“— A ‘potential serious risk to public health’ is defined as a situation where there is a significant probability that a serious hazard resulting from a human medicinal product in the context of its proposed use will affect public health. — ‘Serious’, in this context, means a hazard that could result in death, could be life-threatening, could result in patient hospitalisation or prolongation of existing hospitalisation, could result in persistent or significant disability or incapacity, or could be a congenital anomaly/birth defect or permanent or prolonged signs in exposed humans. … Therefore, a potential serious risk to public health in relation to a particular medicinal product can mainly be considered to exist under the following circumstances: — Efficacy: the data submitted to support therapeutic efficacy in the proposed indication(s), target population(s), and proposed dosing regimen (as defined by the proposed labelling), do not provide sound scientific justification for the claims for efficacy; adequate proof for bioequivalence demonstrated by generic medicinal products to the reference medicinal product is lacking. ….”
“a medicinal product which has the same qualitative and quantitative composition in active substances and the same pharmaceutical form as the reference medicinal product, and whose bioequivalence with the reference medicinal product has been demonstrated by appropriate bioavailability studies. ...”
“In cases where the medicinal product does not fall within the definition of a generic medicinal product as provided in paragraph 2(b) or where the bioequivalence cannot be demonstrated through bioavailability studies or in case of changes in the active substance(s), therapeutic indications, strength, pharmaceutical form or route of administration, vis-àvis the reference medicinal product, the results of the appropriate pre-clinical tests or clinical trials shall be provided.”
“Locally acting products are products which are applied locally and are assumed to exert their effect at the site of the application. Examples are … inhalatory products like powders or aerosols for inhalation … It is necessary to show for locally acting products that the product to be approved (either a generic or a reformulated product) is therapeutically equivalent to the product already approved (based on a full dossier). In order to demonstrate therapeutic equivalence, clinical trials are in principle necessary, but other models may be used. For this purpose, depending on the situation, human pharmacodynamic studies, local availability studies, animal studies or in vitro can be used, provided that all studies used are adequately validated and adequate justification is given for the absence of data.”
“The airway in the younger child differs from the airway in the adult and the amount of dose of an inhaled drug reaching the lower airway in an infant and in a young child will differ from the amount which would reach the lower airway in an adult. The child displays different breathing patterns and has differing tidal volumes, airway geometry, etc compared with adults. …. The characteristics of the delivery device may be such that the device is more difficult for a child to use than it is for an adult and therefore the child is less able to use the device correctly, or the child may use the device differently from an adult. Such differences in the handling of the product by a child may result in a changed risk/benefit relationship in the child compared with that seen in the adult. Examples include the following: … ● The internal resistance of the DPI may be such that a child will find the inhaler more difficult to use than would an adult. Therefore when comparing two DPIs which may be equivalent in adults, equivalence may not be demonstrated in children who inhale with a lower PIF [peak inspiratory flow].” ● The internal resistance of the DPI may be such that a child will find the inhaler more difficult to use than would an adult. Therefore when comparing two DPIs which may be equivalent in adults, equivalence may not be demonstrated in children who inhale with a lower PIF [peak inspiratory flow].”
“Patient materials may include alert cards for patients to carry, leaflets about the disease and the treatment or additional advice on how to take the medicine, for example a video showing how the product is prepared and administered. The materials should be factual and promotional claims must not be included. Consideration should always be given to whether this information can be included in the patient information leaflet which accompanies all medicines.”
“You should take account of the clinical guidelines published by the: a NICE (England) b Scottish Medicines Consortium and Health Improvement Scotland (including the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network) (Scotland) c Department for Health, Social Services and Public Safety (Northern Ireland) d All-Wales Medicines Strategy Group (Wales) e medical royal colleges and other authoritative sources of specialty specific clinical guidelines.” of specialty specific clinical guidelines.”
