N & CJ Horton Property v Ivan Norman & Conjoined Appeals [2026] EWHC 959 (Ch)

“10. The Defendant ("Dean Norman") is a qualified accountant. He formerly supplied accountancy services through a company called DSN Accountants Limited ("DSN"), which was incorporated in 2010 with him and his wife, Sarah Norman, as directors and joint owners. On 22 October 2020, DSN entered voluntary liquidation. Dean Norman and Sarah Norman also own and manage a company called DSN Accountancy and Tax Services Limited (formerly Normtax Limited), which was incorporated shortly after DSN entered liquidation, on 21 December 2020. 11. In around January 2013, Select appointed DSN as its accountant. The services provided by DSN following this appointment (including preparation of Select's management and statutory accounts) were provided through Dean Norman. 12. Dean Norman's role in the business of Select gradually grew and I became increasingly reliant upon his expertise. On 1 June 2016, he was appointed as the Finance Director of Select and around this time he was also given access to and control over Select's bank accounts. Also in around 2016, he was given access to and control over the Property Partnership's bank account with a view to overseeing its finances. On 10 December 2016, he was appointed as Finance Director of Hortons Motorcycles and gained access to and control over its bank accounts at around the same time. 13. In his capacity as Select's Finance Director, Dean Norman's duties included those of managing the company's finances and financial position generally; reporting to the other directors on the company's profit, loss and cashflow; producing management accounts and overseeing the company's ledgers; and organising payments to suppliers and creditors. 14. Dean Norman remained a director of Select until 29 June 2019, when he unexpectedly resigned. When resigning, Dean Norman cited his wife's unfortunate illness with cancer, stating that he needed to look after her. On the same date, he also resigned as a director of Hortons Motorcycles. 15. Dean Norman was reappointed as a director of Select on 15 July 2019 at my request. I wanted him to resume his role because Select was in a period of financial difficulty and I believed its creditors would be unhappy if the Finance Director resigned without a replacement. Also, Dean Norman was involved in Select's refinancing negotiations with its banks at the time, and I thought it might harm the company's prospects of refinancing on favourable terms if he did not remain involved. 16. Dean Norman eventually resigned as a director of Select for the second time on 17 August 2020.”

“15…However, in late-2019 and early-2020, Mr and Mrs Horton further examined the historical transactions on the Controlled Bank Accounts by reference to the available bank statements. These examinations revealed that large sums had been paid into and out of the Controlled Bank Accounts with payment references which referred to companies or transactions that neither Mr Horton nor Mrs Horton recognised and which did not apparently relate to either the Approved Select Loans or the Approved Partnership Loan, or to the ordinary operations of any of the relevant businesses including its bank loans. Further, it was not possible satisfactorily to reconcile or understand those transactions from the available documentary records. 16. In the light of the discovery of these unexplained transactions, in about March to April 2020, Mr and Mrs Horton (and/or Select and/or Hortons Motorcycles) removed Dean Norman’s access to and control of each of the Controlled Bank Accounts and terminated his role in relation to the Property Partnership. On 25 June 2020, Mr Horton reported the unexplained transactions to the West Midlands Police. As aforesaid, Dean Norman resigned as a director of Select on 17 August 2020.”

“(1) Dean Norman provided accountancy services to each of the Claimants. (2) Each of the Claimants Select, N&C Horton and Hortons Motorcycles were in continuous cashflow difficulties and required funding in addition to facilities offered by their banks. Nicholas Horton who was the driving force behind each of the Claimants was fully aware of the cashflow difficulties and in particular in respect of Select and N&C Horton those cashflow difficulties arose prior to Dean Norman’s involvement; and incentivised Dean Norman to obtain borrowing from Dean Norman’s close friend and family, with a promise of growth shares in Select. (3) Dean Norman procured loans from a family friend and his father; Nicholas Horton was fully aware of the same. (4) When it became clear that the loans were still not enough and other funding would have to be obtained, and following a meeting between Nicholas Horton and the lenders at which proposals were requested for repayment, Nicholas Horton falsely reported Dean Norman to the police for fraud; that allegation of fraud was investigated by the police and Dean Norman was cleared. (5) Despite the false report to the police no allegation of fraud has been made in this claim. (6) It is correct that lenders have indicated claims against Select and N&C Horton for repayment of loans. That is not a breach of fiduciary duty by Dean Norman; and nor is it asserted in the Re-Amended Particulars of Claim that any loans made by third party lenders to Select or Dean Norman amount to a breach of duty.”

“10. Mr Crump and Mr Norman are longstanding friends. In October 2016 they were on holiday together with their respective families in Egypt. During that trip, Mr Norman discussed the Defendants’ financial difficulties and need for short­term funding with Mr Crump in person. Mr Crump orally made an offer to Mr Norman that he, APL and/or APL Formwork lend money on a short­term basis to meet the funding needs that Mr Norman had explained. Mr Norman (acting on behalf of Select, the Property Partnership and Hortons Motorcycles) orally accepted the offer by APL, APL Formwork and Mr Crump to periodically advance short­term loans to the Defendants.”

“13. Between 29 November 2016 and 1 November 2019, the Claimants advanced Loans totalling £3,088,522.42 to the Defendants under the Lending Arrangement. These Loans are set out in Appendix 1 to these Particulars of Claim. 14. Between 30 November 2016 and 10 January 2020, and pursuant to their obligation to repay the sums advanced by the Claimants, the Defendants made repayments to the Claimants in relation to the Loans totalling £1,663,573.38. The individual repayments made are set out in Appendix 2 to these Particulars of Claim. 15. Applying the sums received wholly to the principal sums advanced (and not as to interest), the Defendants have received Loans in a total amount of £1,424,949.04, which they have failed to repay (‘the Outstanding Principal Amount’).”

“21.3. CDS and HFR are both entities connected with Dean Norman: 21.3.1. CDS was incorporated on 15 February 2016 and dissolved on 30 May 2017. At the date of its dissolution, its co-equal shareholders were Dean Norman, Carl Norman (who is Dean Norman's brother) and Steven Crump ("Mr Crump"), who is a business associate of Dean Norman. 21.3.2. HFR was incorporated on 22 October 2015 with two shareholders, namely Dean Norman and a John Psaras. According to Companies House filings, it was dormant for the years ended 31 October 2017 and 31 October 2018 and was dissolved on 3 December 2019.”

“18A. Following a contested application heard on 13 July 2022, Deputy Master Collaço Moraes granted summary judgment on the Claimants’ account claim and ordered Dean Norman to account for the transactions specified in Schedule 2 to his order of that date (the “Account Payments”). The Account Payments were those transfers which the Claimants were unable to understand and mostly comprised those set out in Peters & Peters’ letter of 10 February 2021. 18B. On 17 August 2022, Dean Norman purported to provide that account by way of an affidavit dated 15 August 2022 which exhibited more than 4,000 pages of documents, including large spreadsheets labelled “DN1” and “DN3”

“15B. As the Claimant knew and/or knows or suspected, the transfers set out in T17 and T68 of DN1 and App F of DN3, which include the payments in paragraphs 6 and 7, were part of the dishonest money laundering scheme pleaded in paragraph 23A of the Re-Re-Amended Particulars of Claim in the Account Claim. The Claimant’s knowledge or suspicion is to be inferred from the following facts and circumstances: 15B.1 To the best of the Partnership’s knowledge pending disclosure, as set out in T17 of DN1 and App F of DN3, (i) at a time when BCP was under the Claimant’s control, it (a) transferred purported ‘loan monies’ to CDS rather than the purported ‘borrower’, Select, and (b) received purported ‘repayments’ from HFR, CDS and Dean Norman’s personal accounts, (ii) purported ‘repayments’ of a ‘loan’ to the Partnership were made to the Claimant or for his benefit from HFR’s accounts (as particularised in paragraph 1.1A27.1A below), and (iii) purported ‘repayments’ of a ‘loan’ from BCP were transferred to the Claimant’s personal account. Both BCP’s accounts and the Claimant’s personal accounts were controlled by the Claimant at the material times and so it is to be inferred that the Claimant knew about these circuitous payments, which are characteristic of money laundering. 15B.2 The purported ‘loan advances’ pleaded at paragraphs 6 and 7 were broken down into multiple smaller payments sent on the same or consecutive days. These fragmented payments are inconsistent with the transfers having been made pursuant to legitimate loans required by the Claimants and rather indicate that the transactions formed part of a money laundering scheme. 15B.3 Even taking the Claimant’s claim at face value, the ‘loans’ to the Partnership were undocumented, unsecured and on uncommercial terms. It is inherently unlikely that the Claimant would legitimately advance hundreds of thousands of pounds to the Partnership or the other Claimants in the Account Claim on the strength of oral agreements, still less without any meaningful interest or any security of any kind. It is therefore probable that, if the Claimant did transfer the relevant sums by way of loan as alleged (whether on his own behalf or on behalf of BCP), he did so for an illegitimate reason, namely participating in a money laundering scheme. 15B.4 The Claimant has made various inconsistent assertions about the purported ‘loans’ said to have been agreed variously between BCP (acting by the Claimant) or the Claimant on the one hand and the Partnership or Select (acting by Dean Norman) on the other. In particular, at a time when BCP was owned and managed by the Claimant, it instructed Thursfields to make the demands set out in paragraph 13.1 above on behalf of BCP against Select. Then, after the Claimant ceased to be a person of significant control over BCP in March 2021, he instructed IWG to demand an alleged debt derived from the same purported ‘loan monies’ on behalf of the Claimant against the Partnership (as set out in paragraph 13.5 above). After issuing these proceedings, the Claimant amended and re-amended the Particulars of Claim of his own motion, varying both the sums claimed under, and the terms of, the alleged ‘loans’. These changes in the Claimant’s account of his purported dealings indicate that, as the Claimant knew, the transfers from BCP and the Claimant were not made pursuant to legitimate loan transactions and were instead made in furtherance of the money laundering scheme. 15B.5 The purported loan document dated 14 June 2019 signed by the Claimant and relied upon in Thursfields’ letter referenced in paragraph 13.1 above is inconsistent with the Claimant’s claim in that it (i) refers to a loan from “BCP Ltd” to Select Lifestyles Limited, (ii) is a heads of terms rather than a loan contract, (iii) states a “Facility Amount” of £675,166.20 rather than £500,000, and (iv) provides for no interest to be payable until June 2020. The purported loan document dated 31 December 2018, also signed by the Claimant, is inconsistent with both the loan document dated 14 June 2019 and the present claim. 15B.6 In all the circumstances, it is inherently improbable that the Claimant became involved in the money laundering scheme being operated by his son without knowing or suspecting that was the case. 15B.7 The Partnership reserves the right to plead further in this regard following disclosure and expert evidence.”

