MUF, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Defence [2026] EWHC 2108 (Admin)

[2026] EWHC 2108 (Admin)Case No AC-2026-LON-001184
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate Friday 7 August 2026MRS JUSTICE EADY DBE
THE KINGClaimant(on the application of) MUFClaimantTHE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCEDefendantMCV; (2) MNE; (3) MNG; (4) MNP; (5) MNR; (6) MNB; (7) MAS; (8) MFT; (9) THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENTInterested Parties
Greg Ó Ceallaigh KC and Maria Moodie (instructed by Cooley (UK) LLP) for ClaimantLord Murray of Blidworth and Georgia Beatty (instructed by GLD) for DefendantHearing Hearing date: 16 July 2026
Approved Judgment
[1]This is my judgment on the rolled-up hearing of the claimant’s application for permission to claim judicial review of a fourth review decision refusing his application for relocation under the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (“ARAP”). The claimant, formerly a judge in the anti-terrorism court (“ATC”) in Kabul, applied for relocation of himself and his immediate family (interested parties (1)-(8)), to the United Kingdom (“UK”); his application was refused on the basis that he had not established that he “worked in Afghanistan alongside a UK Government department, in partnership with or closely supporting and assisting that department” (ARAP 3.6 condition 1(iii)). By this claim, the claimant contends that, in refusing his application, the defendant: applied an erroneous interpretation of condition 1(iii) (ground 1); drew irrational distinctions between the claimant and other ATC judges (ground 2); reached irrational conclusions on the evidence, or failed to properly consider that evidence (ground 3); acted procedurally unfairly (ground 4); failed to have regard to the judgment of Sir Peter Lane in R (ACG) v Secretary of State for Defence [2025] EWHC 2472 (Admin), relating to an earlier review decision in the claimant’s case (the claimant then being referred to by the cipher “ACG”) (ground 5).[2]This matter was initially listed for an expedited hearing to consider the question of permission alongside the claimant’s application for interim relief. That was subsequently adjourned to a rolled-up hearing, at which both the question of permission and the substantive judicial review might be considered, and the claimant has since withdrawn his application for interim relief. The legal framework and earlier decisions in claims involving Afghan judges The Immigration Rules

The legal framework and earlier decisions in claims involving Afghan judges

[3]In general terms, the Immigration Act 1971 requires that persons who are not British citizens require leave to enter the UK. Pursuant to section 3(2) of the Act, the Immigration Rules set forth the practice to be followed in granting such leave. The ARAP has been incorporated into the Immigration Rules, initially in part 7 but subsequently (from November 2022) by way of a specific ARAP appendix. Thus, the eligibility criteria for category 4 cases are to be found in appendix ARAP 3.6 of the Immigration Rules, which provides that applicants must satisfy conditions 1 and 2, and that one or both of conditions 3 or 4 apply.[4]As was made clear in R (LND1 and ors) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and anor [2024] EWCA Civ 278, conditions 1 and 2 raise separate questions and are not to be approached as part of a single exercise. For present purposes, I am concerned only with ARAP 3.6 condition 1 (iii), and thus with the following requirements:
“ARAP 3.6 A person meets the eligibility requirements if condition 1 and 2 and one or both of conditions 3 and 4 applies: (a) Condition 1 is that at any time on or after 1 October 2001, the person: ... (iii) worked in Afghanistan alongside a UK Government department, in partnership with or closely supporting and assisting that department.”

Interpretation

[5]As is common ground between the parties, a policy such as the ARAP will fall to be construed objectively by the court according to the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used (Mahad (Ethiopia) v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] UKSC 16, paragraph 10; Mandalia v Secretary of State for the Home Office [2015] UKSC 59 paragraph 31); as Sir Peter Lane observed in ACG (see paragraph 51), it is not for the defendant to decide what “in partnership with” or “working alongside” will mean in any particular factual context.[6]The meaning to be given to particular ARAP provisions has, however, now been the subject of judicial consideration in a number of cases. Where those cases concern claims by former Afghan judges, I have set out relevant details below (under the heading “Earlier rulings in ARAP claims by Afghan judges”). More generally, however, when considering the approach to be adopted to ARAP claims, the following principles have been made clear:6.1 Eligibility will depend on a case-specific evaluation of the individual facts to see whether the criteria are met, and, while a judge might be eligible for relocation under the ARAP, the status of being an Afghan judge is not, of itself, sufficient to establish such eligibility (R (S and ors) v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairsand ors [2022] EWHC 1402 (Admin) paragraph 107; R (JZ) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Others [2022] EWHC 2156 (Admin), paragraph 35).6.2 The fact that s/he presided over terrorism cases in Afghanistan will similarly not be sufficient to bring a judicial applicant within ARAP category 4; the focus has to be on whether the judge had a “sufficient link with HMG in accordance with the extant wording of the ARAP policy” (JZ, paragraph 99).6.3 On the other hand, the fact that a court was self-evidently independent of any UK government department will not be an obstacle to eligibility (R (oao MA) v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2024] EWHC 332 (Admin), paragraph 33).6.4 The wording of ARAP condition 1 (iii) means that the relevant applicant will need to show that they (“the person”) “worked ... alongside” a UK government department in some capacity (R (oao CX1) v Secretary of State for Defence [2024] EWHC 94 (Admin) paragraph 65).6.5 In carrying out the required assessment, a decision-maker will have to consider, amongst other matters:(1) the substance of the individual’s work in Afghanistan;(2) the nature of the institutions in which they worked; and(3) the nature of the connections, if any, between those institutions and the relevant UK government department/s (LND1, paragraph 46).[7]Finally, it is a significant feature of this case that the claimant’s earlier claim for judicial review in ACG was allowed, and the defendant’s earlier (second) review decision quashed, and remitted to be reconsidered in light of the High Court's judgment (see paragraphs 47-53 below). In such a case, as Laws LJ reflected in R (Kuteh) v Secretary of State for Education [2014] EWCA Civ 1586:
“20. ... the ratio of the High Court’s decision is a given, an axiom, for the purpose of the lower body’s reconsideration. If it were not so the efficacy of the judicial review jurisdiction would be undermined and so therefore would the rule of law.”

Irrationality and the standard of review

[8]As Chamberlain J observed in KP v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] EWHC 370 (Admin):
“55…rationality is the standard by which the common law measures the conduct of a public decision-maker where there has been no infringement of a legal right, no misdirection of law and no procedural unfairness. It encompasses both the process of reasoning by which a decision is reached (sometimes referred to as “process rationality”) and the outcome (“outcome rationality”) ...”
[9]Process rationality focuses on the decision-making process, allowing that the court may intervene where the decision-maker has “…taken into account matters which they ought not to take into account, or conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which they ought to take into account” (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at pp 233-234), or where the decision “does not add up – in which ... there is an error of reasoning which robs the decision of logic”: (R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ex p Balchin [1998] 1 PLR 1, paragraph 13). Outcome rationality is concerned with whether the outcome is “so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it” (Wednesbury) or is “outside the ‘range of reasonable decisions open to a decision-maker’” (Boddington v BTP [1999] 2 AC 143, at p175).[10]A complaint of unequal or inconsistent treatment does not give rise to free-standing ground of judicial review but can found a complaint of irrationality (see R (Patel) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 2100, paragraph 114; R (Hussain) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 1952 (Admin), paragraph 46). As Lang J observed in S:
“83. Where there are divergent decisions in materially the same situations, the Court is required to ‘consider with the greatest care how such a result can be justified as a matter of law’: R v Department of Health, ex p Misra [1996] 1 FLR 128 at 133 ...”
In this regard, the context in which a decision is taken may be a relevant factor, but the decision-taker should nevertheless be expected to have acted lawfully, in accordance with the policy in operation (see R (oao CHD No. 2) v Secretary of State for Defence [2026] EWHC 1744 (Admin), paragraph 9).[11]As for the standard of review, the Supreme Court has “endorsed a flexible approach to principles of judicial review, particularly where important rights are at stake” (see Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19, per Lord Carnwath JSC at paragraph 60, Lord Mance JSC at paragraph 98, and Lord Sumption JSC at paragraphs 109-110). In determining whether a heightened standard of review is to be applied, what matters will be “the nature of any interests engaged and the gravity of any adverse effects on those interests” (KP, paragraph 76, citing Lord Reed in R (King) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54 at paragraph 126).[12]Where it applies, the heightened standard of review has implications for the way the court evaluates complaints of both process and outcome irrationality (KP, paragraph 77). In a process complaint, the court will subject the decision to “more rigorous examination, to ensure that it is in no way flawed” (Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514, 531) and will expect the decision-maker “to show by their reasoning that every factor which might tell in favour of an applicant has been properly taken into account” (R (YH (Iraq)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 116, paragraph 24). Where the complaint is of outcome irrationality, more will be required by way of justification (R v Secretary of State for Defence ex p. Smith [1996] QB 517, 554); and the importance of the interests affected may, in principle, narrow the range of decisions open to the decision-maker, potentially to just one (Pham, per Lord Sumption at paragraph 107).[13]The evidence provided by Tim Foxley, as well as the claimant himself, supports the view that the claimant and his family (interested parties (1)-(8)) face a real risk of loss of life, torture, or other serious harm, if they are not relocated to the UK; in such circumstances (and I do not understand this to be contested by the defendant), the court is required to apply a heightened level of scrutiny to the application of the policy and the reasons given for the decision under challenge.

