“A business plan is being developed to transform easy.com into a web based email provider, and ISP and/or portal site.”
“easyGroup is the proprietor of the easyJet Mark. easyGroup has licensed the use of the easyJet Mark exclusively to easyJet Airline Company Limited (“easyJet”), with the right to sub-license.”
“Easylife has also developed a range of its own brands which don’t have the word easy in them. For example Easylife has a range of watches and clocks, sold under the Tavistock & Jones brand (which is also abbreviated to T & J on the products), the Good Ideas brand (which we use for various cleaning/disinfecting products including the Oven Genie product), Schloff for mattress toppers and other bedding products, Cucinare, for kitchen products, Featherlight for shoes, Happy Feet for foot products, GoHeater, and the Genius brand which is used on our Safety Ladder and numerous other products. Easylife has also sold many products bearing third party brands such as Cataclean catalytic converter cleaner, some Westland lawn care products, Sursol hand sanitisers and many others.”
“[the] letter did make me aware of the name easyGroup and that the Claimant owned a large number of trade marks containing the word ‘easy’.”
“Easylife Group Limited”
“There was no discussion between myself and Mr. Strauss [the accountant] or between me and anyone else that the choice of the name Easylife Group Limited might help the new business cash in on the goodwill or reputation of the Claimant or any of the brands or businesses that it had set up. That idea was never discussed at that time and has never been discussed.”
“I chose it to match the proposed name of Easylife Group Limited which Mr. Strauss had suggested. I wanted the new domain name to incorporate the name easylife, which by then had a lot of goodwill in it.”
“The amendments which are now sought to be brought fall into primarily three classes. The first and perhaps the most important one is what is termed "the brand extension claim", and that relates to the fact that the claimant has, it says, relatively late in the day, and primarily by reason of the disclosure process in the current litigation, learnt that the defendant is using, in relation to its activities and in relation to websites pertaining to those activities, names, or signs, such as Easylife Gardening Club, Easylife Car Club, Easylife Travel Club and so on. These names have been referred to, generically, today as brand extensions of the Easylife brand… The brand extensions claims are entirely new claims. They are not amendments of the existing claims.”
“It is undoubtedly utterly unfair to the defendants, who have to meet these claims, to expect them to go through all the processes required to bring these new claims to trial in the time available. There is a lot of evidence about what facts might be and brought into play, what disclosure might be brought into play. A large amount of work and material, over and above that which is already extant, is going to arise if these amendments are allowed.”
“It would be untrue to say that there is no degree of overlap, but it would be equally untrue to say that the overlap is overly considerable. The area where there might be a degree of overlap is to do with claims made, in the current proceedings, that the defendant might be producing a family of names or a family of brands, given that that will undoubtedly be one of the arguments raised in the brand extension proceedings, if brought separately. I note, however, from the pleadings that the way the brand extension plea is put and the way that the current claim in respect of easyGroup is put in terms of a family of brands are different; one concerns the use of the name "easy", and one concerns the use of the name “Easylife”.”
“As I have explained at length I have spent more than two decades and invested a great deal of money, as have investors I have worked with, building up and protecting the distinctive EASY family of brands. It seems completely obvious to me that unauthorised trade mark use of EASY, especially together with elements of our get up, is likely to dilute the EASY brand and make it less distinctive.”
“If in any civil proceedings under this Act a question arises as to the use to which a registered trade mark has been put, it is for the proprietor to show what use has been made of it.”
“In the majority of cases, the business is carried out by an independently owned licensee or franchisee company, which has entered into a licence or franchise agreement with easyGroup to use their easy brand name. However, as discussed further below, easyLand and easy4men are both operated and under the direct control of easyGroup, and the easyGroup IP name was included on the packaging of easy4men travel products. easyGroup continues to act as a prudent brand owner, protecting the brand from infringement and other unauthorised use. easyGroup also publishes a brand manual for the benefit of its franchisees, licensees and potential business partners, to maintain continuity across the family of brands.”
“to nurture and protect the easy brand and this family of brands”
“Sir Stelios is unable to travel to the UK to give evidence.”
“The order form in the promotional material that Easylife sends out, the customer fills out the form, attaches a cheque to the value of their order and we receive it. We then process it on Priam, as you refer to it, and there will be occasions where we need to call the customer if, for example, they have not put the correct colour or size, something missing or if the cheque numbers do not correspond with the letters or they have not signed it, all kinds of reasons why you make the phone call. It is quicker these days especially since the pandemic. The Royal mail delivery service I am afraid is way out of sync and it is easier to make a phone call. It is also cheaper than sending a letter these days.”
