Antonio Sidoli & Anor v Dante Sidoli & Anor [2025] EWHC 1425 (Ch)

[2025] EWHC 1425 (Ch)Case No PT 2024 000618IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICECHANCERY DIVISIONBUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALESVenue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 10/06/2025
Before
DEPUTY MASTER DEW
Between
ANTONIO SIDOLIClaimantsANDREA SIDOLIClaimantDANTE SIDOLIDefendantsANNA SIDOLIDefendant
Sarah Egan (instructed by Pini Franco LLP) for ClaimantsRaj Sahonte (instructed by DMH Stallard LLP) for DefendantsHearing Hearing dates: 16 May 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on [date] by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................
[1]In this claim the Claimants seek to register under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (“the 1933 Act”), and the Defendants (for the procedural reasons set out below) seek to set aside the registration of, a judgment made by the Italian Court of Piacenza ordering the Defendants to pay a sum of €381,796.31 plus interest.[2]The applications raise the question of whether the 1933 Act can be used to register judgments arising out of claims in foreign courts regarding succession. In my judgment, it cannot, or at least it cannot usually. For that reason, and as expanded upon in more detail below, I refuse registration, alternatively set such registration aside.

The Italian Judgment

[3]The proceedings in Italy concern the estate of Davide Sidoli. Davide died on 14 September 2006. He left an English Will, dated 22 August 2006, which states his residence to be St Joseph’s Hospice in London and on the face of it applies to his worldwide estate. The executors of the Will were the partners of a firm called Whiskers. There has never been a grant of probate of Davide’s Will.[4]Davide was pre-deceased by his father, Quintilio Francesco Giovanni Sidoli, who died on 14 May 2004. Quintilio left a Will dated 12 October 2000, describing his residence as 3 Broadfield Avenue in London and which applied to his estate outside of the Republic of Italy. That Will appointed Davide as executor. Amongst other things, it gave the property at 3 Broadfield Avenue to be held on a trust which permitted Quintilio’s sister-in-law, Inez, to live in the property and, at the time when the property was sold, gave the sum of £100,000 to Davide. It also left the residue of the estate to Davide so, in the event, Davide was solely entitled to 3 Broadfield Avenue subject to Inez’s interest. From the Italian judgment referred to below it can be seen that Quintilio also left an Italian Will in Italy leaving his whole estate to Davide.[5]Davide’s Will left his estate to the Defendants, who are his brother and his brother’s wife (i.e. Davide’s sister-in-law). It contains the following statement:
“For the avoidance of doubt I take this opportunity to confirm that it is my wish that neither of my former wife’s sons namely Andrea Sidoli and Antonio Sidoli shall receive any part of my estate as BOTH sons were born to my then wife … during our marriage but I was not their natural father and I consequently take the view that I have no moral obligation to make any financial provision for them from my estate and I FIRMLY TAKE THE VIEW that my said brother and sister-in-law are my closest living relatives.”
[6]Andrea and Antonio are the Claimants in this matter. They began proceedings in Italy in 2012. There were various hearings in Italy culminating, eventually, in a judgment of the Ordinary Court of Piacenza on 21 February 2020 (“the Judgment”). The bundle contains a translation of the Judgment and reading that, albeit reliant on the translation and without any expertise in Italian law and procedure, it can be seen that the court found that the Claimants were the children of Davide and set the Will aside on the grounds that Davide was mistaken in holding the belief that the Claimants were not his children. It then assessed, with reference to a report provided by a valuation expert who seems to have consulted both sides, the value of Andrea and Antonio’s share of the whole estate including his right over the 3 Broadfield Avenue.[7]The Judgment concludes with the following (according to the translation): “The Court, definitively pronouncing, any different and contrary instance rejected or absorbed, so disposes: 1. Ascertains the invalidity pursuant to art. 624, co.2, of the Italian Civil Code, of the testamentary dispositions contained in points 3 and 5 of the testaments dated 18 and 22 August 2006 by Davide Sidoli for the effect, 2. Cancels the same provisions; 3. Declares Andrea and Antonio Sidoli legitimate heirs of Davide Sidoli for the share of ½ each; 4. Condemns Davide Sidoli and Anna Moruzzi to the delivery and release, in favour of the plaintiffs, of their share of the properties located in the Municipality of Morass (PC); 5. Condemns the defendants to pay, in favour of the plaintiffs, the total amount of €381,796.31, plus legal interest from the date of this sentence to the balance. 6. Fully compensates litigation costs. 7. Definitively places the Technical Advice’s costs jointly and severally on the parties.[8]The Defendants appealed that decision. By a judgment made on 28 December 2022, the appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal of Bologna (“the Appeal Judgment”). The Appeal Judgment did not replace the earlier judgment but instead dismissed the appeal against it. It follows (and it was not disputed) that the Defendants remain liable under Italian Law to pay to the Claimants the sum set out in paragraph 5 of the above quote.

