“1. If the Court later finds that this order has caused loss to any Respondent, and decides that that respondent should be compensated for that loss, the Applicant will comply with any order the Court may make. … 6. The Applicants will pay the reasonable costs of anyone other than the Respondents which have been incurred as a result of this order including the costs of finding out whether that person holds any of a respondent’s assets and if the Court later finds that this order has caused such person loss and decides that such person should be compensated for that loss, the Applicants will comply with any order the Court may make.”
“MR. PILLOW: Thank you, my Lord. Finally, fortification of the undertaking. Now, you have not heard me on this point. The amount of loss that is suggested to have arisen already is$2m to$2.5m from the fire sale, as it is called, which may not yet have taken place, I should say, but we do not know. My Lord, we make a simple point in our skeleton what the test is and it requires an intelligent estimate that is informed and realistic of the likely loss that is caused by the order. What my learned friends have not done in their evidence is to take account of the fact that losing all these loans from JP Morgan will save them an awful lot of interest repayments. You cannot possibly quantify the loss side of the equation without working out how much the interest was that is being saved going forwards. So, really, I am not sure that your Lordship is in a position to say you are satisfied of the Malabu Oil test without the evidence as to what the countervailing benefit is of not having large loans outstanding to JP Morgan.There is clear evidence they were loans. There is clear evidence they were ---- MR. JUSTICE JACOBS: How much are the loans? MR. PILLOW: We do not know how much the loans were but the positions that were being dematerialised to pay for them, I think – we may have it – it is well over$100m . I think one is$100m plus and the other is$20m . We are talking of loans in the order of about$100m . If the securities that are being used to pay off those loans are going to suffer a loss of 2%, which is the estimate Mr. Mints has put forward, then you do need to bring in to the equation the benefit of not having to pay the interest on such amounts. MR. JUSTICE JACOBS: But they are going to have to borrow the money from somebody else, are they not? MR. PILLOW: No, my Lord, because they will not have any need for it unless they want to buy more assets. If they buy more assets, then they are mitigating the original loss and one then gets into the question of what the overall loss is. There is no evidence they are going to replace the sold assets with more assets. MR. JUSTICE JACOBS: I read this point in your skeleton. I was thinking, if my house is repossessed and sold to pay off my mortgage, on a fire sale, if this is what happens, and I get much less than it was worth, you are much better off because now you do not have to pay the bank. MR. PILLOW: No, my Lord, you are not better off. It is a serious point, if I may say. You are not necessarily better off. I am not saying you are. I am saying you have to bring it into account when you are assessing your loss. MR. JUSTICE JACOBS: Have you done a calculation? MR. PILLOW: We do not know the sums, my Lord. We do not have the evidence, my Lord. This is a simple point, we do not have the evidence to know what these loans were costing and therefore you cannot do the calculation. There we are. MR. JUSTICE JACOBS: I have to say I was inclined to increase the amount. In the light of the evidence that this injunction has had and may have an effect on a business and there may be foreclosures effectively, or sales, the sum which you estimated and put into court, did you? MR. PILLOW: We put 250,000 in and we have offered another 250,000 dollars. MR. JUSTICE JACOBS: I am inclined to increase that, unless you tell me there is a real problem, to US$2m on the basis that there is evidence of a real problem which has been caused by an injunction, which does not surprise me and it is difficult to estimate. I would not have thought that is difficult for your clients to put up. MR. PILLOW: My Lord, I do resist it in principle because your Lordship is not following the guidance in Malabu Oil by sticking a finger in the air. Having said that, I am not ---- MR. JUSTICE JACOBS: I have some evidence that there is a loss of$2.8m , or something like that, on a proposed sale.”
“8. A large part of the applicant’s proposed argument on appeal concerns the effect of the undertakings on the business of EGCA. Contrary to the applicant’s assertion, it is not an uncontroverted fact that the undertakings are harming this business. As the judge pointed out, the applicant’s brother i.e. AM is also a director of EGCA who has not disputed that there is a good arguable case of fraud against him, and who has been found by a judge to give rise to a risk of dissipation of assets. Moreover, while the applicant has not been charged with criminal offences in Russia, his brother has been charged with embezzlement. Reputational damage to the company as a result of the applicant having given undertakings is possible but, as matters stand at present, somewhat speculative. In particular, if investors are indeed looking for “a safe pair of hands” in which to invest (the applicant’s latest evidence), they are likely to have concerns regardless of the applicant’s undertakings.”
“That reference to the beneficiary family, although post-dating the judgment, fully justifies the judge’s conclusion that EGCA as a business is closely associated with the Mints family, and that damage as a result of the undertakings given by the applicant cannot readily be separated from damage to the reputation of the family as a result of the proceedings against them and the undertakings given by other family members.”
