“The panel recognised the important contribution certain judges in Afghanistan made to counter-terrorism efforts. The panel approached the issue carefully and having regard to all of the circumstances and evidence. The panel however decided that a general contribution to such efforts is not sufficient to qualify under ARAP in the absence of a clear and direct link to HMG and its mission. The additional evidence did not justify a different decision. Taking into account all the additional evidence, the panel noted that the JCIP was not supported by the UK, and that while the additional evidence demonstrated JZ's role in tackling counterterrorism in Afghanistan, it was not possible to conclude that JZ worked alongside HMG in a role that made a material contribution to HMG’s mission in Afghanistan.”
“The cohort eligible for assistance on a case-by-case basis are those who worked in meaningful enabling roles alongside HMG, in extraordinary and unconventional contexts, and whose responsible HMG unit builds a credible case for consideration under the scheme (in some cases this includes people employed by contractors to support HMG defence outcomes).”
“I have no evidence to lead me to believe that [Z] was an employee of Her Majesty’s Government, nor does it refer to work alongside or in cooperation with HMG units. The Justice Centre in Parwan was not a UK or HMG led intervention and from June 2010 was indeed an Afghan institution – albeit one that benefitted from extensive donor support.”
“Based on the evidence reviewed, it does not appear to me that [the Applicant] made a material contribution to HMG’s mission in Afghanistan. The UK’s capacity building effort around justice and the rule of law over the last nine years was focused in Kabul – that was also the focus of HMG’s counter terrorism mission in Afghanistan. As [the Applicant] does not claim to have worked in the Anti-Terrorism Courts within Kabul he did not make a material contribution to HMG’s mission there.”
“[T]hose approved under…category [4] (on a case-by-case basis) have included a number of Afghan judges who were publicly known to have co-operated with the UK or had been involved in highly sensitive cases of particular UK interest (including national security) and were at significant risk as a result.”
“HMG began providing assistance to this Court [sc. the Anti-Terrorism Court in Kabul] after the introduction of Annex 1 to the Criminal Procedure Code in 2015. HMG developed substantial links with partner judges through the Counter Terrorism Team in particular.”
“From 2015 onwards, HMG developed a partnership with some judges serving in the Anti-Terrorism Court in Kabul. All 11 judges that were resettled due to their role in presiding over terrorism trials were involved in this partnership, although the full circumstances of this partnership may not have been known to the judges involved. They were invited to attend a series of events run by HMG (colloquia to discuss matters of continuous professional development and debate interpretation on points of law and some of the technical aspects of considering different forms of evidence in complex trials), and, at times, HMG officials attended hearings they presided over, where the cases were of interest to the UK.”
“106. … [A] key difference between JZ and the judges of the Anti-Terrorism Court in Kabul in the successful ARAP cohort relied on by the Defendants is the time of JZ’s service. 107. JZ’s work in hearing terrorism cases at Pol-e-Charkhi prison ended in 2011. In contrast, Judge W had served at the Anti-Terrorism Court in Kabul from 2015 until he was evacuated in August 2021. Further, the Part 18 response showed that all of the judges from the Anti-Terrorism Court in Kabul who had succeeded under ARAP served in that role after 2015. All of the 11 judges who had been successful under ARAP by4 February 2022 were serving at the Anti-Terrorism Court in Kabul in 2020-2021. 108. In challenging the rationality of the Defendants’ reliance on the dates of JZ’s service as a justification for his different treatment, Ms Naik QC understandably highlighted that ARAP has no time limit, that from 2008-2011 the UK mission was active in Afghanistan and that JZ experienced threats as long ago as 2014 as a result of his service from 2008-2011. 109. However, these factors do not bear directly on the central question for the ARAP decision-makers, namely whether there was sufficient evidence of JZ having ‘worked alongside’ HMG at the material time. 110. Rather, the dates of JZ’s service on anti-terrorism cases help explain why the decision-makers considered he did not meet the ‘worked alongside’ criterion, unlike his comparator judges, because HMG only became involved in supporting the Anti-Terrorism Court in Kabul and building partnerships with the judges there after 2015. 111. The extract of the20 October 2021 letter quoted at [36] above [i.e. the quotation in para. 18 above], read together with the Part 18 response summarised at [40] above, suggests that evidence of partnership, or perhaps the ‘worked alongside’ criterion more generally, was made out by factors such as (i) the extent to which a judge was publicly known to have co-operated with the UK; (ii) whether the judge had been involved in highly sensitive cases of particular UK interest; (iii) whether HMG representatives had attended their hearings; and (iv) whether they had been involved in colloquia of the sort described at [40] above [i.e. in the Part 18 response]. These were not discrete requirements, but the sort of factors that enabled the ‘worked alongside’ criterion to be satisfied. 