“Q. Okay, are you -- you say it looks like it, can people cut and paste e-mails into Priam? A. You can cut and paste contents of an e-mail into Priam. Q. Is that generally what your telephone service operators do, do they cut and paste e-mails in, or the e-mail responders? A. Sometimes. They can do either. It depends how the e-mail is and whether -- how much of it is relevant to the customer’s issue and query. Q. Okay. So here there is a comment has been made, and the notes are here on Priam and can we just read them together? A. Yes. Q. It says: "Thank you for your reply e-mail" -- I think it looks like it is a complaint or a query about a missing alkaline battery charger being out of stock, yes? A. Yes. Q. And then attempts to phone customer services on two occasions, delays, which is unfortunate, and then "When the opportunity to speak to a member of easyGroup is possible the telephone line was disconnected!" There we have someone who is calling, and it happens, an unfortunate thing has gone on, but they have, or they have sent an e-mail, someone has sent an e-mail and they have mentioned easyGroup and they could be referring as an abbreviation to Easylife Group, could they not? A. I would think it is exactly what happened. Q. Or they could be referring to easyGroup thinking it is a connection with my client, it is possible? A. Only if he sells alkaline battery chargers. Q. Well, no, because if they were confused as to some sort of connection they could certainly think there was a connection with the easyGroup, could they not? A. No, but this e-mail is in relation to some items ordered from Easylife and I do not see the connection, myself, but we all have our views, I guess.”
“that situation is likely to have arisen in more than 0.001% of”
“These relate to a broad range of issues: problems with a particular product, with delivery, returns and refunds, guarantees etc. During shifts at DRMG, staff raise issues with their supervisor or me as and when they arise (frequently during the call with the customer) and, as we all work in the one area (and during the Covid lockdown we all have access to our WhatsApp group chat), I would expect to know about any issues raised by operators. In addition, operators take regular breaks and invariably informally discuss with each other, supervisors and managers issues that have arisen during calls that day. This informal process is backed up by specific notifications from operators and supervisors to me as the Call Centre Manager about issues that arisen during calls that day.”
“I do not recall ever being told of any such confusion or having any such instance escalated to me. I would have remembered any such instance of confusion being raised with me.”
“At the time, there was interest in purchasing GCE in those days, as it was, Gregory Caplan Enterprises Limited, and we knew this was going to come up later on with the company growing and opportunities. We were kind of the first in the market in those days when TV shopping was coming in and we were approached by a number of companies to sell to them.”
“I think one has to draw a distinction between putting a label on a product or building an entire category of products, and EasyKitchen, EasyHome, if you want to call it a family of brands, EasyHome, EasyKitchen, yes, maybe, but it is not, it is more of a category, I would say; so it is not a family of brands. A family of brands is very broad.”
“to put it into context, the labelling of the product and branding I see as two totally different things. So on the label, we have the descriptive use of "easy" and "easy mop", or an easy this or and easy that, that is not a brand…many things are called “easy”, it is such a generic term…”
“Q. Mr. Caplan, I suggest that if you had been acting fairly, you would not have put your name to a statement of truth in relation to this statement in your Part 18 response whereby you are suggesting that none of the uses in the schedule are to do with the use of "easy" as part of a brand? A. I do not see ‘easy’ as part of a brand.”
“Q. How did you come to give that as a statement when in fact sales were very much significantly greater of that product?”
“you are prepared to at least bend the truth in support of your interests in this case and that is why you underestimated significantly the degree of trade in the oven shine product.”
“The facts are that I said it was a few hundred and it was actually 18,000. Those are the facts. What is around the facts is to take into account that in my mind, when I thought it was an insignificant product and it was, like a colloquial, it was a few hundred, to me it was an insignificant product and 18,000 units and 3,500 units a year is just an insignificant system…I attempt at all times to be honest and clear in what I do.”
“There was definitely reputational harm about delivery of goods. When it comes to the quality of our products, there is certainly no problem there.”
“We only have a limited amount of time. Mr. Caplan, I asked you about being dropped by The Guardian. Here, The Guardian are saying that they will not take your advertising. It was unfair of you in your response to say, "Well, you are asking me about catalogues; it does not matter." If you had been giving evidence that was the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, you would have said, "Yes, we have had reputational damage in The Guardian. They have refused to take our adverts"? A. I agree with you on this. I made a mistake in that. I really think of the inserts and the catalogues in my business. The off-the-page advertising we did for the first time for a few months during the pandemic. It is not really a focus. I am thinking of catalogues and inserts. That is the main business.”