“29.5D. Further or alternatively, the Claimant’s claims are unenforceable by reason of illegality because: a. The purpose of the statutory provisions pleaded above is to prevent money laundering. b. By enforcing the Claimants’ claims, the Court would be placing the parties in precisely the position they would have been in if the alleged loan contracts had been performed. c. Such enforcement would stultify the purpose of the money laundering statutes by facilitating (rather than preventing) money laundering. d. Denying the Claimants’ claims would be a proportionate response to the illegality. e. In those circumstances, it would be harmful to the integrity of the legal system to enforce the Claimant’s claim in restitution.” system to enforce the Claimant’s claim in restitution.”

“29…(2) Rather, it is to be inferred, for the reasons set out below, that (i) Dean Norman and Mr Crump agreed that the Defendants’ accounts would be used for the money laundering operation pleaded below, (ii) the Claimants were therefore indifferent to and did not intend to create any contractual or other binding legal relations with the Defendants (because they were not required for the money laundering scheme), so that (iii) the subsequent payments were not purported to be made under any loan contracts.” “30.. (2) Instead, the alleged loan payments were part of a dishonest money laundering scheme operated by Dean Norman, as set out in paragraph 23A of the draft Re-Amended Particulars of Claim in the Account Claim, which the Defendants repeat and adopt (the ‘Money Laundering Scheme’). As set out further below, the Claimants knew and/or know and/or suspected that the alleged payments in the Appendices to the Particulars of Claim, if made, were part of that dishonest money laundering scheme. (3) Accordingly, it is to be inferred that the Claimants were therefore indifferent to and did not intend to create any contractual or other binding legal relations with the Defendants (because they were not required for the money laundering scheme).”

“43. As Mr Crump knew and/or knows and/or suspected, the alleged payments in the Appendices to the Particulars of Claim, if made, were part of the Money Laundering Scheme. Mr Crump’s knowledge and dishonesty is to be inferred from the following facts and circumstances: (1) To the best of the Defendants’ knowledge pending disclosure, as recorded in App C, App G, App H and App I of DN3, the purported loan ‘advances’ and ‘repayments’ were routed through the accounts of many different entities which were not themselves said to be the relevant ‘borrower’, including (but not limited to) various accounts belonging to the Defendants and the accounts of companies controlled by or otherwise relevantly connected to Dean Norman, including at least HFR and CDS. The Claimants’ own case in paragraphs 11.1 to 11.6 is that Mr Crump knew about these circuitous payments, which are characteristic of money laundering. (2) The inference is supported by the nature of the accounts through which Dean Norman transferred the purported ‘loan monies’. CDS was dissolved before ever filing accounts, while HFR was dormant until December 2019 and dissolved thereafter. APL Formwork was, to the best of the Defendants’ knowledge, owned by Dean Norman from (at least) 1 December 2018 until 1 June 2021. As an accredited professional accountant, Dean Norman must have known that it was not justifiable to use such accounts, or indeed his own personal accounts, to hold or transfer ‘loan monies’ due to or from the Defendants. It is to be inferred that (i) Dean Norman used these accounts because he knew that, by reason of the account holders’ corporate status and/or ownership, they would be subject to minimal scrutiny by the Defendants and third parties, and (ii) Mr Crump had the same knowledge as Dean Norman, not least in circumstances where, at the material times, Mr Crump was himself a director of APL Formwork and a shareholder in CDS. (3) The purported ‘loan advances’ and ‘repayments’ in the Appendices to the Particulars of Claim were broken down into multiple smaller payments sent on the same or consecutive days. These fragmented payments are inconsistent with the transfers having been made pursuant to legitimate loans required by the Defendants and rather indicate that the transactions formed part of a money laundering scheme. (4) Even taking the Claimants’ claims at face value, as set out in paragraph 30(1) above, the alleged agreements with the Defendants have many features which are inconsistent with their having been legitimate loans. It is inherently unlikely that the Claimants would legitimately advance millions of pounds to the Defendants on the strength of oral agreements, still less without any meaningful interest or any security of any kind. It is therefore probable that, if Mr Crump did pay or procure the payment of the relevant sums by way of loan as alleged, he did so for an illegitimate reason, namely participating in a money laundering scheme. (5) The Claimants have made various inconsistent assertions about the purported ‘loans’ said to have been agreed variously between Mr Crump, APL and APL Formwork (acting by Mr Crump) on the one hand and the Defendants (acting by Dean Norman) on the other. In particular: (a) In the letter referenced in paragraph 19(2) above, the Claimants’ then solicitors Tenet alleged that (i) Select borrowed the sum of £417,951.30 from Access Products (Midlands) Limited of which £46,048.70 (excluding interest) was outstanding, and (ii) Select borrowed the sum of £1,209,000 from one or more of Mr Crump, Access Products (Midlands) Limited and Dean Norman (Tenet’s letter did not specify) of which £1,034,000 and/or £1,008,048.70 (it is not clear on the face of Tenet’s letter) (excluding interest) was outstanding. (b) In the FAR Report, produced pursuant to instructions from Mr Crump’s solicitors, Tenet, and sent to the Defendants’ solicitors on Mr Crump’s behalf, it was said that: (i) Mr Crump advanced £186,000 to HFR, principally to enable HFR to make payments to HMRC on behalf of Select, of which £165,000 had been repaid by HFR; (ii) Select borrowed sums amounting to £464,000 from “APL” and had repaid £402,951.30 of that sum; (iii) The Property Partnership had borrowed sums amounting to £875,000 from “APL” and had repaid £190,000 of that sum; (iv) Select borrowed sums amounting to £1,176,438.73 from “APL Formwork”, and had repaid £382,153.12 of those sums; and (v) The Property Partnership borrowed sums amounting to £93,340 from “APL Formwork” and has repaid £247,642.63. (c) By a letter of 9 December 2021 from the Claimants’ solicitors (who remain on the record), the Claimants alleged that Mr Crump and/or APL (it is not specified which one or what amounts from each) loaned the sum of £1,959,000 to Select and/or the Property Partnership (again, it is not specified which one or what amounts to each) of which £1,011,777.92 (plus interest) was outstanding. (d) In the present claim, the Claimants allege that the Defendants (jointly and severally) borrowed sums amounting to £3,088,522.42 from the Claimants (without specifying what amounts for each Claimant) and sums amounting to £1,424,949.04 are outstanding. (6) These changes in the Claimants’ account of their purported dealings indicate that, as the Claimants knew, the transfers in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 were not made pursuant to legitimate loan transactions and were instead made in furtherance of Dean Norman’s money laundering scheme. (7) The purported loan documents dated December 2018 and 14 June 2019 signed by Mr Crump and apparently relied upon by the Claimants are (as the Claimants appear to acknowledge) inconsistent with the Claimants’ claims in that they do not (i) refer to any joint and several loans, (ii) refer to any loan balance in excess of £749,062.74 (to APL) and £200,000 (to Mr Crump), and (iii) in the case of the APL HOT and Crump HOT, evidence any concluded agreement at all. (8) In all the circumstances, it is inherently improbable that Mr Crump became involved in the money laundering scheme being operated by his business associate, said in paragraph 10 to be his “longstanding friend”, without knowing or realising that that was the case. 44. Mr Crump’s knowledge and dishonesty falls to be attributed to APL and APL Formwork on the basis that, at all material times, he was a director of those companies and/or their directing mind and will relative to the transactions set out in the Appendices to the Particulars of Claim.”

