“manage the investment and reinvestment of the assets of the Cellular Assets with a view to achieving the then current investment objectives of each Cell ...” (cl.5.1.3) and: “... purchase (or otherwise acquire), sell (or otherwise dispose of) and invest money and other assets for the account of the relevant Cell(s) ...” (cl.5.1.5); and to: “supervise, regulate and direct the activities of any investment adviser(s)” (cl.5.1.11). (5) Cl.6 set out the remuneration provisions and provided for fees to be paid by GFG PCC to GFG. (6) Cl.11 contained provisions limiting the liability of GFG. It specified that GFG: “... agrees to use its reasonable endeavours and judgement and due care in exercising its duties and providing the Services and the authority granted to it by this Agreement.”
“(A) The GFG Fund PCC Limited (“Company”) was incorporated in Guernsey under the Companies Law on14 March 2014 as a protected cell company limited by shares and has been authorised by the Guernsey Financial Services Commission as a Class B open-ended investment scheme under the Rules. (B) The Manager [GFG] was appointed as the investment manager of the Company [GFG PCC] and by implication all protected cell sub-funds of the Company, on3 April 2014 . (C) Xenfin Securitised Debt Fund 1 (“Cell”) is a protected cell of the Company. The SPV is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Cell and is used as an investment vehicle for the benefit of the Cell. It is managed by the Manager. (D) The SPV has assets in an Account with the Bank. (E) In respect of the sums deposited by the SPV in the Account (or such sums as are otherwise agreed between the Manager and the Advisor), the Manager wishes to appoint the Advisor [Xenfin Capital] to present it with proposed investments and, following Manager approval, place those investments using its platform and the Advisor is willing to accept the appointment on the terms and conditions contained in this Agreement.”
“The Manager appoints the Advisor to present it with suitable investments (‘Proposed Investments’) to be made from the Account and, subject to receipt of the Manager’s prior written approval, to execute the Proposed Investments on behalf of the SPV and to otherwise undertake the duties set out in this clause 3 with respect to the Account and Portfolio and the Advisor accepts the appointment.”
“IT IS FURTHER NOTED that the Company has been appointed to act as Investment Manager to Xenfin Securitised Debt Fund 1 [Xenfin Cell], a cell of GFG Fund PCC Limited (‘Fund’). As per the Letter of Engagement entered into on27 January 2017 , the Company [GFG] wishes to appoint Xenfin Capital as the Investment Advisor to the Fund. The Board acknowledge that the assets of the Fund will be held within a Special Purpose Vehicle (‘SPV’), namely Xenfin Fund 1 Trading Limited [the laimant].” (2) The other document referred to in the particulars of claim was Xenfin Cell’s 2018 accounts which showed it had paid substantial fees to GFG. Para.10(3) of the Particulars of Claim set out the passages from the accounts that the claimant relies on as supporting its contractual claim, and it says as follows: “(a) Listed GFG as Xenfin Cell’s ‘Investment Manager’ and contained an ‘Investment Manager’s Report’ by GFG; (b) Recorded that ‘[The claimant] is managed by the Investment Manager [i.e. GFG]‘ (although it also referred to an agreement dated16 December 2014 , to which the claimant was not a party);” [I should add to this that that is disputed by GFG, which says that it refers not to the claimant but to Xenfin Cell and GFG PCC.] “(c) Recorded that ‘A management fee [is] paid monthly in arrears of whichever is the greater of£15,000 per month or 1.25% per annum of the Net Asset Value of the relevant Class Account during the relevant period.’ (d) Recorded that investment management fees of£20,769 were incurred between 20 March and30 April 2017 ; and (e) Recorded that investment management fees of£307,048 were incurred in the year ended20 April 2018 .”
“Following the Company’s incorporation, the Company and GFG agreed that GFG would act as the investment manager of the Company (the ‘IMA’). Given that the Company is now in liquidation, the best particulars it can give at present as to such agreement, and pending full disclosure, are that it was reached orally, or in the alternative by conduct (including by GFG charging and accepting, and the Company paying, the fees referred to below), on, or soon after, the Company’s incorporation. In support of that allegation and pending disclosure, the Company will rely on the following;”
“... GFG negotiated and managed the Company’s investments on the Company’s behalf, including the [Dolphin Loans].”
“In the alternative, if GFG had not been appointed as investment manager of the Company by the time the [2017] IMA was entered into, it was so appointed by the [2017] IMA, either as a matter of construction or by virtue of an implied term, on the basis that the term is so obvious that it goes without saying and/or is necessary to give business efficacy to the [2017] IMA.”