“I am the CEO and founder of Easylife. I have been looking through some customer care emails as I like to from time to time as it is how I find out what is really going on! I saw your email below. I would firstly like to apologise for the delay you experienced in getting your XXX. We were exceptionally busy over the summer period because of the pandemic, issues in our warehouse caused by social distancing and also because of difficulties with shipping. As a valued customer, I would like to send you a£25 gift token to go some way to making up for the inconvenience you had to suffer. Could you please confirm your address is still XXX so that I can be sure that the gift token is sent to the right address. By the way I noticed that in the email you sent through on 27 July you referred to us at one point in your email as Easy Group. We are Easylife. Was that just a mistake or did you think that we were associated with easyGroup, which is the business owned by Stelios (easyJet founder)? I would be interested to hear about that as our brand messaging is very important to us.”
“Dear Easygroup” in June 2020. Her written evidence is that when she wrote “that email I knew that easyGroup Ltd was connected to the travel industry, air flights, holidays, car hire, cruises etc. I have used their services several times i.e. flights, holidays so I was fully aware that my email was not directed to them but to a separate company. It was only by accident that I inadvertently used their name because of my failure to check easylife’s company name.”
“[P]ure questionnaire evidence is seldom helpful—there are almost inevitable faults with the questions or the record of the answers as well as in later stages of the processing. Of course the court needs to know what evidence was collected, and needs to have the full picture, including particularly what failed surveys, if any there were. But unless one can have some real evidence, tested in cross-examination, one cannot really be sure of what was passing through people’s minds. Those cases where surveys have proved to be useful have all involved some of the ‘pollees’ coming to court.”
“31. I agree … that the notion of an average consumer requires the court to consider any relevant class of consumer, and not to average them. I believe that conclusion to be consistent with the approach taken by this court in Interflora Inc and another v Marks and Spencer plc … 34. As with all issues in trade mark law, the answer to disputed questions is normally provided by considering the purpose of a trade mark which, broadly speaking, is to operate as a guarantee of origin to those who purchase or use the product. In principle, therefore, and in the absence of any authority cited to us which is directly in point, I would consider that the term average consumer includes any class of consumer to whom the guarantee of origin is directed and who would be likely to rely on it, for example in making a decision to buy or use the goods….”
“(1) Genuine use means actual use of the trade mark by the proprietor or by a third party with authority to use the mark …. (2) The use must be more than merely token, that is to say, serving solely to preserve the rights conferred by the registration of the mark: …. (3) The use must be consistent with the essential function of a trade mark, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services to the consumer or end user by enabling him to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another origin: …. (4) Use of the mark must relate to goods or services which are already marketed or which are about to be marketed and for which preparations to secure customers are under way, particularly in the form of advertising campaigns: …. Internal use by the proprietor does not suffice: …. Nor does the distribution of promotional items as a reward for the purchase of other goods and to encourage the sale of the latter: …. But use by a non-profit making association can constitute genuine use: …. (5) The use must be by way of real commercial exploitation of the mark on the market for the relevant goods or services, that is to say, use in accordance with the commercial raison d'être of the mark, which is to create or preserve an outlet for the goods or services that bear the mark: …. (6) All the relevant facts and circumstances must be taken into account in determining whether there is real commercial exploitation of the mark, including: (a) whether such use is viewed as warranted in the economic sector concerned to maintain or create a share in the market for the goods and services in question; (b) the nature of the goods or services; (c) the characteristics of the market concerned; (d) the scale and frequency of use of the mark; (e) whether the mark is used for the purpose of marketing all the goods and services covered by the mark or just some of them; (f) the evidence that the proprietor is able to provide ; and (g) the territorial extent of the use: …. (7) Use of the mark need not always be quantitatively significant for it to be deemed genuine. Even minimal use may qualify as genuine use if it is deemed to be justified in the economic sector concerned for the purpose of creating or preserving market share for the relevant goods or services . For example, use of the mark by a single client which imports the relevant goods can be sufficient to demonstrate that such use is genuine, if it appears that the import operation has a genuine commercial justification for the proprietor. Thus there is no de minimis rule: …. (8) It is not the case that every proven commercial use of the mark may automatically be deemed to constitute genuine use: …”
“Article 15(1) of …. Regulation … 207/2009 … must be interpreted as meaning that the affixing of an individual EU trade mark, by the proprietor or with his consent, on goods as a label of quality is not a use as a trade mark that falls under the concept of ‘genuine use’ within the meaning of that provision . However, the affixing of that mark does constitute such genuine use if it guarantees, additionally and simultaneously, to consumers that those goods come from a single undertaking under the control of which the goods are manufactured and which is responsible for their quality. …””
“easyGroup holds registrations for over 100 trade marks in Europe alone.”