112. As the18 October 2021 decision letter makes clear, decision-making under ARAP involves an assessment of the evidence provided by the applicant and the Defendants’ own enquiries. 113. In JZ’s case he had provided evidence during the ARAP decision making process of attending seminars organised/sponsored by the UK government. These may well have been similar to the colloquia referred to above. However, based on the material before them the ARAP decision makers did not consider that sufficient evidence had been provided of the other type of factors referred to at [111] above, nor did their own enquiries apparently generate the content now advanced by JZ in SQ’s fifth witness statement which was not before them. 114. The absence of this evidence before the decision makers in JZ’s case also helps explain why it was considered he did not meet the ‘worked alongside’ criterion, while other judges did. 115. I recognise that the ‘2015 partnership’ evidence has been provided late in the chronology of this claim, but I do not consider that it undermines the analysis above. Reasons for the decision in JZ’s case were given contemporaneously. These made clear that it was the lack of evidence of work alongside HMG which was the reason why his application had not succeeded. The 2015 partnership evidence essentially provides further detail about how decisions were reached in other cases. 116. It is a slightly unusual feature of the case that the Defendants accept that the judges granted ARAP may not have appreciated that they were considered to be in partnership with the Defendants. There is plainly an element of subjectivity in the Defendants’ assessment of whether the ‘partnership’ existed. However, this is perhaps no more than a further aspect of the evaluative exercise of whether the ‘worked alongside’ criterion was satisfied. This does not in itself show that the scheme was operated in an irrational way.”
“72. By way of an application notice dated22 July 2022 JZ seeks to rely on a fifth statement from SQ. This statement indicates that (i) JZ met a number of HMG officials during events which he attended from 2005-2021; (ii) he was invited to and attended a series of events organised by the CJTF and the Counter Terrorism Team at the British Embassy in Kabul; (iii) he made presentations at some of the HMG events on topics related to terrorism; (iv) at times, HMG officials attended hearings he presided over from 2008-2011 at the Anti-Terrorism court in Kabul; and (v) in 2021, he had a formal request to transfer back to that court, albeit that this was not concluded before Kabul fell to the Taliban. 73. Ms Naik QC argued that the statement should be admitted in the interests of justice because it included plainly important factual material that went directly to the alleged inconsistency of treatment issue. She submitted that the significance of this evidence had only become apparent once the Defendant’s Part 18 replies made clear that at least in respect of the 11 counter-terror judges based in the Kabul courts, the Defendants had interpreted ‘worked alongside’ HMG as including ‘partnership’ with the UK via events, professional development, colloquia and attendance at hearings by HMG officials. The statement from SQ had been provided very promptly after receipt of the Defendant’s Part 18 replies at 4.48 pm on20 July 2022 . 74. The Defendants opposed the admission of the evidence. The court’s role was to decide whether the ARAP decisions made in JZ’s case were correctly made, based on the material before the decision-maker, which did not include the contents of SQ’s fifth statement. It was therefore not material to the issues before the court. The Defendants did not agree with the gist of the statement and needed the opportunity to respond to it, which would necessitate a further adjournment and the litigation becoming never-ending. 75. I do not consider that it would be appropriate to admit SQ’s fifth witness statement. JZ had provided evidence about participating in seminars organised/sponsored by the UK government ahead of the24 November 2021 decision (and again in advance of the26 May 2022 reconsideration): see [22] and [30] above. However, the further details of his contact with HMG provided in SQ’s fifth statement were not before those who made the18 October 2021 and24 November 2021 decisions. I agree with the Defendants that the focus in these proceedings has to be on whether those decisions were properly made, based on the material then available. I also take into account the fact that the contents of the statement are not agreed by the Defendants. 76. As the24 November 2021 and26 May 2022 decisions illustrate, reconsiderations of ARAP decisions are possible within that scheme when further evidence is obtained. It may be that because this claim, including the Part 18 process, has shed greater light on how the Defendants’ decision-making under ARAP has operated, JZ will seek a further reconsideration of the ARAP decision on the basis of the additional information in SQ’s fifth statement. However, conducting such a ‘rolling’ merits-based reconsideration, based on post-decision evidence, is not the role of this court.”
