“Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post (whether the expression “serve” or the expression “give” or “send” or any other expression is used) then, unless the contrary intention appears, the service is deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.”
“It seems to me that when one considers the authorities in the round, including the decision in Abela v Baadarani[2013] UKSC 44 , that when the Treaty does not make service by the Diplomatic Channels exclusive the court may not need to go as far as exceptional circumstances even if the appropriate test is exceptional circumstances rather than good reason.”
“the duty of the applicant is to make a full and fair disclosure of all the facts which it is objectively material for the judge to know in dealing with the application as made: materiality is to be decided by the court and not by the assessment of the applicant or his legal advisers; the duty is a strict one and includes not merely material facts known to the applicant but also additional facts which he would have known if he had made proper enquiries—see Konamaneni v Rolls Royce Industrial Power (India) Ltd[2002] 1 WLR 1269 , per Lawrence Collins J as he then was at [180]. Material facts are those which a judge would need or want to take into account in deciding whether to make the order sought—see Alliance Bank JSC v Zhunus[2015] EWHC 714 (Comm) per Cooke J at [65] and National Bank Trust v Yurov[2016] EWHC 1913 per Males J as he then was [18(a)]. However, there are limits to this and there is no obligation to disclose points there is no reason to anticipate that the other side would raise if present and more generally, the principle should not be carried to extreme lengths in the hope of obtaining the discharge of injunctions in cases where there is little hope of doing so on the substantial merits of the case—see Brink’s Mat Ltd v Elcombe[1988] 1 WLR 1350 per Slade LJ at 1359B-E…The ultimate touchstone is whether the presentation to the judge was fair in all material respects—see Federal Republic of Nigeria v Royal Dutch Shell Plc[2020] EWHC 1315 (Comm) per Butcher J at [90].”
“Where, as will often be the case where permission for service out of the jurisdiction is sought, there are particulars of claim, the analytical focus should be on the particulars of claim and whether, on the basis that the facts there alleged are true, the cause of action asserted has a real prospect of success. Any particulars of claim or witness statement setting out details of the claim will be supported by a statement of truth. Save in cases where allegations of fact are demonstrably untrue or unsupportable, it is generally not appropriate for a defendant to dispute the facts alleged through evidence of its own. Doing so may well just show that there is a triable issue.”
“It does not follow that “de facto director” must be given the same meaning in all of the different contexts in which a “director” may be liable. It seems to me that in the present context of the fiduciary duty of a director not to dispose wrongfully of the company's assets, the crucial question is whether the person assumed the duties of a director. Both Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C in In re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd[1988] Ch 477 , 490, and Millett J in In re Hydrodam[1994] 2 BCLC 180 , 183, referred to the assumption of office as a mark of a de facto director. In Fayers Legal Services Ltd v Day (unreported)11 April 2001 , a case relating to breach of fiduciary duty, Patten J, rejecting a claim that the defendant was a de facto director of the company and had been in breach of fiduciary duty, said that in order to make him liable for misfeasance as a de facto director the person must be part of the corporate governing structure, and the claimants had to prove that he assumed a role in the company sufficient to impose on him a fiduciary duty to the company and to make him responsible for the misuse of its assets. It seems to me that that is the correct formulation in a case of the present kind. See also Primlake Ltd v Matthews Associates[2007] 1 BCLC 666 , para 284.”
