“Nothing in this application should be taken as a submission by Mrs Angela Shamoon and Ms Alexandra Shamoon to the jurisdiction of the English Courts. They make no such submission, and this application is made expressly without prejudice to their rights to object to the English Court’s jurisdiction, in the event that this claim were to be continued, which rights remain fully reserved.”
“It should be made expressly clear that, by making this Application, neither the First nor Second Defendant is to be taken to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the English Court. They make no such submission, and this Application is made expressly without prejudice to their rights to object to the English Court’s jurisdiction, in the event that this claim were to be continued, which rights remain fully reserved.”
“As the Application makes clear, our clients do not by this Application make any submission to the jurisdiction of the English Courts and fully reserve their rights, including to object to the English Court’s jurisdiction.”
“I would like to make clear that by making this witness statement in support of the application, I do not submit to the jurisdiction of the English Court. Being resident in Israel (as I explain in more detail below), I make no such submission and this witness statement and application are made expressly without prejudice to my right and intention to object to the English Court’s jurisdiction, and also to the validity of the purported service on me of the claim documents by the Claimants.”
“Without prejudice to our clients’ contention that your clients have, by their conduct, already submitted to the jurisdiction of the English Court, any application by your clients to challenge jurisdiction be made within 14 days of the consent order setting aside default judgment.”
“We enclose by way of service on your clients Part 18 Requests for Further Information and Clarification of the Particulars of Claim which are being made for the purpose of their challenge to the jurisdiction of the English Court, and expressly (and self-evidently) without any submission to such jurisdiction being made. These Requests, and your clients’ answers to the same, are reasonable, necessary and proportionate in order to enable our clients to prepare their application challenging jurisdiction.”
“This is a Request for Further Information of the Particulars of Claim pursuant toCPR Part 18 dated20 January 2015 . It is served on behalf of Mrs Angela Shamoon and Ms Alexandra Shamoon for the purpose of their challenge to the jurisdiction of the English Court which they intend to bring pursuant toCPR Part 11 and is reasonably necessary and proportionate in order to resolve the issues that arise on that application. By making this Request for Further Information neither Mrs Angela Shamoon nor Ms Alexandra Shamoon submits or is taken to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the English Court. Rather, the purpose of this Request is to assist the Court in resolving Mrs Angela Shamoon and Ms Alexandra Shamoon’ applications contesting jurisdiction.”
“Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.”
“The rules of jurisdiction must be highly predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile and jurisdiction must always be available on this ground saving a few well-defined situations in which the subject matter of the litigation or the autonomy of the parties warrants a different linking factor.”
“Apart from jurisdiction derived from other provisions of this regulation, a court of a member state before which a defendant enters an appearance shall have jurisdiction. This rule shall not apply where appearance was entered to contest the jurisdiction…”
“Article 18 governs jurisdiction implied from submission. If a defendant domiciled in a Contracting State is sued in a court of another Contracting State which does not have jurisdiction under the Convention, two situations may arise: the defendant may either, as he is entitled to do, plead that the court has no jurisdiction under the Convention, in which case the court must declare that it does not have jurisdiction; or he may elect not to raise this plea, and enter an appearance. In the latter case, the court will have jurisdiction.”
“Unlike the case of conventions based on indirect jurisdiction, the defendant may, by virtue of the Convention, rely on its provisions in the court seised of the proceedings and plead lack of jurisdiction. It will be necessary to refer to the rules of procedure in force in the state of the court seised of the proceedings in order to determine the point in time up to which the defendant will be allowed to raise this plea, and to determine the legal meaning of the term ‘appearance’.”
“21. Professor Briggs and Mr Rees QC, in Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (5th edn. 2009) ("Briggs and Rees"), while recognising that "enters an appearance" may have an autonomous meaning, go on to say at paragraph 2.83 that precisely how and when the entering of an appearance takes place is governed by rules of local procedural law, provided always that these rules do not impair the effectiveness of the Convention. That view is consistent with the general approach of the ECJ to procedural rules: see Case 365-88 Kongress Agentur Hagen GmbH v Zeehaage BV[1990] ECR I-1845 cited by Simon Brown LJ in Harada Limited (trading a Chequepoint) v Turner[2003] EWCA Civ 1695 at [30]. Thus national law must not contain rules which compel a defendant to enter an appearance and thereby submit to the jurisdiction in order to protect his position on the merits. Such rules would impair the operation of the Convention. 22. It is therefore to national procedural rules that one must look, in the first instance, to determine whether an appearance has been entered. Once one has determined that question as a matter of national procedural law, it is necessary to ask whether the result is consistent with the effective operation of the Convention.”