The English Process

[9]By an application notice dated 8 November 2023, the Claimants applied to register the Appeal Judgment “as a judgment of the High Court of Justice Business and Property Courts of England and Wales pursuant to ss. 1(1) and 2(1) of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933”. On 15 December 2023 Master Stevens Ordered that it be so registered, and gave the Defendants the right to set her order aside provided they do so within two months of the order.[10]By an application notice dated 25 April 2024 (following delays in service of the order) the Defendants applied to set the Order aside. On 9 May 2024, that application was dismissed on paper, Master Stevens deciding that the application identified no reasonable grounds to set the order aside. The Defendants then asked, by letter, for that dismissal to be set aside. That led to an Order of Master Stevens dated 24 May 2024, where she set aside the earlier Order of 19 December 2023, and ordered that the application notice and other documents of the Defendants be served on the Claimants.[11]It seems to me that the Order of 24 May 2024 was probably a mistake, and that Master Stevens had meant to set aside her Order of 9 May 2024. However, the effect is that the original registration was cancelled.[12]The matter was subsequently transferred to the Chancery Division, at the request of the Defendants who asked for a specialist judge. The matter was assigned to the Chief Master but, having once had to adjourn the hearing for unavailability, I was asked to hear the matter.[13]There have been no directions or other hearings in the matter. The directions given so far, which were for the filing and service of evidence, were agreed by the parties and made on paper. That has, in my judgment, created problems in hearing this case. It is clear to me that the Court would have been considerably assisted by expert evidence as to the nature of the Italian proceedings and judgments and that the parties would have been assisted by the Court asking them to spell out the grounds on which the registration was disputed. The grounds on which the Defendants objected to registration at the hearing were materially different to those set out in their witness statements and even to those in their counsel’s skeleton argument.[14]As it is, by the end of the hearing I was satisfied that the Court had sufficient material to determine the matter. Insofar as relevant to the Court’s decision, the nature and effect of the Judgment seemed to be common ground and both parties were content to make submissions with reference to a translation of the Judgment and did not seek expert evidence as to its meaning.[15]I was also satisfied that the Claimants did have sufficient notice of the points being made by the Defendants to properly respond to them. In particular, Ms Egan for the Claimants asked for a short period of time before commencing her Reply submissions, which I granted and she then dealt ably with the Defendants’ case.