Earlier rulings in ARAP claims by Afghan judges

[14]In R (S and ors) v SoS FCDA and ors [2022] EWHC 1402 (Admin), a number of former Afghan judges brought claims for judicial review by which they contended that the refusal of their ARAP applications was irrational or otherwise unlawful given the difference between their treatment and that of other Afghan judges who had been relocated under the policy. Rejecting that contention, Lang J held that, while an Afghan judge might be eligible for relocation under the ARAP, the status of being an Afghan judge was not of itself sufficient to establish eligibility, which would depend on a case-specific evaluation of the individual facts to see whether the criteria are met.[15]In S, one of the comparator judges was “W”, who had been granted leave to enter the UK under the ARAP during Operation Pitting. Distinguishing W’s case from those before her, Lang J observed:
“108. In the case of Judge W, and his fellow judges at the Anti-Terrorism Court in Kabul, the Defendants appear to have been satisfied that they met the criteria in Category 4 in the ARAP policy because of their role in presiding over the Anti-Terrorism Court, which benefited the UK Government. The judges had a working relationship with UK officials in Kabul, in particular, the Counter-Terrorism Unit which arranged for their sponsorship under ARAP. The UK Government provided the Anti-Terrorism Court with logistical and operational support, and organised training and meetings for the judges. Their roles were public and high profile and they were at risk from the Taliban.”
[16]W had been working at the ATC in Kabul at the time of the Taliban offensive in 2021; Lang J recorded his evidence as follows:
“101. ... Like all judges in Afghanistan, he was employed by the Supreme Court. He did not work directly or indirectly for the UK Government or military. He and his fellow judges were invited to the British Embassy and elsewhere to attend events and training seminars, and they met British officials on those occasions. The UK Government also provided logistical and operational support for the Anti-terrorism Court in Kabul. 102. When the Taliban came to power, Judge W felt very vulnerable and feared for his life. He and his fellow judges in the Anti-Terrorism Court telephoned the Counter-Terrorism team at the British Embassy, who they knew, and asked them for help. They were invited to complete the ARAP application form, and all of them were called forward for evacuation. They were told by the Counter-Terrorism team at the British Embassy that their work had helped the UK mission in Afghanistan. ...”
[17]Specifically comparing W’s case to that of one of the claimants, “AZ”, Lang J noted that AZ’s case had been examined:
“113. ... by the FCDO Head of Counter-Terrorism Afghanistan Task Force which would be the unit responsible for sponsoring Counter-Terrorism judges under Category 4 of ARAP, and so would be able to identify them. AZ had not been involved in cases of special UK interest. AZ had not received training or other support from the UK Government....”
. Going on to find:
“115. ... There were distinguishing features between AZ and the judges of the Anti-Terrorist Court in Kabul, which explained and justified the decision to grant leave to them under the ARAP policy, but to refuse it to AZ.”
[18]The claimant in R (JZ) v SSHD and ors [2022] EWHC 2156 (Admin) had been a judge at the Justice Centre in Parwan and at Pul-e-Charkhi prison; he also claimed judicial review of the refusal of his ARAP application, contending there was an irrational/unlawful inconsistency with decisions relating to other Afghan judges. Reiterating that each was fact-specific, considering the cases of other judges who had been admitted under category 4 ARAP, Hill J recorded:
“37. As at 4 February 2022 13 members of the Afghan judiciary had been relocated to the UK under ARAP. The lives of all 13 were regarded as being at risk. They were sponsored by either the FCDO or MoD. 38. At least 12 of the 13 worked directly alongside HMG and made a material contribution to the UK’s national security objectives in Afghanistan. 39. 11 of this group had been approved under ARAP in summer 2021, due to their role in the Primary or Appeal level of the Anti-Terrorism Court in Kabul between 2020 and 2021. The UK Government provided logistical and operational support for this court: S and AZ [101]. 40. The Part 18 response indicated that the UK’s support to counter-terrorism courts was limited to Kabul and decisions on eligibility made based on the applicants’ work there, with those courts the UK supported. Their cases had been primarily assessed by FCDO, with input from other HMG units. Further, these judges were considered to have “worked alongside”
HMG for the following reasons: “From 2015 onwards, HMG developed a partnership with some judges serving in the Anti-Terrorism Court in Kabul. All 11 judges that were resettled due to their role in presiding over terrorism trials were involved in this partnership, although the full circumstances of this partnership may not have been known to the judges involved. They were invited to attend a series of events run by HMG (colloquia to discuss matters of continuous professional development and debate interpretation on points of law and some of the technical aspects of considering different forms of evidence in complex trials), and, at times, HMG officials attended hearings they presided over, where the cases were of interest to the UK”. 41. Judge W was in this group. He had provided a witness statement which was relied on by the Claimants in S and AZ. His identity was well-known. He did not work directly or indirectly for the UK Government or military. He and his fellow judges were invited to the British Embassy and elsewhere to attend events and training seminars, and they met British officials on those occasions: S and AZ [101]. 42. A second witness statement from Judge W was provided at the outset of the hearing before me. Alexander Pinfield, who had been Deputy Ambassador to Afghanistan from 5 April 2021 to 26 August 2021 and the line manager of the Head of the Counter-Terrorism Team in the British Embassy in Kabul, provided a statement in response to the second statement from Judge W. He explained that from the UK Government’s perspective, it was incorrect to say that Judge W did not have links to the Government as he had asserted: for example, he had met the Head of the Counter- Terrorism Team in Kabul several times between February and April 2021 and was one of the judges dealing with terrorism issues in Kabul with whom the Government had developed substantial links, through the Counter-Terrorism Team in particular. ....” “From 2015 onwards, HMG developed a partnership with some judges serving in the Anti-Terrorism Court in Kabul. All 11 judges that were resettled due to their role in presiding over terrorism trials were involved in this partnership, although the full circumstances of this partnership may not have been known to the judges involved. They were invited to attend a series of events run by HMG (colloquia to discuss matters of continuous professional development and debate interpretation on points of law and some of the technical aspects of considering different forms of evidence in complex trials), and, at times, HMG officials attended hearings they presided over, where the cases were of interest to the UK”.[19]Finding it was “clear that being a judge who has presided over terrorism cases in Afghanistan is not, in itself, sufficient to bring a judge within ARAP Category 4” (see paragraph 98), Hill J held that the focus was on whether the judge had a “sufficient link with HMG in accordance with the extant wording of the ARAP policy” (paragraph 99). Although JZ’s case proceeded on the basis that, from 2008-2011, he had heard terrorism cases that were “similar if not identical to those heard by Judge W and others in the Primary Anti-Terrorism Court in Kabul” (paragraph 105), and accepting that the ARAP had no time limit, Hill J found: 110. ... the dates of JZ’s service on anti-terrorism cases help explain why the decision-makers considered he did not meet the “worked alongside” criterion, unlike his comparator judges, because HMG only became involved in supporting the Anti- Terrorism Court in Kabul and building partnerships with the judges there after 2015.”[20]Giving further detail in this regard, Hill J considered the evidence suggested:
“111. ... that evidence of partnership, or perhaps the “worked alongside” criterion more generally, was made out by factors such as (i) the extent to which a judge was publicly known to have co-operated with the UK; (ii) whether the judge had been involved in highly sensitive cases of particular UK interest; (iii) whether HMG representatives had attended their hearings; and (iv) whether they had been involved in colloquia of the sort described at [40] above. These were not discrete requirements, but the sort of factors that enabled the “worked alongside” criterion to be satisfied.”
[21]Hill J accepted it was an unusual feature of the case that the judges who had been accepted under the ARAP may not have appreciated they were considered to be in “partnership”, finding there was “plainly an element of subjectivity in the ... assessment of whether the “partnership” existed”, but nevertheless, going on to reject JZ’s claim, concluding:
“116. ... this is perhaps no more than a further aspect of the evaluative exercise of whether the “worked alongside” criterion was satisfied. This does not in itself show that the scheme was operated in an irrational way.”
[22]Refusing an application for permission to appeal against that decision (see [2023] EWCA Civ 178), the Court of Appeal referred to the key point of distinction between JZ’s case and that of comparator judges such as W:
“27. ... The Judge’s essential point ... was that the UK Government had, from 2015, developed what it regarded as a special relationship with a group of judges at the Kabul Anti-Terrorism Court, which it reasonably regarded as “working alongside” them within the meaning of category 4 of ARAP.”
Holding that there was no prospect that the Court of Appeal would disagree with Hill J’s conclusion, understanding that the decision-maker was “making an evaluative assessment, not conducting a tick-box exercise”.[23]In LND 1 the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of a former Afghan judge, quashing the decision to refuse his ARAP application and remitting it for reconsideration. Giving the lead judgment, Lewis LJ explained that the decision-maker had failed to consider two material matters:(i) LND’s statement that he was a member of the Afghan Penal Code and the Anti-Narcotics Law Drafting Committee, and(ii) LND’s work at the court for internal and external security between 2008 and 2010, and his role as chairman of that court from 2010 to 2012. When reconsidering the decision, the defendant would therefore:
“62. ... need to address first whether there are any institutional links between the FCDO and the committee or committees relating to reform of the penal law and the anti-narcotics law of which LND says he was a member. Essentially, the MoD will be considering if there is evidence of any institutional link, or structural support, between the FCDO and the committees concerned and, in particular whether any FCDO officials were involved in the work of that committee or committees. That will be part of the process of considering whether or not LND worked alongside in partnership with or closely supporting and assisting the work of the FCDO. Secondly, it will need to consider if there were any institutional links between the British military and the court for internal and external security in Kabul between 2008 and 2012 as part of the process of considering whether or not LND worked alongside in partnership with or closely supporting and assisting the work of the British armed forces or the MoD during that period.”
[24]In a short concurring judgment, Underhill LJ had this to say about LND’s security

judge role in Kabul:

“72. ...I turn to his role between 2008 and 2012 at the Kabul court for internal and external security. For myself, I would accept the MoD’s position that the fact (if established) that it provided some UK funding for the court would not in itself be enough ..., and that some more specific relationship between him and the UK government would be required (such as was apparently later developed with a particular group of judges as noted by Hill J in R (JZ) ...); and I am not satisfied that the case of Judge W, referred to in both JZ and the case of S ..., suggests to the contrary. I am, however, narrowly persuaded that the FCDO’s suggestion that the MoD should consider whether LND’s role at the court might have involved him working alongside it, which on the evidence was not pursued, is sufficient evidence that a relevant consideration was not addressed by the decision-taker.”
[25]In R (BYK) v Secretary of State for Defence [2025] EWHC 235 (Admin) the claimant had worked in civil courts and had attended a FCDO-funded workshop. Noting the holistic nature of the exercise required under the ARAP (BYK paragraph 41, and per LND1 paragraph 47), Farbey J was clear that this could not meet the relevant test (paragraph 56), accepting that the decision-maker had lawfully concluded that BYK’s case - to have worked “alongside” “in partnership” - was insufficiently evidenced, and had permissibly given weight to the fact that BYK had not been a criminal judge:
“60. The court may take into consideration whether a claimant has given sufficient particulars of, and described particular circumstances in which, he or she may be regarded as having “worked alongside” a United Kingdom Government department (R (CX1) v Secretary of State for Defence [2024] EWHC 94 (Admin) DC, para 65, per Dingemans LJ). That has not happened in the present case. ... In the absence of particulars of how the claimant may be said to have worked “alongside” a Government department, the defendant was entitled to treat the claimant as having advanced no more than “mere assertions.”...” ... 62. In my judgment, [the defendant] ... is correct to say that the claimant’s status as a civil judge was not decisive but was one aspect of the review decision overall. It cannot be said that the defendant was unreasonable to consider the nature of the claimant’s work as a judge and the sort of cases with which the claimant was involved. The defendant was entitled to weigh the fact that the claimant was not a criminal judge trying terrorism cases, where Category 4 status may be easier to demonstrate. It cannot be said that the nature of the claimant’s work as a civil judge was an irrelevant consideration. Nothing in the defendant’s approach was flawed.”
The claimant’s case The evidence before the court

The claimant’s case

[26]For the claimant, relevant factual evidence is contained in (and exhibited to) his four witness statements, a statement from his solicitor, two statements from “MAR”, a former judge of the ATC who was relocated to the UK in 2021, and an expert report from Tim Foxley MBE, dated 29 April 2026, assessing the risk arising from the claimant’s present circumstances. The defendant relies on evidence contained in (and exhibited to) three statements of Dan Samedi-Smith, an employee of the Ministry of Defence (“MOD”) and a deputy director within the Defence Afghanistan Relocation and Resettlement Directorate (“DARR”), and two statements from Christine Ferguson, employed by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (“FCDO”) for 42 years, and head of the FCDO’s Afghanistan Resettlement and Relocations Department since March 2022. The FCDO is the government department relied on in the claimant’s application under the ARAP.[27]The parties have also made reference to material disclosed by the defendant in these, and earlier, proceedings (both those brought by the claimant and those brought by other Afghan judges). In addition, relevant factual context is set out within other judgments relating to ARAP applications by former Afghan judges (see “Earlier rulings in ARAP claims by Afghan judges” above), and I have drawn from these in summarising the background to, and history of, the ARAP.

Ms Ferguson’s statement of 4 June 2026

[28]The claimant takes a preliminary point in relation to the statement of Ms Ferguson dated 4 June 2026. This post-dates the decision under challenge (the fourth review decision is dated 9 February 2026), but explains the further enquiries made following the judgment in ACG (upholding the claimant’s claim for judicial review of a previous (second) review decision). The claimant points out that Ms Ferguson’s evidence has previously been criticised (see R (QA) v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2024] EWHC 3064 (Admin), at paragraphs 39(6) and 42), and says this second statement materially contradicts her previous evidence (relied on by the defendant in ACG), lacks transparency, fails to adhere to requirements of procedural fairness and candour, equates to impermissible ex post facto reasoning or re-framing, and should be rejected in its entirety (see R (Sahota) v Herefordshire Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1640).[29]I do not accept this analysis. First, the earlier criticism of Ms Ferguson’s evidence in QA is contextually distinct, and I do not infer that the error made in that instance impugns the input of this experienced civil servant in all other cases (and see the observation to similar effect of Farbey J in BYK, paragraph 33). Second, Ms Ferguson’s evidence is entirely transparent: she explains the circumstances in which additional investigations were undertaken following the judgment in ACG and states where the results of those investigations clarified, and caused her to correct, aspects of her previous statement; I can see no basis for the suggestion that there has been an absence of candour or that there is any procedural unfairness. Third, I do not accept this further evidence re-frames, or goes beyond, the FCDO assessment relied on by the defendant in reaching the decision under challenge; it is, on the contrary, consistent with that assessment.[30]Notwithstanding my rejection of these criticisms of Ms Ferguson’s statement, I bear in mind this post-dates the decision under challenge, and I am cognizant of the dangers of ex post facto reasoning, which risks being self-serving, and, where directly contradictory of the contemporaneous record, should not be admitted (R (United Trade Action Group Ltd) v TfL [2022] RTR 2, paragraph 125). Paying careful regard to the guidance provided at paragraph 18 Sahota, I am, however, satisfied that the statement of 4 June 2026 is elucidatory, serving only to clarify the contemporaneous reasoning, and providing confirmation, not contradiction; I am clear that it would be wrong not to admit this evidence.

Context: operations in Afghanistan

[31]Following the terrorist attacks against the United States of America on 11 September 2001, the United States, supported by the UK, led a military intervention against Al Qaeda groups and the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The military operation was subsequently supported by NATO and by a joint international force, in which the UK played a political, diplomatic and military role. Those activities continued between 2001and 28 August 2021.[32]In May 2021, the Taliban launched a military offensive against the Afghan armed forces and, by 15 August 2021, had seized control of Kabul. British and American forces retreated to Kabul airport from where they operated an emergency airlift for NATO civilian and military personnel, other foreign nationals and certain Afghans thought to be at risk from the Taliban; the UK’s participation in this evacuation exercise was given the name “Operation Pitting”. The last British flight left Kabul on 28 August 2021. Since then, Afghanistan has been controlled by a Taliban government.

