Molly Ball & Anor v JMJ Solicitors LLP [2026] EWHC 1395 (Ch)

[2026] EWHC 1395 (Ch)Case No BL-2025-001118
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
BUSINESS LIST (ChD)
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 17/6/2026
Before
MASTER CLARK
Between
MOLLY BALLClaimantsCLAIRE LAMBClaimantJMW SOLICITORS LLPDefendant
Paul Fisher (instructed by DMH Stallard LLP) for ClaimantsJack Steer (instructed by Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP) for DefendantHearing Hearing dates: 17 & 22 April 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10am on 17 June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................Master Clark:Application
[1]This is my judgment on the claimants’ application dated 22 December 2025, which seeks:(1) an extension of time for service of the particulars of claim (“PoC”); and(2) delivery up of the client file held by the defendant.[2]The claimants are former clients of the defendant solicitors. The claimants own 2 leasehold flats in a redevelopment completed in 2013 called The Belvedere, 44 Bedford Row in central London (“the Development”), owned by entities in a group called The Regal Group.[3]Since buying their flats, the claimants have had persistent issues with the heating and hot water systems (“the Defects”).

Background

[4]The background to this claim and the application is as follows.[5]In about July 2018, the claimants instructed the defendant in relation to the Defects.[6]On 29 September 2019, the primary limitation period for claims in respect of the Defects expired: the start date of the limitation period ran from date of practical completion (30 September 2013), not from the date of the claimants’ leases (16 October 2013).[7]On 15 October 2019, the defendant issued a claim form (“the Regal claim”) on the claimants’ behalf against 7 entities in the Regal Group (“the Regal defendants”). As is apparent, this was after expiry of the primary limitation period for the claim.[8]On 28 February 2020, the parties in the Regal claim agreed a consent order discontinuing the claim against D2-D7 in that claim, but preserving the limitation period position if the claimants were to apply to restore those claims.[9]On 11 January 2022, the claimants wrote a long (43 page) detailed letter (“the January 2022 letter”) to the defendant complaining about its conduct of the Regal claim. In February 2022 the claimants terminated the defendant’s retainer. The claimants have continued to pursue the Regal claim, initially with solicitors, but now as litigants in person. That claim is listed for an 8 day trial in January 2027.[10]On 18 March 2022, the defendant provided the claimants’ then solicitors (Horwich Farrelly) with what they said was a copy of the client file – about 2,000 pages. The claimants then identified a number of missing documents, some of which were provided.[11]On 19 January 2023, Stevens & Bolton on the claimants’ behalf sent the defendant a preliminary notice under the Pre-Action Protocol for Professional Negligence. This letter also set out that :
“we understand that you provided certain documents relating to our clients’ claim against Regal (Bedford Row) Limited and others to Horwich Farrelly Limited. We are, however, instructed that this was not the full set of documents and that several key documents are missing. Please provide a copy of our clients’ complete file …”
[12]Stevens & Bolton made specific requests for documents in May 2023, and on 17 August 2023, the defendant replied:
“documents were sent by us to Horwich Farrelly on 18 March 2022. Those documents were what we considered to be documents that this firm was required to release. On several occasions after those documents were sent, we received correspondence from Horwich Farrelly raising further enquiries about documents it was alleged existed and were not forwarded. As was confirmed in several letters to Horwich Farrelly, we considered that all of the documents that we were required to supply were transferred the 18 March 2022, although on some occasions we re-attached copies of certain documents. Horwich Farrelly eventually stopped requesting documents and we reasonably assumed that the file request has been satisfied.”
[13]On 10 September 2025 DMH Stallard on the claimants’ behalf emailed the defendant asking it to agree to a standstill agreement, on the basis that the limitation period for the claim against it expired the following day.[14]The claim form was issued on a protective basis on 11 September 2025. The claim is for damages caused by the defendant's negligence and/or breach of contract in the performance and discharge of their retainer by the claimants between 14 August 2018 and 17 February 2022 to provide advice and legal services in relation to the Regal claim.[15]The breaches alleged in the claim form are, in summary:(1) failure to advise on the law of limitation in relation to the Regal claim;(2) failure to advise as to formulation and prosecution of the Regal claim;(3) “further failures by the Defendant in its conduct of the [Regal claim] details of which are set out in the Particulars of Claim”.[16]On 21 November 2025, RPC confirmed that they acted for the defendant. They proposed that the claimants provide particulars of claim to stand as a Letter of Claim, and that the claim would then be stayed for 3 months.[17]On 17 December 2025, after telephone calls on 4 and 15 December 2025, the claimants’ solicitors emailed the defendant’s solicitors confirming their request for an extension of time for service of claim form and PoC until after determination of the Regal claim i.e. April 2027. They also asked for a complete copy of the file.[18]On 19 December 2025, the defendant’s solicitors wrote to say that they would agree to an extension of time for service of proceedings, provided that draft particulars of claim were served by 10 January 2026. They stated that the defendant’s file had been provided many years ago, and asked the claimants to explain what key documents were missing.[19]On 22 December 2025, the claimants issued this application. It was supported by a witness statement dated 22 December 2025 of the first claimant, stating:
“7. The Claimants are presently unable to plead their claim properly because the Defendant has not provided a full and complete copy of the Claimant's client file, including documents and communications directly relevant to limitation, breach, causation and concealment. 8. Pleading in general terms without the Defendant’s file would risk omission of material allegations and subsequent amendments, increasing costs and procedural complexity. 9. In those circumstances, requiring immediate service would risk incomplete pleading, unnecessary amendment, and increased costs, contrary to the overriding objective.”
[20]On 23 December 2025, I made an order granting an extension of time for service of the PoC pending determination of the application. On 6 January 2026, the claim form and order of 23 December 2025 were served.[21]On 14 January 2026, the claimants requested the file again, and referred to the first claimant’s witness statement as setting out missing documents.[22]20 January 2026 was the deadline for service of the PoC if the order of 23 December 2025 had not been made.[23]On 21 January 2026, the defendant’s solicitors sent a holding reply to the claimants’ solicitors’ letter of 14 January 2026. On 25 February 2026, the claimants’ solicitors sent a chasing letter.[24]On 2 March 2026, the defendant’s solicitors wrote to say that they were preparing a response to the application generally. On 26 March 2026, the claimants’ solicitors sent a further chasing letter.[25]On 26 March 2026, the defendant’s solicitors replied to say that a witness statement would be filed and served “as soon as possible, we anticipate in the course of next week”; and that the defendant’s position was that the claimants had been provided with all the documents to which they are entitled.[26]On 13 April 2026 (3 days before the hearing of the application) the defendant filed and served its witness statement in opposition.

