“Because I wish to appear in person, I need a lot of time to prepare for the case, I have seen that there are many lawyers acting for the applicant and there are thousands of documents to study. Please advise how I can request the court to grant me sufficient time to prepare to defend the application for contempt of court.”
"On10 December 2020 , Mex Clearing raised a claim against the eleventh defender [Mex Securities] and MBFX [Multibank FX International Corporation, a BVI subsidiary of Mex] in the British Virgin Islands seeking repayment of the sum of€36,385,509.52 ('Mex Clearing BVI Claim'). …. Whilst the dispute in the BVI proceedings was in substance between Mex Clearing and the eleventh defender, MBFX was joined as a second defendant as it held the funds in respect of which Mex Clearing sought payment."
"[11] … An agreement was reached that Mex Securities would enter into a settlement agreement and thereafter a consent order in the BVI court process acceding to the claim to the extent of most of the relevant sums, that Mex would assign its claims against VDH AG to Mex Securities and would thereafter assist it in funding the pursuit of those claims against VDH AG; and that, in the event of successful pursuit of the assigned claim against VDH AG, the ultimate proceeds after reimbursement of legal costs would be used first to restore the note holders to the position they should have been in but for VDH AG's actions, and thereafter would be divided equally between Mex and Mex Securities. The settlement was presented to the court and formalised in a consent order and schedule thereto granted by Wallbank J sitting in the BVI High Court on14 December 2020 . On18 December 2020 the consent order was partially implemented. Mex Clearing received funds of€36,385,509.52 from MBFX in implement of an instruction from Mex Securities, in accordance with the consent order. [12] At this point the plot thickens. Almost immediately after settlement terms were agreed and the consent order was finalised, Mex Securities purported to renege upon it. Mr Smith left Dubai to return to Luxembourg on18 December 2020 . On22 December 2020 , agents purporting to act on behalf of Mex Securities wrote to Mex's solicitors in the BVI claim and separately to MBFX, suggesting that only Mr Volotovskiy was a director of Mex Securities, which had no knowledge of the consent order and was seeking to challenge any implement of it. Mex claims that Mex Securities had been incorporated in Luxembourg in 2018 as a securitisation vehicle for the purpose of a proposed venture which had been discussed between Mex and VDH AG but which did not proceed. Mex allowed it to use the "
"For declarator that the defenders have engaged in an unlawful means conspiracy directed inter alia at harming and injuring the interests of the pursuer by: (a) by causing the eleventh defender [Mex Securities] to seek to renege on the agreement recorded in the schedule to the Consent Order granted by the High Court of Justice of the British Virgin Islands dated14 December 2020 (as defined in the Condescendence hereto) which agreement was a lawful, valid and binding compromise entered into by the parties to it, and for that purpose (b) causing a bribe or inducement to be paid to the third defender [Mr Smith] by the transfer of investment funds from the ninth and tenth defenders [VDH AG and VDHI] in the sum of at least$7m to be paid to the eighth defender [CSM] (and thus indirectly to the benefit of the third defender [Mr Smith]) to induce him to cause the eleventh defender [Mex Securities] to seek to renege; (c) attempting to insulate the ninth and tenth defenders [VDH AG and VDHI] from exposure to their own customers and regulatory difficulty arising as a consequence of their own actions, by seeking to create the false impression that those difficulties were caused by the pursuer; (d) seeking to advance a dishonest account that the third defender [Mr Smith] lacked legal authority to bind the eleventh defender [Mex Securities] to the terms of the settlement; (e) seeking to advance a dishonest account that the third defender's [Mr Smith's] giving of consent to that settlement on behalf of the eleventh defender [Mex Securities] was vitiated by improper pressure applied to him; (f) harming the pursuer's interests and reputation by making, and seeking to publicise, false claims against the pursuer and related companies; (g) furthering the carrying on of substantial volumes of investment business between the defenders; and (h) concealing the first defender's [Mr Ford's] interest in and involvement with that business in light of the prohibition order made against him by the Financial Conduct Authority."