The ARAP

[33]The ARAP is a discretionary scheme established under prerogative powers; it was announced on 29 December 2020 and launched on 1 April 2021, closing to new applicants on 1 July 2025. It was intended to repay a debt of gratitude to Afghans who had worked for the UK government in Afghanistan in exposed or meaningful roles, and who were at serious risk as a result. The ARAP is now an appendix to the Immigration Rules, under which an application is made to the MOD, which will first determine whether the applicant is eligible, and, if so, will then make an application for entry clearance (assuming the applicant is outside the UK) on their behalf. Up to January 2025, over 177,000 ARAP applications had been received, and the defendant has said this has impacted upon the time taken to reach a safe and reasoned decision in each case.[34]Applications under the ARAP are assessed against four categories for assistance. There is no dispute that the claimant’s application fell to be considered under category 4, entitled “Special cases”, under which applications are assessed on a “case-by-case basis”.[35]As initially worded, category 4 was said to apply to:
“... those who worked in meaningful enabling roles for HMG, in extraordinary and unconventional contexts, and whose responsible HMG unit builds a credible case for consideration under the scheme.”
[36]Mr Samedi-Smith has stated, however, that under Operation Pitting, from 13 to 28 August 2021, the application of the ARAP was “adapted to meet the urgency of the situation and the need to process individuals at rapid pace”. Although the majority were category 2 (“Eligible for relocation by default”), a large number of category 4 cases were also signed-off; as Mr Samedi-Smith explains:
“During this crisis period the original intention of Category 4 came under considerable pressure and was in some cases stretched ...”
Others, not eligible under the ARAP, were also evacuated during this period and given leave to remain outside the Immigration Rules.[37]In the aftermath of Operation Pitting, Mr Samedi-Smith has said that:
“... officials and Ministers were concerned that ARAP had expanded, during the emergency, well beyond its original intention and beyond the capacity of the UK to resettle. Government departments, therefore, worked together to bring ARAP back in line with its original, narrow intention, albeit still allowing access to a small group of Afghans who had not been direct HMG employees.”
[38]The contemporaneous evidence supports that description. In advice to the Secretary of State in October 2021, it was stated that it was necessary:
“... to ensure ARAP eligibility is clearly defined and balance the obligation to those who worked for us/with us indirectly with commitments made by Ministers, the wider pressure from the public, and the limits on support and accommodation.”
Thus, while wishing to make clear that the ARAP was not restricted to direct UK government employees, there was also a view that, after more liberal interpretations during Operation Pitting, a narrower definition of category 4 eligibility was required. In September 2021, an initial amendment changed the requirement to have worked “for HMG” to the broader “alongside HMG”, but more significant changes were then introduced under the Immigration Rules from 16 February 2022, such that category 4 was stated to apply as follows:
“The cohort eligible for assistance on a case-by-case basis are those who: • on or after 1 October 2001 were directly employed in Afghanistan by an HMG department; provided goods or services in Afghanistan under contract to an HMG department; or worked in Afghanistan alongside an HMG department, in partnership with or closely supporting that department; and • in the course of that employment or work or provision of services they contributed to the UK’s military objectives or national security objectives (which includes counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and anti-corruption objectives) with respect to Afghanistan; and • because of that employment or work or provision of services, the person is or was at an elevated risk of targeted attacks and is or was at a high risk of death or serious injury; ... Checks will be made with the HMG department or unit by whom the applicant was employed, contracted to or worked alongside, in partnership with or closely supported or assisted.”
In making checks with other government departments relevant to an application, the process undertaken is known as “enrichment”.[39]DARR standard operating procedures at the relevant time stated that, while the vast majority of judges and prosecutors were likely ineligible, such applicants would be referred to the category 4 team for consideration and referral to the FCDO and/or the National Crime Agency. It was explained:
“Judges and Prosecutors may be at great risk of intimidation and threats, due to the nature of their work. This does not make them eligible for ARAP, unless they worked alongside British and Allied forces to ensure the stability of the country and ultimately ensure the success of the UK mission in Afghanistan. This may have included trying individuals that were members of the Taliban and other terrorist groups, who were released from prison when the allied forces withdrew, and Taliban took power.”
As an example, it stated that evidence that an applicant had been a judge of the Supreme Court would be sufficient for a referral to the category 4 team.

The claimant’s work as a judge

[40]The claimant was a judge in Afghanistan for over 20 years, until the Taliban took control in 2021. From March 2011 to April 2016, the claimant was a judge at the ATC in Kabul, with responsibility for judging terrorist crimes. Since 15 August 2021, the claimant has been unable to work. Fearful of violent retaliation from the Taliban regime, the claimant and his family effectively live in hiding, with obvious adverse impacts upon their lives.[41]The claimant says that a significant number of the criminal cases he tried concerned Taliban members or related individuals. While at the ATC, he estimates that he acted as director of the panel of judges (leading the decision making and signing-off on the judgment and sentencing) in approximately 360 cases concerning Taliban members or other terrorist activity; those cases included that of Mohammed Khan, a Taliban member who organised a suicide bombing attack in 2010 at a Kabul supermarket used by many foreign nationals, including members of the UK government and armed forces - Mohammed Khan was tried in 2014 and the claimant sentenced him to death. The claimant has also said he was one of the judges who tried Maulawi Qudratullah, a prominent Taliban member involved in terrorist activity; sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment, Maulawi Qudratullah was released when the Taliban took power and is said to have become Governor of Panjshir Province. More generally, the claimant has said that several of the death sentences he passed as a judge had not been carried out when the Taliban took power and those condemned have since been released, posing a threat of retaliation against him.[42]The claimant emphasises that his role as a judge was closely aligned to the UK government’s objectives in Afghanistan, and directly supported and advanced the UK’s national security objectives. He says the ATC’s day-to-day operations were supported by the UK government, which provided equipment and databases, sometimes sitting in the court to identify its needs, and he refers to having received training on equipment and security from UK officials while working in the ATC. It is the claimant’s evidence that the judges of the ATC provided reports to UK officials, sometimes presenting those reports and case updates to relevant authorities at the embassy, and he says that he, and other ATC judges, attended embassy coordinated seminars and training, for which he received payment as an incentive to attend. Such training sessions included a “Public Security Judicial Forensic Awareness” course held in June/July 2013, for which the claimant has a course certificate signed by a Ms Terri Carpenter, described on the certificate as the rule of law counsellor in the British embassy, Kabul. It is also the claimant’s evidence that towards the end of his time at the ATC (early/mid-2016), UK officials assisted a move to a safer location.[43]Witness evidence from another former judge of the ATC (“MAR”) was filed in support of the claimant’s case. MAR worked at the ATC from 2011 (starting a few days before the claimant) until August 2021, and sat with the claimant on Taliban cases (including that of the supermarket bomber, Mohammed Khan), hearing an estimated four or five cases together each week. MAR has said the relationship with the British was “not as intense at the beginning as it was at the end” but confirms that, by 2014, British officials were coming to the court about once a month to get case reports, with such visits increasing to once a week by 2020/2021. MAR has clarified that such visits would involve the court directors (ATC managers, focussed on administrative duties) and judges would not routinely be involved in these meetings (although might be asked – through the court directors - to provide more information); he has said the meetings were of the same nature in 2014/2015 as in 2020/2021, although the later meetings “were more frequent, involved more people, and the questioning was more in-depth”. MAR confirms that UK authorities provided assistance to help the ATC move premises, and payments were made as an incentive to encourage judges to attend training (explaining that judges took turns to attend). It is MAR’s evidence that he and the claimant “carried out the same work... in the Anti-Terrorism Court ... He received similar training sessions and guidance”. MAR was serving at the ATC at the time of the Taliban’s takeover and was brought to the UK as part of the Operation Pitting evacuation.

The claimant’s ARAP application and the relevant decision-making history

[44]The claimant’s ARAP application was received by the MOD on 9 June 2022, with further evidence being submitted on 23 June 2023. Considered by the DARR eligibility category 4 team, the application was rejected on 21 July 2023. Under ARAP procedures, an applicant who wishes to challenge such a rejection is able to request a review; the claimant did so in October 2023, but, on 29 April 2024, the defendant upheld the application refusal. After those acting for the claimant sent a pre-action protocol letter challenging the first review decision, on 11 June 2024 it was advised that this would be withdrawn and re-taken. A delay then followed, and, on 14 November 2024, the claimant initiated judicial review proceedings, in which a rolled-up hearing was directed for 25 February 2025. Shortly prior to that hearing, however, on 14 February 2025, the defendant made a further review decision, again upholding the initial refusal. The claimant challenged that second review decision in a second claim for judicial review. By his judgment of 1 October 2025, Sir Peter Lane upheld that claim on all grounds, quashing the second review decision and directing that the defendant use all reasonable endeavours to re-take the decision within 28 days.[45]On 29 October 2025, a third review decision again upheld the refusal of the claimant’s application. After the claimant commenced further judicial review proceedings, on 31 December 2025 the defendant indicated the third review decision would be withdrawn and re-taken, leading to a fourth review decision dated 9 February 2026 (sent to the claimant on 11 February), once more upholding the initial application refusal. It is that fourth review decision that is the subject of the current proceedings.

Sir Peter Lane’s judgment in ACG

[46]Before turning to the fourth review decision, however, it is necessary to consider in more detail the judgment of Sir Peter Lane in ACG, which concerned the claimant’s claim for judicial review in relation to the second review decision. Upholding the claim on all grounds, Sir Peter Lane determined that the decision could not stand and must be remitted for reconsideration.[47]On the first ground of claim, it was found the second review decision had not engaged with the defendant’s position in JZ, to the effect that the UK government had developed a partnership from 2015 with “some judges” of the ATC, albeit the judges in question might not have been aware of this. Recording the evidence of Ms Ferguson in ACG, that the FCDO’s “close involvement” with “specific partnership judges” dated “from May 2018 when the Criminal Justice Advisor was appointed”, it was “wholly unclear” whether the defendant’s position was that partnership judges only existed after May 2018, or what was meant by FCDO officials “working with” a judge of the ATC:69. It is impossible to discern from the evidence the nature of the relationship between the partnership judges and the Criminal Justice Advisor. The GLD letter suggests that a judge was a partner before being invited to attend “colloquia”, discuss matters of “professional development” and debate “points of law”; and that it was partner judges whose cases would on occasion be observed by HMG officials. If so, that leaves begging the question of how the partner judges were selected. If, on the other hand, one became a partner judge by being invited to such events and discussions, the criteria for invitation are unexplained. If attendance at a hearing had a bearing on the judge becoming a partner judge, the defendant has not explained why this was rational, given that it seems to depend on the chance of whether the judge happened to be hearing a case that was of interest to HMG.70. There is in short no coherent evidence before this court to explain the defendant’s designation of certain judges as specific partner judges. The position might have been different, had there been evidence from an official who had served in Kabul as a Criminal Justice Advisor or who could otherwise speak from direct knowledge. The defendant cannot be heard to say that being such a partnership judge was only one element in the overall evaluative exercise. On the contrary, Ms Ferguson’s statement puts it beyond doubt that being a partnership judge was regarded by the defendant as a highly relevant factor.” Given the material available, it was concluded that:
“72.... the emphasis placed by the defendant on what, given the state of the evidence before the court, is an unintelligible concept of partnership judges means that the defendant has erred in his approach to the wording of the policy in ARAP.”
[48]The second ground of challenge alleged the defendant failed to cumulatively consider the claimant’s evidence/apply anxious scrutiny. Although agreeing the case required “anxious scrutiny”, Sir Peter Lane did not consider that necessary to find serious defects in the decision-making: given the detail the claimant provided, it was problematic that it was said that evidence did not “go beyond mere assertions”, and unclear as to what had been accepted. These difficulties were not met by Ms Ferguson’s statement, describing the claimant’s list of cases as “abridged” without acknowledging the defendant was more likely to have access to records, albeit it did not, in any event, dispute the claimant was an ATC

judge during the relevant period, and that the:

“77. ... strong inference must be that he was acting in that capacity during that time period and ... hearing cases within the court’s jurisdictional remit ... and [more generally] institutionally connected with [the ATC] and, so, with the FCDO’s developing partnership with the ATC.”
[49]Adopting a holistic view, Sir Peter Lane considered:
“79. ... it was necessary in the present case to consider the nature and extent of links between the ATC and the FCDO (and its predecessors) both before that point (when the claimant received training in 2013 under the apparent auspices of the FCDO’s Rule of Law Officer and no less than two weeks’ training in 2014 from the British Embassy/Adam Smith International; as well as his work trying and sentencing Taliban terrorists); and between 2015 and April 2016, when the claimant left the ATC.” 51. Allowing that: “81. ... the nature of the relationship between an institution in Afghanistan and a department of HMG might be of such a nature as to amount to a partnership and thus be sufficient to show that an individual working for the institution in such a partnership, satisfied the first requirement or “condition” or ARAP Category 4. But the individual would still fail in their application if their own contribution within the institution for which they worked did not make the required substantive and positive contribution.”
He found the defendant had never addressed that second question.[50]Given the finding (on ground 1) that no rational case has been shown for relying upon the “partnership judge” concept, it was not considered to be open to the defendant to say anything that may have happened earlier was necessarily irrelevant and Sir Peter Lane considered the “half way house approach” to the claimant’s evidence vitiated the decision, a problem that was not cured by the post-decision evidence of Ms Ferguson.[51]By his third ground of claim, the claimant submitted there had been a failure to have rational regard to the “independent evidence” of MAR (then referred to as “NAR”). Again this ground was held to have been made out: the case worker’s bald assertion that MAR’s statement was “uncorroborated and does not support [the claimant’s] claim” had failed to understand that the statement of MAR was itself corroboration of the claimant’s statements (it did not need to be corroborated), and it plainly did support the claimant’s application.[52]Finally, the fourth ground alleged the second review decision was tainted by a failure to conduct an adequate review of material capable of corroborating the claimant’s position. On this Tameside challenge (Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014), Sir Peter Lane agreed there was a high bar, but accepted that, since the defendant considered it relevant whether British forces had made the arrest before the judicial contribution could be taken into consideration, it was for the defendant to make the necessary inquiries. On this point, he concluded:
“91. It may be that an evidential case can hereafter be made by the defendant that: (a) there was never an institutional relationship between the FCDO and the ATC, of such a kind that a judge of the ATC would thereby be in partnership etc with the FCDO by reason of their work as such a judge; and (b) that the only judges who can objectively be said to have been in partnership were a properly identifiable cohort of “partnership judges.”
Any such evidential case would still have to be compatible with the holistic approach which the Court of Appeal implicitly endorsed in LND1”. The fourth review decision and the FCDO enrichment The decision