“22. The Claimants are being asked to acknowledge debts in circumstances where there is inconsistency, a lack of clarity and, at times, contradiction in the allegations as to the amounts claimed, who they are owed to and who they are owed by. The only consistent aspect of the various allegations is that the purported debts were orchestrated by Dean Norman and/or arise following oral agreements with him. More fundamentally, the alleged debts emerge in the context of a large number of unexplained transactions arranged unilaterally by Dean Norman to and from the Claimants' accounts and himself and/or entities controlled by him and/or entities connected to him without any satisfactory documentation or explanations to justify them. 23. It is so that the Claimants can determine their legal rights and obligations in connection with the unexplained payments and the various allegations made against them that I regard it as paramount that Dean Norman provides a full account of his actions and a full and coherent reconciliation of the unexplained payments to and from the relevant accounts.”

“43. In response to paragraph 13, I did make payments until 2018, but Linn Goodwin and Les Trumpeter also made payments. If AIB were to provide the information, it would show that a large proportion of payments were authorised by Linn and Les and not by me. From 2019 onwards when cash flow was at its worst, payments had to be approved by Mr Horton or by Duff & Phelps. Mr Horton would receive a list of payments that were due from Les and/or Linn and he would approve them. Les also sent a daily bank screen shot to me and Mr Horton every day from 2016 onwards. Mr Horton wanted to see the daily balance and what payments and receipts were in that day. Mr Horton therefore saw all payments including those from N&C, CDS, HFR, BCP, APL and myself. I exhibit copies of email exchanges with Mr Horton from May to September 2019 at DN5/1-14 that demonstrate his knowledge of payments via HFR and cash flow difficulties.” “46. In response to paragraph 17, as I have already said, I used to send Mr Horton bank statements for all accounts each month showing the transactions. These were always explained and never questioned. I also sent him emails when I made a transfer from my own funds. 47. In response to paragraph 18, notwithstanding what Mr Horton says, he borrowed £75,000 from me in February 2020 and told the bank that I had put the money in to cover PAYE liabilities.” “57. In answer to paragraph 19.3, it must be remembered that for many weeks each month all of Select’s and N&C Hortons’ accounts were over their overdraft limit. Produced to me marked “DN1” is a chart (based on the AIB account balances) showing the bank account balance compared with the authorised overdraft limit. It was therefore impossible to make payments out of these accounts, and if money were paid into them, it would be absorbed and incapable of use. Therefore, I had to manage it the best way we could and make the payments from the HFR account or from my personal accounts to pay HMRC and suppliers and then to pay APL and BCP their loans back. Nicholas Horton was fully aware and approving of this. The FAR report shows that I have not profited in any way from this and in fact I am owed £75,000 and am worse off to that extent due to the loan I made in February 2020 which has not been repaid.”

“4. "DN1" is my Transaction Report. This consists of a spreadsheet with 9 tabs. The report addresses the various transactions which are the subject of the Order and explains the basis of the transfers between the Claimants' accounts. Some of the bank account entries relate to the same transaction. All bank accounts which received any of the Claimants' money are identified. There are no other recipients of the Claimants' money other than the Recipients (as defined in the Order). My report cross-references a series of documents. These documents are found behind the spreadsheet and are indexed with a "T" followed by a number in the top right-hand corner. 5. Tab 1 is the original list of transactions identified in the FAR spreadsheet except for entries 31, 86, 91, 266, 267, 281, 282-6, 543, 746, 791 and 798. It has columns A-K and 795 lines.”

“"DN3" is my Reconciliation Report. This sets out a reconciliation of the total debt owed to the lenders referred to in the Transaction Report. This identifies which of the Claimants owes money to which of the lenders and in what amounts. I have not attempted to reconcile this with the amounts being claimed by Ivan Norman or Steve Crump and his companies. The first page is printed in colour on A3 double-sided. This summarises the overall position. This is followed by a series of appendices which provide the detail in the summary. There is an Appendix B (DSN Accounting Limited), an Appendix C (HFR UK Limited), an Appendix D (D&S Accounting Limited account 60873691), an Appendix E (D&S Accounting Limited account 73555291), an Appendix F (BCP I IPN), an Appendix G (APL Formwork Limited), an Appendix H (AP Midlands Limited) and finally an Appendix I (Steve Crump). 16. As to the legal basis for the debts, I explained in my witness statement of 5 July 2022 that the debts arose whenever Nick Horton asked me to source a short-term loan for the Claimants to fund working capital or to make payments to third parties on behalf of the Claimants when the Claimants did not have the money to pay. I obtained the money from Steve Crump and my father and paid the money into bank accounts under my control. From these accounts I introduced the loan monies to the Claimants' bank accounts as directed by Nick or dictated by the working capital requirements I was aware of from my role as Finance Director. The reason for using bank accounts under my control was to allow me to advance the loans and to repay them in varying amounts on unplanned dates, in effect providing a revolving credit facility to meet Nick Horton' s demands, and paying as much of the loans back when free cash flow permitted. 17. HFR UK Limited did not advance any loans to the Claimants and the Claimants do not owe it any money. I had control of and used its bank account to manage the loans as explained above. HFR UK Ltd did not carry out any transactions of its own which is why dormant accounts were prepared. 18. Similarly, CDS Holdings Ltd did not lend any money to the Claimants and the Claimants do not owe it any money. I had control of its bank account and used it to manage the loans in the way explained above. CDS Holdings Ltd did not carry out any transactions of its own which is why dormant accounts were prepared. 19. The intention was that the loans would be repaid when the Claimants could afford to do so. Repayments were made from time to time on an ad hoc basis whenever the Claimants' cash flow permitted. The arrangements were informal and undocumented until the Claimants' banks requested formal written agreements be prepared setting out the terms. Those agreements are at Exhibit "DN4" to my witness statement of 5 July 2022. 20. The circumstances and events giving rise to the loans and their repayment are set out in the Notes section of Tab 5 (L-0) of Exhibit "DN1" to this witness statement. 21. I have not made any money out of the loan transactions. Nobody else has to my knowledge made any profit or stands to make any profit either, other than through the interest provisions in the written loan agreements. However, the Claimants have not yet paid any interest that has fallen due. The Claimants have been the only ones to benefit from the arrangements described above.”

“1. My name is Tim Care and I have been heavily involved in investigating and prosecuting financial crime and money laundering for over 20 years. My full working history is set out in the copy of my Curriculum Vitae at Appendix l. In brief summary: (1) From 2001 to 2014 I was a Detective in the Metropolitan Police, where I specialised in the investigation of money laundering and terrorist financing. (2) From 2014 to 2018 I worked in the banking industry as a Financial Crime Policy and Advisory Manager. (3) From 2018 to 2019 I led the training institute of the Financial Action Task Force (the "FATF"), the global standard setter for combatting money laundering. (4) From 2019 to 2022 I worked at the UK financial regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority, where (among other things) I was the dedicated financial crime specialist on the prosecution of NatWest Bank for money laundering offences, the first such prosecution in the UK. (5) Since 2022 I have been employed as an Associate Director in the Enforcement Department of the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority. My day-to-day role involves planning, conducting and leading financial crime and regulatory investigations.”

