shall be the Actual Real GDP for such Reference Year measured in constant prices of the Year of Base Prices, and the denominator of which shall be the Actual Real GDP for such Reference Year measured in constant 1993 prices.”
“‘Actual Real GDP Growth’ means, for any Reference Year, the percentage change in Actual Real GDP for such Reference Year, as compared to Actual Real GDP for the immediately preceding Reference Year; …”. “‘Base Case GDP Growth’ means, for any Reference Year, the percentage change in Base Case GDP for such Reference Year, as compared to Base Case GDP for the immediately preceding Reference Year, except that solely for purposes of determining Base Case GDP Growth for Reference Year 2005, the Republic shall assume a Base Case GDP for the year 2004 equal to Ps.275,276.01 (in millions of constant 1993 pesos).”
“provided that, if the Year of Base Prices employed by INDEC for determining Actual Real GDP for such Reference Year and for the immediately preceding Reference Year shall differ, then Actual Real GDP for the immediately preceding Reference Year shall for this purposes be measured using constant prices for the Year of Base Prices applicable to the Reference Year in respect of which Actual Real GDP Growth is being determined.”
“The Payment Amount shall be determined by the Ministry of Economy on the Calculation Date preceding the relevant Payment Date. All calculations made by the Ministry of Economy hereunder shall be binding on the Trustee, the Registrar, the trustee paying agent and each other trustee paying agent and all Holders of this Security, absent bad faith, willful misconduct or manifest error on the part of the Ministry of Economy.”
“… provided that, if the Year of Base Prices employed by INDEC for determining Actual Real GDP shall at any time be a calendar year other than the year 1993, then the Base Case GDP for each Reference Year shall be adjusted to reflect any such change in the Year of Base Prices by multiplying the Base Case GDP for such Reference Year (as set forth in chart above, or as previously adjusted) by a fraction, calculated for the last Reference Year for which official INDEC data is available, the numerator of which shall be the Actual Real GDP for such Reference Year measured in constant prices of the Year of Base Prices, and the denominator of which shall be the Actual Real GDP for such Reference Year measured in constant 1993 prices (or, if INDEC has effected more than one change, the previous Year of Base Prices).”
“the ultimate aim of interpreting a provision in a contract … is to determine what the parties meant by the language used, which involves ascertaining what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to have meant”
“The court must first look at the words which the parties have used in the bond itself. … If the language of the bond leads clearly to a conclusion that one or other of the constructions contended for is the correct one, the Court must give effect to it, however surprising or unreasonable the result might be. But if there are two possible constructions, the Court is entitled to reject the one which is unreasonable and, in a commercial context, the one which flouts business common sense.”
“Loyalty to the text of a commercial contract, instrument, or document read in its contextual setting is the paramount principle of interpretation. But in the process of interpreting the meaning of the language of a commercial document the court ought generally to favour a commercially sensible construction. The reason for this approach is that a commercial construction is likely to give effect to the intention of the parties. Words ought therefore to be interpreted in the way in which a reasonable commercial person would construe them. And the reasonable commercial person can safely be assumed to be unimpressed with technical interpretations and undue emphasis on niceties of language.”
“Taking the provision on its own, there is considerable attraction in the Judge's view that the more natural meaning of the phrase is meaning (a) or (b). However, the provision must, of course, be construed not merely by reference to the language used, but also in its documentary and commercial contexts. Ms Prevezer QC, for party D, suggested that it was illegitimate to start by considering the effect of the language of the provision on its own. However, while one is seeking to interpret the document as a whole, the ultimate issue between the parties turns on the meaning of the provision, and, in order to resolve the issue, the reasoning and analysis have to start somewhere. The natural, indeed, I would have thought, the inevitable, point of departure is the language of the provision itself. However, where the interpretation of a word or phrase is in dispute, the resolution of that dispute will normally involve something of an iterative process, namely checking each of the rival meanings against the other provisions of the document and investigating its commercial consequences.”