The fourth review decision and the FCDO enrichment

[53]By the fourth review decision, it was concluded the claimant had not worked “alongside” a UK government department “in partnership with” or “closely supporting and assisting” that department, explaining:
“... Cross Government checks have not uncovered any evidence of a working relationship between you and the UK Government. In reaching this conclusion the Decision Maker has considered, among other things, your alleged links with individuals, the institutional links relied on by you, and any training undertaken and alleged payments received. In your response to the Request for Further Information, the Decision Maker notes that you did not claim to have personally worked alongside a UK Government department in any capacity, let alone in partnership with or closely supporting and assisting them. Cross Government checks sought to investigate the individuals named by you in your application and it is confirmed that one individual’s name appeared as a signatory on an HMG issued training certificate but this does not demonstrate your working alongside them. The other individual confirmed to not know or have worked with you, and checks confirmed that they were not employed by the FCDO in a relevant role at the time you worked at the Kabul Anti Terrorism Courts. The Decision Maker is satisfied that any training you received does not constitute working alongside a UK Government department. This includes the training evidenced by the UK Government issued certificates, and your claim of having received security training by British officials, of which no evidence was supplied. The witness statement as provided by your fellow judge supports your claims of working as a judge at the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC), Kabul. However, the relationships between FCDO officials and the ATC differed significantly pre- and post-2019. Therefore, I am satisfied that the account made by this judge does not evidence a working relationship between you and the UK Government.”
[54]Notes setting out the information considered by the decision maker, and more extensive explanation of the reasoning, confirm that regard was had to the materials and evidence provided by the claimant (as summarised above), along with the ACG judgment, and “enrichment” provided by the FCDO, dated 23 January 2026.

The FCDO enrichment

[55]In the FCDO assessment, reference was made to the need under ARAP paragraph 3.6 for “A person” to meet the eligibility requirement:
“The requirement is to assess whether the applicant himself (i.e. the “person” referenced in ARAP 3.6) had had the relationship with the FCDO described by this condition. ... for a person to have worked alongside the FCDO, ... it is likely they would have personally worked with FCDO officials and there would have been regular personal contact to establish a working partnership or close support and assistance to the FCDO. Therefore, it would be unlikely for [the condition] ... to be met if only the Afghan institution an applicant worked in had operated alongside the FCDO as an institution, without the applicant also having personally worked alongside the FCDO”
Albeit, the FCDO assessor states:
“I have taken account of any institutional relationships between the FCDO and the institutions the applicant worked for or at, and have assessed whether, in the framework of any such relationships, the applicant himself worked in Afghanistan alongside the FCDO ...”
[56]Notwithstanding the claimant’s own statement (provided within further information submitted to DARR on 3 August 2022) that he “did not have a direct relationship with the British government and its armed forces”, the assessor makes clear that(1) FCDO records were searched for references to the claimant;(2) consideration was given to each of his judicial roles and to the work, if any, the FCDO was doing with the courts at which he had been based;(3) account was taken of the training activities referred to by the claimant; and(4) consideration was given to the references he had made to FCDO staff members. The conclusions reached by the FCDO assessor in respect of each of these lines of investigation are summarised below.[57]FCDO records search: The claimant’s name was found on a list of judges proposed to attend training in an internal FCDO email of 27 May 2013 (consistent with the claimant’s account of attending rule of law training in June 2013). Otherwise, the only reference was in an entry compiled by the embassy’s counter terrorism (“CT”) team when considering Afghans for relocation in September 2021 (a document collated in response to a high volume of correspondence during/after the withdrawal in August 2021), which stated: “No information that worked in Kabul CT Courts and Teams do not know them”.[58]The claimant’s judicial roles and the work, if any, the FCDO was doing with the courts at which he had been based: Aside from the ATC, there was no evidence of institutional links between the FCDO and any of the courts at which the claimant had been based, and nothing to suggest he had a personal working relationship with the FCDO in any of these roles. As for the ATC, as well as searching FCDO systems, the assessor made enquiries of current and former FCDO officials, including: the CT Prosecutions Adviser 2011-2013; Head, Rule of Law 2011-2013; First Secretary Justice (Head, Justice Team) 2010-2012; CT Prosecutions Lead 2015-2016, Head CT Team 2016-2017; Second Secretary CT July-December 2014; Deputy Head, CT Team February 2017-March 2019, CJA May 2018-January 2019; Head CT Team 2021; CJA 2019-2021. This information was considered alongside other evidence relating to working relationships (if any) at the ATC, the UK Criminal Justice Adviser (CJA) and ATC relationship and contact with FCDO officials, witness evidence provided by MAR, and cases tried, finding:58.1 Capacity-building and training: from 2013 the UK had assisted the Afghan government in ensuring the efficient, fair investigation, detention and trial of terrorist suspects, providing training, via a FCDO funded contractor, the Adam Smith Institute (“ASI”), primarily focused on national directorate of security (“NDS”) investigators and anti-terrorism prosecution department (“ATPD”) prosecutors, but with a smaller number of judges also benefitting during the claimant’s time at the ATC; this was considered to represent FCDO supporting and assisting the Afghan government to increase its capacity to deal with terrorism cases more efficiently, not the reverse.58.2 Provision of computers and databases in/around 2015/2016: no evidence was found that the FCDO funded/provided improvements to office facilities/equipment during the claimant’s time at the ATC (although some such assistance was provided later); this was confirmed by a former team official from the embassy and the deputy head of the CT team from 2017-2019. In any event, to the extent they benefitted from such improvements, this did not mean ATC employees worked “alongside”, “in partnership with orclosely supporting and assisting”, the FCDO.58.3 Assistance with an ATC office move in early-mid 2016: extensive searches revealed no evidence of FCDO assistance with an ATC office move in early/mid 2016, and a former embassy official (CT prosecution lead 2015-2016; head of the CT team 2016-2017) confirmed the ATC did not move during that period, although the 2017-2019 deputy head of the CT team said the ATC primary court moved into the same location as the appeal court in 2018, and a former embassy CT team member confirmed the FCDO provided funding in 2015 for a local contractor to assist in establishing a courtroom within a new, USA-constructed, building in a NDS detention facility in Kabul although this work was considered to constitute minor logistical support to the ATC, not a working relationship that involved a partnership with, or support and assistance to, the FCDO.58.4 Attendance of “British officials” at court during trials to identify needs: the claimant’s statement in this regard was not considered to be credible, as former embassy officials, working in Kabul at the relevant time, had confirmed that, when the claimant was at the ATC, FCDO officials did not sit in court to witness trials/sentences – access to courts was not possible due to security constraints and the practicalities of simultaneous translation in small court rooms – and officials and the Afghan judiciary were mindful of the need to maintain judicial independence.58.5 Provision of reports by judges to the UK government on specific trials: noting the claimant had suggested a general practice within the ATC, there was no evidence that he had interacted with British officials, either at the court or the embassy (or that he had presented, or collaborated on, such reports), and former embassy officials confirmed that, during the period 2011-2017, FCDO officials did not request (nor were passed) reports from any judges in the ATC, nor did they discuss cases with them.58.6 Other working relationships (if any) within the ATC:(i) early in the relevant period, evidence showed the FCDO’s focus was on working with the NDS and ATPD prosecutors, although there was some ASI-delivered capacity-building training that included judges, and, in financial year 2013/2014, 40 ATPD prosecutors and 40 judges attended FCDO-funded forensic awareness training (although it had no influence on who attended), otherwise, the CJA for 2011-2013 confirmed they had no relationship with ATC judges, agreeing arrangements for training with Supreme Court judges - such limited interactions were not found to demonstrate close support/assistance to the FCDO;(ii) a former embassy CT official, 2015-2017, confirmed the FCDO had no relationships with judges other than those in top roles in the Supreme Court, with officials only having quarterly meetings with one of the ATC heads and six-monthly meetings with a small selection of judges who attended the ASI training (the claimant did not say he had been an ATC head/was involved in providing training feedback);(iii) a prosecution adviser based at the embassy 2018-2019 noted they had no contact with ATC judges beyond speaking to the head of the ATC second tier tribunal about FCDO funded training.58.7 UK CJA and ATC relationship, and contact with FCDO officials: (i) a former embassy official confirmed that a CJA was in post until late 2014 (when the role was cut), but worked solely with prosecutors and (consistent with judicial independence) did not have engagements with judges; (ii) the former head of the embassy CT team in 2021, and the CJAs in post in 2018 and then between 2019-2021, confirmed the CJA role was reinstated in early 2018, but it was only on the appointment of the last CJA, in May 2019, that a relationship with judges at the ATC began to develop, with some being invited to social events at the embassy, and with the institution of colloquia “to discuss matters of continuous professional development, interpretation of points of law and some technical aspects of considering different forms of evidence in complex trials” (but not individual cases); (iii) as for officials named by the claimant: (a) Carolyn Robinson was a senior legal advisor at the embassy and a signatory to a training certificate issued to the claimant, but attending a training course was not considered to constitute working “alongside” the FCDO and there was no other evidence of any working relationship with Ms Robinson, (b) Gemma Paolucci had worked at the embassy between 2009-2011, and then from 2014-2016, but not in roles with any interaction with ATC judges, and while she returned to head the FCDO CT team at the embassy between December 2018-March 2021, she had no contact with the claimant as he was then working at the district court (the only evidence of any contact with Ms Paolucci relied on by the claimant was an emailed request for assistance dated 20 August 2021 - five months after she had left Afghanistan; Ms Paolucci had also been contacted and confirmed she did not know the claimant), (c) Terri Carpenter was a former rule of law counsellor at the embassy and a signatory on a training certificate provided to the claimant but there was no evidence of any other contact between her and the claimant; (d) other FCDO staff (current and former) who had worked in Afghanistan on rule of law matters were contacted but did not recognise the claimant’s name, nor did a locally engaged member of staff who worked in the CT team during the period of the claimant’s ATC role.58.8 The witness statement provided by MAR: regard was had to MAR’s witness statement but it was noted: (i) each case must be determined on its own facts; (ii) MAR’s career history diverged significantly from that of the claimant, as he continued at the ATC until 2021 so was present after the post-May 2019 change in the relationship with ATC judges; (iii) MAR had been relocated under an earlier version of the ARAP, during the Operation Pitting emergency response.58.9 Cases tried: noting the FCDO had an interest in only a small number of cases (only a very small proportion of the claimant’s cases, if any, were likely to have been UK interest cases, these did not include the case of the supermarket bomber, Mohammed Khan), the assessor found, even where the FCDO had such an interest, it maintained judicial independence and officials worked on investigation and prosecution pathways, not “with” or “alongside” the judge; the claimant’s work might have aligned with the UK’s mission, but that was not sufficient to constitute working “alongside, in partnership with, or closely supporting and assisting” the FCDO.[59]Training activities:(i) the claimant provided evidence of attendance at two FCDO-funded training courses, but the FCDO regularly facilitates training for participants from NGOs, governments, universities and other organisations, globally and in the UK; simply attending such training would not amount to working “alongside” the FCDO, “in partnership with orclosely supporting and assisting”;(ii) as for security training, this was not offered by the FCDO and would not demonstrate that the claimant worked “alongside” the FCDO, in partnership with, or closely supporting or assisting it;(iii) as for payment for attending training, there was no evidence to support this and a former member of the embassy CT team had confirmed no payments were made to judges for attending courses between 2015-2017, but, in any event, such financial support (sometimes paid if potential beneficiaries would otherwise not be able to attend) would not constitute evidence of a working relationship with the FCDO.[60]References to FCDO staff members: this aspect of the claimant’s evidence had been considered when addressing his role at the ATC. Alterations to the defendant’s position and post-ACG disclosure Alterations to the defendant’s position