“According to tab 'T17 - CDS Notes' of the DNJ spreadsheet exhibited to the Account, APL Formwork Limited, Access Products (Midlands) Ltd and Black Country Pressings Ltd, some of the Purported Creditors, transferred sums totalling £519,000 to "CDS" Holdings Ltd which CDS then transferred to Select, pursuant to what Dean Norman says were 'loans' from the relevant Purported Creditors to Select. According to rows 19 and 24 of the 'Overall reconciliation' tab of the DN3 spreadsheet exhibited to the Account, the Partnership and Hortons Motorcycles transferred £919,627.39 and £155,062.96 respectively to "HFR" (UK) Limited by way of repayment for loans allegedly advanced to those entities by third parties. As will be apparent from this description and the relevant parts of the Account, Dean Norman routed these purported loan 'advances' and 'repayments' through the accounts of entities which were not themselves said to be party to the relevant 'loan agreements'. Are such circuitous payments indicative of money laundering and, if so, why? 12. Yes, in my opinion the circuitous payments in this case are indicative of money laundering. In my experience, there is not normally any proper commercial rationale to pass genuine loan advances or repayments through other companies as 'conduits', particularly where those companies are dormant at the time of the relevant transaction, which appears to have been the case in relation to the use of HFR and CDS as 'conduits' in these transactions. Such circuitous payments help to launder money because, unless a particular third party can see records of all the relevant transfers, it is not possible to connect the final destination of the funds with their original source. That is to say, when funds pass from accounts A to B to C to A, only those with access to all the relevant account statements can tell that the funds returned to A by C are those which were originally sent to B by A. 13. I should mention that sometimes there is a commercial rationale for someone who owns multiple companies operating live businesses, say companies A and B, to arrange a series of loans whereby A loans money to B, and B loans the same money to C, rather than A lending directly to C. In such cases, the owner of A and B may wish B to be exposed to C's credit risk rather than A for legitimate commercial reasons, including general financial, accountancy and tax considerations. The loans would be recorded in written loan agreements and all payments/repayments would be properly recorded. 14. However, that is not what happened on the facts of this case because: (i) the intermediary companies were said to be 'conduits' for the loan monies, rather than lenders in their own right, (ii) the intermediary companies often were not trading companies, (iii) the loans were not documented, and (iv) Dean Norman has claimed that the payments/repayments were not properly recorded. 15. I understand that it has been suggested that some of the payments in this case cannot have been part of a money laundering scheme because monies were "paid out and returned to the same party under a loan agreement". I have addressed this issue in the abstract in paragraphs 9 to 11 above. In this particular case, the funds were typically not simply 'paid out and returned to the same party' i.e. Account A to Account B to Account A. Rather, as set out above, the 'payments' and 'repayments' were typically circuitous, passing through multiple different entities or multiple accounts belonging to the same entity and only then returning to the originating party, often into a different account from that which originally sent the funds, i.e. Account A to Account B to Account C to Account D, where both Account A and Account D belong to the originating party. As I have explained, this is indicative of money laundering. 16. Moreover, the origin of the funds in this case is not entirely apparent, only that they were transferred to the Horton Parties' accounts through entities connected to Dean Norman. There is no visibility as to where the funds originated and they therefore could have already undergone several layers of transfers from the criminal source by the time they reached the Horton Parties' accounts. Equally, it might have been intended that, once repaid, the funds would be transferred on from, for example, Ivan Norman to other parties. Accordingly, even where funds were transferred directly from Account A to Account B and back again, that does not mean they were not being laundered. However, I cannot speculate about the possible sources of funds in the absence of further evidence.”

“Please consider transactions 56-59 in the 'DN - Annotated Version' tab of the DNJ spreadsheet exhibited to the Account and transaction 17 in the 'Ti 7 - CDS Notes' tab of the DN1 spreadsheet exhibited to the Account. Those transactions comprise: (i) £25,000 from APL Formwork to CDS on 1 March 2017; (ii) £25,000 from CDS to Select's Santander account on 1 March 2017; (iii) £25,000 from Select's Santander account to Select's AIB account on 1 March 2017; and (iv) £25,000 from Select's AIB account to APL Formwork on 6 March 2017. The £25,000 initially transferred by APL Formwork was circulated through various accounts belonging to Select and CDS before returning to where it started 5 days later. Are such revolving money flows indicative of money laundering and, if so, why? 21. Yes. There is again no apparent commercial rationale for the movement. If this was a legitimate loan agreement, the payment would go from the loan provider direct to the loan taker. It is also unlikely that the same sum would be repaid within 5 days pursuant to any legitimate loan and, if it were, it would be natural for it to be repaid to the first recipient account (i.e. CDS). The fact that the money has touched 4 different bank accounts is strongly indicative of a deliberate attempt to obfuscate the source and destination of the money. Anyone scrutinising APL Formwork's account would be unable to connect the outgoing £25k to CDS with the incoming £25k back to APL several days later. If originally derived from criminal sources, the money paid from APL Formwork to Select and then repaid has now effectively been cleaned.”

“Considering all the materials you have reviewed in the round, do you consider there to be reasonable grounds to believe that Dean Norman committed one or more of the offences as alleged at paragraphs 23A to 23B of the RAPC and, if so why? 32. Yes. Whilst the full picture cannot be seen without full access to the originating account statements and the statements for any accounts transferring those funds since their entry into the banking system, considering these factors in the round, and considering in particular the circuitous nature of the payments through dormant/dissolved companies and others unrelated to any documented 'loan agreements', I consider that it is more likely than not that some or all of these transactions were made using criminal property which Dean Norman was trying to launder. 33. In my opinion, that conclusion is more likely than Dean Norman's explanation for the transfers, i.e. that they constituted the loaning and repayment of exclusively legitimately sourced funds. It is possible that some of the funds were legitimate but, in that case, they were likely being used to 'muddy the waters' by making it more difficult to identify the illegitimate funds, so that the legitimate funds were also part of the money laundering operation. This is a very common technique used in money laundering operations, known as 'co-mingling'.”

“On Ivan Norman's case, his 'loan' to the Partnership was unsecured and bore interest of 3.5% per annum. Ivan Norman also signed a purported written loan agreement with Select on behalf of BCP where no interest was payable. Are the terms of these 'loans' indicative of money laundering and, if so, why? 41. On their own, and pending further explanation from the parties, the existence of loans on these terms is not necessarily indicative of money laundering, although it may be one indication that the loans were part of a money laundering scheme. To determine whether the terms of a 'loan' give rise to suspicion when investigating suspected money laundering, all factors must be taken into consideration to give context. In this scenario, if interest was payable, it should first be considered whether, at the time, 3.5% was a reasonable return on the investment, taking into account the seemingly precarious nature of the business's cash flow situation (i.e. the loan is at higher risk of default) and whether it therefore made commercial sense to enter into it, particularly if the loan was undocumented at the time. This consideration is more acute when considering a loan made that is interest free. Analysed in this way, it does not currently appear that loans on these terms had any genuine commercial purpose, particularly when considering the interest free loan. 42. As explained previously, criminal property is often mingled with legitimate funds before and during the laundering process to lower suspicion and 'muddy the waters'. Loans could be made with criminal funds in the same way they can be made with legitimate funds, or a combination of the two. So even if some of the funds advanced by Ivan Norman were legitimate, they would nonetheless have helped to launder the illegitimate monies, by mingling with the illegitimate funds and muddying the waters in any investigation. At this stage, I cannot comment further as to what parts (if any) of any funds 'lent' by Ivan Norman originated from legitimate funds. Ivan Norman has made various inconsistent assertions about the purported 'loans' said to have been agreed variously between BCP (acting by Ivan Norman) or Ivan Norman on the one hand and the Partnership or Select (acting by Dean Norman) on the other. In particular, at a time when BCP was owned and managed by Ivan Norman, it instructed Thursfields to make the demands referenced in paragraph 21.1 of Nicholas Horton 's witness statement on behalf of BCP against Select. Then, after Ivan Norman ceased to be a person of significant control over BCP in March 2021, he instructed IWG to demand an alleged debt derived from the same purported 'loan monies' on behalf of Ivan Norman against the Partnership (as set out in paragraph 21.11 of Nicholas Horton's witness statement). After issuing his proceedings, Ivan Norman amended and re-amended the Particulars of Claim of his own motion, varying both the sums claimed under, and the terms of, the alleged 'loans' (see the Re-Re-Amended Particulars of Claim). Are these changes in Ivan Norman's account indicative of money laundering and, if so, why? 43. The changes in the accounts given are not, in and of themselves, necessarily indicative of money laundering. Whether loans made with legitimate funds, criminal funds, or a mixture of the two, Ivan Norman would be keen to get his money back if repayments had not been made. A laundering operation is only successful if the criminal property is ultimately integrated back into the legitimate economy or to the originating party.”

“47. Money laundering is committed in order to make funds acquired through illegal means appear legitimate, or to have come from a legitimate source. A laundering operation is successful if the criminal property is ultimately integrated back into the legitimate economy and/or returned to the originating party as apparently ' legitimate' property. 48. In this case, there are numerous indications that both Dean Norman and Ivan Norman committed money laundering offences. In my view, based on my experience of investigating and detecting such offences, it is more likely than not that they both committed money laundering offences as alleged in the Horton Parties' draft amended cases. 49. Based on the evidence before me, I am unable to provide further details of the money laundering operation or the relevant criminal property. It is commonly possible to conclude that there has been money laundering from the way funds have been treated without being able to establish any details about who it belonged to, what crimes gave rise to it, or which specific funds are criminal/legitimate.”

"Loans attached, these are in the monthly packs also so you will see the history of them from there."