“It has long been accepted that this is not a literalist exercise focused solely on a parsing of the wording of the particular clause but that the court must consider the contract as a whole and, depending on the nature, formality and quality of drafting of the contract, give more or less weight to elements of the wider context in reaching its view as to that objective meaning.”
“This unitary exercise involves an iterative process by which each suggested interpretation is checked against the provisions of the contract and its commercial consequences are investigated: Arnold para 77 citing In re Sigma Finance Corpn[2010] 1 All ER 571 , para 10 per Lord Mance. To my mind once one has read the language in dispute and the relevant parts of the contract that provide its context, it does not matter whether the more detailed analysis commences with the factual background and the implications of rival constructions or a close examination of the relevant language in the contract, so long as the court balances the indications given by each.”
“Textualism and contextualism are not conflicting paradigms in a battle for exclusive occupation of the field of contractual interpretation. Rather, the lawyer and the judge, when interpreting any contract, can use them as tools to ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have chosen to express their agreement. The extent to which each tool will assist the court in its task will vary according to the circumstances of the particular agreement or agreements. Some agreements may be successfully interpreted principally by textual analysis, for example because of their sophistication and complexity and because they have been negotiated and prepared with the assistance of skilled professionals. The correct interpretation of other contracts may be achieved by a greater emphasis on the factual matrix, for example because of their informality, brevity or the absence of skilled professional assistance. But negotiators of complex formal contracts may often not achieve a logical and coherent text because of, for example, the conflicting aims of the parties, failures of communication, differing drafting practices, or deadlines which require the parties to compromise in order to reach agreement. There may often therefore be provisions in a detailed professionally drawn contract which lack clarity and the lawyer or judge in interpreting such provisions may be particularly helped by considering the factual matrix and the purpose of similar provisions in contracts of the same type. The iterative process, of which Lord Mance spoke in Sigma Finance Corpn (above), assists the lawyer or judge to ascertain the objective meaning of disputed provisions.”
“Once an alternative reading emerges as a possible meaning, the interpreter must go on to consider which of two or more possible meanings is the more commercially sensible. The Chancellor did not do that, because he stopped at the first stage; namely by deciding that the language was clear and unambiguous. If the Chancellor had proceeded to the second stage, he should have preferred the interpretation that the downgrade had to be in force at the time when the Reinvestment Criteria had to be satisfied.”
“The iterative process thus described is not confined to textual analysis and comparison. It extends also to placing the rival interpretations within their commercial setting and investigating (or at any rate evaluating) their commercial consequences. That is not to say that in a case like this the commercial setting should be derived from considerations outside the four corners of the contractual documents.”
“Thus we must seek to discern the commercial intention, and the commercial consequences from the terms of the contract itself; and that feeds in to the process of deciding whether a particular word or phrase is in reality clear and unambiguous. It follows in my judgment that, where possible, the court should test any interpretation against the commercial consequences. That is part of the iterative exercise of interpretation. It is not merely a safety valve in cases of absurdity. So much is, in my judgment, also made clear by the decision of the Supreme Court in Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank[2011] UKSC 50 ;[2011] 1 WLR 2900 . In that case Lord Clarke said at [20]: ‘It is not in my judgment necessary to conclude that, unless the most natural meaning of the words produces a result so extreme that it was unintended, the court must give effect to that meaning.’”
“I do not therefore agree with Mr Snowden that commercial considerations have no part to play in deciding whether a particular interpretation is or is not ambiguous. Moreover, to say that ambiguity or unambiguity is the governing factor may be to miss the point. As Lord Sumption observed in Sans Souci Ltd v VRL Services Ltd[2012] UKPC 6 at [14]: ‘It is generally unhelpful to look for an “ambiguity”, if by that is meant an expression capable of more than one meaning simply as a matter of language. True linguistic ambiguities are comparatively rare. The real issue is whether the meaning of the language is open to question. There are many reasons why it may be open to question, which are not limited to cases of ambiguity.’”
“On the other hand where the iterative process of interpretation as described above produces a clear answer a court must be very wary of assuming that it knows what is or is not commercially sensible: Skanska Rashleigh Weatherfoil Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd[2006] EWCA Civ 1732 at [22].”
