“15. … The conditions (1) An application to register a trade mark must satisfy three conditions for the purposes of Article 2: (i) there must be a sign; (ii) it must be capable of graphical representation; (iii) it must be capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings. Purpose (2) The purpose of the requirements is to prevent abuse of trade mark law in order to obtain an unfair competitive advantage. Identification (3) Identification requirements for entry of a trade mark on the public register of trade marks include clarity, intelligibility, specificity, precision, accessibility, uniformity, self-containment and objectivity. Multitude of forms (4) The identification requirements are not satisfied, if the mark could take on a multitude of different appearances, which would create problems for registration of the mark and give an unfair competitive advantage over competitors. … Colour without form/in a multitude of forms (8) Those requirements are not met by the mere juxtaposition of colours without shape or contours, or by reference to colours in every conceivable form, so that the consumer would not be able to recall or repeat with certainty the experience of a purchase. The scope of protection afforded by such a mark would be unknown both to the competent authorities responsible for maintaining the register and to economic competitors. Registration would confer unfair competitive advantages on the proprietor of the mark”
“In brief, the description of the mark as including not just the colour purple as a sign, but other signs, in which the colour purple predominates over other colours and other matter, means that the mark described is not “a sign”
“it might be possible to achieve certainty by spelling that out in the registration application. It could have read: ‘applied to the whole visible surface, or to more than 50% of the area of the visible surface of the packaging of the goods’”
“[t]he mark consists of a transparent bin…forming part of the external surface of a vacuum cleaner as shown in the representation”
“[t]he colour orange is applied to the top of the housing of the chain saw and the colour grey is applied to the bottom of the housing of the chain saw”), the CJEU found that the differences between chainsaw housings as regards their external appearance consisted of “variations of design” which “do not preclude it remaining possible for the consumer to identify a single object” (at [37]). Furthermore, the description of the mark placed “a greater limit on the shapes which the chainsaw housing may take”
“[t]here are other marks where the degree of permissible variation is going to be very small indeed, if not practically non-existent. It may well prove easier to justify permissible variation where the variation occurs in the actual use made of the mark, so that it can be seen and/or proved that the public see the same mark”
“[c]onsider the way Adidas use their three stripe mark on, say, track-suit trousers. They vary the position and relative length of the stripes, yet it is reasonable to assume that the public see the same mark”
“The decisive factor for the scope of protection of the mark is not the categorisation of the sign in question as a figurative, three-dimensional or position sign, but the way in which the mark will be perceived by the relevant public in relation to the goods concerned”
“[g]iven that the descriptions are to be read together with the figure…[the court] is entitled to say, well it does not matter that they are not dotted”
“The mark comprises three stripes applied on a cap visor, as shown in the illustration, the shape of the cap as such does not form part of the mark”
“The tribunal must consider whether the applicant has proved that a significant proportion of the relevant class of persons perceive the goods or services designated exclusively by the mark applied for, as opposed to any other mark which might also be present, as originating from a particular undertaking. In short, the mark itself must be seen as a badge of origin”
“40. …First, for a trade mark to possess distinctive character, it must serve to identify the goods or services in respect of which registration is applied for as originating from a particular undertaking and thus to distinguish the goods or services from those of other undertakings… 41. Secondly, the distinctive character of a trade mark must be assessed by reference to (i) the goods or services in respect of which registration is applied for and (ii) the perception of the average consumer of those goods or services, who is deemed to be reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect… 42. Thirdly, the criteria for assessment of distinctive character are the same for all categories of trade marks, but nevertheless the perception of the relevant public is not the same for all categories of trade marks and it may therefore be more difficult to establish distinctive character in relation to some categories (such as shapes, colours, personal names, advertising slogans and surface treatments) than others… 43. Fourthly, in assessing whether a trade mark has acquired a distinctive character the competent authority must make an overall assessment of the relevant evidence, which in addition to the nature of the mark may include (i) the market share held by goods bearing the mark, (ii) how intensive, geographically widespread and long-standing the use of the mark has been, (iii) the amount invested by the proprietor in promoting the mark, (iv) the proportion of the relevant class of persons who, because of the mark, identify the goods or services as emanating from the proprietor, (v) evidence from trade and professional associations and (vi) (where the competent authority has particular difficulty in assessing the distinctive character) an opinion poll. If the relevant class of persons, or at least a significant proportion of them, identifies goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking because of the trade mark, it has acquired a distinctive character… 44. Fifthly, with regard to the acquisition of distinctive character through use, the identification by the relevant class of persons of the product or service as originating from a given undertaking must be as a result of the use of the mark as a trade mark. The expression "use of the mark as a trade mark" refers solely to use of the mark for the purposes of the identification, by the relevant class of persons, of the product as originating from a given undertaking… 45. Sixthly, a trade mark may acquire a distinctive character in consequence of the use of that mark as part or in conjunction with another trade mark (which may itself be a registered trade mark)…”