“What is required of [the defendant] is that he makes his contest to the jurisdiction at the first opportunity which is given to him under the procedural law of the Court seised, and not, as happened in Elefanten Schuh, as decidedly late afterthought. It is difficult to believe that this provision should now give rise to any practical difficulty. If the plea to object to the jurisdiction is made at the first practical opportunity and no later than the time for filing the first defence, and in accordance with the procedural rules of the Court or tribunal concerned, neither concurrently entering a defence on the merits, nor taking procedural steps, such as applying for an extension of time to make the jurisdictional challenge, or seeking discovery of documents in order to demonstrate the facts which show the Court not to have jurisdiction, in the course of the adjudication upon the jurisdictional plea, will prejudice the position of the defendant. By contrast, taking further voluntary steps, not themselves consistent with the original and continuing intention to challenge the jurisdiction, but which deal instead with the merits of the claim, will be liable to forfeit the protection of Article 26, and will amount to the entering of an appearance.”
“In my judgment, the defendants entered an appearance within the meaning of the Brussels Regulation in respect of the claims originally brought by Maple Leaf when they acknowledged service of these proceedings. They did not thereby lose the right to challenge the jurisdiction: they had the right to do so under the CPR. To that extent the defendants did not unconditionally enter an appearance by the filing of the acknowledgment of service. They made this explicit by expressing their intention to challenge jurisdiction on the form, but it would have been the case in any event: see the judgment of Mr. Michael Briggs QC in IBS Technologies (PVT) Ltd v APM Technologies SA, unreported,7 April 2003 .”
“in determining whether there has been an appearance pursuant to Art. 24 of the Brussels regulation it is appropriate to consider whether there has been a submission to the jurisdiction in accordance with the local law, in this case, English law.”
“If the proceedings before this Court were considered in isolation, B&S did not enter an appearance. In the acknowledgement of service the box for challenging the jurisdiction was crossed and within 14 days of filing the acknowledgement B&S made its application disputing the Court’s jurisdiction supported by evidence pursuant toCPR 11 (4).”
“The general rule in the ordinary case in England is that the party alleged to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the English Court must have "taken some step which is only necessary or only useful if" an objection to jurisdiction "has actually been waived, or if the objection has never been entertained at all."”
“I cannot see how anyone can fairly say that a man has voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of a court, when he has all the time been vigorously protesting that it has no jurisdiction.”
“1. This Regulation shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters. 2. The Regulation shall not apply to: (a) the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession; (b) bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings; (c) social security; (d) arbitration.”
“255. The Brussels Regulation provides a comprehensive code or jurisdiction for the courts of the member states of the European Union. The general rule is that all civil and commercial matters are subject to the Brussels Regulation and that, pursuant to Article 2, defendants should be sued at the place of their domicile. 256. It was submitted for Sabbagh that where other Articles exclude or provide exceptions to this general principle, they must be construed strictly and not given an interpretation broader than is required by their objective: see for exampleCase C-292/08 German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v van der Schee [2010] ILPr 1 (at paragraphs 23 to 25) (“German Graphics”). The Defendants rejected this, at least in relation to Article 1(2), on the basis that German Graphics was a case in respect of insolvency where, unlike succession, the scope of insolvency proceedings is specifically defined (see in particular Article 2) and Annex A of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings ("the Insolvency Regulation"). 257. I am not persuaded that the statements in German Graphics are not of more general application than simply in the insolvency context. The statement (in paragraph 23) to the effect that Article 1(1) of the Brussels Regulation should be broad in its scope was a general one (see for example the comments made to similar effect in the context of Article 22 in JP Morgan NA v Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe[2012] QB 199 ("BVG") addressed below). But in any event my findings below do not depend on whether a narrow or a broad approach to construction is taken.”
“succession to the estate of a deceased person and covers all forms of transfer of assets, rights and obligations by reason of death, whether by way of voluntary transfer under a disposition of property upon death or transfer through intestate succession.”
“The scope of this Regulation should include all civil-law aspects of succession to the estate of a deceased person, namely all forms of transfer of assets, rights and obligations by reason of death, whether by way of a voluntary transfer under a disposition of property upon death or a transfer through intestate succession.”