"108. … the central allegations in the Scottish and English Proceedings, are that: 108.1 the Dubai Agreement [i.e. the settlement in December 2020] was entered into by myself and the MultiBank Group lawfully, but subsequent to the return of Colm Smith to Luxembourg, there became an unlawful means conspiracy which occurred (involving Stewart Ford, Michael Gollits, Colm Smith, Adam Duthie, VDH-AG, VDH-I and the other Conspirators) to pay and entice Colm Smith to renege on the Dubai Agreement and further, to issue the Luxembourg Summons.; and 108.2. There is an unlawful means conspiracy in Scotland, which should be tried in that jurisdiction, which involves, amongst other things, the following: 108.2.1. First, on the one hand for VDH-I to commence litigation in the BVI and allege fraud against me and against Colm Smith, pretending, albeit falsely, it is a separate entity from VDH-AG and is not part of the VDH Group and has no knowledge of the involvement of VDH AG with Colm Smith, CSM and the other Conspirators; and 108.2.2. Second, on the other hand, for VDH-AG (sister company to VDH-I, working hand in hand with VDH-I) to enter into the unlawful means conspiracy, pay and work with Colm Smith and his company, CSM, so as to entice and/or induce and/or bribe him to renege on the Dubai Agreement, disappear and not defend the fraud allegations against him by VDH-I; and 108.2.3. Third, through utilising VDH-I as the sole protagonist alleging fraud against me in the BVI, shield Michael Gollits, VDH-AG and the VDH Group, from allegations of illegal trading in gold, breach of fiduciary duty in relation to the value of the Notes, deceiving the Noteholders as to the real value of the Notes and other wrongdoings by Michael Gollits and VDH-AG; and 108.2.4. Fourth, the price that VDH Group (including VDH-AG and VDH-I) will have to pay Colm Smith, his master Stewart Ford, Brian Cormack and other Conspirators is not only to pay€ 8.6 million from1 January 2021 to July 2023, but to also, for VDH-AG to become the investment manager to CSM, and issue Junk Bonds amounting to US$ 5.6 billion , in order to both give credibility to these Junk Bonds and also shield and conceal the involvement of Stewart Ford in the Bonds and the profits arising therefrom (in breach of the FCA life ban on Stewart Ford who suffered the heaviest fine in the history of the FCA amounting to circa GBP 76 million for issuing similar Junk Bonds as those now being issued by CSM under the synopsis of VDH-AG); and 108.3. Needless to say, the result of the concealment of the involvement of VDH-AG with Colm Smith and CSM and the unlawful means conspiracy tantamount to abusive behaviour by VDH-I to conceal facts, deceive and mislead the BVI Honourable Courts so as to cause unjustifiable and substantial harm to the MultiBank Group and I both economically and reputationally."
“Because I wish to appear in person, I need a lot of time to prepare for the case, I have seen that there are many lawyers acting for the applicant and there are thousands of documents to study. Please advise how I can request the court to grant me sufficient time to prepare to defend the application for contempt of court.”
“Nomention was made of the Court of Appeal judgment, handed down the very same day, which upheld Jack J's substantive finding that there was a good arguable case that the settlement was a fraud. That judgment was not referred to let alone exhibited. No explanation has been given for why the Court of Appeal judgment recusing Jack J was exhibited, but the judgment which upheld his conclusions was not. In my view, there must be a strong inference that that was a particular and therefore deliberate omission.”
“there was and remains no explanation for why the proceedings in Scotland were not issued until 15 months or so after the claimant was in possession of all, or almost all, the relevant information.” (3) A failure to explain why the WFO was not sought in the courts of the BVI. At para. 168, Coulson LJ said: “Whatever the causes of action, both sides’ claims come back to the settlement agreement and whether or not it was made in good faith. That is the issue before the courts in the BVI. It strongly suggests that—if appropriate at all—a freezing order should have been sought there.”