“(1) Genuine use means actual use of the trade mark by the proprietor or by a third party with authority to use the mark… (2) The use must be more than merely token, that is to say, serving solely to preserve the rights conferred by the registration of the mark… (3) The use must be consistent with the essential function of a trade mark, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services to the consumer or end user by enabling him to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another origin… (4) Use of the mark must relate to goods or services which are already marketed or which are about to be marketed and for which preparations to secure customers are under way, particularly in the form of advertising campaigns… Internal use by the proprietor does not suffice… Nor does the distribution of promotional items as a reward for the purchase of other goods and to encourage the sale of the latter… But use by a non-profit making association can constitute genuine use… (5) The use must be by way of real commercial exploitation of the mark on the market for the relevant goods or services, that is to say, use in accordance with the commercial raison d'être of the mark, which is to create or preserve an outlet for the goods or services that bear the mark… (6) All the relevant facts and circumstances must be taken into account in determining whether there is real commercial exploitation of the mark, including: (a) whether such use is viewed as warranted in the economic sector concerned to maintain or create a share in the market for the goods and services in question; (b) the nature of the goods or services; (c) the characteristics of the market concerned; (d) the scale and frequency of use of the mark; (e) whether the mark is used for the purpose of marketing all the goods and services covered by the mark or just some of them; (f) the evidence that the proprietor is able to provide; and (g) the territorial extent of the use… (7) Use of the mark need not always be quantitatively significant for it to be deemed genuine. Even minimal use may qualify as genuine use if it is deemed to be justified in the economic sector concerned for the purpose of creating or preserving market share for the relevant goods or services. For example, use of the mark by a single client which imports the relevant goods can be sufficient to demonstrate that such use is genuine, if it appears that the import operation has a genuine commercial justification for the proprietor. Thus there is no de minimis rule… (8) It is not the case that every proven commercial use of the mark may automatically be deemed to constitute genuine use…”
“245. First, it is necessary to identify the goods or services in relation to which the mark has been used during the relevant period. 246. Secondly, the goods or services for which the mark is registered must be considered. If the mark is registered for a category of goods or services which is sufficiently broad that it is possible to identify within it a number of subcategories capable of being viewed independently, use of the mark in relation to one or more of the subcategories will not constitute use of the mark in relation to all of the other subcategories. 247. Thirdly, it is not possible for a proprietor to use the mark in relation to all possible variations of a product or service. So care must be taken to ensure this exercise does not result in the proprietor being stripped of protection for goods or services which, though not the same as those for which use has been proved, are not in essence different from them and cannot be distinguished from them other than in an arbitrary way. 248. Fourthly, these issues are to be considered having regard to the perception of the average consumer and the purpose and intended use of the products or services in issue. Ultimately it is the task of the tribunal to arrive at a fair specification of goods or services having regard to the use which has been made of the mark.”
“T-shirts (including long sleeved, short sleeved and cropped); football shirts; rugby shirts; polo shirts; leotards sweat shirts; hooded tops; drill tops; jerseys; rain jackets; insulated jackets; hooded jackets; wind breakers; crop jackets; track suit tops; bodysuits; satin shirts; all the aforementioned being sleeved, upper garments”
“…The current version of this summary is as follows: “(a) the likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all relevant factors; (b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods or services in question, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant, but who rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has kept in his mind, and whose attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question; (c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details; (d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must normally be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components, but it is only when all other components of a complex mark are negligible that it is permissible to make the comparison solely on the basis of the dominant elements; (e) nevertheless, the overall impression conveyed to the public by a composite trade mark may, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components; (f) and beyond the usual case, where the overall impression created by a mark depends heavily on the dominant features of the mark, it is quite possible that in a particular case an element corresponding to an earlier trade mark may retain an independent distinctive role in a composite mark, without necessarily constituting a dominant element of that mark; (g) a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa; (h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that has been made of it; (i) mere association, in the strict sense that the later mark brings the earlier mark to mind, is not sufficient; (j) the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in the strict sense; and (k) if the association between the marks creates a risk that the public might believe that the respective goods or services come from the same or economically-linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion.”
“Oooooo you acting up!!!! Not the 3 stripes on that (I can’t remember the name) fabric. You gotta be one of the best to do “it”” – I agree with TB that this appears literally to be saying that the TB garment is “Not the 3 stripes”
“Your style is absolutely recognisable and non-trivial 👌 I don’t understand Adidas when they told that you use their symbols”
“Adidas invented something similar this year 😆👏👏👏👏👏.”