Del-Curto v Del-Curto

[16]Before finally turning to the substance of my decision, I should mention the decision in Del-Curto v Del-Curto [2023] EWHC 2106 (KB). In that case, Master Cook dismissed an application to set aside registration of a judgment in very similar circumstances to this case. I must pay close attention to his reasons for doing so when deciding this case. Coincidentally, I was counsel in that case for the losing side. At the start of the hearing, I asked both counsel in this case whether they wished to make any application arising out of that (making it clear that the case has been finally concluded) and both firmly declined. I must, therefore, consider the correctness of that decision. As will be seen below, I do disagree with some of the conclusions in that judgment. To the extent that I do disagree, I am sure that this arises from my own failures in arguing the case. The Grounds Registration

The Grounds

[17]As the original registration order was set aside by Master Stevens’ Order of 24 May 2024 it was necessary for the Claimants to satisfy me that the initial grounds for registering a judgment under the 1933 Act were made out.[18]Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act provides that a person, being a judgment creditor under a judgment to which Part I of the Act applies may apply to the High Court for registration of judgment and “the Court shall, subject to proof of the prescribed matters and to the other provisions of this Act, order the judgment to be registered”. The reference to prescribed matters seems to relate back to section 1(2) which provides that the judgment of a recognised court is within the subsection if it satisfies: “the following conditions, namely –(a) It is either final and conclusive as between the judgment debtor and the judgment creditor or requires the former to make an interim payment to the latter; and(b) There is payable under it a sum of money, not being a sum payable in respect of taxes or other charges of a like nature or in respect of a fine or other penalty; and(c) It is given after the coming into force of the Order in Counsel which made that court a recognised court”.[19]It follows that for a judgment to be registrable under the 1933 Act it must(i) be final and conclusive,(ii) there be payable under it a sum of money and(iii) it must be made by a recognised court after the date on which the Order in Counsel recognising that Court came into force. In addition, section 2(1) states that a judgment shall not be registered if at the date of the application (a) it has been wholly satisfied or (b) it could not be enforced by execution in the country of the original court.[20]Taking those in turn: 20.1. There is no doubt that the Judgment was final and conclusive. It was appealed, but that appeal has been dismissed. I was not told that there was any further appeal, and the Defendants did not seek to argue that there were any proceedings in Italy which could now change the status of the Judgment. Therefore, the Judgment is final and conclusive. 20.2. The Judgment provides for the Defendants to pay a fixed sum of money. In this case, the sum is stated on its face and there is no reference (as there was in Del-Curto) to a separate document or method of determining the figure. Nor did the Defendants seek to persuade me that it was not possible to have regard to one paragraph only of the Judgment, taking into account that the Judgement provided a number of other orders which were not the payment of a fixed sum of money. That is consistent with Del-Curto. Therefore, the Judgement is for a sum of money. 20.3. The 1933 Act was given effect with respect to decisions of the Italian Courts by the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments (Italy) Order 1973 (“the 1973 Order”) from 16 January 1974. It deems the Corte d’Appello and The Tribunale as superior courts of the Republic of Italy for the purposes of the 1933 Act. The Ordinary Court of Piacenza is a Tribunale and the appeal from that court was heard by the Corte d’Appello. Therefore, there can be no doubt that this is fulfilled. 20.4. The Claimants state that the Judgment has never been paid, or otherwise fulfilled, and this is not contested. Therefore, the Judgment is not satisfied. 20.5. There is some discussion in the evidence as to whether the Claimants have pursued their rights to enforce the Judgment in Italy, it being said that as the Defendants have no assets there then it is not possible to enforce it in Italy and, therefore, the judgment cannot be enforced in England. That argument was not pressed at the hearing. In my Judgment, Mr Sahonte was right not to do so, and Ms Egan was right in her criticisms of this point. All the statute asks is whether the Judgment could be enforced in Italy, in the sense that steps could be taken in that country. It is not intended to suggest that if efforts to enforce it in Italy would be futile then the Judgment could not be registered in this country.[21]It follows that the Judgment is registrable under the 1933 Act, subject to the grounds in section 4 to set such registration aside.[22]At paragraph 9 above I stated that the application was to register the Appeal Judgment and at paragraph 8 I observed that the Appeal Judgment did not (on its face) replace the Judgment but simply dismissed the Appeal. It is possible that in saying this I am making a mistake as to Italian law or procedure, but assuming I am right, it seems to me that the application ought to have been to register the Judgment and not the Appeal Judgment. However, I consider there is nothing really in this point. Were I otherwise satisfied that the Judgment ought to be registered I would have given permission to amend the application and have registered the Judgment.