“[19] On25 September 2024 , the Third Defendant filed an affidavit in opposition to the Claimant's application. On27 September 2024 , the Third Defendant, the Eighth Defendant and the Twelfth Defendant applied to discharge the WFO and to stay the application to commit and to vacate the hearing listed for18 November 2024 pending the outcome of their discharge application. On21 October 2024 , Soole J made an order on paper dismissing the application to stay the application to commit and to vacate the hearing listed for18 November 2024 . Soole J held that "the fact of the application to discharge the worldwide freezing Order provides no good reason to stay the contempt application nor therefore to vacate the hearing listed for18 November 2024 ". He ordered in respect of the discharge application that it be listed for directions only on18 November 2024 by the Judge hearing the contempt application, who would determine at what stage in the hearing to consider the directions. Since this order was made without a hearing, Soole J granted any person affected by the order 7 days within which to apply to the court to set aside or vary its terms. No application was made within the seven-day period, and no attempt was made on18 November 2024 to apply out of time.”
"found Mex liable to the defenders in the expenses of the causes on an agent and client, client paying basis; found the defenders' agents entitled to charge an additional fee … with 15% specified as the level of increase in the charges to be allowed at taxation in respect of each such paragraph, found Mex liable to the Scottish defenders for payment of interim expenses in the sum of£150,000 in each process and authorised the sum lodged as caution to be uplifted and paid to their agents."
“27. The reasons advanced for the abandonment did not stand up to scrutiny, as could be seen from a close examination of a witness statement provided by the COO of the MultiBank Group, Salem Kattoura, in one of the related English proceedings. VDHI's insolvency event had occurred many months previously. It had not been represented in the proceedings here for a considerable time, and nothing about their circumstances justified an abandonment only in March 2025. The Scottish defenders were unaware of any particular change in VDH AG's ability to satisfy any decree despite the surrender of its banking licence as part of a restructuring exercise in January 2025. Mr Kattoura's allegation that Mr Taher considered CSM to be a Ponzi scheme was an example of just the sort of self-referential exercise that had characterised Mex's conduct throughout the proceedings here and elsewhere. No notice had been given of any change in circumstances on the part of the Scottish defenders which could justify a change of approach in relation to them. Although Mex claimed that the "Engenera" entity in which Melville Consulting Partners Limited was heavily invested, Engenera Green Bond plc, had become insolvent, in fact it was another related entity with a similar name which had done so, as was quite clear from publicly available information. Melville Consulting Partners Limited continued to have substantial net assets, amounting to over£7 million according to its latest (unaudited) accounts to31 March 2024 . The timing of the abandonment in the context of the conduct of the action to date amply justified the inference that the conduct of the action had been unreasonable throughout. …. 44. The factors that a court would generally take into account in deciding whether to make an award of expenses on an agent and client scale were set out in McKie . In this case, Mex's conduct of the litigation had been either, or both, incompetent and unreasonable. There was no cogent reason for a properly prepared action to be abandoned at this stage. The explanation tendered by Mex was not credible. The event of insolvency affecting VDHI had happened many months ago, that affecting VDH AG more recently, but on no logical basis could they be causally linked to the recent abandonment. In any event, CSM's liquidity position had not changed at any relevant point. If Mex was concerned about the liquidity of any of the remaining defenders, it could quite reasonably have abandoned the action against only those defenders which it deemed to be a recovery risk. 45. The proceedings had been brought in October 2023. That was around three years after the events said to have given rise to the action. There was no cogent explanation for the delay. However, there were ongoing proceedings in the BVI concerned with the validity of the consent order which was central to the present action. The existence of the present proceedings was successfully used by persons and entities connected to Mex to persuade the court in the BVI to postpone a trial on that matter in February 2024. That was their purpose, and it was an improper one. Had the present action proceeded to proof, the defenders might well have been in a position to invite the court to find in fact that it had been an abuse of process. It was regrettable that that opportunity had been denied to them. However, the court was entitled to draw inferences from the background to the raising of these proceedings. Since all that these proceedings seemed to have achieved was a stay in the BVI case, and standing their abandonment for no cogent reason, the court was invited to find that the raising of this action was motivated solely by a desire to achieve that. That was unreasonable conduct. CSM cast no aspersions on counsel and agents who had acted for Mex. It was taken at face value that they would have been acting on instructions and were entitled to assume that Mex was genuine in its desire to ventilate the issues at proof. However, it might be noted in this regard that the turnover of representation for Mex had been vigorous. 