““L move by Adidas”, a comment which appears to be indicating a “Lame” (or bad) move by adidas, as Mr Scott confirmed in his evidence – a reference which would appear most likely to be to the New York Proceedings brought by adidas. I do not consider it likely that, as adidas submits, this commentator considered that adidas was responsible for the garments shown in the photographs; (ii) a post with 7,783 likes, showing various photos of models in grey TB suiting. The comment dated January 2023 from novotell.kz is: “Adidas 🔥🔥🔥”
“What will ADIDAS say???hahaha”
““Thom Browne just copy of Y-3 with extra lines. #JustSaying 😏 😏”
“i) The more immediately and strongly the trade mark is brought to mind by the sign, the greater the likelihood that the current or future use of the sign is detrimental to the distinctive character of the mark: [67]. ii) The stronger the earlier mark’s distinctive character and reputation, the easier it will be to accept that detriment has been caused to it: [69]. iii) The existence of a link between the sign and the mark does not dispense the trade mark proprietor from having to prove actual and present injury to its mark, or a serious likelihood that such an injury will occur in the future: [71]. iv) The more “unique” the trade mark, the greater the likelihood that use of a later identical or similar mark will be detrimental to its distinctive character: [74]. v) Detriment to the distinctive character of the trade mark is caused when the mark’s ability to identify the goods or services for which it is registered and used as coming from the proprietor is weakened. It follows that proof that the use of the sign is or would be detrimental to the distinctive character of the earlier mark requires evidence of a change in the economic behaviour of the average consumer of the goods or services for which the mark is registered consequent on the use of the sign, or a serious likelihood that such a change will occur in the future: [77].”
“41. As regards the concept of ‘taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark’, also referred to as ‘parasitism’ or ‘free-riding’, that concept relates not to the detriment caused to the mark but to the advantage taken by the third party as a result of the use of the identical or similar sign. It covers, in particular, cases where, by reason of a transfer of the image of the mark or of the characteristics which it projects to the goods identified by the identical or similar sign, there is clear exploitation on the coat-tails of the mark with a reputation. ... 44. In order to determine whether the use of a sign takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the mark, it is necessary to undertake a global assessment, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, which include the strength of the mark’s reputation and the degree of distinctive character of the mark, the degree of similarity between the marks at issue and the nature and degree of proximity of the goods or services concerned. As regards the strength of the reputation and the degree of distinctive character of the mark, the Court has already held that, the stronger that mark’s distinctive character and reputation are, the easier it will be to accept that detriment has been caused to it. It is also clear from the case-law that, the more immediately and strongly the mark is brought to mind by the sign, the greater the likelihood that the current or future use of the sign is taking, or will take, unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the mark or is, or will be, detrimental to them (see, to that effect, Intel Corporation, paragraphs 67 to 69). 45. In addition, it must be stated that any such global assessment may also take into account, where necessary, the fact that there is a likelihood of dilution or tarnishment of the mark. ... 49. In that regard, where a third party attempts, through the use of a sign similar to a mark with a reputation, to ride on the coat-tails of that mark in order to benefit from its power of attraction, its reputation and its prestige, and to exploit, without paying any financial compensation and without being required to make efforts of his own in that regard, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of that mark in order to create and maintain the image of that mark, the advantage resulting from such use must be considered to be an advantage that has been unfairly taken of the distinctive character or the repute of that mark.”
“Although your Lordships were referred in the course of the argument to a large number of reported cases, this is not a branch of the law in which reference to other cases is of any real assistance except analogically. It has been observed more than once that the questions which arise are, in general, questions of fact. Neither the appellants nor the respondents contend that the principles of law are in any doubt. The law of passing off can be summarised in one short general proposition — no man may pass off his goods as those of another. More specifically, it may be expressed in terms of the elements which the plaintiff in such an action has to prove in order to succeed. These are three in number. First, he must establish a goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or services which he supplies in the mind of the purchasing public by association with the identifying ‘get- up’ (whether it consists simply of a brand name or a trade description, or the individual features of labelling or packaging) under which his particular goods or services are offered to the public, such that the get-up is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of the plaintiff’s goods or services. Secondly, he must demonstrate a misrepresentation by the defendant to the public (whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that goods or services offered by him are the goods or services of the plaintiff. Whether the public is aware of the plaintiff’s identity as the manufacturer or supplier of the goods or services is immaterial, as long as they are identified with a particular source which is in fact the plaintiff. For example, if the public is accustomed to rely upon a particular brand name in purchasing goods of a particular description, it matters not at all that there is little or no public awareness of the identity of the proprietor of the brand name. Thirdly, he must demonstrate that he suffers or, in a quia timet action, that he is likely to suffer damage by reason of the erroneous belief engendered by the defendant's misrepresentation that the source of the defendant's goods or services is the same as the source of those offered by the plaintiff.”
“[t]he claimant must show that it has a significant goodwill, in the form of customers, in the jurisdiction”