Alterations to the defendant’s position and post-ACG disclosure

[61]In considering the reasoning underpinning the fourth review decision, I am mindful that the defendant’s evidence does not entirely align with that presented in earlier cases involving Afghan judges, including ACG. For the claimant that demonstrates the unreliability of the evidential basis for the decision and is indicative of the errors inherent in the defendant’s approach; for the defendant it is the result of the more detailed investigation undertaken in accordance with the direction of the court in ACG.[62]The issue is apparent when considering the evidential basis of earlier decisions in cases involving Afghan judges. Thus in a statement in the JZ case, made by Alexander Pinfield in June 2022 (Mr Pinfield having been Deputy Ambassador in Afghanistan from 5 April to 26 August 2021, and the line manager for the head of the CT team at the embassy), it was said:
“5. ... HMG began providing assistance to [the ATC] after the introduction of Annex 1 to the Criminal Procedural Code in 2015. HMG developed substantial links with partner judges through the Counter Terrorism Team in particular. It is correct to describe the relevant work of that Court in Kabul, and HMG’s assistance accordingly, as being in relation to counter-terrorism.”
[63]That evidence, along with the further particulars provided during the proceedings (see JZ, paragraph 40; cited above at paragraph 18), was plainly considered material, both by Hill J at first instance and by the Court of Appeal when refusing a subsequent application for permission to appeal (see above, paragraph 22). Evidence to similar effect was provided by Ms Ferguson in her first statement relating to the claimant’s case (referenced by Sir Peter Lane in his judgment in ACG), although she had also explained that relationships with judges remained limited prior to the appointment of a new CJA, which she then dated as being in May 2018.[64]I address the corrections that Ms Ferguson has made to her earlier evidence below, but, in short, she says that, having undertaken further investigation – including contacting persons who had relevant contemporaneous knowledge but had since left the FCDO and, as a result, had not been approached earlier – the FCDO has arrived at a different understanding as to the relevant date of the development of links with “partner judges” at the ATC. The evidence obtained in the further investigation does not impact on the conclusion that, by 2021, as compared to the position prior to 2015, a materially different relationship existed between the UK government and judges at the ATC; what has changed, however, is that it is now said to have been the appointment of the new (and final) CJA in 2019 that was the catalyst for the new relationship with ATC judges (so, not the introduction of annex 1 to the Criminal Procedural Code in 2015, or the previous CJA, who took up appointment in May 2018). In her statement of 4 June 2026, Mrs Ferguson has explained:
“32. In May 2019, a new CJA started work at [the embassy] and was in post until July 2021. He was a UK barrister and had served as a High Court Judge overseas before being seconded to this role. His remit was to engage with the ATPD and ATC judges to ensure the end-to-end process was compliant with international law. There was no extant relationship with any judges when he arrived in post, and he built one with certain judges over the next two years. 33. The CJA regularly engaged with some judges in the Primary ATC, visiting the Primary Court offices (only very occasionally the Court itself), and the Head of the Appeals Tribunal. At the stipulation of the ATC judges, themselves, to ensure fair trials the CJA did not discuss individual cases. ... The CJA established colloquia with ATC judges to discuss the parameters of justice, the evidential value of different types of evidence, correct processes and principles, hypothetical cases, interpretation of the law and the interface between Sharia and constitutional law. This cohort of judges who worked very closely with the CJA are the “partnership judges”.”
[65]This change in the defendant’s position, in particular given the evidence provided to the courts in earlier proceedings, raises obvious concerns. The defendant’s position appears to be that it had previously accepted evidence – incorporated into the DARR decision-making process through the enrichment then provided by the FCDO – that was based upon an inadequate and incomplete investigation. That is plainly troubling, although I cannot see that the additional evidence, derived from the fuller, post-ACG, investigation, would have led to a substantive alteration to the defendant’s case in earlier cases: each would still have been defended on the basis that the claimants in question did not meet the eligibility criteria for category 4. This change in position is, however, part of the contextual background relevant to my determination as to whether a rational decision was reached in the fourth review of the claimant’s case; and, given context, and the heightened standard of scrutiny to be applied, that requires me to pay particular regard to the underlying evidence that has been disclosed.

The corrections to Ms Ferguson’s witness statement of 14 July 2025

[66]In providing her statement of 4 June 2026 (the second relating to the claimant’s ARAP application), Ms Ferguson has explained:
“5. ... in the light of the submissions made by the Claimant and the points raised in the [ACG judgment], it was decided to carry out further investigations, including seeking interviews with individuals who had worked at [the British embassy in Kabul] in periods contemporaneous with the Claimant’s tenure at the ATC. Several of these individuals have now left the FCDO which made access to them more difficult and which is why they were not consulted originally. ... though largely consistent with the original information provided, these new investigations provided more detail on the nature and extent of the relationship between the FCDO and the ATC as well as clarification of specific dates and other details.”
[67]Addressing the chronology of the FCDO’s interactions with the ATC, Ms Ferguson acknowledges that the further investigations revealed errors in her earlier statement in the ACG proceedings, which she has corrected as follows:67.1 It had previously been her understanding that the UK started providing assistance to the ATC after the introduction of annex 1 to the Criminal Procedural Code in September 2015, albeit she had explained that relationships with judges were limited prior to the May 2018 appointment of a CJA to the embassy CT team. An interview conducted in late 2025 with an individual in post in 2015 had, however, clarified that annex 1 did not form the beginning of an institutional relationship, nor was the subsequent provision of assistance to the ATC a consequence of/related to annex 1. Moreover, although it had been correct to say that, in any event, relationships with judges did not start until several years later, the subsequent investigation confirmed there had been two CJAs between 2018 and 2021 and it was only the second, in post from May 2019, who built relationships with some of the ATC judges (the “partnership judges”).67.2 Previously she had said the UK supported the ATC with IT programmes and equipment and other office supplies to aid its day-to-day running, and had developed substantial links with a small number of specific partner judges through the CT team, in particular from 2018 onwards. Further investigation, post-dating ACG, had, however, shown that the FCDO provided sporadic support in the form of equipment and infrastructure to the ATC from around 2018 and links with partnership judges only developed after the arrival of the last CJA, in May 2019, not 2018.67.3 In her first statement, Ms Ferguson expressed her understanding that the claimant’s time at the ATC overlapped FCDO involvement by approximately six to seven months. The further investigation had revealed that was inaccurate as September 2015 had in fact not marked the start of an institutional connection with the ATC; at most: pre-2015 some judges received FCDO-funded training, in 2015 the FCDO supported the installation of a courtroom in a NDS compound, around 2018 the FCDO provided some equipment and infrastructure. The turning point in the relationship between some ATC judges and the FCDO was, however, May 2019, when the final CJA arrived at post.

Underlying documentary material disclosed by the defendant

[68]The claimant relies on a disclosed document entitled “Counter Terrorism Programme Fund for Afghanistan Justice and Human Rights Partnership”. Dated 24 February 2016, it was submitted for approval on 6 April 2016. Described as a “life support” for Afghanistan, it was intended:
“... to mitigate the direct terrorist threat to the UK and our interests in AFG and ... contribute to a safer and more stable Afghanistan.”
The document states that this was to be achieved through the “Afghanistan Justice and Human Rights Partnership” (“JHRP”), consisting of “capacity building [specific operational practices]”. The aims of the JHRP were identified as follows:
“. The development of an effective and fair end-to-end Afghan process for investigating, detaining and trying suspected terrorists. . Increased professionalization and effectiveness of the National Directorate of Security (NDS). . Improved inter-operability between those involved in the Afghan criminal justice process. . The sustainable transition of our training programmes to an effective and efficient NDS Academy and Anti-Terrorism Prosecution Department (ATPD) Training and Education Department.”
As part of the “Strategic Context” it is further explained:
“There remains a direct threat to the UK from Afghanistan and our interests in AFG from terrorism. The enduring aim of the UK effort in Afghanistan is to keep the threat from terrorism at a level which does not require the redeployment of combat troops. A key component in achieving this is supporting the Afghan Government to increase their capability to arrest, detain, investigate and try suspected terrorists. Afghanistan is recognised as a country where there is both a threat to our security, and weakness in the law enforcement, human rights and criminal justice architecture. The more recent US Department of State report on human rights practices in Afghanistan notes that “the law provides for an independent judiciary, but the judiciary continued to be underfunded, understaffed, inadequately trained, ineffective, and subject to threats, bias, political influence, and pervasive corruption” ... CT capacity building efforts have been underway in Afghanistan for several years, with a mature detentions programme in place since 2006, and the JHRP being operational since 2013. The JHRP consists of capacity building and [specific operational practices to ensure human rights compliance] ... Capacity building work will occur mainly with the NDS, the ATPD and Judiciary. By mentoring and building up the capacity of these justice actors, the JHRP seeks to improve the quality of counter-terrorism cases within Afghanistan and encourages each section to act in a way that is compliant with international human rights legislation. ...”
[69]Identifying the bid as targeting an area “fundamental to underpinning the security of the Afghan state: security and the rule of law”, it is stated that, in designing the programmes in question, “discussions have taken place with our Afghan partners”, recording that support and commitment had been provided from the acting director general of the NDS, the directors of various divisions of the NDS (investigations and detention, detection, the academy, and human rights), the director of the ATPD, the Chief Justice and the acting Attorney General. The paper confirms it was intended that, over the following four years, training would gradually be transitioned to the NDS, the ATPD and the judiciary. As for projected results, a “Results chain” identifies “Inputs” relating to the NDS and the ATPD; reference is also made to ways in which progress and results should be monitored, including through regular meetings and reports; there is no specific reference to the judiciary in this regard.[70]The claimant has also referenced an annual review of the JHRP for the period 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017. Confirming that the JHRP sought to “mitigate the terrorist threat to the UK through the development of an effective and fair end-to-end Afghan process for investigating, detaining and trying suspected terrorists who may threaten the UK and UK interests in the region”, this document explains that “The programme contributes to two NSC objectives: ‘countering direct threats to the UK’ and ‘supporting a viable Afghan state’”.[71]In reviewing the programme outcomes, the document observes there had been delays in allocating funding and in the contracting process, resulting in “a six-month window for delivery in FY16/17”. Considering the different “outputs”, under the title “Prosecution: Suspected terrorists who may threaten the UK can be prosecuted and tried effectively”, it was assessed that these “substantially did not meet expectation” (classification “C”). In this regard, the following milestones were identified: an interim training programme “agreed and commenced in September 2016”; “New Implementer training packageagreed and to commences March 2017” (pursuant to a memorandum of understanding between the embassy, the ATPD and the judiciary); and a three year training programme to be established from April 2017. As for progress achieved, it records that a six-month training programme had been delivered, comprising an introductory course for 36 prosecutors, with the observation being made:
“Activities under this strand are focused solely on training for the prosecutors. There is no activity within the period focused on the judiciary. Nor is there any support to ensure that courts are well managed and any potential HR issues addressed.”
[72]Reference has also been made to the disclosure of two emails with individuals consulted as part of the FCDO’s further investigation. 72.1 Email 1 (dated 17 October 2025) provides input from the CT prosecution lead 2015-2016 and head CT team 2016-2017, stating:
“Met with cadre of judges and heads of court quarterly and six monthly. ASI trained them. We did [not] provide mentoring. Did not have a relationship with any judges outside the top roles in the Supreme Court. Keen to maintain judicial independence. Limited access to courts due to security. FCO officials never went in to collect reports. ASI did attend court to check on prosecution. Interpretation would have been an issue. The CT teams focus at the time was on building bridges between the different Afghan departments dealing with investigation, prosecution and courts. There was no focus on individual judges. Training continued through 2015/16. Significant judges would have attended training in Ankara in 2015. That was the pinnacle of engagement. Not a large number of cases we were interested in ... We would not have contacted individual judges about these cases. ... CPC [Criminal Procedure Code] introduction in Sept 2015 – did not cause greater FCO engagement with courts but did damage relations between NDS and ATPD prosecution depts. .... No step change in terms of relations with court. CJA role up to when it was cut in 2014 was to work with prosecution, not judges. They had neither relations with judges or any strong relation with seniors in the Supreme Court. ...” 72.2 Email 2 (albeit from the earlier date of 10 October 2025) provides input from the head of the CT team in 2021, confirming: “2. ... the relationship [with the ATC] changed when the team recruited a Criminal Justice Advisor and moved away from broad capacity building (provided by ... ASI). A detailed negotiation with the Chief Justice was undertaken AFTER the CPC Annex was published to agree a process by which the Chief Justice would agree that “UK interest cases” could be heard at Kabul ATC instead of Baghram ... 3. What form did assistance to the court take? Did it change over time ...? ... it included broad training on judicial skills as well as some court infrastructure improvements. Following the appointment of the Criminal Justice Advisor (2018) there was greater focus on UK interest cases and ensuring the judges presiding over those cases understood the facts of the case and maintained oversight of the case at all times pushing for compliance with legislation. Some mentoring sessions were held with the judges in those courts. 4. Did we have separate relationships with specific judges? If so, why? Yes. The Head of the Primary and Appeal courts to better understand the challenges they and their teams faced. 5. How were the judges with whom we had relationships selected? And when? ... The UK worked with all judges at the ATC but only had a special relationship with those handling UK interest cases. 6. Were there judges who worked in the court with whom we had no relationship? Yes, based on time and caseloads. ... 8. Did FCO/[embassy] officials or contractors visit the court and/or judges? If so, how regularly and for what purpose? Yes. Frequency of visits and their duration varied and were dependent on the security situation and scheduling. On average likely once every eight weeks. 9. If we have no record of a judge who worked at the court between 2015 and 2016, is it possible that we had a relationship with them? ... prior to the appointment of the CJA it’s highly unlikely that the UK would have had a relationship with that judge.”
Ground 1 Submissions