Section 4: Setting aside Registration

[23]Section 4(1)(a) of the 1933 Act provides that the registration of a judgment “shall be set aside if the registering court is satisfied” then sets out a list of six separate matters. By the end of the hearing, it was clear that the Defendants relied upon the following four grounds: 23.1. That the courts of the original court had no jurisdiction on the basis that the claim was one in which the subject matter was immoveable property, 4(1)(a)(ii) and 4(3)(a). 23.2. That the courts of the original court had no jurisdiction on the basis that the claim was not an action in personam, because it concerned an action in respect of the administration of an estate, 4(1)(a)(ii) and 4(2)(a) and see section 11(2). 23.3. If the claim was an action in personam it was not one to which they had submitted to jurisdiction, section 4(1)(a)(ii) and 4(2)(a). 23.4. That the judgment was one the enforcement of which would be contrary to public policy.[24]At one stage, it seemed the Defendants intended to argue that the Judgment had been obtained by fraud. That argument was (rightly) not pressed before me. Nor did Mr Sahonte develop a submission in his skeleton that the Human Rights Act 1988 might confer a further ground of objection.

Subject Matter: Immoveable Property

[25]Mr Sahonte, for the Defendants, argued that the claim concerned immoveable property located in this jurisdiction and so any registration would have to be set aside.[26]The claim concerned immoveable property in this sense. When he died Davide was entitled to the property at 3 Broadfield Avenue under Quintilio’s Will, subject to any rights Quintilio’s sister-in-law had under that Will. Although the property was not vested in Davide at his death, it is not altogether clear whether Davide was entitled to it outright at that time – a part of the Judgment is concerned with whether or not that was so. If he wasn’t, then he either had an interest in an unadministered estate or (more likely) an interest under a trust over 3 Broadfield Avenue. If he did, then his estate may be said to have included 3 Broadfield Avenue or at least a right to it. Of course, the claim in Italy did not concern 3 Broadfield Avenue per se. Rather, the Italian Court sought to vindicate the Claimants’ rights over Davide’s estate, including their rights to assets situated in England and Wales. It is for that reason that 3 Broadfield Avenue is valued in the expert’s report and why part of its value is reflected in the compensation order contained in the Judgment.[27]Mr Sahonte pointed me to Kireeva v Bedzhamov [2024] UKSC 39 [2024] 3 WLR 1010 as establishing(i) that questions as regards rights to and interests in land and other immoveable property are governed by the law of the country in which the property is situated and that jurisdiction to decide those questions belongs to the court of that country and(ii) that immoveable property includes all rights over, or in relation to, land including beneficial or equitable interests (see paragraph 42). That seems to me to be right, but it does not necessarily answer the question posed by the 1933 Act, namely whether the subject matter of the action in Italy was immoveable property not in Italy.[28]Claims, in whatever jurisdiction, often have a multiplicity of subject-matter, even more so where the dispute relates to an entitlement to assets from an estate, where the subject-matter can variously be described as the Will, the estate generally, or the individual assets of that estate. Conflicts of law principles, however, often ask the court to decide in an overall sense what the subject matter of a dispute is before determining what system of law applies to it. In the very well-known case of Macmillan v Bishopsgate [1996] 1 WLR 387, Staughton LJ said: “In any case which involves a foreign element it may prove necessary to decide what system of law is to be applied, either to the case as a whole or to a particular issue or issues. Mr. Oliver, for Macmillan Inc., has referred to that as the proper law; but I would reserve that expression for other purposes, such as the proper law of a contract, or of an obligation. Conflict lawyers speak of the lex causae when referring to the system of law to be applied. For those who spurn Latin in favour of English, one could call it the law applicable to the suit (or issue) or, simply, the applicable law. In finding the lex causae there are three stages. First, it is necessary to characterise the issue that is before the court. Is it for example about the formal validity of a marriage? Or intestate succession to moveable property? Or interpretation of a contract? The second stage is to select the rule of conflict of laws which lays down a connecting factor for the issue in question. Thus the formal validity of a marriage is to be determined, for the most part, by the law of the place where it is celebrated; intestate succession to moveables, by the law of the place where the deceased was domiciled when he died; and the interpretation of a contract, by what is described as its proper law. Thirdly, it is necessary to identify the system of law which is tied by the connecting factor found in stage two to the issue characterised in stage one. Sometimes this will present little difficulty, though I suppose that even a marriage may now be celebrated on an international video link. B The choice of the proper law of a contract, on the other hand, may be controversial[29]It seems to me that the 1933 Act is asking a similarly broad question, i.e. what is the overall subject matter of the claim. I therefore reject the suggestion, which is at the heart of Mr Sahonte’s submission, that if one can identify within the claim an asset which is both immoveable and out of the original court’s jurisdiction then any registration under the 1933 Act must be set aside.[30]It seems to me that the subject matter of the claim that was before the Italian Court was Davide’s succession. It was that which was at issue and it was the determination of those issues of succession which gave the Claimants, under Italian law, a right to compensation (and other orders) over the whole of Davide’s estate.[31]It follows that, in my judgment, the subject matter of the proceedings in Italy was not immoveable property, but was the succession to Davide’s estate.