“Transportation of passengers and travellers by air; arranging of transportation of passengers and travellers by land; airline services; arranging, operating and providing facilities for vacations ; travel agency and tourist office services.”
“and the provision of services to tourists”
“In order to establish infringement under Article 9(1)(b) of the Regulation, six conditions must be satisfied: (i) there must be use of a sign by a third party within the relevant territory; (ii) the use must be in the course of trade; (iii) it must be without the consent of the proprietor of the trade mark; (iv) it must be of a sign which is at least similar to the trade mark; (v) it must be in relation to goods or services which are at least similar to those for which the trade mark is registered; and (vi) it must give rise to a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. In the present case, there is no issue as to conditions (i)-(iv). Comparison of services. In considering whether services are similar to each other, all relevant factors relating to the services must be considered, including their nature, their end users, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary: seeCase C-106/03 Canon KKK v Metro Goldwyn Mayer Inc[1998] ECR I-5507 at [23]. Likelihood of confusion. The manner in which the requirement of a likelihood of confusion in Article 9(1)(b) of the Regulation and Article 5(1)(b) of the Directive, and the corresponding provisions concerning relative grounds of objection to registration in both the Directive and the Regulation, should be interpreted and applied has been considered by the CJEU in a large number of decisions. The Trade Marks Registry has adopted a standard summary of the principles established by these authorities for use in the registration context. The current version of this summary, which takes into account the decision of the Court of Appeal in Maier v ASOS plc[2015] EWCA Civ 220 ,[2015] FSR 20 , is as follows: "(a) the likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all relevant factors; (b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods or services in question, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant, but who rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has kept in his mind, and whose attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question; (c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details; (d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must normally be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components, but it is only when all other components of a complex mark are negligible that it is permissible to make the comparison solely on the basis of the dominant elements; (e) nevertheless, the overall impression conveyed to the public by a composite trade mark may, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components; (f) and beyond the usual case, where the overall impression created by a mark depends heavily on the dominant features of the mark, it is quite possible that in a particular case an element corresponding to an earlier trade mark may retain an independent distinctive role in a composite mark, without necessarily constituting a dominant element of that mark; (g) a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa; (h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that has been made of it; (i) mere association, in the strict sense that the later mark brings the earlier mark to mind, is not sufficient; (j) the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in the strict sense; and (k) if the association between the marks creates a risk that the public might believe that the respective goods or services come from the same or economically-linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion." The same principles are applicable when considering infringement, although as noted above it is necessary for that purpose to consider the actual use of the sign complained of in the context in which it has been used. Common elements with low distinctiveness. If the only similarity between the trade mark and the sign complained of is a common element that is descriptive or otherwise of low distinctiveness, that points against there being a likelihood of confusion: see Whyte and Mackay Ltd v Origin Wine UK Ltd[2015] EWHC 1271 (Ch) ,[2015] FSR 33 at [43]-[44]. Family of marks. Where it is shown that the trade mark proprietor has used a "family" of trade marks with a common feature, and a third party uses a sign which shares that common feature, this can support the existence of a likelihood of confusion. As the Court of First Instance (as it then was) explained inCase T-287/06 Miguel Torres v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market[2008] ECR II-3817 : "79. As regards the applicant's argument that its earlier marks constitute a 'family of marks' or a 'series of marks', which can increase the likelihood of confusion with the mark applied for, such a possibility was recognised in BAINBRIDGE and confirmed inCase C-234/06 P Il Ponte Finanziaria[2007] ECR I-7333 . 