“68. You should usually prescribe licensed medicines in accordance with the terms of their licence. However, youmay prescribe unlicensed medicines where, on the basis of an assessment of the individual patient, you conclude, for medical reasons, that it is necessary to do so to meet the specific needs of the patient. 69. Prescribing unlicensed medicines may be necessary where: (a) There is no suitably licensed medicine that will meet the patient’s need. … (b) Or where a suitably licensed medicine that would meet the patient’s need is not available. … 70. When prescribing an unlicensed medicine you must: (a) be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence or experience of using the medicine to demonstrate its safety and efficacy (b) take responsibility for prescribing the medicine and for overseeing the patient’s care, monitoring, and any follow up treatment, or ensure that arrangements are made for another suitable doctor to do so (c) make a clear, accurate and legible record of all medicines prescribed and, where you are not following common practice, your reasons for prescribing an unlicensed medicine. 71. You must give patients (or their parents or carers) sufficient information about the medicines you propose to prescribe to allow them to make an informed decision. … 73 If you intend to prescribe unlicensed medicines where that is not routine or if there are suitably licensed alternatives available, you should explain this to the patient, and your reasons for doing so.”. (a) There is no suitably licensed medicine that will meet the patient’s need. … (b) Or where a suitably licensed medicine that would meet the patient’s need is not available. … (a) be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence or experience of using the medicine to demonstrate its safety and efficacy (b) take responsibility for prescribing the medicine and for overseeing the patient’s care, monitoring, and any follow up treatment, or ensure that arrangements are made for another suitable doctor to do so (c) make a clear, accurate and legible record of all medicines prescribed and, where you are not following common practice, your reasons for prescribing an unlicensed medicine. 73 If you intend to prescribe unlicensed medicines where that is not routine or if there are suitably licensed alternatives available, you should explain this to the patient, and your reasons for doing so.”
“a chronic disease characterised by recurrent attacks of breathlessness and wheezing, which vary in severity and frequency from person to person … During an asthma attack, the lining of the bronchial tubes swell, causing the airways to narrow and reducing the flow of air into and out of the lungs.”
“not one single disease but an umbrella term used to describe chronic lung diseases that cause limitations in lung airflow. The more familiar terms ‘chronic bronchitis’ and ‘emphysema’ are no longer used but are now included within the COPD diagnosis. The most common symptoms of COPD are breathlessness, or a ‘need for air’, excessive sputum production, and a chronic cough. However, COPD is not just simply a ‘smoker's cough’, but an under-diagnosed, life threatening lung disease that may progressively lead to death.”
“There is a significant continuing growth in the number of combination inhalers in the UK respiratory market. There is a significant chance that a generic prescription for a combination inhaler can result in the patient getting different devices on different occasions. Unfamiliar devices can result in poor adherence and sub-optimal treatment. The only way for a prescriber to make sure that the patient gets the specific inhaler product that they intended, is by specifying it by brand and device name. For example, if budesonide/formoterol is prescribed this could result in the Symbicort Turbohaler or DuoResp Spiromax being dispensed. These are different devices even though the drug components are the same. There are differences in licensed indications, e.g. Seretide Evohaler & Symbicort Turbohaler are an option for 12 years and over (all strengths). SirDupla pMDI & DuoResp Spiromax is an option for 18 years and over (both strengths). There are differences in strengths available e.g. SirDupla and DuoResp don’t currently have the lower strengths. DuoResp is available in 200/6 & 400/12 and SirDupla is available in 125/25 & 250/25. There may be compatibility issues with spacers e.g. Seretide is to be used with a Volumatic or an Aerochamber Plus; SirDupla is compatible with an Aerochamber Plus only. When a combination inhaler is considered an appropriate option, NICE guidance recommends taking into account patient preference as well as cost. Combination inhalers are commonly category C in the drug tariff, so if the more cost effective inhaler is chosen by the patient & practitioner then savings will be seen every time it is prescribed by brand name.”
“My daily asthma routine My preventer inhaler (insert name/colour): …. I need to take my preventer inhaler every day even when I feel well … My reliever inhaler (insert name/colour): …. I take my reliever inhaler only if I need to”
“Take one puff of your reliever inhaler (usually blue) every 30-60 seconds, up to a maximum of 10 puffs.”
“Information received through the NPA’s patient safety incident reporting system has identified incorrect dispensing of inhalers against generically written prescriptions as a common issue.