Subject Matter: Administration of Estates

[32]In a rather tortuous process of deeming provisions and double negatives, the 1933 Act provides that: 32.1. The original court is deemed to have jurisdiction in respect of an action in personam, if any of the pre-requisites in section 4(2)(a) are made out (including submission to the jurisdiction, see next heading). 32.2. An action in personam shall not “be deemed to include” (which I take to mean, shall exclude) “any matrimonial cause or any proceedings in connection with any of the following matters, that is to say, matrimonial matters, administration of the estate of deceased persons, bankruptcy, winding up of companies, lunacy, or guardianship of infants” (emphasis added), section 11(2).[33]Mr Sahonte submits that the action was not an action in personam either generally or because it concerned the administration of the estate of a deceased person.[34]At this stage, it is important in my judgment, to put the 1933 Act in its historical context.[35]First, the common law conflicts of laws rules in England and Wales are that the English Court applies English law to the succession of immoveable assets in this jurisdiction and to the worldwide movable assets of those domiciled in this country. Accordingly, it did not recognise judgments which determine the succession of immoveable assets in this jurisdiction or to the moveable assets of those domiciled here. The 1933 Act was not intended to change the common law, see Report of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Committee, CMND 4213 (1932) and Société Coopérative Sidmetal v Titan International Ltd [1966] 1 QB 828. As Mr Sahonte pointed out, in all the European Conventions concerning the recognition and enforcement of judgments, Wills and Succession have either been excluded or else (in respect of the Convention known as Brussels IV) the United Kingdom was not a signatory. Thus, there is no reason to believe that in the past 100 years, England has sought to alter its approach to jurisdiction in respect of succession matters.[36]Second, judgments concerning succession have generally been regarded by the English Courts as not being, or as being more than, merely actions in personam. A decision as to who is entitled to what from a person’s estate is a decision capable of being enforceable against the world, and so at least in part an action in rem.[37]It would therefore be surprising if the 1933 Act had included succession matters as being registrable judgments on the basis of their being actions in personam.[38]In that context, the express exclusion of matters concerning the “administration of estates” in section 11(2) is peculiar in apparently not also excluding succession to estates. As Ms Egan pointed out, in English law there is a distinct difference between disputes over the administration of an estate and disputes over succession to it. The peculiarity greatens when it is realised that in the treaty between Italy and England which led to the recognition of Italian Judgments by way of the 1973 Order, matters concerning succession apparently were to be excluded, see Article IV to the Convention which forms Schedule 1 of the 1973 Order. Thus, one can reasonably assume that Italy will not itself, at least under its legislation giving effect to the treaty, give effect to English judgments concerning succession despite the treaty being reciprocal.[39]In my judgment, the above suggests that either(i) the term “administration of estates” was intended to have a broader meaning and to have included “succession” or(ii) the definition of actions in personam in any event excludes claims in respect of succession.