“I believe that EGCA Group’s position has been exacerbated by the extensive media campaign, which I believe the Claimants have been involved in, particularly in the Russian press. This campaign is particularly damaging for EGCA Group’s business as most of its clients are Russian-based or Russian-speaking and are constantlyseeing my family’s name mentioned in the context of the alleged fraud.”
“The court has no power to compel an applicant for an interim injunction to furnish an undertaking as to damages. All it can do is to refuse the application if he declines to do so. The undertaking is not given to the defendant but to the court itself. Nonperformance of it is contempt of court, not breach of contract, and attracts the remedies available for contempts, but the court exacts the undertaking for the defendant’s benefit. It retains a discretion not to enforce the undertaking if it considers that the conduct of the defendant in relation to the obtaining or continuing of the injunction or the enforcement of the undertaking makes it inequitable to do so, but if the undertaking is enforced the measure of the damages payable under it is not discretionary. It is assessed on an inquiry into damages at which principles to be applied are fixed and clear. The assessment is made on the same basis as that on which damages for breach of contract would be assessed if the undertaking had been a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant that the plaintiff would not prevent the defendant from doing that which he was restrained from doing by the terms of the injunction: see Smith v Day(1882) 21Ch D 421 , per Brett LJ, at p 427.”
“…all the remote consequences of obtaining an injunction which was afterwards dissolved, were not to be taken into account in assessing the damages to be paid to the defendant under the plaintiff’s undertaking. It would be unduly straining such undertaking to include in it damages which did not naturally flow from the injunction…the plaintiffs ought not to be exposed to damages which were not fairly consequential on the injunction, and which they could not have foreseen when the injunction was granted.”
“In the result, therefore, and perhaps not surprisingly, I reach the conclusion that the law as to the recoverability of loss suffered by reason of a cross-undertaking is as stated by Lord Diplock in his dictum in the Hoffmann-La Roche case, but with this caveat. Logical and sensible adjustments may well be required, simply because the court is not awarding damages for breach of contract. It is compensating for loss for which the defendant “should be compensated” (to apply the words of the undertaking). Labels such as “common law damages” and “equitable compensation” are not, to my mind, useful. The court is compensating for loss caused by the injunction which was wrongly granted. It will usually do so applying the useful rules as to remoteness derived from the law of contract, but because there is in truth no contract there has to be room for exceptions.”
“[as] to causation, it is sufficient for the court to be satisfied that the making of the order is or was a cause without which the relevant losswould not be or would not have been suffered. That is the hurdle which the applicant must surmount. It is of course open to the defendant to demonstrate that it has not been surmounted, as by demonstrating that there is no causal link between the granting of the injunction or order and the loss in question. If however, disproving the asserted causal link as to which a good arguable cause is shown requires the deployment of extensive contentious evidence and argument, that is not an exercise to be attempted at the interlocutory stage.”
“The object of the undertaking is to protect a party, normally the defendant, in respect of such damage as he may sustain by reason of the grant of the interim relief. It is no part of the undertaking to protect the defendant against loss or damage which he would have sustained otherwise, as for example, detriment which flows from the commencement of the litigation itself. That is loss or damage which the defendant must bear himself, as he does when no interim injunction is sought or granted. Consequently, it is for the party seeking to enforce the undertaking to show that the damage he has sustained would not have been sustained but for the injunction.”
“Neither I nor counsel were aware of any case in which the purely reputational consequences of being the subject of a freezing order have formed a part of an award of damages under the cross-undertaking, wholly divorced from the consequences of the restraint which the freezing order imposed on the applicant for damages or upon anyone else. In this case, the reputational loss is not even that of thedefendants against whom the freezing order was made, but of thefourth defendant. That makes the supposed causative link even more tenuous.”
“The question at this stage is whether Services have demonstrated that they would not have suffered the loss they claim “but for” the grant of the mareva injunction. As I have already indicated there is no doubt that the decision of the bank to seek the sale of the dollars was triggered by the notification of the mareva injunction. However, itis important to appreciate that it is only insofar as the Mareva was effective asagainst Services that it could be relevant to any claim for damages in relation to thecross-undertaking. It must be remembered that a valid Mareva was granted in relation to [the second and third defendants] and because the same also related to Bias, that injunction would have been served in any event on the Midland Bank [because Bias also held an account there]. In the context of these accounts and although [the Bank] did not feel able to say with any certainty what [it] would have done, it seems to me highly likely that within a short period of the service of such an injunction, the bank would have insisted on the setting-off of the dollar account and the sterling account…. [The bank] made clear in [its] evidence that even without the mareva, the bank would not have allowed the position to remain as it was for very long. It seems to me highly likely that with notification of the mareva in relation toother companies in the group, the bank would have insisted on the set-off. In those circumstances it seems to me that Services do not get over the first hurdle.”
