“8. To receive any gift or property under this Will a beneficiary must survive me for thirty (30) days. Beneficiaries of my estate residue will receive and share all of my property and assets not specifically bequeathed or otherwise required for the payment of any debts owed, including but not limited to, expenses associated with the probate of my Will, the payment of taxes, funeral expenses or any other expense resulting from the administration of my Will. The entire estate residue is to be divided between my designated beneficiaries with the beneficiaries receiving a share of the entire estate residue. All property given under this Will is subject to any encumbrances or liens attached to the property. 9 . I direct my Executor to distribute the residue of my estate as follows (“Share Allocations”): a. All of the residue of my estate to Simon Timothy Abraham of Southampton, England, for their own use absolutely. If Simon Timothy Abraham does not survive me then I leave this share of my estate to Hilary Lynda Abraham of Southampton, England.”
“9. The task of the probate court is to ascertain what (if anything) was the last true will of a free and capable testator. The focus of the enquiry is upon the process by which the document which it is sought to admit to proof was produced. Other matters are relevant only insofar as they illuminate some material part of that process. Probate actions become unnecessarily discursive and expensive and absorb disproportionate resources if this focus is lost.”
“14. Knowing and approving of the contents of one's will is traditional language for saying that the will “represented [one's] testamentary intentions” see per Chadwick LJ in Fuller v Strum[2002] 1 WLR 1097 , para 59. The proposition that Mrs Gill knew and approved of the contents of the will appears, at first sight, very hard indeed to resist. As a matter of common sense and authority, the fact that a will has been properly executed, after being prepared by a solicitor and read over to the testatrix, raises a very strong presumption that it represents the testatrix's intentions at the relevant time, namely the moment she executes the will. 15. In Fulton v Andrew (1875) LR 7 HL 448 , 469, Lord Hatherley said that “when you are once satisfied that a testator of a competent mind has had his will read over to him, and has thereupon executed it … those circumstances afford very grave and strong presumption that the will has been duly and properly executed by the testator …”
“When all is dark, it is dangerous for a court to claim that it can see the light.”
“Then in their will we are named as executors”
“And then we just need to change the executors of the will, whoever you want that to be mum x”
“You’ve got your tens of thousands of pounds from her. And your fucking blinds”
“No … I’ve told him what you’ve both had … and he works it out from there”
“Abraham” was always spelt “abraham”
“All I’m doing is everything possible to make it as easy for you and [Henrietta] as I possibly can, alright? The money’s left to you; got Simon having POA you know what more do you want.”
“and then that 30,000 would be invested in your and Henrietta’s name, there’s all sorts of things I’m sorting out alright, you’re not going to be left destitute Tom, you won’t. Entirely up to you how you spend it …”
“Of course she would have read through it – I would have thought. I don’t recall seeing her read through it”
“… neither she nor I noticed it”, and he replied “She told me there was a misspelling. I don’t know why I didn’t mention it”
“Tom and Henrietta had been pressuring Jo about her will, and she had resolved to do things “her way”, as can be seen from the WhatsApp exchange. Jo said “I cancelled Tom coming over yesterday . . . I wanted you both to listen to my wishes . . . I’m doing it my way now.”
“Jo did not respond to Henrietta’s offer of help, and as far as I know she never discussed the provisions of the 2019 Will with either Tom or Henrietta. She told me what she wanted the new will to do, and I downloaded a template from the internet to work from. I emailed and posted the draft to her on6 August 2019 .”
“3. Immediately after I drafted the will, I read it to Jo over the telephone, and she was happy with the content. Again, the provisions were so simple it would be difficult for her to misunderstand what the effect of the will would be. 4. I have admitted that I was in Jo's house at the time the will was executed, but I was not in the same room at the time it was signed and witnessed … 5. I have also admitted that I mis-spelt Louise as "Lousie" in the will. I am dyslexic and prone to making spelling mistakes. Jo’s name is not part of the operative wording of the will and would not necessarily have been spotted by her when she read it through.”