Ground 1

[73]Ground 1 raises two questions:(1) what is the meaning of the requirement that “the person: ... (iii) worked in Afghanistan alongside a UK Government department, in partnership with or closely supporting and assisting that department”?(2) did the defendant correctly apply that requirement?[74]The claimant argues that the ARAP eligibility criteria should be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning but with particular regard to the purpose of the February 2022 amendment: “working alongside” was intended to ensure the ARAP did not exclude those who performed meaningful roles in institutions created or shaped, sustained and promoted by the UK, and the reference to “indirect” working made clear category 4 was wider than merely direct personal relationships; consistent with LND1, that required looking at evidence of “any institutional link, or structural support”, not simply personal links (harder to show given staff turnover, record-keeping variations, and the 20-year time period). The claimant further emphasises LND1’sreference to the “substance” of the work, submitting this did not require a quid pro quo from applicants, still less membership of a particular cohort (and even if such a group was identified, that would not mean others were ineligible (ACG, paragraphs 77 and 81)).[75]As for the defendant’s application of condition (iii), the claimant says the issue was whether there was an institutional relationship between the ATC and a UK government department at the relevant time and, if so, whether his work within that context met the rule; the defendant had irrationally adopted a position that only applicants personally known to/remembered by embassy officials (consulted/willing to respond) ten years later could qualify; and, insofar as the defendant asserted that institutional links between the FCDO and the ATC were not present until after 2016, that was contrary to the evidence (and findings) in ACG (paragraphs 68, 72) and JZ (paragraph 40); further, as set out in later grounds, an irrational conclusion was reached on the evidence.[76]The defendant says, however, that the existence of a link between an Afghan institution and a UK government department is not determinative of condition 1 (iii) eligibility: the relationship “might be of such a nature as to amount to a partnership and thus be sufficient ...”, ACG paragraph 81 (emphasis in original), but the defendant might still be able to establish an evidential case that there was never an institutional relationship such that an ATC judge would be in partnership with the FCDO by reason of their work (ACG paragraph 91). On a plain English reading, the defendant submits that the individual must have worked “alongside ..., in partnership with or closely supporting and assisting”, a UK government department; the existence of institutional links was only one relevant factor (LND1, paragraph 46) and would not necessarily be sufficient (CX1, paragraph 65). This, the defendant contends, was the approach of the fourth review decision, which considered the existence, and nature, of institutional relationships between the UK government and the ATC, but nonetheless – having engaged with a wide range of sources - permissibly concluded that the claimant failed to satisfy condition 1 (iii).

Ground 1: analysis and conclusions

[77]There is no dispute as to the approach I am to take to the interpretative exercise required; per Mahad, the eligibility requirements fall to be construed sensibly, according to the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used, and it is not for the defendant to decide what terms such as working “alongside” or “in partnership with” mean in any particular factual context (ACG paragraph 51). Having regard to the guidance provided in earlier cases relating to ARAP applications by former Afghan judges (see paragraph 6, above), I note that a case-specific approach is required, holistically considering all relevant factors, which will include the substance of the work undertaken, the nature of the institution/s at which that work was done, and the nature of any connections between such institutions and the relevant UK government department.[78]The claimant contends that the question thus posed by condition 1 (iii) was whether there was an institutional relationship between the ATC and a government department at the relevant time and, if so, whether his work in that context met the rule. That, it seems to me, provides a practical expression of the test, which requires (per LND1) consideration of both any relevant institutional links and of the substantive nature the applicant’s work within that institution (and see the emphasis on the position of the individual in, for example, CX1 at paragraph 65). Thus accepting the approach urged by the claimant, I do not, however, find that the defendant failed to adopt this course in undertaking the necessary assessment in this fourth review.[79]First, it was demonstrably not the defendant’s position that only applicants personally known to, or remembered by, embassy officials would qualify. On the contrary, it is apparent that the defendant (through the FCDO assessment) took into account potential evidence from a far wider range of sources, including locally engaged staff from the relevant time period and a wide range of documentary and other records.[80]Second, and relatedly, it was, however, not irrational to investigate whether there was any recollection of, or reference to, the claimant, as this could provide evidence to support his application: while not necessarily determinative, personal relationships or specific references within records, might be evidentially relevant, pointing towards “the person” having worked alongside, in partnership with or closely supporting or assisting, a UK government department. The FCDO assessor (and the defendant, when incorporating that reasoning in his decision) was not irrationally departing from, or misapplying, the test by looking to see if there was evidence of the claimant having “personally worked alongside” the department. As the claimant’s interpretation of condition 1 (iii) acknowledges, even where there is a relevant institutional relationship, it is necessary to consider if the work of the applicant, in that context, met the rule. It was thus consistent with the claimant’s approach for the FCDO assessor to find the test was unlikely to be met “if only the Afghan institution an applicant worked in had operated alongside the FCDO as an institution, without the applicant also having personally worked alongside the FCDO”; and, it was not irrational to consider that, for an applicant to have worked alongside the FCDO, “it is likely they would have personally worked with FCDO officials and there would have been regular personal contact to establish a working partnership or close support or assistance”; indeed, the case of judge W illustrates the point: when fearful for his life in August 2021, he was able to call upon embassy contacts, who knew him precisely because his work had assisted the UK’s mission in Afghanistan.[81]Third, whatever the failings of earlier decisions, it is clear that, on this fourth review, the defendant did give careful consideration to the institutional links between the UK government and the ATC at the time when the claimant was working there. It is right that the conclusions drawn in this respect – that relevant institutional links were not present until after the claimant had left (so, post-dating April 2016) – differed from the defendant’s evidence in earlier cases (e.g., JZ and ACG) but, as Ms Ferguson has made clear, that is because, following ACG, the FCDO undertook a far more thorough investigation, making contact with a number of individuals who had not previously been consulted because they had left the FCDO’s employment. Recording this explanation does not mean I am untroubled by the change in the defendant’s position, but, however poorly that reflects upon the FCDO’s contribution in earlier cases, I have to consider the present claim on the basis of the evidence before me.[82]Fourth, I do not accept that the defendant was irrational in finding that examples of FCDO support (e.g. for particular training activities, or the installation of a courtroom in a NDS compound) did not demonstrate that judges of the ATC were working “alongside”, in “partnership or closely supporting or assisting”, the FCDO. The defendant was not thereby adding an extra requirement for applicants to demonstrate a quid pro quo, but, adopting the required holistic approach, was considering whether, as a matter of substance, there was evidence of the necessary relationship: that a UK government department provided financial support or a training workshop does not, of itself, show the Afghan recipient was working alongside it, in a relationship of partnership or close support and assistance (see, for example, the observations of Underhill LJ in LND1, paragraph 72, and those of Farbey J in BYK, paragraphs 56-60); something more would be necessary. Equally, looking at the role carried out by the prospective ARAP judicial applicant, when considering the substance of the work undertaken, while judicial independence would not preclude eligibility under category 4 (see MA, paragraph 33), it is equally apparent that undertaking a judicial role, even in terrorism cases, would not, of itself, be sufficient (S, paragraph 103; JZ, paragraphs 35 and 99). While many of those employed in the Afghan justice system at the relevant time would have undertaken work aligned with the UK’s values and aims, a shared commitment to the rule of law would not, of itself, establish that they worked alongside, in partnership with or closely supporting or assisting, a UK government department.[83]Fifth, and finally, while I address its practical application in this case in detail below, a finding that the required relationship was not demonstrated does not necessarily imply there was a failure to apply the relevant test; as Sir Peter Lane allowed, it was open to the defendant to establish an evidential case that there never was an institutional relationship such that an ATC judge at that time would be working alongside, in partnership with, the FCDO by reason of their work (ACG, paragraph 91). Having regard to the detail provided in the fourth review decision (and the underlying FCDO assessment), I am satisfied that the defendant applied the correct approach, considering both the nature of any institutional relationship and the substance of the work undertaken by the claimant.[84]I do not consider that an arguable case has been demonstrated in this regard, and I duly refuse permission on ground 1. Ground 2 Submissions

Ground 2

[85]By ground 2, the claimant contends that artificial and irrational distinctions were made between judges, submitting the defendant:(i) was unable to rationally explain how the claimant’s case differed from that of other ATC judges;(ii) continued to adopt an “unintelligible” approach to “partnership judge” (ACG, paragraph 72);(iii) elevated a number of judges post-2018 without engagement with the claimant’s contention (and evidence) that the institutional relationship existed in the earlier period/by other means;(iv) relied on FCDO enrichment that failed to explain how only certain ATC judges would qualify or were selected, and the nature of the relationship with those judges (and how it differed from that with the claimant);(v) provided no rational basis for distinguishing between judges in the ATC, other than personal interactions (illustrative of a flawed fixation on personal/direct relationships), notwithstanding that “the UK worked with all judges at the ATC” (email 2). Further, as for the purported delineation of the period 2019-2021 and the new CJA’s engagement with ATC judges as the basis of differentiation, the claimant says this was artificial, failing to engage (and see the similarities) with evidence of the relationship with ATC judges prior to 2019: see, the 2016 “Counter Terrorism Programme Fund for Afghanistan Justice and Human Rights Partnership; the “capacity building and [specific operational practices]” implemented through the JHRP; the second witness statement of MAR, confirming there had been no real difference in how the UK government interacted with him; and the confirmation that there was “No step change in terms of relations with court”(see email 1).[86]For the defendant it is emphasised that the case of each judge must be considered on its own merits and there were clear points of distinction between the claimant’s case and those of judges (including MAR) who applied under an earlier iteration of the ARAP and were relocated during Operation Pitting. There were also substantial differences on the facts: the FCDO enrichment had expressly considered whether the claimant’s case was comparable to MAR (identified as one of the post-2019 partnership judges) and rationally concluded it was not. Although Sir Peter Lane found the concept of “partnership judges” was “unintelligible” (ACG, paragraph 72), that was on the evidence then before the court, and he allowed that the defendant may be able to make the evidential case that “the only judges who can objectively be said to have been in partnership were a properly identifiable cohort of “partnership judges”” (paragraph 91) – a case made on the basis of the further FCDO enrichment.