“The licensed indications for inhalers vary and some may only be licensed for patients over a particular age – individual Summaries of Product Characteristics (SPCs) should be referred to when dispensing an inhaler on a prescription to ensure that it is licensed for the patient’s age and indication. For example, AirFluSal® Forspiro® (salmeterol 50mcg/ fluticasone 500mcg) is only licensed for use in adults aged 18 years of age and older.”
“● The Applicant must define carefully the population of patients with asthma for whom this high strength would be prescribed within the Summary of Product Characteristics, Section 4.1 Therapeutic Indications within the Summary of Product Characteristics, Section 4.1 Therapeutic Indications ● The Applicant will have to state clearly in the SmPC that this fixed-dose combination cannot be used in any of the situations and patient groups listed above and that in order to down titrate the dose of the inhaled corticosteroid component to attain the minimally effective dose to control asthma, a change to an alternative fixed-dose combination of salmeterol … and fluticasone…. will be required.”
“AirFluSal Forspiro should not be used in patients with mild or mild to moderate asthma. AirFluSal Forspiro should not be used as initial maintenance therapy in adults and adolescents with moderate persistent asthma. AirFluSal Forspiro should not be used in children and adolescents less than 18 years of age with asthma.”
“In asthma patients, the dose should always be titrated to the lowest dose at which effective control of symptoms is maintained. To Note: AirFluSal Forspiro is available in the strength of 50 micrograms of salmeterol and 500 micrograms of fluticasone … per metered dose only. Therefore, when it is appropriate to titrate down to a lower strength than is available for AirFluSal Forspiro, a change to an alternative fixed dose combination product of salmeterol and fluticasone … containing a lower dose of the inhaled corticosteroid is required.” 119.Dr Russell’s statement explained at pages 5-6 how asthma is managed in the UK. Having made the point that “[c]linicians understand that the goals of therapy change depending on the severity of the disease”, he went on to say (references omitted): “The decision to step-down therapy will be based on the perceived risk-benefit for each patient. There is a cohort of severe patients in who[m] due to the high disease burden and the continued symptoms, stepping down is difficult to achieve … Consistency of therapy and regular use in an effective device is more important … ”
“To add a new therapeutic indication ‘asthma’ for the medicinal product. Consequently, the PIL and sections 3, 4.1., 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.8, 4.9, 5.1 & 5.2 of the SmPC have been updated.”
“AirFluSal Forspiro is for use in patients with severe asthma only.”
“Colour coding of devices In many cases, drug classes will be identified by the colour of the inhaler. The colour-coding is as follows: - Blue: short acting b2 agonist (‘reliever’); - Brown/orange/burgundy: corticosteroid (‘preventer’); - Green: long-acting b2 agonist; - Purple: long-acting b2 agonist/corticosteroid combination.”
“There is no consistent use of color to reference product type – short acting versus long acting or bronchodilators versus inhaled corticosteroids. While some markets seem to have certain color connotations (i.e. blue = short acting rescue inhaler in the UK), there are no longer clear standards in terms of color usage. Where in the past there were more general color guidelines (blue for short acting and brown for controller medications) the proliferation of newer types of drug products (and combinations) have led to a ‘blurring’ around the communication of color on the device in relation to drug type/class. That said, there are some colors that currently are represented by a single drug type/class – deep orange (ICS), beige/brown (ICS), purple (ICS + LABA), deep green (SAMA), light green (LAMA).” “There is no consistent use of color to reference product type – short acting versus long acting or bronchodilators versus inhaled corticosteroids. While some markets seem to have certain color connotations (i.e. blue = short acting rescue inhaler in the UK), there are no longer clear standards in terms of color usage. Where in the past there were more general color guidelines (blue for short acting and brown for controller medications) the proliferation of newer types of drug products (and combinations) have led to a ‘blurring’ around the communication of color on the device in relation to drug type/class. That said, there are some colors that currently are represented by a single drug type/class – deep orange (ICS), beige/brown (ICS), purple (ICS + LABA), deep green (SAMA), light green (LAMA).”