“7. This is the allegation that I deliberately broke the loan advances into smaller amounts to avoid detection and to avoid triggering banking alerts. In fact, the payments were made that way because there was a limit on the amount of money I could send online from my bank account. I am aware that these daily transaction limits have been raised previously but were dismissed by the Partnership’s expert as merely “one theoretical explanation for the fragmentation” (see paragraph 8 of Mr Care’s second report). I find that a surprising response, for the reasons set out below. 8. I have banked with Barclays Bank for many years, for both business and personal banking. All of the loans that are the subject of these proceedings were made via its online banking service, either through the Barclays website or its mobile app, although I have come to realise recently that my understanding at the time of the daily transaction limits is actually slightly different from the true position. 9. Currently, there is a daily transaction limit for Barclays Premier customers (of which I am one) of £100,000 and there is a “per transaction” limit of £50,000. This can be confirmed via the Barclays website…an extract of which is attached at page 1. I gather there is also a limit of £30,000 for payments made via the Barclays app. 10. I have spoken to Dave Willis, who was my bank manager at Barclays for many years, and he has confirmed that the same limits that apply now were also effective back in 2018 and 2019 when I made the loan advances to the Partnership. He has also confirmed that my account was not subject to any special exemption that would have allowed me to send more money.”

“The loans were not properly documented 21. It is difficult to understand the complaint that is being made here. At paragraph 13 of his witness statement, Mr Tickner says that I have not provided any documentary evidence to deal with the fact that the loans were not fully documented. It is unclear to me what documents might be produced to answer an allegation about the lack of documentation. 22. Mr Care is even more difficult to follow. In his first report at paragraph 24, he suggests that money launderers will commonly draw up apparently supporting documents to add legitimacy to the payments being made. In his second report at paragraph 11, he states that a lack of supporting documentation does not point to a transaction being legitimate. The only sensible conclusion is that there are any number of reasons why the parties to a transaction might or might not draw up a comprehensive set of documents and, overall, the presence or absence of transaction documents sheds little light on whether the parties were involved in money laundering. 23. In this situation, there is a very mundane explanation for the limited state of the loan documents. When I entered into these loan arrangements, I never for a moment expected that I would have to sue to recover my money or that I would have to rely on any written loan agreement. My primary assurance as to repayment was that Dean was arranging the loans on behalf of someone he knew and trusted. I was aware that Nick Horton did sign loan agreements, which I took as his acknowledgement of the existence of the debt, and I was not concerned as to the detail of those agreements. Terms of the loan 24. The suggestion here is that the terms of the loan were not commercial and therefore the loans did not have any genuine commercial purpose. Specifically it is suggested that the loans were uncommercial because no security was provided and interest was charged at 3.5 per cent per annum. This is dealt with at paragraphs 41 and 42 of Mr Care’s first statement. 25. As regards the lack of any security, and as explained above, I never thought when I entered into these loans that I would need to take enforcement action to recover my money. I agreed to make the loans because I wanted to help my son and because I believed he would not have asked me to lend the money unless he thought it would be repaid. 26. Regarding the rate of interest, I explained in my first witness statement that the ultimate source of the money that I lent to the Partnership was BCP (see paragraph 10). For many years, whenever BCP had any surplus money, it paid that money into its savings account and over the years, that built up into a substantial sum (paragraph 8). 3.5 per cent per annum may not be a vast amount of interest but the money would otherwise have continued to sit in the savings account, earning bank interest at a low rate. From my point of view, these loans served the twin purposes of helping Dean and earning a slightly better rate of return. There were therefore perfectly legitimate reasons for the terms of the loans which had nothing to do with laundering money.”

“3. The loan advances I made to the Partnership, and which are the subject of this claim, were paid from an account in the name of my wife and me, with account number 70675571. The Partnership refers to this as the “Ivan Personal Account” in its skeleton argument. The skeleton notes (correctly) that at roughly the same time as I made the loan advances, there were payments into the Ivan Personal Account from the following three accounts (see paragraphs 56(4) and (5) of the skeleton): a. Account no. 4364 7897, sort code 20-93-15; b. Account no. 1011 9334, sort code 20-93-15; and c. Account no. 9309 3786, sort code 20-93-15. 4. The Partnership goes on to complain that “neither Ivan nor anyone else has disclosed ownership of these accounts, still less any statements for the same”

“23. It is also said by the Defendants' lawyers that, "It is inherently unlikely that the Claimants would legitimately advance millions of pounds to the Defendants on the strength of oral agreements, still less without any meaningful interest or any security of any kind". 24. I don’t think it is unlikely. Dean talked about the Defendants' financial difficulties and how he felt it was his responsibility to find funding to help it through its liquidity issues. Dean is my best friend and I trusted (and trust) him completely; he needed help and I was in a position to help.”

“As agreed these are the outlines of the proposed loan. Loan value – up to £200k (may not take all in first week) Repayment terms 3 months - £228k 3 years - £245k 5 years - £268k” “3 month options good for me” “Sound I’ll get moved over ASAP Thanks x”

“Transactions 39-41 was loan 1 as per the agreement on T17.21, as we couldn't trf £100k from the account to Select as the daily limit £25k in one transaction and no more than £99k in total, this is why it was transferred in these increments. The loan agreement states £100k loan on T17.21 BUT in fact it was only for £99k as per the monthly loan summary on T 17.23 that was sent to management each month. The repayments and interest on this loan was also shown each month on the short term monthly loan summary included in the monthly management accounts. The loan agreement was compiled for the bank when requested for the Dec 2018 accounts (see T17.26) so was compiled retrospectively BUT signed by NICK and emailed to the bank with nick copied in (T17.26). there are some errors on the agreement as I have now marked. The funds were transferred to CDS an account I had access to for a dormant company account that never traded. I asked for the funds to be transferred here so myself and Nick could then decide which account to transfer for select (AIB or Santander). It was simply held in here whilst we agreed a plan of action. This was transferring the £99k as per Transactions 38-41 from Santander into AIB. AIB bank managers were getting wary of our debt levels so nick wanted it to go from Santander rather than CDS directly as it would not raise an alarm bells. Transactions 44-47 and 49 relates to loan 2 as per the agreement on T17.21 for £109k in total. The loan agreement states £175k loan as further loans were added at a later date - see TRANS 152 for notes. The repayments and interest on this loan was also shown each month on the short term monthly loan summary included in the monthly management accounts. The loan agreement was compiled for the bank when requested for the Dec 2018 accounts so was complied retrospectively BUT signed by NICK and emailed to the bank with nick copied in (T17.26).The funds were transferred to CDS as per previously commented. In transactions 48, 56, 62-68, 71,72 totals £250k loan from BCP to Select lifestyles (this was paid via CDS) see CDS notes as per transition 44 above. This loan relates to the loan agreement dated 31.12.18 (T17.19) that was drawn up post the loans for the benefits of the bank. The loan was agreed to be repaid in 28 instalments of £9,677.78 totalling £270,977.84 (£20,977.84 interest). The loan repayments were sent directly to I Norman private account and not BCP as the company owed I Norman funds due a credit directors loan account so these funds were used to repay this loan. During late 2016 after AIB had originally promised to fund future developments they subsequently rejected our proposals to finance the development of All Saints and Hawbush (St Aidan's). We purchase St Aidan's in Dec 2016 and between Dec 2016 and June 2017 spent £655k on developing this site See T27. As AIB would not fund this development Nick and I met and discussed the requirement for a loan of around £500k to finish the development and start All Saints the next development. In total at this stage I agreed to borrow in total £250k from BCP and further funds from APL and would remit funds asap. Nick was told of the loans and was grateful for the support and cheap debt!!. The funds were transferred to Santander bank from CDS and then sent from Santander to AIB. The funds were used to also keep AIB bank balance within £400k facility as much as possible.”

“As per Loan agreement T17.19 this was the loan 2 - for £300K. This is part of a second loan from my father to N&C Horton which totalled £300k”

“As per Loan agreement T68.1 this was then all rolled into one loan balance inc all previous loans. This is a loan from my father IPN to N&C Horton which totalled £200k”

“Quadzilla paid by APL Formwork and [then] refunded by Horton Motorcycles”

“7. It is alleged in Kenny 1 (SB3/135) that payments ‘needed’ to be made circuitously to avoid passing through Select’s bank account because it was frequently overdrawn and unable to make certain payments. Even if that is true, transfers could easily have been made direct from the ‘lender’ accounts (which it seems were under Dean Norman’s control) to either the party requiring payment by Select or to another account belonging to Nick Horton, such as the Partnership account, or Hortons Motorcycles, before being applied to its proper purpose. If an intermediary account was necessary, Dean Norman could have used one of those two accounts for this purpose, paying all loan monies into the same intermediary account under Nick Horton’s ultimate control. This would be the most simple and clear way of tracking loans, payments, loanees and payees. As an accountant, that is what Dean Norman would be expected to have done, yet he appears to have chosen an overly complicated method of dealing with these transfers, through a wide range of companies controlled by him that had no business operating in such a way, including dormant/dissolved companies (as I describe in the next section). The fact that, in order to account for those payments, Dean Norman had to produce over 4000 pages of documents (SB3/49 para 23) demonstrates just how convoluted they were. I have seen no legitimate explanation for this convolution. 8. In any event, I can see that, according to Mr Horton, HFR and CDS made very few payments to suppliers of Select. If that is right, I don’t think the overdraft limit explanation works at all. 9. I can also see that many ‘repayments’ were transferred to HFR rather than the alleged creditor. Overdraft limits cannot explain that circuity and I have seen no good explanation for it in the papers I have reviewed. 10. The explanation given by Dean Norman in his witness statement dated 5 July 2022 regarding the use of CDS, is not reflective of the actual transactions. At paragraph 60, he stated that the “CDS account was used to slowly introduce funds into Select when the account was overdrawn”