46. The action alleged an unlawful means conspiracy and a range of steps taken by the defenders said to amount to fraud. Those allegations had not been vindicated. CSM's position was that there never had been any proper basis to make those averments at the outset. However, it had been preparing for proof, in keeping with all timetables set by the court, to refute the allegations. Not only were the reputations of the averred conspirators impugned, but they were faced with an£85 million claim. Any defender acting reasonably would vigorously oppose such claims where they were not admitted. CSM, having gone to entirely reasonable and predictable expense to resist Mex's claim, should not be left out of pocket by the award of expenses on the usual scale. Mex should bear the cost of its own unfounded and unreasonable, failing which incompetent, litigation.”
“In a case where it is determined that the injunction should not have been granted the undertaking is likely to be enforced, though the court retains a discretion not to do so.”
“The third principle is that loss will not qualify for compensation under the cross-undertaking unless it has been caused by the grant of the injunction. Though normally that is an issue decided on an enquiry as to damages at the end of the day, the causation issue must also be examined in forming an intelligent estimate of likely loss at the fortification stage.”
“On an application for an inquiry the applicant should adduce some evidence (Yukong Line Ltd v Rendsburg Investments Corp [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 113 at [35]—“some credible evidence that he has suffered loss as the result of the making of the order”) to show an arguable case that he has sustained loss falling within the undertaking. The court will not order an inquiry if it would be pointless to do so because the intended claim is obviously bad or because any recoverable loss is trivial. On the other hand, at the discretion stage the court should not hear protracted argument on whether the suggested loss will be recoverable: see Malhotra v Malhotra [2015] 1 B.C.L.C. 428; see generally Williams and Humbert Ltd v WDH Trademarks [1986] A.C. 368 at 441.”
“33. Upon discharge of a Mareva injunction, the court has a discretion whether or not to enforce the undertaking in damages….if it is established that the injunction was wrongly granted, albeit without fault on the plaintiff's part, the court will ordinarily order an inquiry as to damages in any case where it appears that loss may have been caused as a result. 34. … The order for an inquiry as to damages is discretionary, such discretion being exercised in accordance with equitable principles, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, but bearing in mind that, since the injunction should not have been obtained, prima facie the plaintiff ought to bear the loss: see Financiera Avenida -v- Shiblaq [1991] The Times 14th January (CA Civil Division) . As observed by James LJ in Graham -v- Campbell (1877) 7 Ch. D. 490 at 494, the undertaking ought to be given effect except under ‘special circumstances’. Those special circumstances include the conduct of the injunctee at the time the injunction was obtained or later, see per Lord Diplock in F. Hoffmann -v- La Roche & Co AG -v- Secretary of State[1975] AC 295 at 361. However, whilst the principles referred to above have been enunciated as generally applicable to the exercise of the court's discretion whether or not to order an inquiry as to damages, if the reason for the discharge of the injunction is that the court lacked jurisdiction to make it in the first place, it is difficult to envisage any circumstances in which the court would refuse to order an inquiry as to damages upon some evidence of loss…” 35. So far as evidence of loss is concerned, upon an application for an inquiry, the applicant must adduce some credible evidence that he has suffered loss as the result of the making of the order. The court will not order an inquiry if it appears to be pointless to do so because the intended claim for damage is plainly unsustainable. That may be because it is clear that the order is no more than the factual context for loss which would have been suffered regardless of the granting of the order, or it may equally be clear that the damage is too remote. However, at the stage of exercising its discretion whether to order an inquiry, the court does not ordinarily hear protracted argument on whether the suggested loss will be recoverable. If the defendant shows that he has suffered loss which was prima facie or arguably caused by the order, then the evidential burden of any contention that the relevant loss would have been suffered regardless of the making of the order in practice passes to the defendant and an inquiry will be ordered: see for instance Financiera Avenida SA -v- Shiblaq (above); Tharros Shipping Co Limited -v- Bias Shipping[1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep 577 .”