80. According to that case-law, there can be said to be a 'series or a 'family' of marks when either those earlier marks reproduce in full the same distinctive element with the addition of a graphic or word element differentiating them from one another, or when they are characterised by the repetition of the same prefix or suffix taken from an original mark (BAINBRIDGE, paragraph 123). In such circumstances, a likelihood of confusion may be created by the possibility of association between the trade mark applied for and the earlier marks forming part of the series where the trade mark applied for displays such similarities to those marks as might lead the consumer to believe that it forms part of that same series and therefore that the goods covered by it have the same commercial origin as those covered by the earlier marks, or a related origin. Such a likelihood of association between the trade mark applied for and the earlier marks in a series, which could give rise to confusion as to the commercial origin of the goods identified by the signs at issue, may exist even where the comparison between the trade mark applied for and the earlier marks, each taken individually, does not prove the existence of a likelihood of direct confusion (BAINBRIDGE, paragraph 124). When there is a 'family' or a 'series' of trade marks, the likelihood of confusion results more specifically from the possibility that the consumer may be mistaken as to the provenance or origin of goods or services covered by the trade mark applied for and considers erroneously that that trade mark is part of that family or series of marks (Il Ponte Finanziaria, paragraph 63). 81. However, according to the above case-law, the likelihood of confusion attaching to the existence of a family of earlier marks can be pleaded only if both of two conditions are satisfied. First, the earlier marks forming part of the 'family' or 'series' must be present on the market. Secondly, the trade mark applied for must not only be similar to the marks belonging to the series, but also display characteristics capable of associating it with the series. That might not be the case, for example, where the element common to the earlier serial marks is used in the trade mark applied for either in a different position from that in which it usually appears in the marks belonging to the series or with a different semantic content (BAINBRIDGE, paragraphs 125 to 127)." I do not understand it to be in dispute that it is not necessary for this purpose for all of the trade marks in the family to have been registered at the relevant date, provided that at least one was registered and a number were in use. Colour. Where the trade mark proprietor has used the trade mark in a particular colour or combination of colours, and a third party uses a sign in the same colour or combination of colours, this can support the existence of a likelihood of confusion even if the trade mark is not registered in colour. The CJEU ruled in Specsavers (CJEU) that: ‘Article 9(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 207/2009 must be interpreted as meaning that where a Community trade mark is not registered in colour, but the proprietor has used it extensively in a particular colour or combination of colours with the result that it has become associated in the mind of a significant portion of the public with that colour or combination of colours, the colour or colours which a third party uses in order to represent a sign alleged to infringe that trade mark are relevant in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion or unfair advantage under that provision.’”
“The law of passing off can be summarised in one short general proposition - no man may pass off his goods as those of another. More specifically, it may be expressed in terms of the elements which the plaintiff in such an action has to prove in order to succeed. These are three in number. First he must establish a goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or services which he supplies in the mind of the purchasing public by association with the identifying ‘get-up’ (whether it consists simply of a brand name or trade description, or the individual features of labelling or packaging) under which his particular goods or services are offered to the public, such that the get-up is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of the plaintiff's goods or services. Secondly, he must demonstrate a misrepresentation by the defendant to the public (whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that goods or services offered by him are the goods or services of the plaintiff. Whether the public is aware of the plaintiff's identity as the manufacturer or supplier of the goods or services is immaterial, as long as they are identified with a particular source which is in fact the plaintiff. Thirdly he must demonstrate that he suffers, or in a quia timet action that he is likely to suffer, damage by reason of the erroneous belief engendered by the defendant's misrepresentation that the source of the defendant’s goods or services is the same as the source of those offered by the plaintiff.”
“158 As Jacob J forcefully stated in Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd v Wards Mobility Services Ltd[1994] 1 WLR 1564 at 1569-1570: “I turn to consider the law and begin by identifying what is not the law. There is no tort of copying. There is no tort of taking a man's market or customers. Neither the market nor the customers are the plaintiff's to own. There is no tort of making use of another's goodwill as such. There is no tort of competition. … At the heart of passing off lies deception or its likelihood, deception of the ultimate consumer in particular. Over the years passing off has developed from the classic case of the defendant selling his goods as and for those of the plaintiff to cover other kinds of deception, e.g. that the defendant's goods are the same as those of the plaintiff when they are not, e.g. Combe International Ltd v. Scholl (UK) Ltd [1980] R.P.C. 1; or that the defendant's goods are the same as goods sold by a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member when they are not, e.g. Erven Warnink Besloten Vennootschap v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] A.C. 29 (the Advocaat case). Never has the tort shown even a slight tendency to stray beyond cases of deception. Were it to do so it would enter the field of honest competition, declared unlawful for some reason other than deceptiveness. Why there should be any such reason I cannot imagine. It would serve only to stifle competition. The foundation of the plaintiff's case here must therefore lie in deception…” 159. It is not enough if members of the public are merely caused to wonder. As Jacob LJ explained in Phones 4U Ltd v Phone4U.co.uk Internet Ltd[2006] EWCA Civ 244 ,[2007] RPC 5 : “16. The next point of passing off law to consider is misrepresentation. Sometimes a distinction is drawn between ‘mere confusion’ which is not enough, and ‘deception’, which is. I described the difference as ‘elusive’ in Reed Executive Plc v Reed Business Information Ltd[2004] RPC 40 . I said this, [111]: ‘Once the position strays into misleading a substantial number of people (going from ‘I wonder if there is a connection’ to ‘I assume there is a connection’) there will be passing off, whether the use is as a business name or a trade mark on goods.’ 