Common ground

[27]It was common ground between the parties that:(1) the court has an inherent jurisdiction to order the defendant to produce the client file insofar as they belong to the client and not the solicitor to the claimants;(2) insofar as the documents provided do not constitute the complete client file, the claimants are entitled to the complete file;(3) the claimants have received about 2,000 documents;(4) there remain outstanding documents which should be part of the file, but which have not been provided.

The claimants’ position

[28]The claimants’ position is that:(1) they should not be required to plead their case until they have the complete file;(2) insofar as their complaints relate to what they were advised or not advised, they should be provided with all documents recording or evidencing the advice they received from the defendant;(3) insofar as their complaints relate to other acts or omissions in the conduct of the claim, they should be provided with all documents recording or evidencing communications: (i) internally within the firm; (ii) between the defendant and the defendants or their solicitors in the Regal claim; (iii) between the defendant and counsel instructed on the claimants’ behalf, Toby Watkin.[29]In addition, the claimants have identified the following “missing documents” i.e. documents which would be expected to be on the file but which have not been provided:(1) Contemporaneous correspondence about the removal of D2-D7 from the Regal claim, and why it was done;(2) Documents recording or evidencing instructions and telephone conversations with counsel (Mr Watkin) referred to in the defendant’s letter dated 8 October 2021 to him;(3) Documents recording or evidencing contemporaneous advice to the claimants, internal discussions and analysis of counsel’s advice in November 2021 as to the effect of February 2020 consent order and the position on limitation.

