"It is of course also worth remembering that until quite recently, Dr Al-Dowaisan had trusted [Imad] sufficiently to make him a sole signatory on his NatWest account for many years. Such a fact must not be disregarded lightly in this situation. Dr Al-Dowaisan trusted [Imad] to handle his investments in the UK and that is what [Imad] did for their mutual benefit. He and Dr Al-Dowaisan were in regular contact throughout this time."
"But the mere fact that one party to a commercial relationship 'trusts' the other does not predicate a fiduciary relationship. The word 'trust', like the word 'advice' has a variety of meanings. In a broad sense, trust is an important element in many commercial dealings ... Springwell no doubt 'trusted' Chase to conduct itself in a commercially appropriate manner. But I do not consider that Springwell had any legitimate expectation that, in its commercial dealings with Springwell, Chase would subordinate its interests to those of Springwell." 85.Likewise, in John Youngs Insurance Services Limited v Aviva Insurance Service UK Limited[2011] EWHC 1515 (TCC) , Ramsay J noted (at paragraph 94(7)) that: "… Merely because a party puts faith in another party and contends that their trust has not been repaid does not give rise to a fiduciary duty; high expectations do not necessarily lead to equitable remedies ..."
"Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation has been imposed seem to possess three general characteristics: (1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power. (2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests. (3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power."
"… the broad principle that directors stand in a fiduciary position only to the company, not to creditors of the company, not even to individual shareholders of the company, still less to strangers dealing with the company."
‘were the profits treated as the profits of the principal?’
"42. ... An obligation to account is implicit in a fiduciary relationship, but it is not always easy to ascertain if a relationship imports fiduciary obligations. 43. I find of particular benefit the statement of principle contained in McGhee: Snell’s Equity (33rd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), where the obligation to account is explained as one which arises out of the receipt by a person of property 'in an accountable capacity', at para. 20-015, and although that description might appear to be tautological, it is useful as it identifies the key component. The accountable capacity is one that arises in any circumstance where it can be shown that a person has control of property which belongs to another. As Snell says, the central case is that of an express trustee but the principles apply to various categories of relationships, including 'agents who control property belonging to the principals', at para. 20-012. 44. Snell also suggests that '[t]he claimant bears the onus of proving that the defendant has received property into their control in circumstances sufficient to import an equitable obligation to handle the property for the benefit of another', at para. 20-015."
"3.14. … What is relatively clear is that fiduciary relationships arise in two main circumstances: (1) Status-based fiduciaries – where a relationship falls within a previously recognised category, such as a solicitor and client; and (2) Fact-based fiduciaries – where the particular facts and circumstances of a relationship justify the imposition of fiduciary duties. 3.15. Status-based fiduciary relationships are those that are recognised, by their very nature, as inherently fiduciary. They represent the settled categories of fiduciary relationship. They include the relationships between: trustee and beneficiary; principal and agent; mortgagee and mortgagor; solicitor and client; company directors and the company; partners and co-partners; and civil servants and the Crown. 3.16. The categories of fiduciary relationship are not closed. However, the difficulty lies in identifying the circumstances which justify the imposition of fiduciary duties. The courts have traditionally declined to provide a clear definition, preferring to preserve flexibility…"
" … The key test is whether there is a legitimate expectation that one party will act in another's interest. However, discretion, power to act and vulnerability are indicators of such an expectation."
"I am entirely confident that Dr Al-Dowaisan obtained all statements on a regular basis from Gorvins during both the construction and sales process. Some of the investors did not have any or a good command of English and Park Lane/Mayfair could arrange for the information to be passed to them in Arabic. As a consequence, the statements and substatements were also sent to Mayfair, specifically Hussein Hemadi and myself. Mayfair would then send the statements and sub-statements to the investors and, when appropriate, Mayfair would also write, reminding the investors that any distribution could or should be applied to other projects then underway."
"The right starting point is section 23 of the 1980 Act which directs attention to the basis of the duty to account. The limitation period will be that period which is applicable to the basis in question."
"For the purposes of determining appropriate limitation periods, a breach of fiduciary duty is treated as equivalent or analogous to a breach of trust. In general, therefore, a six-year limitation period applies to claims against fiduciaries for breach of fiduciary duty, either by direct application of theLimitation Act 1980 or by analogy with that statute. Where a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is based on the same facts as a claim for breach of contract or a claim in tort and there is 'correspondence' between the remedies available, the six-year limitation period is applied by analogy."
"Section 21(3) of the 1980 Act applies to an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of any breach of trust. Plainly the former is not applicable and, to my mind, neither is the latter. The Claimants' case is not put forward on the basis that, by failing to account, the Defendant has acted in breach of trust but, rather, by virtue of his obligation to account which they seek to enforce. The remedy they seek is one seeking a positive order enforcing the obligation, not a remedy for breach. It seems to me that section 21(3) has no application and the 1980 Act has no limitation period which applies to proceedings brought by a beneficiary for an order for an account in common form, as opposed to an account based on wilful default. Support for this conclusion can be found in obiter remarks by Harman J in Attorney-General v Cocke[1988] 1 Ch 414 (at 421E)."