“Do you remain of the view (first expressed at Care-1/32-33) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Dean Norman committed one or more of the offences as alleged at paragraphs 23A to 23B of the RAPC [SB2/6/57-59]? If so, why?” 22. Yes. My opinion is unchanged. The circumstances of circuitous payments through dormant and dissolved companies (itself illegal in the case of the latter and also in the case of the former if accounts are not later filed) originating from numerous connected individuals and companies, though ultimately controlled by Dean Norman, coupled with the further layering of the funds through the Select group of accounts and back out (via the similar circuitous routes) to the originators leads to an irresistible inference that they were done so in furtherance of a money laundering scheme. Such actions, conducted by an accredited and experienced accountant are, in my opinion, impossible to explain as part of the normal course of business operations and I again emphasise that Dean Norman needed to produce over 4000 pages of documents in order to attempt to explain the transfers made. This is not an indication of organised and efficient accounting practices, which (in combination with all other factors) leads me to conclude they were more than likely not legitimate accounting practices.”

“39. In criminal proceedings, the prosecution must prove that the property is or represents the proceeds of crime: R v Montilla [2005] 1 Cr App R 26 HL. 40. Thus, under ss.327-329, an offence is only committed where the property in fact constitutes or represents a person’s benefit from criminal conduct, and the accused knows or suspects that it does. 41. A person ‘suspects’ a state of affairs where they subjectively think there is a possibility, which is more than fanciful, that it exists: R v Da Silva [2007] 1 WLR 303 at [16]; see also K Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc [2006] 4 All ER 907 at [16]. In an appropriate case, the suspicion so formed “should be of a settled nature”: K Ltd at [16]. 42. A prosecution will not be made out where the suspicion fails to coincide with the actus reus of the offence. If a person converts property which was in fact criminal and had at the time of the converting neither knowledge nor suspicion, they will not be guilty if at some future time they had the requisite mens rea: Smith, Owen and Bodnar on Asset Recovery, Criminal Confiscation and Civil Recovery (2nd ed., 2015) at [I.3.121]. 43. It is “of course” possible that an offence under s. 327 of POCA is also an offence under s.328, and vice versa: R v Fazal [2010] 1 WLR 694 at [17]. 44. While suspicion is enough to prove a substantive offence under ss.327-329, it is insufficient to prove the crimes of conspiracy or attempt to commit such offences: R v Saik [2007] 1 AC 18; R v Pace [2014] 1 WLR 2867. For those crimes, the defendant must either know or intend that the relevant property was or would be derived from crime. 45. Criminal property is property which already has the quality of being criminal property by reason of criminal conduct distinct from the conduct alleged to constitute the actus reus of the money laundering offence itself: R v GH [2015] 2 Cr App R 12 at [30]-[37]. Sections 327-329 are ‘parasitic’ offences, because they are predicated on the commission of another offence which has yielded the proceeds which then become the subject of a money laundering offence: R v GH at [37]. For a s.328 offence, the criminal property need only exist when the arrangement operates on it: R v GH at [40]. 46. The definition of “criminal property” in s.340(3) does not embrace property which the accused intends to acquire by criminal conduct; property is not criminal property because the wrongdoer intends that it should be so: R v Akhtar [2011] 1 Cr. App. R. 37. 47. Funds in a bank account are ‘converted’ within the meaning of s.327 when they are lodged, received, retained, withdrawn, or transferred between accounts: see R v Fazal [2010] 1 WLR 694 at [21]-[22].”

“66. In Barings Plc v Coopers & Lybrand (No 2) [2001] EWHC 17 (Ch); [2001] PNLR 22 Evans-Lombe J reviewed the authorities, and extracted from them at [45] the following propositions: “expert evidence is admissible under section 3 of the Civil Evidence Act 1972 in any case where the Court accepts that there exists a recognised expertise governed by recognised standards and rules of conduct capable of influencing the Court’s decision on any of the issues which it has to decide and the witness to be called satisfies the Court that he has a sufficient familiarity with and knowledge of the expertise in question to render his opinion potentially of value in resolving any of those issues.” 67. However, this is not entirely consistent with Bingham LJ (as he was) in R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 161, in which, after referring to Lord Russell’s judgment in R v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766, he said, at 165, “… the essential questions are whether study and experience will give a witness’s opinion an authority which the opinion of one not so qualified will lack, and (if so) whether the witness in question is peritus [skilled] in Lord Russell’s sense. If these conditions are met the evidence of the witness is in law admissible, although the weight to be attached to his opinion must of course be assessed by the tribunal of fact.”” “71. In determining whether particular evidence is reasonably required a key question will be: “…whether the subject matter of the opinion is such that a person without instruction or experience in the area of knowledge or human experience would be able to form a sound judgment on the matter without the assistance of witnesses possessing special knowledge or experience in the area.”

“97. As to this: (1) The Horton parties admit (in para 38 of their Defence to the Crump claim) that they received at the material times monthly summaries of their indebtedness, and financial spreadsheets, both prepared by Dean; (2) Those monthly summaries and spreadsheets clearly record the Ivan and Crump loans on their face; (3) In an email dated 14 January 2020 to AIB, Mr Horton referred to “the short term loans we have always shown in our accounts”; (4) In an email dated 2 March 2020, Mr Horton wrote “in preparation for the meeting next week could you let me know what Select owe your dad and Steve please?" Dean Norman responded on the same day attaching a PDF document entitled “Short term loans” and stating “Loans attached, these are in the monthly packs also so you will see the history of them from there”. 98. Although the latter two emails were sent after December 2018, they acknowledge Mr Horton’s knowledge of the loans before that date. 99. The Horton parties also plead (in para 58(1) of their Defence) in response to the Crump parties’ unjust enrichment claim that they “ran their businesses, issued dividends and made investment decisions on the basis that the sums received were not loan monies, but rather the [Horton parties’] own money to treat as they wished". This is in my judgment, inconsistent with being unaware of the receipt of the monies: if the Horton parties believed that these were their monies (and they do not explain how and why they had this belief), they must have been aware of their receipt. This passage highlights the difficulties in the Horton parties’ case: they received the monies, they dealt with them as beneficial owners, and they do not allege that the monies were a gift. In those circumstances, they have in my judgment, no real prospect of showing that they are not (subject to the other matters that they rely upon as showing money laundering) under an obligation to repay them i.e. that the monies were lent to them.”

“112. The Horton parties do not (and could not) allege that these payments had most of the hallmarks of money laundering on which they otherwise rely. They rely on the fact that at a time when Black Country Pressings Limited (“BCP”) was under Ivan’s control, solicitors acting on its behalf (Thursfield Solicitors) wrote a letter dated 4 January 2021 claiming that BCP was owed £623,155 plus interest by Select. The payments made by BCP are said to have the hallmarks of money laundering, and the terms of the loan relied upon in Thursfield’s letter are said to be inconsistent with the claim now made. 113. However, Mr Care accepts that this inconsistency is not, in and of itself, necessarily indicative of money laundering. In my judgment, none of these facts are relevant to or even begin to establish that the monies paid by Ivan, and now claimed, were paid as part of a money laundering scheme. 114. The only hallmark of money laundering alleged to have any application to Ivan’s claim is that the loans were “undocumented, unsecured and on uncommercial terms”

“123. Dean exhibits a chart setting out Select’s AIB bank account balance compared with its authorised overdraft limit (on a monthly basis, from July 2017 to June 2020) which shows that Select’s balance consistently exceeded its overdraft limit in the period. This chart is unchallenged in the evidence in response on behalf of the Horton parties. Mr Horton accepts that he was aware that Dean used intermediary companies to pay suppliers for this reason, but only on “a handful of occasions”, not routinely and not in connection with the loans which are the subject matter of these claims. 124. Plainly, the court cannot resolve the issue of Mr Horton’s knowledge in these applications. However, an examination of the extent to which intermediary companies were used shows that the Horton parties’ case is vastly overstated. Payments to the Horton parties by the Crump parties 125. These are listed in appendix 1 to the PoC. There are 93 payments totalling about £3 million. Only 5 of these payments were made to CDS or HFR, 3 to CDS (all before its dissolution) and 2 to HFR. 11% of the payments are described as being to “HMRC for the benefit of Select”

