‘45. So the question of what constitutes the “strongest evidence” for the purposes of this kind of case remains to be explored. As I see it, there is a sliding scale according to which evidence will constitute the strongest evidence in one case but not in another. What constitutes the “strongest evidence” in any particular case will depend on totality of the relevant facts of that case, and the court's evaluation of the probabilities. The court must look at all the circumstances of the case relevant to attestation. The more probable it is, from those circumstances, that the will was properly attested, the greater will be the burden on those seeking to displace the presumption as to due execution to which the execution of the will and the attestation clause give rise. Accordingly the higher will be the hurdle to be crossed to meet the requirement of showing the “strongest evidence”, and the stronger that evidence will need to be. 46. Likewise, if the evidence of due attestation is weak, then the burden of displacing the presumption as to due execution may be more easily discharged and the requirement to show the strongest evidence satisfied. Allegations that were not made, or were not pursued, and mere suspicion, have to be put on one side.’
“It is essential . . . that a testator shall understand the nature of the act and its effects; shall understand the extent of the property of which he is disposing; shall be able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect; and, with a view to the latter object, that no disorder of the mind shall poison his affections, pervert his senses of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties, that no insane delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it which, if the mind had been sound, would not have been made.”
‘i) While the burden starts with the propounder of a will to establish capacity, where the will is duly executed and appears rational on its face, then the court will presume capacity. ii) In such a case the evidential burden then shifts to the objector to raise a real doubt about capacity. iii) If a real doubt is raised, the evidential burden shifts back to the propounder to establish capacity nonetheless.’
“Although those propounding the will must satisfy the court that the testator was of sound disposing mind, yet if the will is rational on the face of it and is shown to be duly executed and no other evidence is offered, the court will pronounce for it, presuming that the testator was mentally competent. Slight evidence of mental incapacity will not disturb this presumption, and some cases have suggested that even an admitted mental disorder will not upset this presumption unless it is shown that the testator’s mental impairment was of a type that would. However, where real suspicion of incapacity arises, those propounding the will must dispel that suspicion by proving testamentary capacity. Thus where it is admitted by those propounding the will that the deceased suffered from serious mental illness at a period before the will, or where its terms are incoherent, irrational or strange, a presumption may be raised against it, though not a conclusive one. However, it is not the law that in all cases of doubtful capacity there has to be positive proof of capacity before the court can pronounce for the will.”
“A testator cannot be said to know and approve the contents of his will unless he is able to, and does, understand what he is doing and its effect. It is not enough that he knows what is written in the document which he signs.”
“In the ordinary probate case knowledge and approval are established by the propounder of the will proving the testamentary capacity of the deceased and the due execution of the will, from which the court will infer that knowledge and approval. But in a case where the circumstances are such as to arouse the suspicion of the court the propounder must prove affirmatively that knowledge and approval so as to satisfy the court that the will represents the wishes of the deceased.”
“in relation to the question of knowledge and approval, the fact that a will had been properly executed after being prepared by a solicitor and read over to the testatrix raised a very strong presumption that it represented the testatrix’s intentions at the moment she had executed the will; that the presumption was reinforced by policy considerations in support of the fundamental principle of testamentary freedom and the evidential difficulties presented by the fact that the testatrix could not be directly examined.”
‘23. The doctrine of proprietary estoppel was described as follows in In re Basham decd[1986] 1 WLR 1498 , 1503 : 'Where one person, A, has acted to his detriment on the faith of a belief, which was known to and encouraged by another person, B, that he either has or is going to be given a right in or over B's property, B cannot insist on his strict legal rights if to do so would be inconsistent with A's belief.' […] 24. There are three main elements to a proprietary estoppel (i) an assurance by B (whether by words or inferred from conduct) (ii) reasonable reliance on the assurance by A and (iii) detriment in consequence of that reasonable reliance; see Thorner v Major[2009] UKHL 18 at [29] . The latter two elements are often intertwined and they are sometimes referred to together simply as "detrimental reliance", but it is important to keep in mind their constituents. If these elements are present they give rise to an equity which the Court will decide how best to satisfy. 25. These are not, however, watertight compartments. As Robert Walker LJ said in Gillett v Holt at 225: "…it is important to note at the outset that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel cannot be treated as subdivided into three or four watertight compartments. Both sides are agreed on that, and in the course of the oral argument in this court it repeatedly became apparent that the quality of the relevant assurances may influence the issue of reliance, that reliance and detriment are often intertwined, and that whether there is a distinct need for a 'mutual understanding' may depend on how the other elements are formulated and understood. Moreover, the fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the elements of the doctrine. In the end the court must look at the matter in the round." 26. The assurance must be ' clear enough' but what amounts to sufficient clarity, as Lord Walker explained in Thorner v Major at [56] is " hugely dependent on context ". In its proper context the assurance must be reasonably understood by A to be unambiguous and intended to be taken seriously. B's subjective intention in making the statement is not relevant; what matters is how the statements were reasonably understood; Thorner at [3-5], [17] and[18]. 27. The assurance must be that A will acquire a proprietary interest in specified property owned (or possibly about to be owned) by B; Thorner at [2] and [61] […] 28. The assurance does not need to be expressed to be irrevocable. As observed in Gillett at 229E, "… it is the other party's detrimental reliance on the promise which makes it irrevocable ". It is, however, important to distinguish between mere statements of present (revocable) intentions and statements tantamount to a promise; Gillett at 227G to 228F . It is not reasonable to rely on the former. The latter, on the other hand, may be reasonably understood as intended to be taken seriously and therefore reasonably relied upon. 29. There must be a sufficient link between the assurance and the conduct which constitutes the detriment. B's communications do not have to be the sole inducement for A's conduct; it is sufficient if they are an inducement: Gillett at page 226G-H. 30. Detriment must be pleaded and proved, but it is not a narrow or technical concept. It need not consist of the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something substantial. The issue of detriment is judged at the moment when B decides to repudiate his assurance. The broad inquiry which then arises is whether the repudiation of the assurance is or is not unconscionable in all the circumstances. See Gillett at 232D-F”’
“They started to suffer. When you work with livestock you know they are sick, Keith seemed to lose his eye for good stock. He couldn’t see them deteriorating. It was hard to see for someone who was brilliant with his cattle. It was even more sad that he failed realise that his stock was deteriorating, as he struggling mentally to contain what had and had not been done.”