“The High Court has jurisdiction to determine the succession of the property of any person if, but only if, there is a properly constituted representative of the estate before the court.”
“‘Good arguable case’ reflects in that context that one side has a much better argument on the material available. It is the concept which the phrase reflects on which it is important to concentrate, i.e. of the court being satisfied or as satisfied as it can be having regard to the limitations which an interlocutory process imposes that factors exist which allow the court to take jurisdiction.”
“…when looking for “the much better argument” the court is concerned with the question of relative plausibility. But there is also an absolute standard to be met. The words used by Waller LJ, namely a "much better argument", mean more than that, on the material available, the case is arguable. There must be some substance to it: since we are deciding a question of jurisdiction, the evidence must achieve an acceptable level of quality and adequacy. However, the standard to be attained is not that of succeeding on a balance of probabilities because there is no trial: see per Flaux J in Erste Group Bank AG v JSC (VMZ Red October)[2013] EWHC 2926 (Comm) .”
“(2) An individual is domiciled in the United Kingdom if and only if— (a) he is resident in the United Kingdom; and (b) the nature and circumstances of his residence indicate that he has a substantial connection with the United Kingdom.”
“487 I am not persuaded that Yugraneft has much the better of the argument on whether at the date of the issue of the claim form Mr Abramovich was resident in England and Wales. On the contrary it appears to me that, despite his ownership of Chelsea and his property in Lowndes Square, he was resident in Russia and not in England. Purchases of expensive property in England which, in the case of a man of ordinary wealth, would suggest settlement here, may have no such significance to someone for whom money is no object.”
“It is therefore clear that, whether in order to become non-resident in the UK or whether at any rate to avoid being deemed by the statutory provision still to be resident in the UK, the ordinary law requires the UK resident to effect a distinct break in the pattern of his life in the UK. The requirement of a distinct break mandates a multifactorial inquiry. In my view however the controversial references in the judgment of Moses LJ in the decision under appeal to the need in law for “severance of social and family ties” pitch the requirement, at any rate by implication, at too high a level. The distinct break relates to the pattern of the taxpayer's life in the UK and no doubt it encompasses a substantial loosening of social and family ties; but the allowance, to which I will refer, of limited visits to the UK on the part of the taxpayer who has become non-resident, clearly foreshadows their continued existence in a loosened form. “Severance” of such ties is too strong a word in this context.”
“In evaluating the prospects of success of a claim or defence the judge is not required to abandon her critical faculties. As Potter LJ put it in E D & F Man Liquid Products Ltd v Patel[2003] EWCA Civ 472 , [2003] CP Rep 51 at [10]: “It is certainly the case that under both rules, where there are significant differences between the parties so far as factual issues are concerned, the court is in no position to conduct a mini-trial: see per Lord Woolf MR in Swain v Hillman[2001] 1 All ER 91 at 95 in relation toCPR 24 . However, that does not mean that the court has to accept without analysis everything said by a party in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporary documents. If so, issues which are dependent upon those factual assertions may be susceptible of disposal at an early stage so as to save the cost and delay of trying an issue the outcome of which is inevitable: see the note at 24.2.3 in Civil Procedure (Autumn 2002) Vol 1 p.467 and Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No.3) [2001] UKHL/16,[2001] 2 All ER 513 per Lord Hope of Craighead at paragraph [95].””
“In any event, the court is not bound to accept a witness statement which is inherently defective, and certainly should not do so if it conflicts with other incontrovertible evidence or is unreliable for some other tangible reason, or, as Christopher Clarke J (as he then was) put it in Cherney v Deripaska[2008] EWHC 1530 at [44], “wholly implausible”.”
“Although the investigation concerned Mr Shamoon’s estate, it also indirectly involved the affairs of Angela Shamoon. HMRC did not make an express judgment as to Mrs Shamoon’s tax position (to my knowledge) as part of the investigation as this was not the purpose of the investigation. However, HMRC accepted evidence throughout the investigation, which I and my team were involved in preparing and which I have no reason to doubt was anything other than fulsome and correct, that Angela Shamoon was physically present with her husband for the vast majority of the period under assessment and, therefore, were inclined to agree that if one were non-UK resident for a given tax year then this would be the same for both of them.”