“The exercise of interpreting a provision involves identifying what the parties meant through the eyes of a reasonable reader, and, save perhaps in a very unusual case, that meaning is most obviously to be gleaned from the language of the provision. Unlike commercial common sense and the surrounding circumstances, the parties have control over the language they use in a contract. And, again save perhaps in a very unusual case, the parties must have been specifically focussing on the issue covered by the provision when agreeing the wording of that provision.”
“The third point I should mention is that commercial common sense is not to be invoked retrospectively. The mere fact that a contractual arrangement, if interpreted according to its natural language, has worked out badly, or even disastrously, for one of the parties is not a reason for departing from the natural language. Commercial common sense is only relevant to the extent of how matters would or could have been perceived by the parties, or by reasonable people in the position of the parties, as at the date that the contract was made. … .”
“A pension scheme, such as the one in issue on this appeal, has several distinctive characteristics which are relevant to the court’s selection of the appropriate interpretative tools. First, it is a formal legal document which has been prepared by skilled and specialist legal draftsmen. Secondly, unlike many commercial contracts, it is not the product of commercial negotiation between parties who may have conflicting interests and who may conclude their agreement under considerable pressure of time, leaving loose ends to be sorted out in future. Thirdly, it is an instrument which is designed to operate in the long term, defining people’s rights long after the economic and other circumstances, which existed at the time when it was signed, may have ceased to exist. Fourthly, the scheme confers important rights on parties, the members of the pension scheme, who were not parties to the instrument and who may have joined the scheme many years after it was initiated. Fifthly, members of a pension scheme may not have easy access to expert legal advice or be able readily to ascertain the circumstances which existed when the scheme was established.”
“Two conditions must be satisfied: first there must be a clear mistake on the face of the instrument; secondly it must be clear what correction ought to be made in order to cure the mistake. If those conditions are satisfied, then the correction is made as a matter of construction. If they are not satisfied then either the claimant must pursue an action for rectification or he must leave it to a court of construction to reach what answer it can on the basis that the uncorrected wording represents the manner in which the parties decided to express their intention.”
“Further, as Lord Hoffmann also made clear in Investors Compensation[1998] 1 WLR 896 , there is a difference between cases of ambiguity, which may result in giving the words a meaning they can naturally bear, even if it is not their prima facie most natural meaning, and cases of mistake, which may result from concluding that the parties made a mistake and used the wrong words or syntax. However, he emphasised the court does ‘not readily accept that people have made mistakes in formal documents’ - Chartbrook[2009] 1 AC 1101 , para 23. He also pointed out in paragraph 20, that, as the court, and therefore the notional reasonable person, cannot take into account the antecedent negotiations, the fact that the natural meaning of the words appears to produce ‘a bad bargain’ for one of the parties or an ‘unduly favourable’ result for another, is not enough to justify the conclusion that something has gone wrong. One is normally looking for an outcome which is ‘arbitrary’ or ‘irrational’, before a mistake argument will run.”
“The court can, of course, do just that where it is ‘clear’ that something has gone wrong in the language which the parties have used. However, although I accept that it is undoubtedly possible that something has gone wrong here, given the various pointers to which I have already referred, it is not by any means clear to me that it has in fact done so.”
“There was very little dispute about the law. The principles applicable to the construction of written instruments in general, and contracts in particular, have been considered by the Supreme Court in a series of well-known cases, which it is not necessary to go over again. Those authorities are largely concerned with the position where a contractual provision is open to two possible interpretations. In the present case we are not concerned with such an exercise as it is common ground that the Formula, read with the relevant definitions, is clear and unambiguous and not open to two different interpretations. Rather we are concerned with the Chartbrook principle, under which the literal meaning of a provision can be corrected if it is clear both that a mistake has been made, and what the provision was intended to say. This is in principle a different exercise from that of choosing between rival interpretations: see for example the recent decision of this Court in Britvic plc v Britvic Pensions Ltd[2021] EWCA Civ 867 .”