“133. Mr Care’s comment on this, adopted by the Horton parties, is that it is unlikely that the same sum would be repaid within 5 days pursuant to any legitimate loan. However, the relevant bank statements show: (1) On 1 March 2017 Select’s debit balance on its AIB account was £393,829.29. It therefore had less than £8,000 available before it would exceed its £400,000 overdraft limit on that account. (2) Following receipt of £25,000 on 1 March, it made payments that day to trade creditors totalling £21,915.47, so that by the end of the day its debit balance was £390,744,76. (3) Further payments to trade creditors were made on 2 March 2017, bringing the debit balance to £394,415.39. (4) On 3 March 2017, a large payment (£48,633.09) was received from Wolverhampton County Council, one of Select’s customers. (5) On 3-6 March 2017, other payments were received and trade creditors paid. After repayment of £25,000 to APL Formwork, Select’s debit balance was £353,372.24 i.e. it had head room of about £47,000 before it would exceed its overdraft limit. 134. In my judgment, there is nothing inherently suspicious or requiring explanation in the fact that the £25,000 was repaid within that time scale in the light of the bank statements themselves, which appear not to have been considered by Mr Care. Unless and until the Horton parties carry out this type of analysis on the “revolving transactions” by reference to their own bank statements, they have not in my judgment any real prospect of success in showing that they are suspicious or indicate money laundering.”

“Source of the funds 140. In this context, the relevant background facts include the source of the funds provided for the Crump loans. The evidence includes a summary of APL’s paid invoices for the period 30 November 2013 to 19 July 2018, showing its receipts at about £21 million net of VAT. The Crump parties submitted that during the relevant period, APL’s business was sufficiently substantial for there to be ample funds available to lend to the Horton parties. The notion that despite having these “clean” funds from an established and successful business, the Crump parties would nonetheless deal with “dirty” money by lending it to the Horton parties is in my judgment, wholly implausible, and has no real prospect of success. 141. Similarly, it is, in my judgment, fanciful to suggest that the Crump parties nonetheless included their “clean” money in a money laundering scheme run by Dean to help him launder the money of others. There is no obvious benefit, and there would be substantial risks in doing so. Absence of proper documentation: Defence para 43(4), (7) 142. This is relied upon in paras 43(4) and (7) of the Defence to the Crump claim. It appears to be based on para 27 of Care 1, which refers to a lack of supporting documentation and an absence of an auditable and trackable record of payments. However, Mr Care accepts that the absence of formal loan agreements does not, in and of itself, indicate money laundering. 143. As to this, Mr Crump’s evidence (in para 21 of Crump 1) is first, that neither Mr Care nor the Horton parties’ lawyers have asked him if there was such a record; and secondly, that records were in fact kept; and he exhibits a spreadsheet showing the loans and repayments exchanged between him and Dean in the period 2 June 2017 to 26 May 2020. 144. There are also in evidence a number of informal email exchanges between Dean and Mr Crump, in which they are negotiating the amount and terms of loans, and the payments and repayments to be made. On the Horton parties’ case, these emails would be a sham to cover up a scheme involving the proceeds of a criminal offence. As the Crump parties’ counsel submitted, there is an absence of reality to such a supposition. 145. Finally, in Care 1 at para 33, Mr Care says that he has “not been presented with any information that suggests these payments were recorded on the business accounts of [APL]”

“9. The Claimants in the Crump Claim do have judgment against the Defendants in respect of the following paragraphs or parts of paragraphs of the Defence in the Crump claim: the second sentence of 2(1)(a), 2(2), the second sentence of 2(4)(a), 2(4)(g) 29(2), 30(2), 30(3), 30(6), 32(1), the second sentence of 34(1), 43, 44, 45, 54(2), the words “pursuant to a money laundering scheme operated by Dean Norman” and “and, in any event, any such purported ‘loan agreements’ would be unenforceable by reason of illegality” in 55(1)(a), the words “and/or in furtherance of a money laundering scheme” in 55(1)(b), the words “in circumstances where those payments were part of a money laundering scheme, and in any event” and “legitimate” in 55(3) and 58(2).”

“As this is a second appeal, the question for us is whether the Judge was correct to find that the Master’s decision was “plainly wrong”

“9. The burden of proof is on the claimant and the standard of proof they must satisfy is the balance of probabilities. While the claimant alleged serious criminal conduct, the criminal standard of proof does not apply, although “cogent evidence is generally required to satisfy a civil tribunal that a person has been fraudulent or behaved in some other reprehensible manner. But the question is always whether the tribunal thinks it more probable than not” – see Secretary of State for the Home Department –v- Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153 at paragraph 55 per Lord Hoffmann…” “17. I respectfully agree with and adopt the above cited observations of Sullivan J, Langley J and King J and if support is needed it is to be found in the decision of the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division in R –v- Anwoir & Others [2008] 2 Cr App R 36 at para 21 at page 539 that there are two ways in which the Crown can prove in money laundering offences that property was derived from crime - either by proving it derived from unlawful conduct of a specific kind or kinds or by evidence of the circumstances in which the property was handled, such as to give rise to the irresistible inference that it could only have been derived from crime (although in criminal proceedings the higher standard of proof is required).”

“26. The burden of proof in establishing that any of the properties are recoverable property for the purposes of POCA lies with the NCA. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, that is, whether on the evidence the facts alleged are more likely than not to have occurred: Re B [2008] UKHL 35 per Lord Hoffmann Para.13 and Baroness Hale Paras.62-70; Re S-B [2009] UKSC per Lady Hale Para.10; Gale v SOCA [2011] UKSC 49 per Lord Phillips Para.54, Lord Clarke Para.57, Lord Dyson Para.123. 27. It is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired as the result of any particular criminal offence but it is necessary to prove that the property was obtained by the kinds of unlawful conduct relied on. This may be established by evidence of the circumstances in which the property was handled, such as to give rise to the irresistible inference that it could only have been derived from crime: Gale v SOCA [2009] EWHC 1015 per Griffith Williams J Paras.12-17; Olupitan v The Director of the Assets Recovery Agency [2008] EWCA Civ 104 per Carnwath LJ Paras.22-24; R v Anwoir [2008] EWCA Crim 1354 per Latham LJ Para.21. 28. While a claim for civil recovery may not be sustained solely upon the basis that a respondent has no identifiable lawful income to warrant his lifestyle, the absence of any evidence to explain that lifestyle may provide the answer because the inference may be drawn from the failure to provide an explanation, or from an explanation which was untruthful (and deliberately so), that the source was unlawful: Gale v SOCA (above) per Griffith Williams J Para.14; Olupitan (above) per Carnwath LJ Paras. 13-18.”

“a. It is not open to the Court to infer dishonesty from facts which are consistent with honesty or negligence, there must be some fact which tilts the balance and justifies an inference of dishonesty, and this fact must be both pleaded and proved. b. The requirement for a claimant in proving fraud is that the primary facts proved give rise to an inference of dishonesty or fraud which is more probable than one of innocence or negligence. c. Although not strictly a requirement for such a claim, motive "is a vital ingredient of any rational assessment". By and large dishonest people are dishonest for a reason; while establishing a motive for conspiracy is not a legal requirement, the less likely the motive, the less likely the intention to conspire unlawfully. d. Assessing a party's motive to participate in a fraud also requires taking into account the disincentives to participation in the fraud; this includes the disinclination to behave immorally or dishonestly, but also the damage to reputation (both for the individual and, where applicable, the business) and the potential risk to the "liberty of the individuals involved" in case they are found out.”

