“it ought to have been clear by the end of December 2010 that the trading between October and Christmas would not be sufficient to support the LLP through the first 5 months of the following year given the arrears and cash demands”. c) Third, his further alternative date is1 April 2011 . This was when: “… the Respondents approached Lloyds for a loan to meet cash-flow but … [did not] have … any reasonable prospects of securing funding … [and] approved[31 July 2010 ] annual accounts incorporating … [a] disputed capital account balance and on12 April 2011 … [made] [disputed] adjustments … to the First Respondent’s capital account ledger to bring it into a credit balance … because the Respondents had recognised that the LLP had no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation or alternatively … were sufficiently concerned to want to eliminate the overdrawn balance from the accounting records”. d) Fourth, Mr McTear’s next date is13 May 2011 : “being the date on which the Second Respondent emailed Mr Weller confirming that Lloyds would not support the LLP and relaying the dire financial position”. e) Fifth, the final date is14 July 2011 when: “the Respondents confirmed in their note to [his] offices that they recognised the business could not continue”
“taking the capital accounts together, the Eades were always net creditors of the LLP and the current accounts which recorded the drawings were cleared off by the capital accounts when the statutory accounts were finalised … Therefore, at all times, as a matter of law, the capital and current accounts should be netted off … [withdrawals] can also be set off as against the monies put into the LLP and against their capital account by virtue of the principle of insolvency set off (see rule 14.25 of theInsolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 )”. “The End of September 2010 Trading Defence”
“The members honestly anticipated that these sales would have rescued the LLP from being placed into liquidation had the support of [Lloyds Bank] been forthcoming”. “Other Defences”
“it wasn’t an easy start”
“Attention then turned to the plight of the LLP, which had significant debt and little funds”
“The current cash flow … is at its tightest since we first discussed our options with you … our sales have fallen below the minimum required to keep up to date with our cash demands. Chris and I have injected a further£40,000 into the business to remain afloat … Our concerns remain that by you continuing to act for us will drain cash flow further and as no viable solution to our plight has been possible, we cannot continue to casually incur expense. Further overhead cuts have been instigated and we have realised assets to improve cash flow temporarily. I have drafted a revised business plan and have requested from Lloyds a facility to cover our current working capital shortfall, which they are considering. The positive is that we have secured new clients and prospects for the summer look likely to improve, subject to the goodwill of our creditors. I am not in a position to settle any fees to you currently, my main concern is to ensure the VAT and PAYE get paid this month to prevent HMRC returning to [distrain] … as they have threatened before”
“content inevitable”
“I hesitate to attempt to formulate a general test of the degree of financial instability which would impose upon directors an obligation to consider the interests of creditors. For present purposes, it is not necessary to draw upon Nicholson v Permakraft as authority for any more than the proposition that the duty arises when a company is insolvent inasmuch as it is the creditors’ money which is at risk, in contrast to the shareholders proprietary interests. It needs to be borne in mind that to some extent the degree of financial instability and the degree of risk to the creditors are interrelated. Courts have traditionally and properly been cautious indeed in entering boardrooms and pronouncing upon the commercial justification of particular executive decisions. Wholly differing value considerations might enter into an adjudication upon the justification for a particular decision by a speculative mining company of doubtful stability on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by a company engaged in a more conservative business in a state of comparable financial instability. Moreover, the plainer it is that it is the creditors’ money that is at risk, the lower may be the risk to which the directors, regardless of the unanimous support of all of the shareholders, can justifiably expose the company.”
“Mr Chivers also objected that an account of profits is not within section 21(1 )(b). I am inclined to agree, but the remedies sought by the claimant include equitable compensation and that appears to me to be an appropriate remedy falling within section 21(1 )(b), particularly where, as in the case of Mrs Fielding, the trustee’s indirect interest in the trust asset has been converted to the use of the trustee.”