17. This of course is a question of degree—there will be some mere wonderers and some assumers—there will normally (see below) be passing off if there is a substantial number of the latter even if there is also a substantial number of the former. 18. The current (2005) edition of Kerly contains a discussion of the distinction at paras 15–043 to 15–045. It is suggested that: ‘The real distinction between mere confusion and deception lies in their causative effects. Mere confusion has no causative effect (other than to confuse lawyers and their clients) whereas, if in answer to the question: “what moves the public to buy?”, the insignia complained of is identified, then it is a case of deception.’ 19. Although correct as far as it goes, I do not endorse that as a complete statement of the position. Clearly if the public are induced to buy by mistaking the insignia of B for that which they know to be that of A , there is deception. But there are other cases too—for instance those in the Buttercup case. A more complete test would be whether what is said to be deception rather than mere confusion is really likely to be damaging to the claimant's goodwill or divert trade from him. I emphasise the word ‘really’.” 160. In order for there to be passing off, a substantial number of members of the public must be misled: see Neutrogena Corp v Golden Ltd[1996] RPC 473 at 493-494 (Morritt LJ). Furthermore, it is not enough that careless or indifferent people may be led into error: see Norman Kark Publications Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd[1962] 1 WLR 380 at 383 (Wilberforce J). 161. The correct approach to this question was well described by Jacob J at first instance in Neutrogena at 482: “The judge must consider the evidence adduced and use his own common sense and his own opinion as to the likelihood of deception. It is an overall ‘jury’ assessment involving a combination of all these factors, see ‘GE’ Trade Mark [1973] R.P.C. 297 at page 321. Ultimately the question is one for the court, not for the witnesses. It follows that if the judge's own opinion is that the case is marginal, one where he cannot be sure whether there is a likelihood of sufficient deception, the case will fail in the absence of enough evidence of the likelihood of deception. But if that opinion of the judge is supplemented by such evidence then it will succeed. And even if one's own opinion is that deception is unlikely though possible, convincing evidence of deception will carry the day. The Jif lemon case (Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc.[1990] RPC 341 ) is a recent example where overwhelming evidence of deception had that effect. It was certainly my experience in practice that my own view as to the likelihood of deception was not always reliable. As I grew more experienced I said more and more ‘it depends on the evidence.’”
“The absence of a common field of activity, therefore, is not fatal; but it is not irrelevant either. In deciding whether there is a likelihood of confusion, it is an important and highly relevant consideration “...whether there is any kind of association, or could be in the minds of the public any kind of association, between the field of activities of the plaintiff and the field of activities of the defendant”: Annabel's (Berkeley Square) Ltd. v. G. Schock (trading as Annabel S Escort Agency) [l9721 R.P.C. 838 at page 844 per Russell L.J. In [Lego System A/S v. Lego M. Lemelstrich Ltd.[1983] FSR 15 ] Falconer J. likewise held that the proximity of the defendant's field of activity to that of the plaintiff was a factor to be taken into account when deciding whether the defendant's conduct would cause the necessary confusion. Where the plaintiff's business name is a household name the degree of overlap between the fields of activity of the parties’ respective businesses may often be a less important consideration in assessing whether there is likely to be confusion, but in my opinion it is always a relevant factor to be taken into account. Where there is no or only a tenuous degree of overlap between the parties’ respective fields of activity the burden of proving the likelihood of confusion and resulting damage is a heavy one. In Stringfellow v. McCain Foods (G.B.) Ltd. [1984] R.P.C. 501 Slade L.J. said (at page 535) that the further removed from one another the respective fields of activities, the less likely was it that any member of the public could reasonably be confused into thinking that the one business was connected with the other; and he added (at page 545) that: “even if it considers that there is a limited risk of confusion of this nature, the court should not, in my opinion, readily infer the likelihood of resulting damage to the plaintiffs as against an innocent defendant in a completely different line of business. In such a case the onus falling on plaintiffs to show that damage to their business reputation is in truth likely to ensue and to cause them more than minimal loss is in my opinion a heavy one.”