“I have made specific findings of fact in the course of this judgment – see paragraphs 54, 55, 57, 65, 66, 72, 73, 76, 78, 84, 89, 90, 93, 97, 99, 100, 103, 104, 109, 111, 115, 116, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 132, 134 and 136 - and so at the risk of some repetition, I am in no doubt that DG and TG engaged in unlawful conduct – in DG’s case, money laundering and drug trafficking, in TG’s case, money laundering. There is also evidence of tax evasion in four jurisdictions. They have acquired capital and various assets as a direct consequence of the money laundering and/or drug trafficking but it is not possible to quantify the extent of the tax evasion or to estimate the extent, if at all, that it contributed to their capital wealth. For reasons given during the course of the judgment and below, I am satisfied the Receiver has correctly identified recoverable property. I found DG a witness whose evidence, on the central issues, was wholly unreliable. He was so often demonstrably lying. I am not prepared to believe the evidence of TG insofar as she purported to confirm his account or to explain her involvement; she too was shown to be a liar about matters of real moment. While I am prepared to accept that DG was the moving force behind all criminal conduct, she was hardly ignorant of what he was doing and played her full part in the money laundering. I base that conclusion not only on the unfavourable impression I formed of her as a witness of the truth, but in particular on the evidence about the paper concealed in the candlestick, her knowledge of the off-shore accounts and companies and her assumption of the role as money launderer when DG was in prison in Portugal. My other conclusions are as follows:- • I agree with the Receiver that DG and TG have accumulated significant wealth for which there is no evidence of lawful sourcing. • DG was engaged in drug trafficking in the UK before he left to live in Spain: this conclusion is based upon his admissions to the Portuguese authorities (paragraph 126 above) which corroborates UK police intelligence reports both before he moved to Spain and subsequently. • There is no evidence of him earning anything other than modest earnings from any business interests he had in Spain – his earnings would have been no more than enough to contribute to his living expenses and certainly insufficient to explain any capital savings or the capital savings he and TG made; in the unlikely event that any part of those earnings formed part of his and TG’s capital savings, then they were sourced from criminal conduct. • There is no evidence that DG made any money from lawful property speculation, development or investment in Spain or elsewhere – I reject out-of-hand DG’s evidence and the evidence of TG that his property interests were funded by his mother; her tax records contradict his claims that she was a person of financial substance; his capital base was at all times, the proceeds of crime: he used his mother’s name to launder the proceeds of crime in Spain and latterly in the UK. • While the picture is not clear and it may be that some of the monies for the purchase of Mezquita and Las Hortensias can be traced to the proceeds of sale of El Sardinell and Casa Manana, all were purchased with laundered monies and/or the proceeds of drug trafficking. • DG owned the ‘Hanja’ and used Tideswell Ltd and his brother, Philip Moore as ‘fronts’ to hide that interest – Tideswell was the name chosen for a company which owned a boat and DG said in evidence that he named the company that was incorporated for his flying business, ‘Airswell’. • DG lied about his links to the purchase of Calle Fluvia No 9; I am satisfied he was not a broker but was behind the decision, both in identifying its convenient location and in the provision of funds. • DG and TG made no attempt to challenge the freezing order over their Allied Dunbar Isle of Man accounts because they knew no challenge would succeed; similarly, they did not challenge a freezing order in Ireland, preferring to reach a compromise by which they accepted. • DG’s associations with drug traffickers cannot be a coincidence – there were Allen and Barry as well as his brother Christopher, who with Barry was arrested trying to smuggle 21 kilograms of cannabis into France; as Barry and Christopher Moore lacked funds, my conclusion is that either DG provided the funds for the purchase of that cannabis or was in some way associated with its carriage into France on route to the UK. • The use of false passports and false names, while consistent with money laundering, is equally consistent with drug trafficking. • The construction of the isolated airstrip, the use of light aircraft, the links with Morocco provide evidence that DG was close to the source of supply of cannabis; although DG claimed the aircraft was not large enough to transport much by way of weight, I am satisfied there was enough room to transport significant amounts. • The use of bank accounts, nominees, offshore accounts, offshore companies and the complicated transactions summarised above and shown on the relevant charts appended hereto relating to the acquisitions of 110 Corhampton Road, Melbourne Beach, Casa Paraiso, Glendale Road, 118 & 120 Hurn Road, Mezquita and Las Hortensias are not only redolent of money laundering but provide the cogent and compelling evidence from which I am prepared to infer on the balance of probabilities that DG and TG were actively involved in money laundering from the date they moved to Spain. 141. I have concluded the only inference must be that the recoverable property identified and listed in Schedule 2 to the Interim Receivers Order was obtained from the unlawful conduct alleged – money laundering, tax evasion and drug trafficking.”

“The judge applied Part 33A.1 of the Criminal Practice Direction as current at the time of the trial when deciding whether the evidence of Mr Lowe was admissible. This set out the relevant criteria in clear terms. Is the evidence relevant to a matter in issue? Is it needed to provide information likely to be outside the jury's knowledge and experience? Is the witness competent to give the opinion relied on? Mr Lowe's evidence about the features commonly found in money laundering arrangements plainly was relevant to a matter in issue. The defence case was that the circumstances were consistent with legitimate business dealings. The prosecution were entitled to adduce evidence to rebut that assertion. The way in which money laundering schemes work was outside the jury's knowledge and experience. Plainly they were entitled to bring their own common sense to bear on how to interpret the passage of huge sums of cash through the accounts of shell companies for no apparent reason. But they were also entitled to be assisted by the evidence of someone with experience of the operation of money laundering schemes and the common features of such schemes. Moreover, there were aspects of the evidence of Mr Lowe which went beyond the general nature of the arrangement and which were not in any way a matter of common sense e.g. the significance of large amounts of Scottish and Northern Irish banknotes being paid into the accounts and of the presence of a torn banknote as a token. Mr Lowe's expertise arose from his long experience of money laundering investigations. He did not purport to base his view on scientific or similar data. That did not prevent him from being an expert any more than a court would be prevented from receiving expert evidence from a police officer of sufficient experience who gave evidence of drug dealing or of gang culture. In his ruling the judge observed that Mr Lowe had given such evidence on many previous occasions, that he had been involved in cases of this type for over 15 years and that he had provided training to a variety of Government departments and non-governmental organisations. He was competent to give the evidence he did. The evidence of Mr Lowe was properly admitted.”

“14. Easyair principles (vi) and (vii) contain echoes of the law’s traditional disapproval of “a desire to investigate alleged obscurities and a hope that something will turn up …” as a basis for defending a summary judgment application; a case that is “all surmise and Micawberism” will not do: see The Lady Anne Tennant v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1979] FSR 298, 303 (Sir Robert Megarry V-C). The focus is not just on whether something more might emerge, but also—and crucially—on whether, if so, it might “affect the outcome of the case”; and the court’s task is to assess whether there are “reasonable grounds” for believing that both these things would occur: see The Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd v Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 661; [2007] FSR 63, para 18 (Mummery LJ). 15. As Mummery LJ warned in the Doncaster case at [10], on applications for summary judgment the court must be alert to “the defendant, who seeks to avoid summary judgment by making a case look more complicated and difficult than it really is”

“24. There could be no real dispute that the Account Payments as a whole involved a significant number of circuitous payments. Of the 703 Account Payments: (1) 410 were between one of the Horton Parties and a counterparty which was not said to be a creditor. In particular: (1) 247 were transfers between accounts belonging to the Horton Parties, (2) 143 were to or from HFR, comprising ‘advances’ of £158,023 and ‘repayments’ of £1,160,939.26 (‘App C’ tab of DN3), and (3) 20 were ‘advances’ from CDS of monies it had received from the purported creditors, totalling £480,000 (‘T17’ tab of DN1), (2) 92 were between (a) the Partnership and (b) Dean, Ivan or the Crump Parties; given Mr Horton’s evidence that the Partnership had no need for capital and was not said to be a borrower until the disputes arose (Horton-2/30-37), these payments must properly be viewed as circuitous too (or at least arguably so), (3) as explained in paragraph 38 below, a further 63 were circuitous ‘repayments’ by Select and 14 were circuitous payments involving APL Formwork. 25. The Horton Parties can therefore show by reference to the evidence currently available that at least 579 of the 703 Account Payments were circuitous (82.36%). Dean’s explanations for this have been inconsistent and are not credible. It would be impractical and inappropriate to consider at this stage each such explanation. As before the Judge, the Horton Parties will address by way of illustration Dean’s explanations for the use of CDS and HFR as intermediaries.”

“circuitous payments”, “dormant/dissolved companies” and “revolving transactions”

“The Crump Claimants have very belatedly sought to demonstrate the source of the funds purportedly loaned to the Horton Parties, by way of Crump-1, served only on 11 July 2024, which exhibits (an incomplete set of) bank statements for the Crump Claimants and purports to explain some of the payments into their accounts. That late evidence fails to demonstrate that the funds advanced to the Horton Parties were legitimate, still less to the summary judgment standard, including because (1) the statements for AP Midlands only go back to April 2018, so that they do not shed any light on the source of (a) the funds advanced by AP Midlands before that date (going back to November 2016), or (b) the April 2018 opening balance of £456,627.98 [C/14/5218], (2) there is an unexplained gap in the AP Midlands statements from 28 January 2019 to 15 February 2019 with 11 sheets apparently missing… the information on the bank statements is not conclusive proof as to the source of the payments, as it can be manipulated by the parties to the payment, see for example Ivan’s payments to the Partnership which were misdescribed as payments to Select on Ivan’s bank statements, described further in paragraph 56(4) below. To the contrary, even in the limited time available, the Horton Parties have found that the partial set of bank statements and purported explanations provided by Crump-1 tend to support the Horton Parties’ case, rather than undermine it.”

“Then (sic) inconsistencies in the amounts said to have been lent by the Crump Parties to Select, do not, in and of themselves, indicate money laundering.”

“While these factors would not justify an inference of money laundering on their own, when viewed in combination with the other facts addressed above, they create a picture of an individual seeking to conceal his wrongdoing rather than to provide honest assistance in relation to legitimate loans.”