“6. In respect of costs (i) the Claimant succeeded in substance in two significant interim judgments in this claim (JZ No. 1 and JZ No. 2); and (ii) the key reason why the Claimant failed on the overall merits in JZ No. 3 was the late disclosure by the Defendants of a clear explanation for his differential treatment under the ARAP scheme, as recognised in JZ No. 3, in the form of both Mr Pinfield’s statement and the Part 18 response. 7. However (i) after neither interim application was the Claimant awarded his costs; (ii) success in interim relief applications does not, of itself, dictate that costs should be recovered by the claimant: Shahi v SSHD[2021] EWCA Civ 1676 ; [2021] Costs L.R. 1397, at [68], [79] and [84]; (iii) in JZ No. 2 at [49]-[50] the court was critical of the Claimant’s delay in making the Part 18 application, and this delay has led, overall, to delay in the proceedings being concluded; and (iv) M v Croydon[2012] EWCA Civ 595 at [58]–[65], on which the Claimant relies, does not assist as this relates to the principles to be applied where a claim is settled in the Administrative Court and where the Defendants accept that the claimant is entitled to all, or substantially all, the relief which he claims, which is not the case here. 8. In those circumstances there is insufficient basis to depart from the general rule set out inCPR rule 44.2 (a) that the unsuccessful party (the Claimant) should pay the successful party’s costs. I am not therefore persuaded to make no order for costs as the Claimant requests.”
“That is not an arguable, or tenable, construction of category 4 of ARAP. Those within the category must have worked in meaningful enabling roles ‘alongside HMG’. There is no arguable basis that an indirect contribution by means of a contribution to others with the same underlying mission as HMG means that a person is working in a meaningful enabling role alongside HMG. Consequently there is no arguable basis for contending that the respondents have misinterpreted the relevant policy.”
“(a) it is necessary to do so in order to avoid real injustice; (b) the circumstances are exceptional and make it appropriate to reopen the appeal; and (c) there is no alternative effective remedy.”
“[Lewis LJ] did not have the full evidence as to how ARAP operated in practice during August 2021 and was therefore not aware that the Respondents considered that ‘working alongside’ could be satisfied by judges working in the Anti-Terrorism Court in Kabul, an Afghan institution, where judges were said to be in partnership (possibly unbeknownst to the Judges themselves) which included attendance at HMG events, and at times, attendance by HMG officials at their hearings. That evidence shows that ARAP was clearly applied in practice more flexibly by officials at the material time. In short, had the evidence obtained via the Part 18 process – which Hill J considered properly to be within the Respondents’ duty of candour – been before the Court, the Court may well have reached a different outcome on whether it was arguable that the Respondents had erred in their application and construction of ARAP policy in the Appellant’s case.”