“Hi my name is Aron & I have known Tim 4 about 10 years and he is the king of chatting shit … but I can asure u that Tim is a good guy that yes may be a opinionatted twat the talk’s alot (even at 9am in morning) . Just ask him about anything and he will know something about it.”
“Now we hope that our son Tim, who helps run the place, will take over the business in due course.”
“His son Timothy has run the business since then.”
“I have been instructed that you will be unable to return to the Cowley Road MOT bay until the enquiry has taken place. This will be at the end of June.”
“My son works with me a Director and 20% shareholder …”
“Therefore I find that the relationship between you and Mrs Smith, as directors of the business, had broken down and that this is damaging to the company. I find that there is a loss of trust and confidence between you and you are unable to work together. I therefore find that you are unable to return to work and this leaves the Company with no option but to terminate your employment.”
“The relationship difficulties and clear lack of trust and confidence in each other was clear to [Ms Fryatt] in making a decision and I agree with this view.”
“The relationship you [i.e., Tim] described to me throughout our meeting appears to be one where your mother makes the decisions around the future of the business, managed the finances and gave you direction and permissions and that you dealt with operational matters on the ground and took a lead role in the management of the MOT Bay. This appears to have been an arrangement that you accepted for a considerable period of time.”
“The First Respondent’s husband died in 2010, and thereafter the business was operated by the First Respondent and the Claimant. They were both directors and shareholders however the First Respondent holds the majority 80% shareholding and assumed the role of managing director.”
“(1) A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order under this Part on the ground – (a) that the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or of some part of its members (including at least himself) …”
“31 Prior to the death of his father the Petitioner and his parents were on friendly, familial terms, and did not contemplate making formal agreements concerning the Petitioner's participation in the Company. However, from October 2005 (if not before), it was informally agreed and/or understood between all parties that the Petitioner would devote his working time to the Company, that he would eventually take over the business and that he would be made a shareholder. The expectation was that in due course he would become a significant, if not majority shareholder. 32 The Petitioner's participation in the business commenced in October 2005, and increased over time as set out above. Due to the family relationship, no date was set for transferring shares to the Petitioner, but it was expected in due course. 33. This agreement, arrangement or understanding was confirmed when the First Respondent transferred 2,000 shares to the Petitioner following the death of his father and the administration of the estate. The shares were transferred and the Petitioner received them subject to this agreement, arrangement or understanding. In particular, the transfer of shares confirmed that both the First Respondent and the Petitioner expected that the Petitioner would continue to participate in the management of the Company and its business. 34. Further or in the alternative, the Company was a "quasi-partnership" of a family business, in which Clive Smith and the First Respondent were "quasi-partners", succeeded by the Petitioner and the First Respondent as "quasi-partner.”
“The way in which such equitable principles operate is tolerably well settled and in my view, it would be wrong to abandon them in favour of some wholly indefinite notion of fairness.”
“ So I agree with Jonathan Parker J. when he said in In re Astec (B.S.R.) Plc. [1998] 2 B.C.L.C. 556, 588: “in order to give rise to an equitable constraint based on ‘legitimate expectation’ what is required is a personal relationship or personal dealings of some kind between the party seeking to exercise the legal right and the party seeking to restrain such exercise, such as will affect the conscience of the former.”
“Although it does not matter, I should say that I do not think that this was the position when Mr. O'Neill first acquired his shares in 1985. He received them as a gift and an incentive and I do not think that in making that gift Mr. Phillips could be taken to have surrendered his right to dismiss Mr. O'Neill from the management without making him an offer for the shares. Mr. O'Neill was simply an employee who happened to have been given some shares. But over the following years the relationship changed. Mr. O'Neill invested his own profits in the company by leaving some on loan account and agreeing to part being capitalised as shares. He worked to build up the company's business. He guaranteed its bank account and mortgaged his house in support.”
“Indeed, the position of succeeding generations in a family company is a classic instance of a case where it is possible for there to be such constraints notwithstanding the absence of any capital introduced those in succeeding generations.”
“The family element in the relationship between the three brothers as officers and employees of the Company was significant. I find that there were equitable considerations operating to restrain the exercise of Patrick’s powers.”