“There is therefore a distinction between a case which concerns a provision which seems merely imprudent and one which appears irrational. The position was neatly summarised by Briggs LJ in Sugarman v CJS Investments Ltd[2014] EWCA Civ 1239 (‘Sugarman’) at [43]-[44] where he referred to the fine dividing line between a case where the result appears ‘commercially unattractive and even unreasonable’ and a case which appears ‘nonsensical or absurd’.”
“As Mr Watkin submitted in his brief but cogent oral submissions, there is a consistent line of authority illustrating the sort of case that falls on the far side of the line. The language used by judges to describe such cases naturally varies but the concept is consistent. In City Alliance Ltd v Oxford Forecasting Services Ltd[2000] EWCA Civ 510 Chadwick LJ at [13] referred to the Court being satisfied that the words actually used ‘produce a result which is so commercially nonsensical that the parties could not have intended it’. In Chartbrook itself Lord Hoffmann referred variously to ‘an interpretation … sufficiently irrational to justify a conclusion that there has been a linguistic mistake’ (at [15]); to a ‘commercially absurd’ interpretation (ibid); to one that ‘makes no commercial sense’ (at [16]); to his not being able to believe that ‘any rational parties’ who wished to provide for a catastrophic fall in the market would have adopted the precise sum which the literal interpretation produced (at [19]); and to the interpretation adopted by the trial judge and majority of the Court of Appeal as not just producing provisions that were favourable to Chartbrook but as making the structure and language of the relevant provisions appear ‘arbitrary and irrational’ when the concepts could be combined in a rational way (at [20]). In Sugarman Briggs LJ at [43] referred to a case where the apparently unambiguous meaning of the words used ‘produces such a nonsensical result’ that it cannot be treated as expressing the meaning of the document.”
“We are now working on ways to solve this apparent conflict between sustainability and acceptability by offering debt enhancements, such as GDP indexed bonds, for example. An offer that includes GDP indexed bonds recognizes our responsibility to secure a sustainable debt restructuring with the potential upside benefits that a long-term recovery of the Argentine economy offers. They also evidence the good faith which we always pledged to follow.”
“A growth-linked component (‘GDP Unit’) is added to the aforementioned bonds, which will increase the payments derived from the bond menu presented each year if growth actually achieved by the country during the previous year exceeds that projected in the sustainability model; in this case, Argentina will share part of this surplus with the creditors. The surplus that triggers the payment of this component is defined in the medium term as that which exceeds 3% annual growth. These are not payments on estimates or prospects, but on growth actually achieved in future years (starting from the year 2005).”
“… it leaves the position with respect to the Payment Conditions and the Payment Amount as if: (1) Actual Real GDP continued to be measured by INDEC (despite the rebasing to 2004 Year of Base Prices) in 1993 Year of Base Prices (contrary to the definition of ‘Actual Real GDP’ by reference to ‘Year of Base Prices’); (2) the Payment Conditions (which determine whether or not any Payment Amount is due) would be met if and only if they would be met in 1993 Year of Base Prices; and (3) ‘Excess GDP’ (the measure of the Republic’s economic outperformance, which is required to be calculated for the Payment Amount) can be measured solely by reference to GDP in 1993 Year of Base Prices (albeit multiplied by a deflator, to take account of the effect of inflation).”
“Put differently, all three of these consequences of the Claimants’ interpretation would have arisen, if the Securities had simply provided that, even after a rebasing: Actual Real GDP will always be calculated in 1993 Year of Base Prices (irrespective of the actual Year of Base Prices INDEC uses to measure GDP); and no adjustment is to be made to Base Case GDP … .”