“Angela describes the work of Mr Hodgson-Barker as a “forensic review”, but it is nothing of the sort. It is the work of a man paid to help Angela argue that she is not resident in the UK, limited to a review of Angela’s own manipulated day count, using only the supporting evidence which Angela has chosen to provide and accepting instructions from Angela which are factually wrong. As Mr Hodgson-Barker states himself, his conclusions rely on information collected and supplied by Angela’s personal assistant, rather than any kind of independent investigation.”
“Please find hereunder the list of the days Mr Sami Shamoon was in Israel - take into consideration that this is a list of his days in Israel ONLY - the days that he was not in Israel he could have been in any one of the following countries: London, New York, Cannes, Turkey etc…”
“64. As someone who was close to Sami, managing most of his business and personal issues, I can state that the centre of Sami’s life until a couple of months prior to his death was undoubtedly in England.” “66. Sami not only lived in England with his entire family, including Alexandra and Angela, but also managed his worldwide business from there, including the Yakhin Hakal Group, by instructing managers and directors, such as Mr Grumbach and me, to act on his behalf, on a regular basis.”
“61. Similarly Angela claims that I knew that Sami was not resident in England when he died. She quotes documents where I put forward arguments to support this position, but this was just advocacy to help her to reduce taxes that Sami’s estate would have to pay, which I sent out Angela’s request and under her explicit instructions. As Angela knows, but does not mention, the arguments which I suggested were not even accepted by HMRC; HMRC decided that Sami was resident in the UK from 2004/5 to 2007/8 inclusive.”
“(1) The necessary or proper party head of jurisdiction was anomalous, in that, by contrast with the other heads, it was not founded upon any territorial connection between the claim, the subject matter of the relevant action and the jurisdiction of the English courts. (2) Caution must always be exercised in bringing foreign defendants within the jurisdiction under that head, and in particular it should never become the practice to bring in foreign defendants as a matter of course, on the ground that the only alternative requires more than one suit in more than one different jurisdiction. (3) The fact that the defendant within the jurisdiction (D1 or the “anchor defendant”) is sued only for the purpose of bringing in the party outside the jurisdiction (D2) is not fatal to the application for permission to serve D2 out of the jurisdiction, but it is a factor in the exercise of the discretion. (4) The action is not properly brought against D1 if it is bound to fail. (5) If a question of law arises on the application which goes to the existence of jurisdiction, the court will normally decide it, rather than treating it as a question of whether there is a good arguable case. (6) The question of the merits of the claim is relevant to the question of whether the claim against D1 is “bound to fail” and to the question whether there is a “serious issue to be tried” in relation to the claim against D2; and there is no practical difference between the two tests, and they in turn are the same as the test for summary judgment. (7) In considering the merits of the claim, whether the claim against D1 is bound to fail on a question of law should be decided on the application for permission to serve D2 (or to discharge the order), but it would not normally be appropriate to decide a controversial question of law in a developing area, particularly because it is desirable that the facts should be found so that any further development of the law should be on the basis of actual and not hypothetical facts. (8) The question whether D2 is a proper party is answered by asking: “supposing both parties had been within the jurisdiction would they both have been proper parties to the action?”
“I the undersigned, Sami Shamoon Adulnabi, holder of Portuguese Passport No. h 754544 hereby instruct you, expressly and in writing, that prior to engaging in any activity and/or commitment and/or payment and/or bank transfer, and/or waiver and/or charge of any kind and/or any instruction regarding property and all bills and/or monies and/or trusts and/or shares in my companies, registered directly or indirectly in my name and/or to my benefit - and which lie under your care, you must obtain my express written and executed consent, as well as oral (live or via telephone) confirmation from myself personally. I am hereby cancelling all prior instructions for transactions which do not have my written authorisation and telephone confirmation.”
“The gift of the legal interest in the property will not be complete until the donor has completed all the formalities necessary to vest the legal interest in the donee. The gift may, however, be treated as complete in equity at an earlier point in the transaction when some of those remaining steps are still unfulfilled. It has been held that if the donor has taken all the steps that lie exclusively in his power, according to the nature of the property given, to vest the legal interest in the property in the donee, then the gift will be complete in equity. The gift will not fail even if something remains to be done by the donee or some third person.”