[40]In Del-Curto, the Master rejected submissions to similar effect to the points made above, stating that(i) the treaty had no effect in English Law (para 48),(ii) the judgment in that case was an order for restitution, which was in personam, (para 91 onwards) and(iii) the judgment was not in rem (para 96). With the greatest of respects to his decision, I do not agree. First, the issue that arises from the treaty is not whether it had effect in law, but whether it lends assistance in understanding whether the statute itself intended to exclude matters of succession. Second, the nature of the judgment of the Italian Court is not the issue that arises. Actions of all kinds, whether in personam or in rem conclude with orders that include orders against particular people and so can be described as in personam. However, what the 1933 Act asks is what the subject-matter of the action is.[41]At this stage it is necessary to refer to the decision of HHJ Paul Matthews in Pescatore v Valentino [2021] EWHC 1953. This concerned an application for an ‘anti-suit’ injunction, i.e. an injunction to prevent a foreign claim. The foreign claim was in Italy and concerned succession. At paragraphs 78 and 79, the learned Judge sets out the conventional principles as to the recognition of foreign judgments concerning succession. However, in the immediately preceding paragraphs (paragraphs 74 to 77) he suggests that a judgment in Italy concerning succession could possibly be registered under the 1933 Act on the grounds that the party had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction. That would suggest that such a claim could, at least in part, be treated as an action in personam. However, it does not appear to me that the learned Judge was directly addressed on, or directly considered, whether the 1933 Act did exclude such judgments from registration and these passages do not make up any part of his decision (which was to grant the injunction). With some nervousness, given the considerable knowledge of the learned Judge in these matters, I do not regard these passages as decisive.[42]Standing back, it seems to me: 42.1. The 1933 Act probably did intend to include, within the definition of “administration of estates” matters concerning succession, and I therefore give those words that wide meaning. 42.2. In any event, a claim the subject-matter of which is the succession to a person’s estate is not, in my judgment, described as an action in personam.[43]Following the words of the statute, the effect of concluding that a claim regarding succession is not an action in personam, is still to ask the question whether the courts of the country of the original court had “no jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case”. In my judgment that supports the conclusions I have reached above because it leaves the court to go on to consider whether, under the English principles, the Italian Court is considered to have jurisdiction over this succession matter.[44]In this case, the answer is clearly that the court had no such jurisdiction (under English principles). Some argument was directed to whether Davide might have retained a domicile of origin acquired from his father. However, all the evidence suggests that Davide died having lived his entire life in England and with very few connections with Italy. It is very difficult to see, at least on the evidence the parties chose to put before the court, that he had anything other than an English domicile. Therefore, to the extent that the question involved succession to his moveable assets the Italian Court would not have jurisdiction. In any event, almost the whole succession concerned rights over immoveable assets. By value, the property at 3 Broadfield Avenue was the largest part of his estate. The English Court does not regard the Italian Courts has having jurisdiction in respect of the succession to that asset and so to the extent the judgment includes the value of that asset it did not have jurisdiction to make the Order.[45]It follows that, in my judgment, the registration should be set aside on the grounds that the country of the original court had no jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case.