“A particular color can be representative of a particular brand – this is most clearly seen with GSK’s Advair [the US brand name for Seretide] with their Diskus [Accuhaler] and MDI devices. Advair probably has the strongest brand association with a particular color (purple) in the inhalation device space.”
“Innovative pack design that may incorporate the judicious use of colour is to be encouraged to ensure accurate identification of the medicine. … The primary aim of innovative design of packaging is to aid in the identification and selection of the medicine.”
“The law of passing off can be summarised in one short general proposition – no man may pass off his goods as those of another. More specifically, it may be expressed in terms of the elements which the plaintiff in such an action has to prove in order to succeed. These are three in number. First, he must establish a goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or services which he supplies in the mind of the purchasing public by association with the identifying ‘get-up’ (whether it consists simply of a brand name or trade description, or the individual features of labelling or packaging) under which his particular goods or services are offered to the public, such that the get-up is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of the plaintiff’s goods or services. Secondly, he must demonstrate a misrepresentation by the defendant to the public (whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that goods or services offered by him are the goods and services of the plaintiff. Whether the public is aware of the plaintiff’s identity as the manufacturer or supplier of the goods or services is immaterial, as long as they are identified with a particular source which is in fact the plaintiff. For example, if the public is accustomed to rely upon a particular brand name in purchasing goods of a particular description, it matters not at all that there is a little or no public awareness of the identity of the proprietor of the brand name. Thirdly, he must demonstrate that he suffers, or, in a quia timet action, that he is likely to suffer damage by reason of the erroneous belief engendered by the defendant’s misrepresentation that the source of the defendant’s goods or services is the same as the source of those offered by the plaintiff.”
“I turn to consider the law and begin by identifying what is not the law. There is no tort of copying. There is no tort of taking a man's market or customers. Neither the market nor the customers are the plaintiff's to own. There is no tort of making use of another's goodwill as such. There is no tort of competition. … At the heart of passing off lies deception or its likelihood, deception of the ultimate consumer in particular. Over the years passing off has developed from the classic case of the defendant selling his goods as and for those of the plaintiff to cover other kinds of deception, e.g. that the defendant's goods are the same as those of the plaintiff when they are not, e.g.CombeInternationalLtdv.Scholl(UK)Ltd [1980] R.P.C.1; or that the defendant's goods are the same as goods sold by a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member when they are not, e.g. ErvenWarninkBeslotenVennootschapv.J.Townend & Sons(Hull)Ltd [19 79] A.C.29(the Advocaat case). Never has the tort shown even a slight tendency to stray beyond cases of deception. Were it to do so it would enter the field of honest competition, declared unlawful for some reason other than deceptiveness. Why there should be any such reason I cannot imagine. It would serve only to stifle competition. The foundation of the plaintiff's case here must therefore lie in deception…”
“The judge must consider the evidence adduced and use his own common sense and his own opinion as to the likelihood of deception. It is an overall ‘jury’ assessment involving a combination of all these factors, see ‘GE’ Trade Mark [1973] R.P.C. 297 at page 321. Ultimately the question is one for the court, not for the witnesses. It follows that if the judge's own opinion is that the case is marginal, one where he cannot be sure whether there is a likelihood of sufficient deception, the case will fail in the absence of enough evidence of the likelihood of deception. But if that opinion of the judge is supplemented by such evidence then it will succeed. And even if one's own opinion is that deception is unlikely though possible, convincing evidence of deception will carry the day. The Jif lemon case (Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc. [1990] R.P.C. 341) is a recent example where overwhelming evidence of deception had that effect. It was certainly my experience in practice that my own view as to the likelihood of deception was not always reliable. As I grew more experienced I said more and more ‘it depends on the evidence.’”