“The Claimants’ approach is to say that the role of the Adjustment Provision is to ensure that rebasing is to be treated as irrelevant, despite the fact that the definitions of ‘Actual Real GDP’ by reference to ‘Year of Base Prices’, and ‘Actual Real GDP Growth’ (with its proviso language), and the very fact of the inclusion of the Adjustment Provision in the definition of Base Case GDP, make it obvious that rebasing is highly relevant: after rebasing, it is the new Year of Base Prices that is to be used to measure Actual Real GDP, Actual Real GDP Growth and Base Case GDP. It simply makes no sense that the effect of applying the Adjustment Provision, and the equivalent provisos in the definitions of Actual Real GDP, Year of Base Prices and Actual Real GDP Growth, is the same as not applying these provisions at all. The Claimants’ construction deprives (i) the definition of ‘Actual Real GDP’ by reference to the further defined term ‘Year of Base Prices’, (ii) the proviso to the definition of ‘Actual Real GDP Growth’, and (iii) the Adjustment Provision in the definition of Base Case GDP of any practical effect, and the construction is therefore futile … .”
“…if the Year of Base Prices employed by INDEC for determining Actual Real GDP shall at any time be a calendar year other than the year 1993, then the Base Case GDP for each Reference Year shall be adjusted to reflect any such change in the Year of Base prices by multiplying the Base Case GDP for such Reference Year (as set forth in the chart above) by a fraction, the numerator of which shall be the Actual Real GDP for such Reference Year measured in constant prices of the Year of Base Prices, and the denominator of which shall be the Actual Real GDP for such Reference Year measured in constant 1993 prices.”
“… provided that, if the Year of Base Prices employed by INDEC for determining Actual Real GDP shall at any time be a calendar year other than the year 1993, then the Base Case GDP for each Reference Year shall be adjusted to reflect any such change in the Year of Base Prices by multiplying the Base Case GDP for such Reference Year (as set forth in chart above, or as previously adjusted) by a fraction, calculated for the last Reference Year for which official INDEC data is available, the numerator of which shall be the Actual Real GDP for such Reference Year measured in constant prices of the Year of Base Prices, and the denominator of which shall be the Actual Real GDP for such Reference Year measured in constant 1993 prices (or, if INDEC has effected more than one change, the previous Year of Base Prices).”
“the ratio of estimates on the new base and the old base is not a relevant economic variable. It is not related to the revenue, the strength of the fiscal revenues, that the Republic is getting … But that difference between the new base and the old base doesn’t give you any information at all over how the Republic’s fiscal revenues are doing, and this what I want to link to the payment.”
“This can only happen if the reason the growth rate of real GDP is negative and still in excess of the growth rate of base case GDP is that the rebasing, the data revision, the adoption of an alternative measure, has turned a materially positive growth rate at the old year of base prices into a materially negative growth rate at the new year of base prices. So it is not what I would call a recession by any normal economic use of the word, it is a major data revision.”
“Again, if the reason they have -- you call it ‘recession’ -- negative real GDP growth is just the rebasing rather than, I would say, a proper cyclical contraction, which is a reduction in the utilisation rates of labour and capital across in the economy, which would show up in the old year of base prices for sure as well as the new year of base prices, basically, rebasing exercises are not there to capture recessions that are untracked by the old base.”
“MR JUSTICE PICKEN: Assume I decide, which I’m not saying I will, the contract does require 1993 base still to be used. Then I think what is being put to you is, given that that's what the contract requires, it is economically worthwhile for the Republic to do that because, otherwise, investors won't be getting what they're contractually entitled to. A. I would agree with that, but I would just use the phrase ‘specific performance’ as opposed to economic utility. If it is your decision that they have to do it, then they have to do it.”
“... provided that, if the Year of Base Prices employed by INDEC for determining Actual Real UDF shall at any time be a calendar year other than the year 1993, then the Base Case GDP for each Reference Year shall be adjusted to reflect any such change in the Year of Base Prices by multiplying the Base Case GDP for such Reference Year (as set forth in chart above) by a fraction, the numerator of which shall be the Actual Real GDP for such Reference Year measured in constant prices of the Year of Base Prices, and the denominator of which shall be the Actual Real GDP for such Reference Year measured in constant 1993 prices [in the new Year of Base Prices as published by INDEC, adjusted for inflation from pesos in the new Year of Base Prices to 1993 pesos using the INDEC-published deflator from 1993 to the new Year of Base Prices.].”