Submission to jurisdiction

[46]On the above basis, the question of whether the Defendants submitted to the jurisdiction of the Italian Courts does not arise.[47]Mr Sahonte directed me to passages from Winkler v Shamoon [2016] EWHC 217 (paragraphs 31 to 34) which show that (to summarise)(i) a party who is forced by the foreign procedure to engage with a case on the merits whilst at the same time arguing that the court has no jurisdiction, is not deemed to have submitted to jurisdiction but(ii) if, the decision on jurisdiction having been made, they then take further voluntary steps not consistent with the decision to challenge jurisdiction then they will be deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction.[48]Here, the Defendants did dispute the Italian Court’s jurisdiction. However, it appears from the Judgment that this was rejected by at least 6 May 2015 and that the Defendants continued to engage with what was described as the “evidentiary phase”. Even if that is not a correct interpretation of the Judgment, it is clear that the Defendants appealed the Judgment not on the grounds of jurisdiction but in respect of the merits. In my judgment there can really be no clearer submission to jurisdiction than an appeal which does not refer to jurisdiction and is in respect of the merits of the claim only.[49]It follows that had I concluded that the action was an action in personam, I would have rejected the assertion that the Defendants had not submitted to the jurisdiction.

Public Policy

[50]The public policy argument boiled down, in the end, to two points.[51]First, it was said that the delay in the Italian Court system was so extraordinary as to be a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the United Kingdom, that submission being made with reference to paragraph 156 of Spain v The London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mutual Insurance Association Ltd [2024] EWCA Civ 1536, a paragraph which cites a decision of the CJEU in Bamberski v Krombacj [2001] QB 709.[52]There was a lengthy and drawn-out process in this matter. Davide died around six years before the proceedings were commenced, and it then took eight years for the final judgment and a further two years for the appeal to be determined. Mr Sahonte pressed me that in this Court a decision would have been made much sooner, and he is probably right about that. However, I have no clear insight into the causes of the delay and so do not know whether they are inherent in the Italian system or the result (for example) of his own clients’ manoeuvrings. Delay appears to have suited his clients and to have disadvantaged Ms Egan’s. In any event, whilst delay of such a long time is regrettable, the submission that it effectively undermines the rule of law in Italy is a very bold one and not one I am prepared to accede to.[53]Second, it was said that the Italian court’s decision was irrational on its face. That submission related to(i) the dismissal of the jurisdiction arguments,(ii) the failure to apply English law to the claim,(iii) the rejection (apparently without reasons) of the Italian limitation period and(iv) the acceptance of the DNA evidence as establishing that the Claimants were Davide’s children.[54]Only the latter point was developed in any detail. The DNA evidence shows only that the Claimants are brothers. Therefore, it is said, the Italian Court ought not to have accepted that evidence as establishing that the Claimants were the children of Davide. However, on closer examination of the Judgment, the Court decides not that the DNA evidence was determinative, but that there was no good objective evidence to suggest that the Claimants were not Davide’s children, in circumstances where they were the children of his wife and born during his marriage. That is a conclusion an English Court could very easily reach. Thus, in my judgment this does not come close to showing the Judgment to be irrational.[55]Similar things can be said about the other points. An English Court might disagree with another court’s decision or regard their processes and decisions as alien. However, so too might a foreign court looking at English decisions or at the English system. This does not amount to a basis to refuse recognition of a judgment properly made.

Other Grounds

[56]There are hints in the skeleton arguments of the registration being objected to on the grounds of procedural delay (i.e. English procedural delay) and/or abuse of process. In the end, those arguments were not developed before me. That is understandable. The delays in the English system were not particularly lengthy and at least partly arise from the non-service of applications or orders. The abuse of process argument seems to be an assertion that the Claimants ought not to have proceeded in Italy at all. However, those arguments were raised in Italy at the time and dealt with and it was always open to the Defendants to apply for injunctions here (as in Pescatore). It is not possible to now object to the registration of that judgment other than on the terms of the statute itself.

Conclusion

[57]For the reasons given above I will not register the Judgment. Strictly, I have decided that the application is registrable but that the registration should be set aside but procedurally it seems to me that the best course is to just dismiss the application for registration.[58]I will hear the parties briefly on any consequential matters. I will extend time for filing an appellant’s notice to 21 days from the date of that hearing.