“…“but for” the bank allowing the accounts to be run with a substantial sterling overdraft secured by a substantial dollar credit; “but for” the mareva injunction; “but for” the bank taking a decision not required by the mareva but because of the mareva to set-off the two accounts; “but for”
“First, the plaintiffs did not know that the bank was allowing Services in effect to speculate in currency by allowing an extensive credit overdraft in sterling and a substantial credit in dollars. Furthermore, I do not think the evidence established that the running of the accounts in that way would happen in the majority of cases so as to make it reasonable or fair that the plaintiffs should be taken to have contemplated it. Secondly, it seems to me clear that the plaintiffs should not be regarded as contemplating that there was to be a dramatic fall in the value of sterling as compared to dollars at the time when they applied for the Mareva injunction.”
“Historic budgets (prepared before the Return Date Undertakings and WFO came into effect) made provision for existing loans provided by Tylsoca to EGCA Group to be repaid in 2019 and thereafter, and did not make provision for any further financing to be provided by Tylsoca. Instead of now being in a position to repay those loans, EGCA Group has had to rely on further financing from Tylsoca, which means that, in order for it to survive, it will require increased levels of funding.”
“The process of ensuring compliance with the Return Date Undertaking (the “Undertaking” related to the Order of the High Court of Justice of England & Wales (CL-2019-000412) dated11 July 2019 (the “Order”) is – as you know – very complex. This complex process lead [sic] the Bank to the conclusion to cease the payment service on the account as outlined above with a grace period so that you have sufficient time to make the necessary arrangements.”
“Further, as I have already explained at paragraph 9 of my first witness statement, it is the Return Date Undertakings, rather than the underlying claims, which are causative of the damage which has been inflicted on EGCA over the last few months. The public perception, as reflected in a number of press articles, is that the FreezingOrder and the Return Date Order amount to a preliminary determination by theEnglish Court that the defendants (including Igor) committed a fraud. At this stage, I understand that the underlying claims are mere allegations brought by the Claimants. It not unusual for international and successful entrepreneurs, with international business interests, to attract litigation. What Is damaging to EGCA is the widelyreported view that the Return Date Order is, in effect, an early finding of fraud. I exhibit at pages 1 - 6 of RS1 an example of an article in the Russian press, projecting this view. In my experience, EGCA’s existing clients and potential investors would have been materially less concerned had Igor not been subject to the Return Date Order.”
“As Igor has pointed out in paragraph 96.2 of his third affirmation, the problems we have experienced with J.P. Morgan Bank Luxembourg S.A. (“JPM”) began with the Freezing Order. I share Igor’s view that what is particularly concerning for investors(and potential Investors) is the existence of a restrictive court order, such as theFreezing Order or now the Return Date Undertakings, which creates the falseimpression that what would otherwise be mere unproven allegations against Igoractually have some merit.”
“… [In a call on4 July 2019 ] Mr. Hawkins [of JPM] stated that, since the order, MF Trust’s risk profile as a client was significantly changed, and so the Bank had taken the decision to demand repayment of the three loan facilities described above, with immediate effect.”
“On15 July 2019 , JPM confirmed during a call with Alexander and Dmitry that the replacement of the WFO with the Return Date Undertakings had not changed the demand for immediate repayment…”
“The valuation price is derived from the mid-price of the securities. The price source for determining the mid-price of the securities is the published Bloomberg Generic Price (“BGN”). This is the market standard measure for determining the valuation of securities.”
“54. EGCA have used the [EG Emerging Markets Fund] as the benchmark Fund for the loss calculation for both the JPM Loan redemptions and the CS redemptions for the following reasons: 54.1 As regards the JPM Loan repayment, the redemption was made from the [EG Emerging Markets Fund]. 54.2 As regards the CS loan repayment, the redemption was made by EG IV. The [EG Emerging Markets Fund] is the core asset in the portfolio of EG IV and the two funds share the same investment strategy. Therefore, the total returns of the [EG Emerging Markets Fund] is the appropriate benchmark for the CS Loan redemption as well. Accordingly, EGCA have used Bloomberg to confirm the total return generated by the [EG Emerging Markets Fund] for the purposes of calculating the losses.” 54.1 As regards the JPM Loan repayment, the redemption was made from the [EG Emerging Markets Fund]. 54.2 As regards the CS loan repayment, the redemption was made by EG IV. The [EG Emerging Markets Fund] is the core asset in the portfolio of EG IV and the two funds share the same investment strategy. Therefore, the total returns of the [EG Emerging Markets Fund] is the appropriate benchmark for the CS Loan redemption as well. Accordingly, EGCA have used Bloomberg to confirm the total return generated by the [EG Emerging Markets Fund] for the purposes of calculating the losses.”
“Moreover, the management fee which EGCA would have charged in relation to its management of MF Trust assets (but did not in fact charge, resulting in a saving for Tylsoca, EG I and EG IV) is already reflected in the calculations for Loss 3, which deduct fund costs, which include management fees, from the overall investment return (see page 33 of IBM7).”