“Section 4.8. Limitations on Suits by Holders. Except as provided in this Section 4.8 and Section 4.9 of this Indenture, no Holder of any Debt Securities of any Series shall have any right by virtue of or by availing itself of any provision of this Indenture or of the Debt Securities of such Series to institute any suit, action or proceeding in equity or at law upon or under or with respect to this Indenture or of the Debt Securities, or for any other remedy hereunder or under the Debt Securities, unless: (a) such Holder previously shall have given to the Trustee written notice of default and of the continuance thereof with respect to the Debt Securities; (b) the Holders of not less than 25% in aggregate principal amount of the Outstanding Debt Securities shall have made written request to the Trustee to institute such action, suit or proceeding in its own name as Trustee under this Indenture; (c) such Holder or Holders shall have provided to the Trustee such reasonable indemnity and/or security as it may require against the costs, expenses and liabilities to be incurred therein or thereby; (d) the Trustee for 60 days after its receipt of such notice, request and provision of indemnity and/or security shall have failed to institute any such action, suit or proceeding; and (e) no direction inconsistent with such written request shall have been given to the Trustee pursuant to Section 4.11 of this Indenture; it being understood, intended, and agreed by each Holder of Debt Securities of a Series that no one or more Holder shall have any right in any manner whatever by virtue or by availing itself of any provision of this Indenture or of the Debt Securities to affect, disturb or prejudice the rights of any other Holder of Debt Securities of such Series or to obtain priority over or preference to any other such Holder, or to enforce any right under this Indenture or under the Debt Securities of such Series, except in the manner herein provided and for the equal, ratable and common benefit of all Holders of Debt Securities of such Series. For the protection and enforcement of this Section, each and every Holder and the Trustee shall be entitled to such relief as can be given either at law or in equity. The Republic expressly acknowledges, with respect to the right of any Holder to pursue a remedy under this Indenture or the Debt Securities, the right of any beneficial holder of Debt Securities to pursue such remedy with respect to the portion of the Global Security that represents such beneficial holder’s Debt Securities as if definitive Debt Securities had been issued to such Holder.”
“Unconditional Right of Holders to Receive Principal and Interest. Notwithstanding Section 4.8, each Holder of Debt Securities shall have the right, which is absolute and unconditional, to receive payment of the principal of and interest on its Debt Security on the stated maturity date for such payment expressed in such Debt Security (as such Debt Security may be amended or modified pursuant to Article Seven) and to institute suit for the enforcement of any such payment, and such right shall not be impaired without the consent of such Holder.”
“Enforcement. Except as provided in Section 4.9 of the Indenture with respect to the right of any Holder of a Security to enforce the payment of any amounts due hereunder on any Payment Date (as this Security may be amended or modified pursuant to Paragraph 22), no Holder of a Security shall have any right by virtue of or by availing itself of any provision of the Indenture, the GDP-Linked Securities Authorization or the Securities to institute any suit, action or proceeding in equity or at law upon or under or with respect to the Indenture, the GDP-Linked Securities Authorization or the Securities, or for any other remedy hereunder or under the GDP-Linked Securities Authorization or the Indenture, unless: … .”
“The principal question on this appeal relates to the construction of a ‘no-action’ clause in a bond issue, whereby only the trustee of the issue is entitled to take enforcement action against the issuer, and bondholders cannot proceed directly against the issuer unless the trustee fails to take action in accordance with the bond documentation. Such clauses have been common in bond issues governed by English law since the nineteenth century, and in bond issues in other common law countries. The use of a trustee is an effective way of centralising the administration and enforcement of bonds. Bondholders act through the trustee, and share pari passu in the fortunes of the investment, and do not compete with each other. The trustee represents and protects the bondholders, who are treated as forming a class, and who give instructions to the trustee through a specified percentage of bondholders. Such a scheme promotes liquidity. Individual bondholders rely on the trustee as the exclusive channel of enforcement and can be confident that on enforcement principal and interest will be distributed pari passu.”