“The plaintiff’s problem of proof when there is no manifest badge of trade origin such as a trade mark becomes hard. This is so in the case of a descriptive or semi-descriptive word such as ‘camel hair’. It is perhaps even more so where one is concerned simply with the appearance of the article with no self-evident trade origin frill or embellishment. For people are likely to buy the article because of what it is, not in relianceon any belief of any particular trade origin. This is so whether they buy it for its eye-appeal (e.g. glass dogs) or for what it does (e.g. the copy Rubik cube… The plaintiff’s problem of proof lies in relation to the first two items of the trinity, which are related. It is not good enough for him to show that his article is widely recognised – has a ‘reputation’ in that general sense. … I believe that [Learned Hand J in Crescent Tool Co v Kilborn & Bishop Co (1917) 247 F 290 at 300-301] exactly encapsulates what must be shown when the plaintiff is complaining, in a passing off action, about a copy of his product as such. Is the public ‘moved to buy by source?’ It is, I think, because the difficulties of proof are so great that successful cases of passing off based on the shape of goods are so rare.”
“It is recognised that it is more difficult to acquire a sufficient reputation and goodwill in the shape or get-up of a product. Whilst the principal function of a brand name is to denote origin, the shape and get-up of a product are not normally chosen for such a purpose. A member of the public seeing a product which looks identical to another (a red cricket ball is an example) does not necessarily, or even normally, conclude that they come from the same source. The claimant must prove that the shape of its goods has come to denote a particular source to the relevant public...”
“The case for the plaintiffs can really be put thus simply: a potential customer will go into a shop and will ask for a packet of ‘reds’, meaning thereby a packet of Rizla ‘reds’ and the shopkeeper may supply him with a packet of Swan ‘reds’ and he may not notice the difference. As I have already said, that, I think, is just about conceivable. But it must be borne in mind first of all that it is by no means certain that when the customer asked for ‘reds’ he wants Rizla ‘reds’. Up to the moment, he has had no opportunity in practical terms of obtaining any product other than a Rizla product. Therefore, in a sense, the manufacturer of the product has become, so far as he is concerned, an irrelevance, just like going to the post office one cannot get any other products than those which are made by the firm that supplies the perquisites therefor. But quite clearly what he does mean is that he wants a paper of a particular specification, a medium one in the case of the red packet.”
“Before turning to the evidence I would make one general observation. It was the Reverend Wm. Paley who said in Natural Theology (1784), ch. i: ‘The watch must have a maker.’ In that sense every manufactured article conveys a representation — that it had a maker. Now where an article has a readily distinguishable appearance and there has only been one maker, once the article becomes well-known in the market, consumers when they see an article like that may assume that it is made by the same maker as he who made the articles of that individual appearance which they have seen before. So, in the instant case, almost all those who casually saw the Flo'Tair cushion (or just a picture of it) reacted by saying, ‘That is a Roho’. One more precisely said, ‘That is a Roho or a convincing copy.’ This sort of evidence alone can seldom, if ever, satisfy the legal test for passing off. It does not prove that anyone relies upon the appearance to get the product of the maker they want.”
“I do not think it has been proved that the public use the shape as a badge of trade origin. Yes, a substantial proportion recognise the product as ‘Viennetta’, a Walls product. But no, it is not shown that they recognise the shape alone as a trade mark. An acid test may be, what would happen in real life? Suppose another trader sold a product identical to ‘Viennetta’ but using his own very different word trade mark. I do not actually know what the result would be. But the most likely reaction would seem to be no more than that ‘Oh X are doing a Vienetta-like ice cream too’. …”
“77. Before assessing these rival submissions, I think it may be helpful to say a little more about a concept which is woven into the decisions of the CJEU, including the decision of the CJEU in this case, concerning the acquisition of distinctive character by an inherently non-distinctive three-dimensional shape mark such as the Trade Mark. As we have seen, the CJEU has held that it is not sufficient for the applicant to show that a significant proportion of the relevant class of persons recognise and associate the mark with the applicant’s goods. However, to a non-trade mark lawyer, the distinction between, on the one hand, such recognition and association and, on the other hand, a perception that the goods designated by the mark originate from a particular undertaking may be a rather elusive one. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between the two and, as I shall explain in a moment, it is an important one. 78. The distinction is this. We are concerned here with a mark, the three-dimensional shape of a chocolate product, that has no inherent distinctiveness. A shape of this kind is not inherently such that members of the public are likely to take it as a badge of origin in the way they would a newly coined word or a fancy name. Now assume that products in that shape have been sold on a very large scale under and by reference to a brand name which is inherently highly distinctive. Assume too that the shape has in that way become very well-known. That does not necessarily mean that the public have come to perceive the shape as a badge of origin such that they would rely upon it alone to identify the product as coming from a particular source. They might simply regard the shape as a characteristic of products of that kind or they might find it brings to mind the product and brand name with which they have become familiar. These kinds of recognition and association do not amount to distinctiveness for trade mark purposes, as the CJEU has now confirmed in its decision in this case.” product and brand name with which they have become familiar. These kinds of recognition and association do not amount to distinctiveness for trade mark purposes, as the CJEU has now confirmed in its decision in this case.”