Ground 2: analysis and conclusions

[87]In addressing this ground of claim, I accept the defendant’s point that the case of each judge must be considered on its own merits (S, paragraph 107; JZ, paragraph 35), and that there are difficulties in drawing comparisons with ATC judges relocated under the ARAP (or otherwise given leave to remain outside the rules) during Operation Pitting. Not only were there then different eligibility criteria for category 4 cases, but there is evidence the criteria were “stretched” (per Mr Samedi-Smith) during that crisis period, such that, accepting that the defendant must act lawfully in accordance with the ARAP (per CHD No. 2), I do not consider it irrational to consider there were relevant distinctions between the claimant’s case and those of the ATC judges evacuated at that time.[88]The more substantive issue raised by this ground of appeal relates, however, to the defendant’s evaluative assessment that there was a relationship between the CJA and ATC judges after May 2019 – allowing that relevant ATC judges were to be treated as working “alongside” the FCDO as “partner judges”, even if they did not themselves appreciate this was how they were viewed – which did not exist before. A number of questions are identified in this respect, including those arising from the defendant’s previous characterisation of this relationship, and those highlighted by Sir Peter Lane in ACG. More generally, however, it is the claimant’s case that no rational distinction, supported by the evidence, can in fact be drawn in this regard.[89]Addressing first the way in which the partner judge relationship was previously characterised, it is apparent that this has undergone some revision. Initially (see Mr Pinfield’s evidence in JZ), it was said that assistance began to be provided to the ATC after the introduction of annex 1 to the Criminal Procedural Code in 2015, and that substantial links had then developed “with partner judges through the Counter Terrorism Team in particular”. As Sir Peter Lane observed in ACG (see paragraph 68), the earlier cases had not required an intense focus on how a judge became a “partner judge”, or precisely what that entailed, but these were questions that needed to be addressed in the claimant’s case, as his work as an ATC judge had continued into 2016. In ACG, in seeking to answer those questions, the defendant had relied on Ms Ferguson’s (post-decision) evidence that, while the institutional relationship with the ATC had intensified in 2015 (on the introduction of annex 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code), the emergence of such partner judges actually took place later, linked to the appointment of a new CJA in 2018. There was, however, little explanation of the nature of the relationship between such partner judges and the CJA, and it was held that there was “no coherent evidence ... to explain the defendant’s designation of certain judges as specific partner judges”, which was found, on the evidence, to be “an unintelligible concept” (ACG, paragraphs 70 and 72).[90]As I have already recorded, following the further investigation undertaken by the FCDO post-ACG, the position has yet again undergone revision; it is now clarified that, in fact, the introduction of annex 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code was irrelevant, and it was the appointment of the final CJA in May 2019 that saw the development of relationships with partner judges at the ATC. Ms Ferguson’s 4 June 2026 statement explains this history and provides further description of the partner judge relationships in question.[91]Again noting the unsatisfactory nature of the changes in the FCDO’s evidence in these cases, I am, nonetheless, unable to say that its current position should not be accepted. Adopting the requisite heightened level of scrutiny, and testing Ms Ferguson’s explanation against the underlying evidence disclosed (discussed in more detail below), I accept the history related in her 4 June 2026 statement, which is confirmatory of the FCDO assessment that underpins the fourth review decision. As for Sir Peter Lane’s concerns, I note that a more detailed explanation has now been provided as to what was implied by the partner judge relationship and that the FCDO’s position in this regard has been informed by evidence from the relevant CJA responsible for the development of such relationships (and see the observation at ACG, paragraph 70).[92]Turning then to the details of the partner judge relationship that informed the defendant’s decision on the fourth review, the claimant objects that the description of the CJA’s remit (“to engage with the ATPD and ATC judges to ensure the end to-end process was compliant with international law”, per Ms Ferguson, 4 June 2026 statement, paragraph 32) did not differ from the aim of the 2016 “Counter Terrorism Programme Fund for Afghanistan Justice and Human Rights Partnership; that there was no explanation as to how ‘colloquia’ between the CJA and ATC judges post 2019 differed from the “capacity building and [specific operational practices]” implemented through the JHRP; and that, in his second witness statement, MAR had confirmed there was no real difference in how the UK government interacted with him during both periods, which was consistent with the CT prosecution lead’s observation (see email 1) that there was “No step change in terms of relations with court”.[93]I am, however, unable to agree with the claimant’s characterisation of the evidence in these respects. Accepting this is a case that calls for a heightened degree of scrutiny by the court, I have not only carried a thorough review of the reasoning provided in the decision, and the underlying FCDO assessment, I have also considered with care the materials disclosed by the defendant. Undertaking that exercise, I do not find that the defendant’s conclusion – that there was a relevant distinction between relationships with ATC judges before and after May 2019 - was irrational.[94]First, looking at the funding bid contained within the Counter Terrorism Programme Fund for Afghanistan Justice and Human Rights Partnership, I note this was only approved on 6 April 2016 and that (as the relevant JHRP review for 2016/17 makes plain) there was then a six-month delay in the allocation of funds and the related contracting process. Even allowing for the fact that the “partnership” suggested by this programme might have been intended to build on existing work (the JHRP is said to have been operational since 2013), the documents make clear that the initial (and primary) focus was on the NDS and ATPD, and the investigation, prosecution, and detention of terrorists. While recognising the need to support the judges (the trial aspect of the “end-to-end process”) by including them within capacity building work, references to the monitoring of results made no specific reference to the judiciary and it is apparent (from the 2016/17 JHRP review) that very little had been done by the time the claimant left the ATC.[95]Second, looking at the evidence regarding post-2019 ATC judicial involvement in “colloquia” with the CJA, as compared to “capacity building and [specific operational practices]” implemented through the JHRP, I first note that the specific operational practices related to human-rights-compliant detention, which would not suggest this had particular relevance to ATC judges. As for judicial capacity building, the JHRP review for 2016/17 does not suggest any milestones had been achieved before the claimant’s departure from the ATC in April 2016. That said, as the defendant accepted, the claimant had previously attended two FCDO-funded training courses in 2013 and 2014 (the former being a two-day course on “public security judicial forensic awareness”; the latter, provided through the ASI, being a two-week course entitled “legal skills for judges of courts combatting crimes against domestic and external security”). Comparing this, however, to the description provided by the FCDO assessment (informed by consultation with the CJA appointed in May 2019) of post-2019 “colloquia” between the CJA and certain of the ATC judges (“those handling UK interest cases”, per email 2) - “to discuss matters of continuous professional development, interpretation of points of law and some technical aspects of considering different forms of evidence in complex trials” – I cannot say it was irrational for the defendant to consider this was qualitatively different to the two courses undertaken by the claimant.[96]More generally, I do not consider it was irrational for the FCDO (and, therefore, the defendant in accepting this underlying assessment) to distinguish between the provision and/or funding of training (usually understood to involve teaching, or the imparting of particular learning, and something the FCDO regularly facilitates, globally and in the UK, for participants from a range of entities), and the establishment of colloquia, which would normally be understood to involve a more equal sharing of knowledge, experiences, views, and ideas. In then considering whether participants in either activity might thus be working “alongside”, “in partnership with or closely supporting and assisting”, the FCDO, I accept that the latter might rationally be found to provide evidence corroborative of such a relationship while the former did not.[97]Thirdly, as for whether, more generally, the evidence suggested there was no real difference in interactions between UK government officials and ATC judges pre- and post-2019, I do not consider the claimant’s submission fairly represents the material before the decision-maker. Although MAR’s second witness statement speaks of a “connection” with the British “even at the earliest stage”, and says that, by 2014, officials regularly attended to obtain case reports, his account is nuanced, also explaining that:(i) the connection was “not as intense at the beginning as it was by the end”;(ii) officials attended the offices (he does not say they sat in court) for meetings with ATC directors, but only had an interest in selected cases; and(iii) later meetings (in 2020/2021) were “the same type” (as in 2014/15) but “were more frequent, involved more people, and the questioning was more in-depth”. As for the observation made in email 1, this was referring to the introduction of annex 1 to the Criminal Procedure Code in 2015 (saying – as the FCDO assessment now accepts – this did not in fact “cause greater FCO engagement with the courts”). Otherwise, email 1 confirms that in 2015-2016: the CT team had no relationship with judges other than those at the top of the Supreme Court; FCDO officials never went into the ATC to collect reports, although the ASI did attend “to check on prosecution”; there was no focus on individual judges, and the CJA prior to 2014 (when that role was cut (it was reinstated in 2018)) had no relationship with any judges.[98]It is right to observe that the evidence still suggests that there was a degree of subjectivity in the selection of participants in the colloquia with the CJA from 2019, and thus in the determination of who should be counted as “partner judges”; I do not find, however, that this remains an “unintelligible concept” or that it demonstrates a flawed fixation on personal relationships. The clarification of the position, with input having been obtained from the CJA in question, makes apparent that, from 2019, a relationship (both institutional and personal) was consciously developed between the CJA and judges who were handling “UK interest cases”, involving a sharing of knowledge, ideas and experience, that could rationally be viewed as evidence of working “alongside” and in “partnership”.[99]I would give permission on ground 2 –the claim having identified an arguable issue as to whether the nature of the partner judge relationship had been fully explained – but dismiss the claim on this basis: I am satisfied the question raised has been answered, and there is no irrationality in the distinction drawn. Ground 3 Submissions

Ground 3

[100]By this ground it is contended the defendant failed to apply anxious scrutiny or give proper weight to the claimant’s evidence, accepting a flawed assessment and reaching irrational conclusions. Specifically, it is said the defendant:(i) irrationally failed to give weight to evidence of 2013-2014 training and capacity-building;(ii) dismissed the claimant’s and MAR’s evidence regarding assistance given to the ATC to move premises, failing to consider the likelihood this referred to the (accepted) support for a new courtroom in the NDS complex;(iii) dismissed the claimant’s and MAR’s evidence regarding the provision of equipment without reference to corroboration in Ms Ferguson’s first statement and email 2;(iv) dismissed the claimant’s and MAR’s accounts of UK officials attending the ATC without reference to other corroboration, and irrationally failed to take account of the claimant’s and MAR’s evidence regarding the provision of reports to UK officials;(v) irrationally dismissed the relevance of certain cases being of interest to the UK government, making no reference to the claimant’s role in the trials of suspected terrorists arrested by UK forces/who threatened UK interests;(vi) gave no separate consideration to the claimant’s security training;(vii) afforded no weight to the judiciary’s importance to the UK’s counter-terrorism programme in Afghanistan (see “Counter Terrorism Programme Fund for Afghanistan Justice and Human Rights Partnership”). More generally, the claimant contends the defendant failed to adopt the holistic approach required.[101]The defendant responds as follows:(i) regard was had to the evidence of 2013/14 capacity building/training but it was rationally concluded this was FCDO support, not working alongside (see BYK, paragraph 56), and not comparable to subsequent colloquia with partner judges;(ii) although the claimant’s evidence about the ATC office move in early/mid 2016 was found not to be credible, regard was had to the support given for a new courtroom in 2015 but this was rationally considered to be only minor logistical support;(iii) the same was the case in relation to any provision of equipment;(iv) as for court attendances and reports, the evidence did not support the claimant’s account;(v) evidence of possible interest in certain cases was considered but a rational conclusion reached that involvement in particular trials was not working “alongside”;(vi) regard was given to the reference to security training, but this was not corroborated and would not be sufficient to meet the test;(vii) as for the judiciary’s importance for the UK government’s counterterrorism programme in Afghanistan, this was for the defendant to assess, but would be relevant to condition 2 (assessing the degree of the applicant’s contribution).