"… the simple duty to account, central though it is, is not a fiduciary duty. It is a contractual duty and breach of it gives rise to a claim which would be governed by section 5 of the 1980 Act."
"… Despite the express allegation of breach of fiduciary duty, the claims are simply claims for breach of contract and no more. The Act of 1980 cannot be sidestepped by describing them as claims in breach of fiduciary duty..."
"Once the trust or fiduciary relationship is established or conceded, the beneficiary or principal is entitled to an account as of right. Although, like all equitable remedies, an order for an account is discretionary, in making the order the court is not granting a remedy for wrong but enforcing performance of an obligation."
"If there had been a limitation period, then it would not have been open to the court to consider the question of laches ... On the basis that the court has a discretion whether to make an order for an account, I am not convinced that consideration of the doctrine of laches adds a great deal, bearing in mind delay on its own will not be sufficient to make out laches. It is more likely that the sort of considerations relied upon by the Defendant as grounds for the court refusing to make an order will be persuasive than that the Defendant could establish laches."
"60. The court has a discretion whether or not to make an order for an account in common form to be produced by a trustee. Although it would not be right to say that there is a presumption in favour of making an order for an account, in my judgment, the court will not decline to make an order lightly where a trustee holds or has held assets for beneficiaries of a trust. 61. The duty to account must also be seen alongside an obligation to keep and to retain records. Although it is perfectly acceptable for trustees, amongst themselves, to divide responsibilities such that one of the trustees is designated to be the record-keeper, that does not absolve the trustees collectively from their duties to the beneficiaries. It is not an answer in this case, therefore, for the Defendant to say that he left record-keeping to Doris Watson and he can, therefore, be absolved from providing an account because no documents have been retained."
"… The style of the accounts, and the level of detail provided will necessarily vary. The accounts produced for 1990 and 1991 may have been suitable for submission to the Inland Revenue, as it then was, for the purposes of assessing tax liability and providing a general summary of the trust's position. However, they were not suitable to provide a beneficiary with an adequate understanding of how the trustees had managed the trust assets in the relevant periods."
"Dr Al-Dowaisan is the owner or otherwise beneficially entitled to the investments."
"A party who executes a deed is estopped in a court of law from saying that the facts stated in the deed are not truly stated."
"... a person who may be tricked into putting their signature on a piece of paper which has legal consequences totally different from anything they intended."
"[50%], [one-half part or share], [one-third part or share] of the investments on trust."
"The overriding objective in construction is to give effect to what a reasonable person rather than a pedantic lawyer would have understood the parties to mean. Therefore, if in spite of linguistic problems the meaning is clear, it is that meaning which must prevail."
"If an error in the drafting of a document can be corrected by a legitimate process of construction, in principle the court should do so without ordering rectification of the document."
"Before a mistake in a document can be corrected as a matter of construction and without obtaining an order for rectification, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) there must be a clear mistake; and (2) it must be clear what correction ought to be made in order to cure the mistake. In deciding whether there is a clear mistake, the court is not confined to reading the document without regard to its background or context. But it must be clear from the rest of the agreement, interpreted with the admissible background, what the parties intended to agree; and the mistake must be one of language or syntax. … The correction of clear mistakes by construction is not part of the law of rectification, but is an aspect of the single task of interpreting the document in its context."
"In considering whether it would be disproportionate to refuse relief to which the claimant would otherwise be entitled as a matter of public policy, various factors may be relevant ... Potentially relevant factors include the seriousness of the conduct, its centrality to the contract, whether it was intentional and whether there was marked disparity in the parties' respective culpability."
"Part of the harmony of the law is its division of responsibility between the criminal and civil courts and tribunals. Punishment for wrongdoing is the responsibility of the criminal courts and in some instances, statutory regulators ... Punishment is not generally the function of the civil courts, which are concerned with determining private rights and obligations. The broad principle is not in doubt that the public interest requires that the civil courts should not undermine the effectiveness of the criminal law; but nor should they impose what would amount in substance to an additional penalty disproportionate to the nature and seriousness of any wrongdoing."
"The essential rationale of the illegality doctrine is that it would be contrary to the public interest to enforce a claim if to do so would be harmful to the integrity of the legal system (or, possibly, certain aspects of public morality, the boundaries of which have never been made entirely clear and which do not arise for consideration in this case). In assessing whether the public interest would be harmed in that way it is necessary (a) to consider the underlying purpose of the prohibition which has been transgressed and whether that purpose will be enhanced by denial of the claim, (b) to consider any other relevant public policy on which the denial of the claim may have an impact and (c) to consider whether denial of the claim would be a proportionate response to the illegality, bearing in mind that punishment is a matter for the criminal courts. Within that framework, various factors may be relevant, but it would be a mistake to suggest that the court is free to decide a case in an undisciplined way. The public interest is best served by a principled and transparent assessment of the considerations identified rather than by the application of a formal approach capable of producing results which may appear arbitrary, unjust or disproportionate."