“…it is clear from Lord Hoffmann’s application of these principles to the facts of the case that a promise binding in equity is more than a reasonable and legitimate expectation. Mr O’Neill had a reasonable and legitimate expectation that he would be allotted more shares, in the sense that it reasonably appeared likely to happen. But Mr Phillips gaveno promise to that effect. So there was no equity binding Mr Phillips’s conscience and section 459 should not be used to impose on someone an obligation to which he had never agreed.” ii) Mr Strutt referred to [183(i)] where the deputy judge observed that: “It follows from the points made above that the mere fact that a company is a family company does not result in the conclusion that it is a quasi-partnership, in which the exercise by the majority of their legal rights are subject to equitable constraints. iii) Mr Strutt referred to the fact that the deputy judge, at [186], had identified an important question to focus on as being: “… notwithstanding that Paul’s exclusion from management was in conformity with DPL’s constitution, has he shown sufficiently clearly on the evidence the existence of any agreement or understanding, binding in fairness and equity, that he would be entitled to participate in the management of DPL for so long as the business of DPL continued (or at least, so entitled in the absence of an appropriate offer to purchase his shareholding)?” iv) Mr Strutt further highlighted [188], where the deputy judge stated: “… the mere fact that a company as a family company, and even the fact that it is managed on the basis of mutual trust and confidence, are not in themselves a sufficient basis for the conclusion that the company is a quasi-partnership company. Something more is needed.” [Emphasis added]
“For all the above reasons, I come to the conclusion that Paul’s case on his alleged Understandings is not made out. It follows that in my view DPL was not a quasi-partnership company, in the sense in which that phrase was used by Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries. Paul’s exclusion from the management of DPL by Andreas therefore does not give rise to unfair prejudice.”
“Every case must be decided on its facts, and given Lord Hoffmann’s analogy with frustration the conclusion that the judge reached may have been open to him on the facts. But in this case, taking account of the serious nature of [the petitioner’s] conduct, it would not arguably be unfair to leave [the petitioner] without a remedy.”
"The general principle is well settled. Normally, in 'quasi-partnership' companies the appropriate basis of valuation is on a non-discounted basis. This is established by the decision of this Court in Re Bird Precision Bellows Limited[1984] 1 CH 419 and the speech of Lord Hoffman in O'Neill v Phillips[1999] 1WLR 1092 at 1107 with which the other members of the House agreed. But Lord Hoffman added: "
“112 The next question is the basis upon which those shares should be valued. In approaching this question, I have considered the authorities cited to me on the principles applicable to the grant of relief under section 994 and the terms of any share buy-out order, starting with the classic exposition of Nourse J in Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd[1984] Ch 419 (and approved on appeal to the Court of Appeal at[1986] Ch 658 ) and including the decisions of Mr Nicholas Strauss QC in Richards v Lundy[2000] 1 BCLC 376 , HHJ Purle QC in Re Sunrise Radio Ltd, Kohli & Lit & Ors[2009] EWHC 2893 (Ch) , reported at[2010] 1 BCLC 367 , Mr Robin Hollington QC in Re Blue Index Limited, Murrell v Swallow[2014] EWHC 2680 (Ch) , the late Mr Edward Bartley Jones QC in Re Addbins Ltd, Ashdown v Griffin[2015] EWHC 3161 (Ch) , and the commentary to be found at Joffe: Minority Shareholders: Law, Practice and Procedure , 5th edition (2015) at paragraphs 6.326 to 6.336. 113. From those authorities I derive the following principles (as applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case): (1) The task of the court, in granting relief under section 994, is, first, to identity the unfair prejudice which has been established and, then, to fashion the relief so as to cure that prejudice. That principle must underly the issue whether or not a discount for a minority shareholding should be applied. (2) The whole purpose of the unfair prejudice remedy is to grant the oppressed minority a remedy which they would not otherwise have. It would substantially defeat the purpose of the new remedy if the oppressing majority were routinely rewarded by the application of a discount for minority shareholding. (3) Thus, whether or not a discount for a minority shareholding is applicable involves drawing a distinction between the general case, where it would be unfair to treat the wronged petitioner as a willing seller, and therefore for the price to be fixed on a discounted basis, and the exceptional case where it would fair to do so because (for example) he had acquired his shares at a discounted price, or had so acted as to deserve his exclusion from the company. In other words, the emphasis of the underlying principle lies in the unfairness in treating a successful petitioner as a willing seller. (4) Although the general rule is that there should be no discount, the court retains a wide discretion and may apply a discount where, apart from section 994, the petitioner would not have succeeded in securing a winding-up order on the just and equitable ground: see in particular observations of HHJ Purle QC in Sunrise Radio Ltd at paragraph 301 and Mr Robin Hollington QC in Re Blue Index Limited, Murrell v Swallow at paragraph 33.”