The defendant’s position

[30]The defendant’s position in its written evidence was that:(1) it has provided what it considers to be the client file;(2) it has responded to requests for specific documents where it has been possible. However, it accepted in the course of the hearing that the above documents are documents which were or ought to have been on its file, and in that sense are missing from the client file provided by it.[31]In any event, it submitted:(1) the claimants have enough documents to plead their claim;(2) the claimants’ correspondence (and, in particular, the January 2022 letter) shows that they have the knowledge necessary to plead their claim;(3) to the extent that further documents relevant to the claim exist, they will be disclosed as part of the disclosure process in the claim.[32]As to (1) and (2), the defendant referred to CPR 16.4(1), which provides that particulars of claim must include “a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies”. Thus, it submitted, a claimant is not required to plead every single fact upon which they might conceivably rely.[33]In support of this, the defendant referred to the following authorities. The first is Andrews v Messer Beg [2019] EWHC 911 (Ch); [2019] PNLR 23, in which Stephen Jourdan QC (sitting as a High Court judge) said:
“The function of a pleading which asserts a claim … is to set out a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies as giving the claimant a cause of action against the defendant: see CPR r 16.4. The claimant should state all the facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action against the defendant. Such a pleading needs to give the defendant such reasonable and proportionate information about the facts alleged as is required to enable the defendant to understand the case he has to meet and to prepare his defence.”
[34]The second was Pantelli v. Corporate City Developments [2010] EWHC 3189 (TCC); [2011] PNLR 12, [11], in which Coulson J (as he was) said:
“CPR r 16.4(1)(a) requires that a particulars of claim must include ‘a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies’. Thus, where the particulars of claim contain an allegation of breach of contract and/or negligence, it must be pleaded in such a way as to allow the defendant to know the case that it has to meet. The pleading needs to set out clearly what it is that the defendant failed to do that it should have done, and/or what the defendant did that it should not have done, what would have happened but for those acts or omissions, and the loss that eventuated. Those are ‘the facts’ relied on in support of the allegation, and are required in order that proper witness statements (and if necessary an expert’s report) can be obtained by both sides which address the specific allegations made.”
[35]Finally, in Tchenguiz v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2015] EWHC 405 (Comm) | [2015] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 961, at [1], where Leggatt J (as he was) said:
“Statements of case must be concise. They must plead only material facts, meaning those necessary for the purpose of formulating a cause of action or defence, and not background facts or evidence. Still less should they contain arguments, reasons or rhetoric.”
[36]None of the above statements of the law are contentious, nor were they disputed by the claimants.[37]In this context, the defendant submitted that the claimants were able to plead their claim. In particular, as to the claim for failure to advise as to limitation, this could, it submitted, be pleaded by reference to the following factual elements of the cause of action, all of which were within the claimants’ knowledge:(1) what the limitation period was, by reference to the relevant facts;(2) when the Regal claim was issued;(3) what advice if any was given on limitation;(4) the impact, if any, on the Regal claim of the advice or failure to advise. This was shown, the defendant said, by the fact that the claimants were able to articulate their claim in respect of all these elements in the January 2022 letter.[38]Similarly, insofar as the claimants allege breaches of duty in relation to the removal of D2-D7 in the Regal claim, the defendant referred me to passages in the January 2022 letter, which articulate those complaints.[39]The defendant submitted therefore that the claimants were able to plead those 2 allegations to the standard required by the CPR. It did however implicitly accept that allegations as a failure by the defendant to advise as to ATE insurance had not been articulated by the claimants, and did not submit that they were currently in a position to plead those allegations.[40]In addition, the defendant accepted (rightly in my view) that, following disclosure of the documents not yet disclosed from the client file, the particulars of claim might require refinement or amendment to fill out allegations or even to plead further allegations. This was, it said, not a reason to allow the claimants not to serve a particulars of claim at all, but was a normal feature of litigation.[41]The defendant therefore opposes both any order being made in respect of the client file, and, even if it is, the claimants being given any more time to plead their claim.