“The question is whether the defendant’s article is offered in such a way as to lead the public to believe that it is the same as Combe’s when in fact it is admittedly different. On that issue, it seems to me that there is certainly a serious and substantial issue to be tried. Indeed, it seems to me that Combe makes out a prima facie case on the evidence which it now adduces. The actual product sold by the defendants is very similar indeed in appearance to Combe’s, and it is sold in a way which emphasises the use of charcoal (where the charcoal used is not in fact activated charcoal) and it uses as its name the words ‘Odour Destroying Cushion Insoles’, which, less prominently it is true, are the ones used by Combe in its product.”
“The case even when it comes to trial involves the outer limits of the tort of passing off. There are many products which have to confirm to some sort of regulation and those whose products do so confirm can arguably say that their quality is different from rival products that do not so conform, and that there could be accordingly a class of plaintiffs who would be damaged by a misrepresentation by a defendant that in effect he is a member of that class. The difficulty with the limits of the tort is not difficult to articulate. What is difficult is to find out precisely where the limits go. Aldous J. in SDS Biotech UK v. Power Agrichemicals (1989), [1995] F.S.R. 797, indicated on an interlocutory application that this area of law was indeed one which is arguable one way or the other. Mr Hacon pointed out some of the difficulties with the notion of a tort as wide as this: how can a plaintiff say he is really entitled to part of a goodwill, the only goodwill, when all he has done is to comply with a certain standard? And how wide does the tort go? Would it, for instance, cover a motorcar manufacturer who wrongly claimed that his car would do 110 m.p.h. in a case where he was being sued by a manufacturer whose cars would do 110 m.p.h.? Mr Hacon hinted darkly that, if I were to find against him on this point, the courts might be flooded with applications by plaintiffs whose products comply with one regulation or another against defendants whose products did not so comply. Mr Hacon's argument went so far as to say that, even if the defendants in this case expressly and deliberately lied about their product saying, for example, ‘our lenses when fitted to Hodge Clemco's helmets comply with HSE regulations’, Hodge Clemco would have no cause of action. It is not necessary for me to decide the matter one way or the other today. I can well envisage that sooner or later this question is going to come fair square before the courts.”
“It seems to me arguable that selling lenses to customers who need the products to comply with the regulations does convey to the customer, unless he is warned, a danger of the customer being misled, of the customer assuming that what he is buying he can lawfully use. It seems to me that just selling the lens may contain that representation. Looking at it from the point of view of a contract between the supplier and the customer, one could well understand a customer complaining if it turned out he could not use the product for the very purpose for which he had bought it, and for which the seller knew he was buying it. To my mind, there [is] no difference between advertising the lenses expressly saying they are ‘to suit Apollo blast helmets’ and simply selling the lenses for that purpose.”
“[Counsel for the plaintiffs] says that there can be or should be an extension of the law of passing off, taking it further than was taken in Combe International Ltd and Others v. Scholl (U.K.) Limited [1980] R.P.C. 1. In that case the plaintiff had extensively advertised its insoles as containing activated charcoal and educated the public that activated charcoal had the effect of destroying odour. The defendant put out an insole saying truly that it contained charcoal. But it was ordinary unactivated charcoal …. It was intended to deceive the public into believing that the defendant's products had the same properties as the plaintiff’s. The false representation depended upon the plaintiff's product in the market having achieved a reputation of having [certain] properties. What [counsel] says here is that the two statements complained of are in effect a statement that the Alkazyme is the same as Gigasept. He points to some advertising which has been done by the plaintiffs, …, which describes [their] product ….. He says, therefore, along the lines of Combe v. Scholl, what the defendants are doing is representing their product to be the same as the plaintiffs. I do not think that the analogy is a good one. Passing off involves not only a false representation but a false representation related to the plaintiffs' product or goodwill, not a false representation in the air. This false representation does not depend, on the plaintiffs' case, on any representation concerning the plaintiffs' product at all; it is false (if it is in fact false) not because of the plaintiffs' product or goodwill but because it is inherently false. I do not think that there is a cause of action in passing off. It follows that the plaintiffs’ claim will fail.”