“Pursuant to the [Unwritten IMA], or ... the [2017] IMA, GFG owed [it] a duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence in managing [its] investment affairs ...”
“In March 2017, GFG (acting by Mr Hofgren), on behalf of the [claimant] ... entered into negotiations with Dolphin in relation to a substantial loan from Xenfin Cell (via the [claimant] ...) to a Dolphin special purpose vehicle. The negotiations ultimately led to the Company making the DC158 Loan. It is inferred and averred that, as the Investment Manager of the Company, GFG approved the Company entering into the DC158 Loan and thereby caused it to do so, including through the actions of Mr Hofgren and Mr Cheek, as set out below.”
“But for the Defendants’ breaches of their duties as alleged above, the Company would not have entered into the DC158 and 7EP Loan Agreements or the Vordere Transaction or made the First or Second Core Consulting Payments. As a result of doing so, it has suffered loss and damage.”
“(b) Further, even if GFG and the Claimant chose to replicate the other terms of the 2014 Agreement to govern their relationship, they cannot have intended for Clause 11 to apply as between GFG and the Claimant. Clause 11.2 required GFG PCC to indemnify GFG ‘out of the Cellular Assets of the relevant Cell.’ That is not applicable as against the Claimant as the Claimant did not own the Cellular Assets. (c) Further, even if a clause equivalent to Clause 11 of the 2014 Agreement did apply to the relationship between GFG and the Claimant (which is denied), GFG’s breaches of its contractual/tortious duties to the Claimant as particularised at paragraphs 70, 74 and 76 of the Particulars of Claim constituted ‘gross negligence’ within the meaning of Clause 11.1 and Clause 11.2 of the 2014 Agreement.”
“A defendant ought to know whether the proceedings against him are oppressive. It is not a question which calls for nice judgment. If he defends on the merits, this should be taken as acquiescence. It might well be otherwise if the ground on which the proceedings are alleged to be an abuse of process were different. But in a case of the present kind the Court is not so much protecting its own process as the interests of the defendant.”
“... failure to take action to strike out over a long period of time is potent evidence not only that the action was not seen as abusive at the time but also that, on the facts, it was not abusive. The indicia of true abuse are not so obscure that an experienced professional party, advised by leading counsel … will fail to recognise them.”
“GFG agrees with the claimant that disclosure, and oral evidence will be relevant when determining the basis and terms upon which GFG provided services to the claimant.”
“... disclosure from both the claimant and the defendants will be relevant to the determination of which terms actually applied as between the claimant and GFG. That decision will also (consistent with the claimant’s case) be informed by the oral evidence of those actually involved at the time.”
“Mr Clark suggests (paragraph 77 [of his second witness statement]) that it is ‘not in dispute’ that the provisions were not invoked to add the claimant as an additional cell for the purposes of the 2014 IMA. Unless and until disclosure has been provided, and GFG understands what the other defendants maintain happened (being the persons involved at the time) GFG does not know whether the provisions were invoked. Nor does GFG know whether (as pleaded) there was an agreement reached orally or by conduct that the terms of the 2014 IMA would apply as between the claimant and GFG.”
“Where a claim is based upon an oral agreement, the particulars of claim should set out the contractual words used and state by whom, to whom, when and where they were spoken.”
“Where a claim is based upon an agreement by conduct, the particulars of claim must specify the conduct relied on and state by whom, when and where the acts constituting the conduct were done.”
“(i) The court must consider whether the claimant has a ‘realistic’ as opposed to a ‘fanciful’ prospect of success ... (ii) A ‘realistic’ claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable ... (iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a ‘mini trial’ ...But it does have to take at face value ... everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court.”
“(v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No. 5)[2001] EWCA Civ 550 . (vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus, the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd[2007] FSR 63 .”
“In the alternative, when entering into the IMA, the parties expressly or impliedly agreed that the terms of the agreement reached between GFG and GFG PCC on or around3 April 2014 (or substantially similar terms) would apply between GFG and the company (at least insofar as applicable between the parties). Those terms require GFG inter alia to: (i) do all such matters, acts, and things as reasonably necessary and/or incidental to the discharge of GFG’s services, obligations, and duties under the agreement (clause 5.1.1); and (ii) to use its reasonable endeavours, judgment, and due care in exercising its duties and providing services under the agreement (clause 11.1). ”