Extension of time - legal principles

[42]The relevant parts of the CPR are 1(2) and 3.1(2)(a).[43]CPR 1(2) provides: “(2) Dealing with a case justly and at proportionate cost includes, so far as is practicable –(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing and can participate fully in proceedings, and that parties and witnesses can give their best evidence;(b) saving expense;(c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate – (i) to the amount of money involved; (ii) to the importance of the case; (iii) to the complexity of the issues; and (iv) to the financial position of each party;(d) ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly;(e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases;(f) promoting or using alternative dispute resolution; and(g) enforcing compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.” (a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing and can participate fully in proceedings, and that parties and witnesses can give their best evidence; (b) saving expense; (c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate – (i) to the amount of money involved; (ii) to the importance of the case; (iii) to the complexity of the issues; and (iv) to the financial position of each party; (e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases;[44]CPR 3.1(2)(a) provides:
“(2) Except where these Rules provide otherwise, the court may – (a) extend or shorten the time for compliance with any rule, practice direction or court order (even if an application for extension is made after the time for compliance has expired);” (a) extend or shorten the time for compliance with any rule, practice direction or court order (even if an application for extension is made after the time for compliance has expired);”
[45]In addition, the following principles are established by authority at Court of Appeal level:(1) The court’s power to extend time for service of the particulars of claim is conferred by CPR 3.1(2)(a), and not by CPR 7.6: Totty v Snowden [2001] EWCA Civ 1415, [2002] 1 WLR 1384 at [46];(2) The very strict regime in CPR 7.6 does not therefore apply: Totty at [37];(3) A reason which would not be a sufficient reason to extend time for a claim form may be a reason to extend time for particulars of claim: ST v BAI (SA) trading as Brittany Ferries [2022] EWCA Civ 1037 at [62(ii)](4) The power to extend time under CPR 3.1(2)(a) is discretionary and is to be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective: Totty at [37], Robert v Momentum Services [2003] EWCA Civ 2999, [2003] 1 WLR 1577 at 33;(5) CPR 3.9 does not apply to an in-time application to extend time: Robert at [33];(6) In determining an application to extend time to serve the particulars of claim, the general rule is that the focus should be on the prejudice occasioned by the failure to serve the particulars of claim in time, and not pre-existing prejudice of the type relevant to a claim issued after expiry of the limitation period: Robert at [39];(7) CPR 1.1(2)(g) does not require courts to refuse reasonable extensions of time, which neither imperil hearing dates nor otherwise disrupt the proceedings: Hallam Estates Ltd v Baker [2014] EWCA Civ 661, [2014] 4 Costs LR 660; Jalla v Shell International [2021] EWCA Civ 1559 at 29;(8) Even in an out of time application, a relevant factor is the fact that the refusal to extend time would in practice mean the end of the claim: Price v Price [2003] EWCA Civ 888, [2003] 3 All ER 911; Jalla at [29].[46]CPR 3.1(2)(a) does not refer to any particular factor in the overriding objective, and the authorities referred to earlier also do not. It is clear from those authorities in my judgment that all the relevant factors are to be taken into account, and no special weight is to be given to the reason why the extension is needed. As Nicol J said in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2015] EWHC 1847 (QB):
“The Claimant has not served his Particulars of Claim within the time prescribed by CPR r.7.4(2) and, to that extent he has not acted expeditiously. But it was in anticipation that that would be the case that the Claimant made the present application.”

Analysis and conclusion

[47]In this context, the issues which arise are: Production of the file(1) Whether the file provided by the defendant is complete in material respects;(2) If not, what further order should be made as to disclosure of the file; Extension of time for PoC(3) Whether the claimants should be required to plead their claim without the disclosure sought;(4) If disclosure of the file would or might require amendment of the particulars of claim, whether that is a reason for granting an extension of time for the PoC until the complete file has been provided;(5) If not, are there any other factors which justify granting an extension of time. Production of the file Material completeness of the file