“(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, a claimant who discontinues is liable for the costs which a defendant against whom the claimant discontinues incurred on or before the date on which notice of discontinuance was served on the defendant.”
“58. The claimants have sued the eighth defendant but by discontinuing their claim they accepted that it is not a valid claim against the defendant. The position should be, and in my view the wording of the rule provides, that in those circumstances the claimant is on the face of it liable for the eighth defendant's costs. That would have the effect of reversing the order for costs below. The claimant should not normally have the luxury of bringing a claim now accepted as invalid and not meeting costs incurred along the way. Of course, if the eighth defendant's conduct in the course of proceedings was found to have been abusive or vexatious different considerations may apply but an appropriate application would need to be made by the claimant discontinuing. 59. I do not accept that there is a burden on the party against whom a claim is discontinued to have to seek to set aside the notice underCPR r 38.4 and keep alive the claim against him in order to contest costs below. In my judgment that is to put the burden in the wrong place and it is for the party discontinuing a claim to take the initiative. It is for the claimant discontinuing to seek a different order or to achieve by negotiation a discontinuance on other terms. 60. The starting position should be, in my view, that a party who unilaterally discontinues a claim against a defendant by serving a notice of discontinuance is liable for the costs of that defendant, as provided by rule 38.6 . Even had the appeal by the other defendants failed in this court the claimants should in my view have met the costs of the party against whom they had discontinued when the claim reached this court. It has not been suggested that the application to strike out was vexatious or other than arguable.”
“The modern practice is to be much more willing to make adverse orders for costs in interim matters as the case progresses rather than to leave them to be made later. The purpose of this is to fix liabilities and to allocate costs. … It is consistent with this that such orders for assessment should be dealt with on a self-contained basis. Otherwise part of the purpose of the orders is lost.” 36. Further, Mann J's judgment (at para 38) implicitly rejects Pill LJ's characterisation of interlocutory costs as being “incurred along the way” in the course of proceedings. In a case concerning the costs of the trial of a preliminary issue, he considered it “entirely logical” that costs orders should remain unaffected by subsequent events in the litigation, and saw this as: “consistent with a scheme of litigation in which the costs of applications are dealt with according to the fate of the application. It does not produce unfairness to the paying party, it was the defendant's choice in this case to take the collateral contract point, and it accepted that it should be dealt with as a preliminary issue.” 37. As a matter of policy it would be surprising if the CPR provides for harsher consequences on a litigant who discontinues a claim or part of a claim than are typically visited on one who pursues an invalid claim or arid litigation to the bitter end. Surely a litigant who comes to appreciate that there is no point in pursuing a claim or part of one is to be encouraged to discontinue it promptly. … 39. I therefore conclude that prima facie under the rules discontinuance does not affect costs orders already made. I see no justification for a contrary order in this case. Even if I took a different view about the prima facie position, I would make orders to depart from it, and uphold orders already made….” … “The modern practice is to be much more willing to make adverse orders for costs in interim matters as the case progresses rather than to leave them to be made later. The purpose of this is to fix liabilities and to allocate costs. … It is consistent with this that such orders for assessment should be dealt with on a self-contained basis. Otherwise part of the purpose of the orders is lost.” “consistent with a scheme of litigation in which the costs of applications are dealt with according to the fate of the application. It does not produce unfairness to the paying party, it was the defendant's choice in this case to take the collateral contract point, and it accepted that it should be dealt with as a preliminary issue.”