“Miss Angus very properly treated me to a full citation of the two most recent authorities bearing upon this question, namely Pennington v. Waine[2002] 1 WLR 2075 and Zeital & anr v. David Norman Kaye & ors[2010] EWCA Civ 159 . In Pennington v. Waine, Arden LJ (with whom Schiemann LJ agreed) identified three routes by which, in the context of a defective voluntarily transfer of shares, the court might avoid the rigorous application of the principle that equity will not compel the completion of an imperfect gift, in the absence of a valid declaration of trust. She described all three as methods whereby a court of equity might temper the wind to the shorn lamb. The first is where the donor has done everything necessary to enable the donee to enforce a beneficial claim without further assistance from the donor: see paragraphs 55 to 56 and Rose v. Inland Revenue Commissioners[1952] Ch 499 . The second is where some detrimental reliance by the donee upon an apparent although ineffective gift may so bind the conscience of the donor to justify the imposition of a constructive trust: see paragraph 59. The third is where by a benevolent construction an effective gift or implied declaration of trust may be teased out of the words used: see paragraphs 60 to 61, apparently based upon Choithram International SA v. Pagarani[2001] 1 WLR 1 . On its facts, Pennington v Waine appears to have been an example of a sufficient detrimental reliance by the donee, who had agreed to become a director of the subject company upon an assumption that he had received an effective gift of qualifying shares in it: see paragraphs 64 and 66.”
“Mr GRUMBACH indicated that Mr. Sami SHAMOON instructed him to undertake the necessary steps in order to transfer 1% of the shares in the company to Mr WINKLER. These instructions have been given orally by Mr SHAMOON and they have also been confirmed in writing. The written instructions are kept in a safe and will be transmitted to the interim executor as soon as he has obtained the recognition in Switzerland of the “order of appointment of provisional executor” rendered by the Family Court Kfar Saba on June 18 2009.”
“In my note of the meeting dated27 July 2009 it says that the written instructions from Mr Shamoon relating to the transfer of 1% of the Ainsbury shares to Mr Winkler are kept in a safe. However, the written instructions signed by Mr Shamoon in fact relate to the transfer of shares in the company B. Gaon Holdings Limited. A copy and translation appears at page 2 of PAG2. The note of that meeting did not specify that the instructions were in respect of B. Gaon Holdings Limited, not Ainsbury, because it was later that Mr Shamoon instructed me to transfer 1% of the shares in Ainsbury to Mr Winkler instead. As I have mentioned above, when the instructions changed I asked Mr Shamoon to send written confirmation of this instruction, but he did not.”
“Registered shares are transferred by a written instrument of transfer signed by the transferor and containing the name and address of the transferee. The instrument of transfer shall also be signed by the transferee if registration as a holder of the share imposes a liability to the company on the transferee. The instrument of transfer of a registered share shall be sent to the company for registration.”
“equity has tempered the wind to the shorn lamb by applying a benevolent construction to words of gift. As explained above an imperfect gift is not saved by being treated as a declaration to trust. But where a court of equity is satisfied that the donor had an intention to make an immediate gift, the court will construe the words used as words effecting a gift or declaring a trust if the words can fairly bear that meaning…”
“But where a court of equity is satisfied that the donor had an intention to make an immediate gift, the court will construe the words which the donor used as words effecting a gift or declaring a trust if they can fairly bear that meaning and otherwise the gift will fail. This point can also be illustrated by reference to T Choithram International SA v Pagarini[2001] 1 WLR 1 ... [61] Accordingly the principle that, where a gift is imperfectly constituted, the court will not hold it to operate as a declaration of trust, does not prevent the court from construing it to be a trust if that interpretation is permissible as a matter of construction, which may be a benevolent construction. The same must apply to words of gift. An equity to perfect a gift would not be invoked by giving a benevolent construction to words of gift or, it follows, words which the donor used to communicate or give effect to his gift.”