Production of the file

[48]As mentioned, the defendant does not in its evidence challenge that documents forming part of the client file are missing. It asserts that its searches have been “exhaustive”. It has not however explained in correspondence nor in its evidence what those searches have been. In particular, its evidence does not include any explanation as to:(1) how the file was operated and the process by which documents would have become part of the file;(2) how documents which ought to be on the file are missing from it;(3) the searches that have been carried out to locate missing documents;(4) whether there are any other searches which could be carried out.[49]I am not therefore satisfied, on the available evidence, that the defendant’s searches for documents forming part of the file have been complete.[50]As to the defendant’s argument that any further documents on the file will be disclosed as part of disclosure, that is in my judgment, misconceived. The claimants’ entitlement to the client file is proprietary, and not relevance based. To the extent that there are documents not yet provided which will or may inform the claimants’ pleading, they will not be disclosable unless and until the facts which they evidence have been pleaded. It is therefore in my judgment no answer to this application to say that the documents sought will ultimately be disclosable.

Further order

[51]I will therefore order the defendant:(1) to provide the claimants with all documents or classes of documents identified as missing i.e. not yet provided;(2) to the extent that documents or classes of documents are not provided, to file and serve a witness statement explaining the matters set out in paragraph 48 above. Extension of time for the PoC Whether claimants should be required to plead their claim without the disclosure sought

Extension of time for the PoC

[52]As to this, the defendant’s position is, as set out above, that the claimants have both the knowledge and the documents to plead their claim. I accept that they are in a position to plead a claim – that much is plain from the claim form itself. However, as the defendant accepted, to the extent that documents which underlying any part of or adding to their claim are not currently available, they are not or may not be able to plead their claim in its final form.[53]It follows, as the defendant also accepted, if the claimants were required to plead their claim now, they may well need to amend their PoC once the full file was provided. Not only would the amendments themselves put them to further costs (not recoverable until the end of the claim), but they would need to obtain either the defendant’s consent or the permission of the court. The defendant would of course be entitled to oppose the grant of permission and/or to seek costs against the claimants. None of this would be necessary if the file to which the claimants are entitled is provided in its entirety before the PoC is finalised.[54]In addition, the fact that a claim can be articulated (for example in the January 2022 letter) is not enough of itself to properly plead it. Although it is axiomatic that facts, and not evidence, are to be pleaded, the evidence in support of a claim is the foundation underlying the pleaded case. The claimants, in my judgment, are reasonably entitled to have all of the evidence in the client file (their entitlement to which is, as I have said, undisputed) so that their barrister can review it, advise them as to its implications, and then plead a case which reflects that evidence and his/her advice on it.[55]I will therefore extend the time for filing and service of the PoC until a period (as to which I will hear submissions from counsel) after compliance with my order for production of the client file.

Other factors

[56]If I am wrong in my conclusion as the extension of time, I would in any event have granted a short further extension (28 days) for service of the PoC, taking into account the following factors relevant to the exercise of my discretion.[57]First, as in Lachaux, the starting point is, in my judgment, that the claimants have issued their claim within the limitation period and served their claim form in time.[58]Secondly, the time for service of the PoC currently runs until the determination of the claimants’ application. A further extension of 28 days is a short extension within the range of what the court would normally grant. The court routinely grants extensions of this length on the first application without imposing any conditions, and on further applications, albeit with, depending on the circumstances, the sanction of an unless order. If the defendant is right, then it would be entitled effectively to the benefit conferred by an unless order where no previous extension application has been made. This is a draconian consequence for the claimants having waited to the end of the limitation period to issue their claim, as they were entitled to do.[59]Thirdly, the claimants reasonably sought the defendant’s consent to extend time for service of the claim form and PoC, some 3½ weeks before the deadline.[60]Fourthly, the claimants’ reasons for wanting the extension, even if they had not been accepted by the court, were not in my judgment unreasonable.[61]Fifthly, as set out above, the relevant prejudice is the delay in the progress of the claim, which is minimal. Indeed, if the defendant had agreed to provide the documents sought or given a proper explanation of why they are not available, the case management conference would have been listed by now.[62]Sixthly, if the extension is refused, the prejudice to the claimants will be substantial. The claim form values their claim at over £500,000. This is an important factor, and significantly outweighs the minimal prejudice to the defendant in the circumstances of this case.