“In Brookes v HSBC Bank Plc[2011] EWCA Civ 354 ; [2012] 3 Costs L.O.285, Moore-Bick LJ set out the following principles (approved in Nelson’s Yard Management Co v Eziefula and Ashany v Eco-Bat Technologies Ltd[2018] EWCA Civ 1066 ): (1) when a claimant discontinues the proceedings, there is a presumption by reason ofCPR r.38.6 that the defendant should recover their costs; the burden is on the claimant to show a good reason for departing from that position; (2) the fact that the claimant would or might well have succeeded at trial is not itself a sufficient reason for doing so; (3) however, if it is plain that the claim would have failed, that is an additional factor in favour of applying the presumption; (4) the mere fact that the claimant’s decision to discontinue may have been motivated by practical, pragmatic or financial reasons as opposed to a lack of confidence in the merits of the case will not suffice to displace the presumption; (5) if the claimant is to succeed in displacing the presumption they will usually need to show a change of circumstances to which they have not themselves contributed; (6) however, no change in circumstances is likely to suffice unless it has been brought about by some form of unreasonable conduct on the part of the defendant which in all the circumstances provides a good reason for departing from the rule. (See Teasdale v HSBC Bank Plc[2010] EWHC 612 (QB) ; [2010] 4 All E.R. 630, HH Judge Waksman QC, sitting as a judge of the High Court; affirmed by the Court of Appeal at[2011] EWCA Civ 354 ; [2012] 3 Costs L.O. 285.)”
“Court’s discretion as to costs 44.2 (1) The court has discretion as to – (a) whether costs are payable by one party to another; (b) the amount of those costs; and (c) when they are to be paid. (2) If the court decides to make an order about costs – (a) the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party; but (b) the court may make a different order. …. (4) In deciding what order (if any) to make about costs, the court will have regard to all the circumstances, including – (a) the conduct of all the parties; (b) whether a party has succeeded on part of its case, even if that party has not been wholly successful; and (c) any admissible offer to settle made by a party which is drawn to the court’s attention, and which is not an offer to which costs consequences under Part 36 apply. (5) The conduct of the parties includes – (a) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings and in particular the extent to which the parties followed the Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct or any relevant pre-action protocol; (b) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue; (c) the manner in which a party has pursued or defended its case or a particular allegation or issue; (d) whether a claimant who has succeeded in the claim, in whole or in part, exaggerated its claim; and (e)whether a party failed to comply with an order for alternative dispute resolution, or unreasonably failed to engage in alternative dispute resolution. ... (6) The orders which the court may make under this rule include an order that a party must pay – (a) a proportion of another party’s costs; (b) a stated amount in respect of another party’s costs; (c) costs from or until a certain date only; (d) costs incurred before proceedings have begun; (e) costs relating to particular steps taken in the proceedings; (f) costs relating only to a distinct part of the proceedings; and (g) interest on costs from or until a certain date, including a date before judgment. (7) Before the court considers making an order under paragraph (6)(f), it will consider whether it is practicable to make an order under paragraph (6)(a) or (c) instead. …” (a) the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party; but (b) whether a party has succeeded on part of its case, even if that party has not been wholly successful; and (c) any admissible offer to settle made by a party which is drawn to the court’s attention, and which is not an offer to which costs consequences under Part 36 apply. (a) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings and in particular the extent to which the parties followed the Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct or any relevant pre-action protocol; (b) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue; (c) the manner in which a party has pursued or defended its case or a particular allegation or issue; (d) whether a claimant who has succeeded in the claim, in whole or in part, exaggerated its claim; and (e)whether a party failed to comply with an order for alternative dispute resolution, or unreasonably failed to engage in alternative dispute resolution. ... (g) interest on costs from or until a certain date, including a date before judgment. (7) Before the court considers making an order under paragraph (6)(f), it will consider whether it is practicable to make an order under paragraph (6)(a) or (c) instead. …”