“[53] The principle that equity will not assist a volunteer has been lucidly explained in Maitland, Lectures on Equity (1909), p 73:” “I have a son called Thomas. I write a letter to him saying ‘I give you my Blackacre estate, my leasehold house in the High Street, the sum of£1,000 Consols standing in my name, the wine in my cellar’. This is ineffectual—I have given nothing—a letter will not convey freehold or leasehold land, it will not transfer Government stock, it will not pass the ownership in goods. Even if, instead of writing a letter, I had executed a deed of covenant—saying not I do convey Blackacre, I do assign the leasehold house and the wine, but I covenant to convey and assign—even this would not have been a perfect gift. It would be an imperfect gift, and being an imperfect gift the court will not regard it as a declaration of trust. I have made quite clear that I do not intend to make myself a trustee, I meant to give. The two intentions are very different—the giver means to get rid of his rights, the man who is intending to make himself a trustee intends to retain his rights but to come under an onerous obligation. The latter intention is far rarer than the former. Men often mean to give things to their kinsfolk, they do not often mean to constitute themselves trustees. An imperfect gift is no declaration of trust. This is well illustrated by the cases of Richards v Delbridge LR 18 Eq 11 and Heartley v Nicholson (1875) LR 19 Eq 233.” “I have a son called Thomas. I write a letter to him saying ‘I give you my Blackacre estate, my leasehold house in the High Street, the sum of£1,000 Consols standing in my name, the wine in my cellar’. This is ineffectual—I have given nothing—a letter will not convey freehold or leasehold land, it will not transfer Government stock, it will not pass the ownership in goods. Even if, instead of writing a letter, I had executed a deed of covenant—saying not I do convey Blackacre, I do assign the leasehold house and the wine, but I covenant to convey and assign—even this would not have been a perfect gift. It would be an imperfect gift, and being an imperfect gift the court will not regard it as a declaration of trust. I have made quite clear that I do not intend to make myself a trustee, I meant to give. The two intentions are very different—the giver means to get rid of his rights, the man who is intending to make himself a trustee intends to retain his rights but to come under an onerous obligation. The latter intention is far rarer than the former. Men often mean to give things to their kinsfolk, they do not often mean to constitute themselves trustees. An imperfect gift is no declaration of trust. This is well illustrated by the cases of Richards v Delbridge LR 18 Eq 11 and Heartley v Nicholson (1875) LR 19 Eq 233.”
“is based on three main elements… a representation or assurance made to the claimant; reliance on it by the claimant; and detriment to the claimant in consequence of his reasonable reliance.”
“Alexandra has no control over the assets of the Trust until she turns 35 and the Trust comes to an end. Until then, and save for payment of the monthly stipend, all matters relating to the management and use of the Trust assets is in the sole control of the trustee.”
“I do not believe I ever made any such representations and I do not understand on what basis Mr Winkler can even allege that I have done so.”
“This letter was signed pursuant to what my mother and I had been led to believe by Mr Grumbach and Mr Winkler. I believe it was signed by me in Israel. In the circumstances as I have explained them, it was perfectly natural for me to say I had no objections to this transfer. I thought I was merely attending to a formality based on what Mr Grumbach and Mr Winkler told me and that was needed in connection with what my late father had apparently decided and so instructed Mr Grumbach to do. This letter was also subject to the (missing) consent of the administrators of the estate.”
“The overwhelming weight of authority shows that detriment is required. But the authorities also show that it is not a narrow or technical concept. The detriment need not consist of the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something substantial. The requirement must be approached as part of a broad inquiry as to whether repudiation of an assurance is or is not unconscionable in all the circumstances.”
“A person domiciled in a State bound by this Convention may also be sued: 1. where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgements resulting from separate proceedings.”
“Therefore, in order for article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 to apply, it is necessary to ascertain whether, between various claims brought by the same applicant against various defendants, there is a connection of such a kind that it is expedient to determine those actions together in order to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings: see Freeport plc v Arnoldsson (Case C-98/06 )[2008] QB 634 ;[2007] ECR I-8319 , para 39, and Land Berlin v Sapir, para 42. In that regard, in order for judgments to be regarded as irreconcilable, it is not sufficient that there be a divergence in the outcome of the dispute, but that divergence must also arise in the context of the same situation of fact and law: see Freeport plc v Arnoldsson, para 40; Painer’s case[2011] ECR I-12533 , para 79; and in Land Berlin v Sapir [2013] CEC 947, para 43.”
“If, as a result, the Claimants have lost out either because: (1) They have beneficial title to shares as a result of Sami’s instructions, but for any reason are unable to vindicate their rights to the shares to the full extent as a result of Mr Grumbach’s failure to ensure that the necessary formalities were completed to bring about the transfer of legal title, whether before or (in the case of Ainsbury, assuming he did have a written instrument of transfer) after Sami’s death, or (2) They have no title to the shares, but would have done so but for Mr Grumbach’s negligence in failing to take the necessary steps to give effect to Sami’s intended gift of the shares to them, then it is fair, just and reasonable for Mr Grumbach to compensate them for this.” then it is fair, just and reasonable for Mr Grumbach to compensate them for this.”