“… if you are driven to the conclusion that what is intended to be done is to deceive if possible, I do not think it is stretching the imagination very much to credit the man with occasional success or possible success. Why should we be astute to say that he cannot succeed in doing that which he is straining every nerve to do?”
“It is said in this case that the Defendants intended to deceive – not that the goods were calculated even innocently to deceive – but that there was a fraudulent intention on the part of the Defendants. That is a material fact which would be weighed duly and to which doubt great weight would be attached by any Court if it were established, because no Court would be astute when they discovered an intention to deceive, in coming to the conclusion that a dishonest defendant had been unsuccessful in his fraudulent design. When once you establish the intent to deceive, it is only a short step to proving that the intent has been successful, but still it is a step even though it be a short step. To any such charge there must be, however, two conditions. The first is that it ought to be pleaded explicitly so as to give the defendant an opportunity of rebutting the accusation of intent. The second is that it must be proved by evidence.”
“… if the intention to deceive is found, it will readily be inferred that deception will result. Who knows better than the trader the mysteries of his trade?”
“… it seems to me likely that [Asda’s representatives] were, under advice, seeking to make only such changes as were needed to avoid what they judged to be an unacceptable risk of being attacked for copying while maintaining Puffin’s position as an obvious competitor and parody, and (they hoped) a ‘brand-beater’. I cannot escape the conclusion that, while aiming to avoid what the law would characterise as deception, they were taking a conscious decision to live dangerously. That is not in my judgment something that the court is bound to disregard.”
“114. Finally, I come to the ‘living dangerously’ point. Mr Mellor submitted that if a trader takes a decision to live dangerously he recognises a risk of a successful legal action and so also recognises a likelihood that his activity will deceive some people. This submission was founded upon an observation of Robert Walker J … 115. In my judgment it is important to distinguish between a defendant who takes a conscious decision to live dangerously and one who intends to cause deception and deliberately seeks to take the benefit of another trader’s goodwill. It has long been established that if it is shown that a defendant has deliberately sought to take the benefit of a claimant’s goodwill for himself the court will not ‘be astute to say that he cannot succeed in doing that which he is straining every nerve to do’ … A trader who has taken the decision to live dangerously is in 190. a different position, however. He has appreciated the risk of confusion and has endeavoured to adopt a sign which is a safe distance away. All must depend upon the facts of the particular case. Further, it must be kept firmly in mind that the ultimate question whether or not the similarity between the trade mark and the sign is such that there exists a likelihood of confusion is one for the court to determine in the light of its global assessment of all material factors, of which the intention of the defendant, as a person who knows the market in which he is offering his goods or services, is only one. 116. In the present [case], the judge carried out precisely this assessment at [141] of his judgment which I have set out at [71] above. The judge considered that the evidence of Asda ‘living dangerously’ did not, in the circumstances of this case, amount to evidence of an intention to confuse. Asda had no wish for consumer to confuse one business for another and so the judge held its intention and conduct could not be relied upon as evidence of a propensity to confuse. I am entirely satisfied that the judge was entitled to reach this conclusion … ”
“QO: What comes to your mind spontaneously when you see this colour in connection with inhalers? Q1: Have you already seen this colour used on an inhaler? Or do you think that you might have seen this colour used on an inhaler? Or have you not seen this colour used on an inhaler?”
“Q3: Do you know the name of the pharmaceutical company or brand? Please answer this question only if you are sure about the name.”
“Q1: Have you ever seen this colour before in relation to inhalers? Q2 Where have you seen this colour before? Q3: Is there anything else you can tell me about this colour in relation to inhalers? Q4: How do patients typically refer to the inhaler that you mentioned?”