“Practical points: what makes a person a de facto director? 33. Lord Collins JSC sensibly held that there was no one definitive test for a de facto director. The question is whether he was part of the corporate governance system of the company and whether he assumed the status and function of a director so as to make himself responsible as if he were a director. However, a number of points arise out of Holland's case and the previous cases which are of general practical importance in determining who is a de facto director. I note these points in the following paragraphs. 34. The concepts of shadow director and de facto are different but there is some overlap. 35. A person may be de facto director even if there was no invalid appointment. The question is whether he has assumed responsibility to act as a director. 36. To answer that question, the court may have to determine in what capacity the director was acting (as in Holland's case). 37. The court will in general also have to determine the corporate governance structure of the company so as to decide in relation to the company's business whether the defendant's acts were directorial in nature. 38. The court is required to look at what the director actually did and not any job title actually given to him. 39. A defendant does not avoid liability if he shows that he in good faith thought he was not acting as a director. The question whether or not he acted as a director is to be determined objectively and irrespective of the defendant's motivation or belief. 40. The court must look at the cumulative effect of the activities relied on. The court should look at all the circumstances “in the round” (per Jonathan Parker J in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Jones[1999] BCC 336 ). 41. It is also important to look at the acts in their context. A single act might lead to liability in an exceptional case. 42. Relevant factors include: (i) whether the company considered him to be a director and held him out as such; (ii) whether third parties considered that he was a director. 43. The fact that a person is consulted about directorial decisions or his approval does not in general make him a director because he is not making the decision. 44. Acts outside the period when he is said to have been a de facto director may throw light on whether he was a de facto director in the relevant period. 45. In my judgment, the question whether a director is a de facto or shadow director is a question of fact and degree…”
“16. Mr Ali Ahmad performed the functions of a director of [the Claimant] and was therefore a de facto director of [the Claimant], at least in relation to the DC158 and 7EP Loans and the Vordere Transaction. In particular: (1) Mr Ali Ahmad was sent extensive information about the Company’s activities by Mr Hofgren and other and, in particular, sent and received a large number of significant emails in relation to the DC158 Loan, the 7EP Loan and the Vordere Transaction; (2) Mr Ahmad was consulted about significant decisions in relation to [the Claimant] (including in the emails referred to in paragraphs 26 and 35 below); (3) Mr Ali Ahmad appears to have had the final say in relation to certain major decisions made by [the Claimant], including decisions as to the amount to be advanced under the DC158 Loan and whether the Company should enter into the Vordere Transaction; (4) Further, it appears from such emails that Mr Hofgren deferred to Mr Ali Ahmad’s judgment in relation to key decisions concerning the affairs of [the Claimant], including decisions as to the terms of the DC158 Loan and the Vordere Transaction; (5) Mr Ali Ahmad participated with Mr Hofgren in meetings on behalf of [the Claimant] with Dolphin and Vordere, at which the key commercial terms of the DC158 Loan, the 7EP Loan and the Vordere Transaction were negotiated and agreed ([the Claimant] relies in particular in this regard on the meetings referred to in paragraphs 27 and 53 below). 17. As a de facto director of [the Claimant], Mr Ali Ahmad owed the same duties to [the Claimant] as a de jure director, being those duties set out at paragraphs 15(1) to 15(3) above. In the alternative, Mr Ali Ahmad’s involvement with [the Claimant], as set out in the preceding paragraphs, was such that, in all the circumstances, he owed [the Claimant] the duties set out at paragraphs 15(1) to 15(3) above.”
“This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Island of Guernsey and subject to clause 22 (Arbitration), the parties agree to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the island of Guernsey.”
“the assets of the Company attributable to a Cell…” “Cell” is defined as: “the cells listed in Schedule 2 together with each Additional Cell, each being a cell of the Company created in accordance with and subject to the provisions of [the Companies (Guernsey) Law 2008 as amended]”. “Additional Cell” means: “any additional cell of the Company for which the Investment Manager has, from time to time, agreed to provide the Services, as set out in Schedule 3 to this Agreement.”
“This Agreement shall be construed and governed in accordance with English law. Disputes arising under, out of or connected with this Agreement shall be subject to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts to which the parties hereby submit.”
“(B) The Manager was appointed as the investment manager of the Company, and by implication all protected cell sub-funds of the Company, on3 April 2014 . (C) Xenfin Securitised Debt Fund 1 (“Cell”) is a protected cell of the Company. The SPV is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Cell and is used as an investment vehicle for the benefit of the Cell. It is managed by the Manager. (D) The SPV has assets in an Account with the Bank. (E) In respect of the sums deposited by the SPV in the Account (or such sums as are otherwise agreed between the Manager and the Advisor), the Manager wishes to appoint the Advisor to present it with proposed investments and, following Manager approval, place those investments using its platform and the Advisor is willing to accept the appointment on the terms and conditions contained in this Agreement.”
“This is, accordingly, a case in which the fact on which jurisdiction depends is also likely to be decisive of the action itself if it proceeds. For the purpose of determining an issue about jurisdiction, the traditional test has been whether the claimant had ‘the better of the argument’ on the facts going to jurisdiction. In Brownlie v Four Seasons Holdings Inc[2018] 1 WLR 192 , para 7, this court reformulated the effect of that test as follows: ‘(i) that the claimant must supply a plausible evidential basis for the application of a relevant jurisdictional gateway; (ii) that if there is an issue of fact about it, or some other reason for doubting whether it applies, the court must take a view on the material available if it can reliably do so; but (iii) the nature of the issue and the limitations of the material available at the interlocutory stage may be such that no reliable assessment can be made, in which case there is a good arguable case for the application of the gateway if there is a plausible (albeit contested) evidential basis for it.’ It is common ground that the test must be satisfied on the evidence relating to the position as at the date when the proceedings were commenced.”