“I need to work out sensibly what we are going to do, how we’re gonna work out what to do with the money I’ve got, because I don’t want any other fucker to have it other than you two, alright? …”
“There must be a reasonable basis for some hypothesis in the evidence or the inherent probabilities, before a court can draw useful inferences from a party's failure to rebut it. For my part I would adopt, with a modification which I shall come to, the more balanced view expressed by Lord Lowry with the support of the rest of the committee in R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex p TC Coombs & Co[1991] 2 AC 283 , 300: “In our legal system generally, the silence of one party in face of the other party's evidence may convert that evidence into proof in relation to matters which are, or are likely to be, within the knowledge of the silent party and about which that party could be expected to give evidence. Thus, depending on the circumstances, a prima facie case may become a strong or even an overwhelming case. But, if the silent party's failure to give evidence (or to give the necessary evidence) can be credibly explained, even if not entirely justified, the effect of his silence in favour of the other party may be either reduced or nullified.” “In our legal system generally, the silence of one party in face of the other party's evidence may convert that evidence into proof in relation to matters which are, or are likely to be, within the knowledge of the silent party and about which that party could be expected to give evidence. Thus, depending on the circumstances, a prima facie case may become a strong or even an overwhelming case. But, if the silent party's failure to give evidence (or to give the necessary evidence) can be credibly explained, even if not entirely justified, the effect of his silence in favour of the other party may be either reduced or nullified.”
"… a court should be very slow to find that a will does not represent the genuine wishes of the testatrix simply because its terms are surprising, inconsistent with what she said during her lifetime, unfair, or even vindictive or perverse"
“it is knowledge and approval of the actual will that count: not knowledge and approval of other potential dispositions. Testamentary capacity includes the ability to make choices, whereas knowledge and approval requires no more than the ability to understand and approve choices that have already been made” 263.4. The proponent of the will bears the burden of proof. The scale is a sliding one (see WSM paragraph 10-30) depending on the factors at play and the time-honoured phrase the extent to which the suspicion of the court has been excited. The proponent must simply provide sufficient evidence of knowledge and approval to address any suspicion aroused by the circumstances of its execution. Fuller v Strum[2002] 1 WLR 1097 per Chadwick LJ at paragraphs 67-72. 263.5. Once the suspicion of the court is aroused the court is ‘vigilant and jealous’ in examining the evidence in support of the will. – see Fuller v Strum[2002] 1 WLR 1097 , Peter Gibson LJ 1107E-F. 263.6. Where a party writes a will under which they take a benefit that is a circumstance that excites the suspicion of the court – see WMS paragraph 10-34. 263.7. The matters which arouse suspicion include the beneficiary preparing the Will, the deceased being without legal advice, the Will being a radical departure from previous instructions and the Testator ‘feebleness of body or mind’ – WMS paragraph 10-36. 263.8. The approach of the court is an objective analysis of the evidence. 263.9. The fact that the effect of a will is to exclude entirely the deceased’s children is not sufficient in itself to overturn knowledge and approval, even if there is clear evidence of a strong relationship and other concerning factors about the will’s execution: Sherrington at paragraph 74 and McCabe v McCabe[2015] EWHC 1591 (Ch) , but each case will depend on its own facts. 263.10. In the case of Reeves v Drew[2022] EWHC 153 (Ch) there being no adequate explanation for a dramatic change in testamentary wishes was an important factor in the court not being satisfied that the Deceased knew and approved of the terms of the last Will (paragraphs 367 – 379, 406, 413). The explanations put forward were analysed and rejected by the court. 263.11. Typographical errors and sloppy drafting are not necessarily significant, even where the deceased was an experienced solicitor: Sherrington at paragraph 76. 263.12. Mr Wasitell relied on Re R (Deceased)[1950] P 10 as authority for the proposition that relevant matters which may “excite the suspicions of the Court” and require satisfaction by contrary evidence must be circumstances attending or at least relevant to the preparation and execution of the will itself; matters extraneous to the preparation and execution of the will cannot “conceivably be admissible in evidence on the issue whether the deceased knew and approved of the contents of the will”