“i) if a survey is to have any validity at all, the way in which the interviewees are selected must be established as being done by a method such that a relevant cross-section of the public is interviewed; ii) any survey must be of a size which is sufficient to produce some relevant result viewed on a statistical basis; iii) the party relying on the survey must give the fullest possible disclosure of exactly how many surveys they have carried out, exactly how those surveys were conducted and the totality of the number of persons involved, because otherwise it is impossible to draw any reliable inference from answers given by a few respondents; iv) the questions asked must not be leading; and must not direct the person answering the question into a field of speculation upon which that person would never have embarked had the question not been put; v) exact answers and not some sort of abbreviation or digest of the exact answer must be recorded; vi) the totality of all answers given to all surveys should be disclosed; and vii) the instructions given to interviewers must also be disclosed.”
“Q. Mr. Crompton, I am going to put to you if this is the best evidence of patient confusion that can be found after the kind of trawl of internet resources that we are looking at ---- 272. Q. ---- it suggests very strongly that there is not any patient confusion going on at all; correct? A. Correct.”
“AirFluSal is only authorised for COPD sufferers and should not be taken by asthma sufferers … AirFluSal is therefore not equivalent to Seretide because the latter includes both indications (COPD and asthma) while AirFluSal is only authorised for COPD.”
“When all the repeat prescriptions come in, the pharmacist won’t know if it is for COPD or asthma. I would rather wait until you have all indications as it will cause confusion”
“Are you following the colour code for Seretide? ([One of the representatives] explained the reason behind the colour purple) – That makes sense to me to do it that way.”
“(1) the Defendants deliberately sought to make the AirFluSal product and packaging as similar as possible to the Seretide Accuhaler and they did so recognising that this would assist in switching patients from the Seretide Accuhaler to their product; (2) the Defendants identified and sought to exploit the high level of generic prescribing of the DPIs and the commercial opportunities of pharmacy substitution; and (3) the Defendants were aware of a risk that many patients and HCPs would take a purple-branded product to be associated in the course of trade with the Seretide Accuhaler and/or that it was equivalent to it.”
“Our suggestion would be that we produce the Gyrohaler [later this became the Forspiro] in purple and label it normally (white). (The alternative would be to produce the Gyrohaler in the standard [i.e. Sandoz house] colour, e.g. dark blue, and to make the respective active ingredient recognisable by labelling it with an indicative colour, but in my opinion the label is too small for that.) Whether the purple tone is exactly identical to that of Viani does not matter (could also be protected). In any case, purple is now the indicative colour for the active ingredient combination fluticasone + salmeterol, which every doctor has certainly internalised. … We can determine later whether we want to have 2 different purple tones, like the originator. In that case, the protective cap, for example, could have a lighter tone. Of course this is also a question of costs.”
“Vectura have presented several design options for two colours provided (dark purple: Pantone 2573 C and light purple: Pantone 2603 C). The light purple combination for cap, top and bottom case (colour code: Pantone 2603 C) was agreed to be the preferred option and should be continued in the further development. Although there are lots of arguments in favour of this colour design (different device design, different colour purple, purple is the identification colour for this combination product) a fallback position with different colour should be established. The back-up solution could have a light grey colouring.”
“Q. Did you at least consider that there was a risk that healthcare professionals and patients would think that a purple product would be a GSK product? A. Absolutely not, no. This is my baby, and I do not want anybody to think that it is produced by anybody other than Vectura and Sandoz.”
“My perspective, at that point in time, was there is a colour coding, essentially, and patients --it is in the interest of the safety of the patient that he knows which drugs he is taking. So the colour was a helpful reminder [to] the patient that he is taking the salmeterol fluticasone product, which he has to take twice a day.”
“Q. Did you recognise that risk at all at this point in time? A. That there would be -- which risk? Q. The risk that asthma sufferers, who were getting repeatgeneric prescriptions, would be dispensed your product? A. My Lord, I did not consider this a risk. We made it very clear what our product was for, namely for COPD. All our marketing materials were structured accordingly, and we communicated this to our customers.”