“that, first, the party relying on the existence of the agreement must supply an evidential basis showing that it has the better argument (and not much the better argument); second, if there is an issue of fact about it, or some other reason for doubting whether it applies, the court must take a view on the material available if it can reliably do so; but, third, the nature of the issue and the limitations of the material available at the interlocutory stage may be such that no reliable assessment can be made, in which case there is a good arguable case for the existence of the agreement if there is a plausible (albeit contested) evidential basis for it.”
“The complexity of international commercial and financial transactions has resulted in the frequent use of inter-linked contracts. Because jurisdiction clauses are not generally the subject of close negotiation or scrutiny, it frequently happens that there are inconsistent jurisdiction clauses, or situations in which one or more contracts have jurisdiction clauses and others do not. Which, if any, jurisdiction clause applies to a dispute is entirely a matter of construction, and where English law governs the jurisdiction agreement, a matter of the application of established principles of contractual construction. It may be that the many decisions in this area have over-elaborated the application of familiar principles of construction, but the following propositions can be derived from them: (1) Jurisdiction clauses should be construed widely and generously. (2) An agreement which is part of a series of agreements should be construed by taking into account the overall scheme of the agreements. (3) It is generally to be assumed that just as parties to a single agreement do not intend as rational business people that disputes under the same agreement be determined by different tribunals, parties to an arrangement between them set out in multiple related agreements do not generally intend a dispute to be litigated in two different tribunals. (4) Where there are multiple related agreements, the task of the court in determining whether the dispute falls within the jurisdiction clauses of one or more related agreements depends upon the intention of the parties as revealed by the agreements (at the time when they were entered into) as against these general principles. (5) Rational business people are unlikely to intend that disputes between them should fall within the scope of two inconsistent jurisdiction clauses. (6) What is required is a broad, purposive and commercially-minded construction, in the light of the transaction as a whole, taking into account the overall scheme of the agreements and reading sentences and phrases in the context of that overall scheme. (7) This may include enquiring under which of a number of inter-related contractual agreements a dispute actually arises, and seeking to do so by locating its centre of gravity and thus which jurisdiction clause is closer to the claim. (8) Nevertheless the normal process of construction may not be able to avoid a degree of fragmentation and overlap.”
“In answer to the question posed, I believe it is strongly arguable that the [2014 Agreement] provisions (including clauses 22 and 24) bind [the Claimant] vis-à-vis [D1]. I am not aware that there was every any express contract made directly between the [Claimant] and [D1]. However, we know from the [2014 Agreement] that it was intended [D1] should be the investment manager for the whole structure given that [GFG PCC] is a single legal entity acting for all cells (which, as noted, have no separate legal personality and cannot themselves contract) and cell assets such as [the Claimant] (the existence of such entities being expressly contemplated by the 2008 Law as above) formed a part of that structure; see generally clauses 2.1 and 3.1 of the [2014 Agreement] and the reference to “Cellular Assets” and the definition of that term at clause 1.2. One could argue for GFG PCC acting both for Xenfin Cell (being a part of the same legal entity) and as agent for the [Claimant] as a (then future) Cellular Asset in making the [2014 Agreement]. And of course [the Claimant] did not exist at the time the [2014 Agreement] was made.”
“On the evidence before me, the [2014 Agreement] does not amount to a legally binding agreement with [the Claimant].”
“And again it is not strictly a question of whether the [2014 Agreement] became legally binding between [D1] and [the Claimant] (because [the Claimant] would not become a party even if the Xenfin Cell had been identified under Schedule 3) as opposed to [D1] owing duties as investment manager to [the Claimant] under [the 2014 Agreement], itself governed by Guernsey law, arbitration and jurisdiction.”
“…I do not say that [the Claimant] became a party to the [2014 Agreement] but I stand by the suggestion that it is at least strongly arguable that the [2014 Agreement] governed the investment management relationship between [D1] and [the Claimant].”
“Mr MacInnes helped raise funds which the Company eventually loaned out, including the DC158 and 7EP loans.”