Ground 3: analysis and conclusions

[102]In applying the required heightened scrutiny of the defendant’s decision in this case, I nevertheless remind myself that this was not a tick-box exercise but an evaluative assessment of the entirety of the evidence available. Keeping this in mind, I note that the individual matters identified under this ground of appeal form a part of the claimant’s broader case: although not claiming to have had a direct relationship with the UK government, he relies, on the one hand, on what he describes as the UK’s provision of “assistance and technical cooperation” to the ATC, and, on the other, on the substance of his work as an ATC judge, which he says directly supported and advanced the UK’s national security objectives. It is the claimant’s case that the individual incidents or practices he has cited cumulatively evidence an institutional relationship between the ATC and the FCDO, within which ATC judges worked alongside, in partnership with or closely supporting and assisting, the FCDO in advancing the UK’s national security objectives. The defendant has, however, rejected this analysis. To the extent particular incidents or practices were found to have been established, the defendant has accepted the FCDO’s assessment: that these were matters that simply evidenced FCDO support for the Afghan government, not a partnership with the judges of the ATC, or that they were closely supporting and assisting the FCDO or any other UK government department.[103]Thus, accepting that, in 2013 and 2014, the claimant undertook two FCDO-funded training courses, the defendant agreed the FCDO ’s analysis that this:
“... represented the FCDO supporting and assisting the Afghan government to increase its capacity to deal with terrorist crimes more efficiently, rather than the reverse, as required ...”
As regards “capacity-building” more generally, the FCDO assessment – supported by contemporaneous documentation (see my earlier discussion of the document entitled “Counter Terrorism Programme Fund for Afghanistan Justice and Human Rights Partnership” and the 2016/2017 JHRP annual review) – was that this was delivered through training that was primarily focussed on investigators in the NDS and prosecutors in the ATPD, but was similarly evidence only of FCDO support and assistance for the Afghan government. As for the claimant’s claim to have been provided with security training, it is apparent that this was considered by the decision-maker (this would have been a matter for the Ministry of Defence, not the FCDO), but it was found that no corroboration had been provided, and that, in any event, this would amount to a benefit afforded to the claimant, it would not show he was working alongside a UK government department, in partnership with or providing close support and assistance.[104]Having paid careful regard to the underlying material that informed the FCDO assessment and, therefore, the defendant’s decision, I am unable to say the conclusion reached on this point was irrational. The training undertaken by the claimant in 2013 and 2014 did not provide evidence of partnership working in the way the later colloquia did, and, although pointing to a closer relationship with NDS investigators or ATPD prosecutors, in relation to capacity-building, the contemporaneous documentation does not support the view that there was an institutional relationship with the ATC judiciary at this time. As for the security training, assuming (in the claimant’s favour) that this was undertaken, I cannot say it was irrational to see this as further evidence of UK support for Afghan government institutions and not as demonstrating the kind of institutional relationship that could be relevant for the condition 1 (iii) test.[105]As for the FCDO having provided assistance for the ATC to move premises, or equipment to the ATC at the time the claimant was based there, the defendant did not accept the claimant’s account. The decision in this regard was based on the conclusions reached in the FCDO’s investigation, as follows:
“ii. Provision of computers and databases in/or around 2015/2016 Despite searches of FCDO systems, no evidence was found that the FCDO funded or provide improvements to office facilities or equipment I the period the application was working at the ATC. When consulted ... an ex-[embassy] CT team official confirmed that the FCDO did not provide computers and/or databases for the ATC between 2011 and 2016 ... The Deputy Head of the CT Team, 2017-2019, confirmed that the FCDO funded the provision of computers in the ATC offices during the time they worked in their role ... but not during the period the applicant worked at the ATC. Searches of FCDO systems revealed that in the 2018/19 financial year the FCDO funded video-conference facilities in the ATC and some NDS detention centres to assist in hearings ... In the 2019/2020 financial year the FCDO funded installation of two secure doors at the ATC and CCTV in the reception area and detainee waiting room. These last works were completed in September 2019. ... iii. Assistance with an ATC office move in the form of equipment and furnishings in early-mid 2016 ... Despite extensive searches, no evidence was found that indicates the FCDO assisted the ATC with “moving offices” during the period the applicant was in his ATC role. ... When consulted for this assessment, an ex-[embassy] CT official (CT prosecution lead 2015 to 2016 and Head of the CT team 2016 to 2017) confirmed that the FCDO did not assist the court with an office move during this period (2015-2017) and that the ATC did not move office or court in that same period either. When consulted, the Deputy Head of the CT team from 2017 to 2019 confirmed that in August 2018 the ATC primary court moved into the same location as the ATC appeals court. ... Although distinct from “moving offices”, an ex-[embassy] CT team member confirmed that in 2015 the FCDO provided funding for a local contractor to carry out work to assist in establishing a courtroom within a new building constructed by the USA on the NDS 40 compound (an NDS facility in Kabul) ... This work was completed in June 2015. ... I considered this constituted FCDO minor logistical support to the ATC and not a working relationship between the FCDO and the ATC involving a partnership with or close support and assistance to the FCDO ...”
(emphasis in original)[106]As for other evidence, it is right that, in his first statement (see paragraph 10), MAR referenced UK assistance for a move to a new compound “in or around” 2016, with help for the refurbishment and improved security there. He also spoke in general terms of the UK providing office equipment to the ATC, clarifying in his second statement that this “happened a lot after we moved to a new court, but it was happening before then to a lesser extent”. For her part, in her first statement, Ms Ferguson spoke of assistance being provided “after the introduction of Annex 1 to the Criminal Procedure Code” (paragraph 5), stating that “Between 2015 and 2021, HMG provided the Court with IT programmes and equipment and other office supplies to aid its day-to-day running” (paragraph 6). Following the FCDO’s further (post-ACG) investigation, however, she corrected that evidence, explaining, in her 4 June 2026 statement, that any assistance from the FCDO did not in fact start until some time after 2015: “FCDO provided sporadic support in the form of equipment and infrastructure to the ATC from around 2018” (paragraph 58). Finally, email 2 refers to the provision of “some court infrastructure improvements” but that plainly relates to the period after the claimant had left the ATC (the email is written by the former head of the CT team from 2021).[107]Thus considering the evidence available to the decision-maker, I am unable to find it was irrational to reject the claimant’s accounts in relation to the provision of equipment or the assistance for a court move:(i) the decision-maker was entitled to give weight to the further, post-ACG, FCDO investigation and to note that no records had been found to support what the claimant had said (in contrast to confirmation of later FCDO (sporadic) support and assistance);(ii) the inference drawn from the lack of contemporaneous records was corroborated by officials consulted as part of the investigation (albeit they volunteered other information: the establishment of a courtroom in a new, US-built, NDS compound building in 2015; the provision of equipment from 2017-2019);(iii) MAR’s account is more nuanced than the claimant’s submission allows, and it does not seem impossible (particularly as MAR was working to the Afghan calendar) that his recollection of a court move “in or around 2016” was in fact a reference to the move in 2018 or to the establishment of a court room in the US-built NDS building in 2015;(iv) Ms Ferguson’s first statement was corrected by the further investigation; and(v) email 2 plainly relates to a later period. More generally, however, it was not irrational for the FCDO to assess that matters of this nature merely evidenced the assistance it was providing to the Afghan government, not of working alongside the judges of the ATC, in partnership or benefitting from their close support and assistance.[108]The claimant has further contended that UK officials attended the ATC, were given reports by judges, and had a particular interest in certain cases, and (more generally) in the work he (and other ATC judges) undertook. I have grouped these points together as it seems to me that these go to the substance of the claimant’s work at the ATC and how he says this demonstrated that he was, indeed, working alongside, in partnership with or closely supporting and assisting, the UK government.[109]Although supported to some extent by the statements of MAR (albeit he talks of officials attending the offices of the ATC directors, not the judges, and does not suggest they sat in court), those consulted as part of the post-ACG investigation denied that officials would attend court (in part due to security and language difficulties, but also because of the need to respect judicial independence), or (at least during the period 2011-2017) request reports from judges, or discuss cases with them. Moreover, although accepting that the UK would have an interest in a small number of cases tried at the ATC, the FCDO assessment was clear that officials would not work “alongside” the judges presiding over those proceedings given the need to maintain judicial independence. As for the suggestion that the claimant’s contentions were corroborated by Ms Ferguson’s first statement, her account in this regard was limited to recording what had been stated by the claimant and the FCDO assessor, providing nothing further by way of relevant evidence.[110]Further advancing his case on this point, the claimant has placed reliance on email 1, which he contends supports his account as the writer (CT prosecution lead 2015-2016 and head of the CT team 2016-2017) confirms that ASI representatives would “attend court to check on prosecution”. Consistent with the contemporaneous documents I have already referenced, that evidence does no more, however, than emphasise a focus on the prosecution of terrorism cases at the relevant time; otherwise, the author of email 1 states that FCDO officials “never went in to collect reports”, further emphasising there were “[n]ot a large number of cases we were interested in” and stating “We would not have contacted individual judges about these cases”.[111]Acknowledging the concerns expressed by Sir Peter Lane in this regard (see ACG, paragraph 72), having regard to the evidence obtained in the FCDO’s further investigation, I am unable to find it was irrational for the decision-maker to conclude that the FCDO’s interest at the relevant time was “focused on establishing an effective prosecution system in Afghanistan” (this is corroborated by both the contemporaneous documentation and by the author of email 1), and that, considering the substance of the claimant’s work at the ATC, judicial independence was maintained, even where there was a UK interest in particular cases being tried (again confirmed by the author of email 1). Accepting that judicial independence will not preclude ARAP eligibility (MA, paragraph 33), it was not irrational for the defendant to take this into account as part of the relevant evidential context.[112]I do not, however, find that those considerations entirely address the issue of the reports that the claimant (and MAR) has said the judges would provide to assist the UK government. In his first statement (see paragraph 36), the claimant described the provision of “work reports that would be collated and presented to the British officials”. On its face, this would seem to be contradicted by the further FCDO investigation, noting that no records could be found of such reports on the archived systems, and recording that former embassy officials (covering the period 2011-2017), had stated that: “... the FCDO did not at that time ... request reports from any judges in the ATC, nor did they discuss cases with them; there were no reports passed to the FCDO or asked for by the FCDO at all.” (see the FCDO assessment under “v. Provision of reports by judges to HMG on specific trials”)[113]In the claimant’s fourth statement (post-dating the fourth review decision), he has clarified:
“8. Regarding the case reports, I confirm that I always gave these orally when a director asked me to join a meeting with a British official asking about one of my cases. It is possible that the Directors gave them written reports, however that would have been in my absence and given on a director level, so I was not privy to that. I estimate that I gave such reports 15 or 16 times. I also confirm ... that I never went to the Embassy to give a case report. I know that some other judges did during my time at the Anti-Terrorism Court. 9. Regarding officials attending court, I remember this happening on two occasions. I understand that the arrangements for the officials to attend were also made through the directors.”
Allowing that the claimant (reasonably) might not have distinguished between an ASI representative and an official from the FCDO, it is possible to see his account of court attendances as relating to an interest in checking on prosecutions. His statement regarding case reports is, however, hard to square with the results of the FCDO’s further investigation, although, as these are said to have been oral reports, it may be unsurprising that there was no corroboration from searches of FCDO systems.[114]I am troubled by the contradiction in the evidence in this regard. Although I have set out the information obtained as part of the FCDO’s post-ACG investigation, I am unable to see that the defendant expressly addressed this issue in the decision under challenge (albeit that would necessarily be limited to the accounts provided by the claimant and MAR in their first statements).[115]Turning to the FCDO assessor’s ultimate conclusion regarding the claimant’s work, I note this is explained as follows:
“Even where the FCDO was interested in a case, they did not work alongside trial judges and always maintained judicial independence. ... the interest was in assisting the Afghan authorities to establish an effective end-to-end prosecution system for dealing with terrorism cases that was compliant with international standards and where all Afghan government departments worked effectively together. By working on investigation and prosecution pathways and not with judges the FCDO’s approach expressly maintained judicial independence and did not favour one judgement over another (guilty/not guilty). Further, interviews with ex-officials confirmed that this independence was an expectation of the Afghan judges in the ATC.

(s) ”

[116]Accepting (as I do) that there was a focus on the prosecution of terrorism cases, the establishment of an “effective end-to-end prosecution system” would still suggest an interest in how such cases were prosecuted at trial. That, it seems to me, would seem consistent with ASI attendances at court (referenced by the author of email 1) and might also explain why reports would be obtained from ATC judges presiding over such trials. Even if such reports were given orally and/or via ATC directors, that might, in turn, be seen as working alongside, in partnership with the FCDO, or closely supporting and assisting it, in securing the effective prosecution system it is accepted it was seeking to establish.[117]It would be entirely speculative for me to try to resolve these questions, but I cannot avoid the conclusion that this aspect of the claimant’s case remains unanswered. Although the FCDO assessment sets out the evidential dispute, the defendant’s decision does not explain what, if any, conclusion was reached on the question whether the claimant (and other ATC judges) provided reports on their work to the FCDO, allowing that such reports might have been communicated via other court officials, and acknowledging that the information provided might have been used to support and assist the establishment of an effective end-to-end system of prosecution rather than to communicate a judicial view regarding any particular case. The requirement on the defendant was to carry out a holistic assessment of the claimant’s work, which would include any assistance he might have provided for a wider institutional relationship between the ATC and the FCDO, even if that went to issues relating to the prosecution of terrorism cases rather than the judicial conduct of the trial. Moreover, given the heightened standard of review to be applied in this case, and having regard to the way in which this issue had been highlighted in ACG (see paragraph 72), it is to be expected that the decision would show that every factor that might tell in the claimant’s favour has properly been taken into account (YH, paragraph 24); that, I find, has not been done, giving rise to a flaw in the decision under challenge.[118]On this point, for the reasons provided, I grant permission and allow the claim on ground 3. Ground 4 Submissions

Ground 4

[119]The claimant further argues that the defendant’s decision-making process and approach to assessing credibility was procedurally unfair. He says that although the defendant had previously stopped short of asserting that the factual case had not been accepted, it was now stated that aspects of that case were “not credible”; specifically whether:(i) the FCDO provided computers and databases to the ATC in/around 2015/16;(ii) help was given to the ATC to move offices during the claimant’s tenure;(iii) officials sat in court during trials. The claimant contends those findings cannot stand in the light of emails 1 and 2 but, in any event, it was procedurally unfair he had not been provided with the opportunity to comment in advance of any such conclusions.[120]The defendant counters, however, that: emails 1 and 2 did not provide the corroboration claimed; the onus was on the claimant to provide all relevant material to establish the facts he relied on, and, given the history, he was undeniably aware of the case he had to meet; although he had put in a further statement, he had not identified any material evidence that could have been adduced in response to credibility concerns; in any event, the decision-maker had also proceeded to consider the case on the basis of the matters relied on by the claimant, but had found this would still not demonstrate he had worked alongside, in partnership with or closely supporting and assisting,any UK government department.

Ground 4: analysis and conclusions

[121]The short answer to this ground is that the defendant is correct: for the reasons already given, emails 1 and 2 do not provide relevant corroboration of the claimant’s case; as for procedural fairness, the claimant was aware the defendant would be re-making the review decision in the light of ACG, and it was open to him to submit further evidence if that was available; in the event, the claimant provided a further statement, post-dating the decision under challenge, but did not identify any additional evidence on which he would otherwise have sought to rely to counter issues over credibility; finally, and conclusively, the decision-maker expressly considered each of the points in issue on the alternate basis that the claimant’s case was accepted but nevertheless rationally concluded these would not meet the condition 1 (iii) test.[122]I refuse permission on ground 4. Ground 5 Submissions

Ground 5

[123]By this ground, the claimant contends that the defendant’s fourth review decision impermissibly by-passed the judgment of Sir Peter Lane in ACG (and see Kuteh paragraph 20), rendering that decision unlawful.[124]The defendant points out that both the decision-maker and the FCDO assessor referenced the judgment in ACG, and the requirement (per Kuteh) did not oblige the defendant to determine this matter in the claimant’s favour.

Ground 5: analysis and conclusions

[125]Again it is possible to deal with this ground in short form: as the defendant observes, the judgment in ACG was expressly referenced in the FCDO assessment and by the decision-maker; for the reasons I have already provided (in particular, see under ground 1), the defendant did not fail to apply the test laid down in LND1 (identified by the claimant as the ratio of ACG); and the fact that the defendant again refused the claimant’s ARAP application did not mean that the decision-maker had impermissibly by-passed the judgment in ACG, which had, after all, remitted the decision to the defendant, allowing that a further rejection of the application remained a possible (and permissible) outcome.[126]I refuse permission on ground 5.

Decision and relief

[127]For the reasons provided, I duly:(1) refuse permission on ground 1;(2) grant permission but refuse the claim on ground 2;(3) grant permission and allow the claim on ground 3, on the basis explained at paragraph 117 above;(4) refuse permission on ground 4;(5) refuse permission on ground 5.[128]The parties having been provided with a copy this judgment in draft form and having had the opportunity to make written representations on the question of relief, save on one point only it was common ground (and so ordered) that, given the decision reached on this claim:(1) the defendant’s (fourth) ARAP review refusal decision dated 9 February 2026 is to be declared to be unlawful;(2) the defendant’s (fourth) ARAP review refusal decision dated 9 February 2026 is duly quashed;(3) the claimant’s ARAP application is remitted to the defendant for a fresh ARAP review decision to be made within six weeks of the date on which (a) any application for permission to appeal made to this Court is refused (or upon the expiry of the time limit for any such application for permission to appeal to be made), or (b) any renewed application made for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal is refused (or upon the expiry of the time limit for any such renewed application for permission to appeal to be made), or (c) if permission to appeal is granted, the appeal is finally determined. The only dispute between the parties on the question of relief related to the timescale in which the defendant is to make a fresh ARAP review decision; ultimately that dispute came down to whether the six week period allowed should be subject to the caveat “barring exceptional circumstances”. As those acting for the claimant have pointed out, however, should exceptional circumstances arise, it would be open to the defendant to make the appropriate application to the Court, which – it has been indicated – would be unlikely to be opposed. I have therefore ordered that the decision is to be re-made within six weeks.