“5.4 Decision 5.4.1 In conclusion, there is a significant amount of information that raises concerns around LDM. The most prevalent cause for concern is LDM’s conduct towards women. During the vetting interview as part of this review LDM was clearly upset by the allegations that had been made against him and despite a lack of guilty outcomes it appeared that these allegations had not led LDM to review his behaviour in a way that now could be used to mitigate any risk. 5.4.2 Section 1.3 of the Vetting APP outlines the purpose of the APP which includes supporting the delivery of the highest standards in serving the public through the nine policing principles. These principles include authority, respect and courtesy as well as conduct. 5.4.3 LDM’s conduct specifically engaging in sexual activities in public places on more than one occasion could bring the police service into disrepute and damage the trust and confidence between the police and public. 5.4.4 LDM has displayed a lack of respect and courtesy which was evident during his vetting interview which showed insufficient composure, respect and self-restraint. The allegations in relation to his behaviour around his former partner also could fall into a category of not meeting the expected level of behaviour for a police officer. 5.4.5 In making a risk based decision, having specifically considered sections 8.7, 8.8 and 8.38 of the Vetting APP along with the National decision model and conclude that despite not being found guilty of the serious allegations made against him, LDM has conducted himself in a way that significantly raises concerns about his behaviour towards women which represents a risk to his female colleagues, the public and the wider MPS. 5.4.6 When considering the two stage test as per section 8.37.4 of the Vetting APP, the case shows evidence of being subjected to adverse information and given the number of allegations as well as concerning intelligence it could reasonably be concluded that the circumstance around LDM are suitable for withdrawal of vetting. 5.4.7 As a result I agree with the Review Officer’s recommendation and I have decided that Lino Di Maria should not hold Management Vetting (MV) and it should be withdrawn. 5.4.8 I have also decided that Lino Di Maria should not hold Recruitment Vetting (RV) which is the minimum requirement for a Police Officer.”
“Forces are expected to have regard to APP in discharging their responsibilities and the standards adopted. This is the standard for police vetting and provides the operational guidance and detail on how to deliver vetting.”
“1. Introduction 1.1 Everyone in policing must maintain the highest ethical and professional standards, and must act with the utmost integrity. This is crucial in ensuring that public trust and confidence in the service is maintained. 1.2 It is essential that the public is confident that police vetting processes are effective in identifying those who pose a potential risk to others, or who are otherwise unsuitable for working within the police service. 1.3 It is imperative that those working in policing are also able to maintain the trust and confidence of their chief constable to perform their role in delivering policing services. 1.4 Vetting is an integral part of a police force’s framework of ethics and professional standards. Vetting must form part of a wider security regime, rather than being used in isolation. It assists with identifying individuals who are unsuitable to work within the police service, or to have access to police assets. This includes people who: • are unsuitable through criminal activity or association • pose a risk to the public and to those who are particularly vulnerable • have a demonstrable lack of honesty • have previously behaved in a manner that is inconsistent with the standards of professional behaviour • are financially vulnerable 1.5 A thorough and effective vetting regime is an important component in considering an individual’s suitability to work in policing. An assessment of an individual’s integrity, professionalism and demonstration of the expected character indicates whether they will achieve and maintain the required level of vetting clearance. This helps to ensure public trust and confidence in those working in policing to deliver a public service. 2. Purpose 2.1 The Vetting Code of Practice sets out the expectations of chief officers in relation to vetting, which are to be applied by police forces in England and Wales. 2.2 This code has been developed to help achieve, implement and maintain the national standards, as set out in the supporting authorised professional practice (APP), and to ensure that those standards are consistently applied across the police service. 3. Scope …. 3.2 The code applies to all those engaged on a permanent, temporary, full-time, part-time, casual, consultancy, contracted or voluntary basis with the police, as well as any individuals who apply to join the service. It also applies to those in partner agencies who have unsupervised access to any police premises or police information that is not publicly available. 3.3 The purpose of the Vetting Code of Practice is to: • set out the actions that a chief officer must ensure are taken for effective vetting in the police service • ensure confidence that all those in policing are effectively vetted, so that only those who are suitable to work in policing, and can maintain the expected standards, are able to do so • promote an ethical and professional environment in policing • uphold the standards of professional behaviour • ensure the consistent application of vetting standards across the police service 3.4 The code will be supported by APP on Vetting, which will describe the vetting procedures, technical processes and detail needed to implement vetting.”
“The threats faced by the police service, including the MPS, that vetting is designed to tackle are set in the [APP] at paragraph 8.2.2 …. These threats are real, not theoretical. They include people joining the police service who pose an unacceptable risk to women or vulnerable persons who they will encounter while in a position of trust. They also include people seeking to infiltrate the police for their own criminal ends or the criminal ends of their associates (e.g. by obtaining and disclosing information from police systems about rivals or police operations, tipping off criminals about police interest in them and so forth). Importantly, they also include people who are vulnerable to coercion or blackmail, whether because of their close association with criminals, because of something in their private life that they do not wish to be revealed, or because they are financially vulnerable due to being in debt. The opportunities for criminals to seek to corrupt a police officer e.g. through family / friends, social groups (whether online or offline), shared spaces such as the gym etc. are manifold and the ease with which this might be done where the officer has a vulnerability to coercion or blackmail cannot be overstated.”
“7.20.1 All police personnel with long-term, frequent and uncontrolled access to SECRET assets and occasional access to TOP SECRET assets should hold MV clearance (see designated posts and minimum level of clearance). In order to grant MV clearance, the force should ensure that they have no reason to doubt the integrity of the individual or their susceptibility to improper external influences. 7.20.2 The purpose of MV is to provide a means of additional assurance in relation to the integrity, reliability and potential for financial vulnerability of individuals serving in posts with access to sensitive police premises, information, intelligence, financial or operational assets, where: • the risk of potential compromise of those assets is high • the risk of serious damage to the force is substantial.”
“8.50 Reviewing vetting clearance following misconduct 8.50.1 Following the conclusion of a misconduct hearing or meeting where the officer, special constable or member of staff is not dismissed but has been issued with a written warning or a final written warning, a review of vetting clearance should be carried out. The review includes a consideration of the applicant’s suitability to maintain the level of clearance held and to continue in the post they occupy.”
“Following the conclusion of misconduct proceedings that result in a sanction other than dismissal, an individual’s vetting clearance will be reviewed. This does not preclude a decision to review a vetting clearance, even where no sanction is given …”
“….. Having gathered the necessary information and intelligence, each case must be decided on its own merits, taking all relevant information into account. Assess the risks posed by the individual to the public and the police service, giving consideration to threats, vulnerability and impact. In making a decision, this does not establish a precedent, as each case is considered on its own merits. In making vetting decisions where adverse information has been considered, the decision maker must apply the vetting test. 1. Are there reasonable grounds for suspecting that the applicant, a family member or other relevant associate: • is, or has been, involved in criminal activity • has financial vulnerabilities (applicant only) • is, or has been, subjected to any adverse information 2. If so, is it appropriate, in all the circumstances, to refuse vetting clearance?”
“Employment Rights Act 1996 and Police (Performance) Regulations 2020 8.47.1 Where vetting clearance is withdrawn or refused on renewal for existing personnel, a different process will need to be followed for police officers and police staff. If vetting clearance is refused at RV, unsupervised access to police assets, including premises, information and systems, cannot be granted. IF MV clearance is withdrawn, consideration must be given to whether RV clearance can be granted. 8.47.2 For police staff, withdrawing RV clearance may lead to dismissal undersection 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA). This would ultimately occur when the force decides that alternative employment is not possible and/or the risk cannot be managed. 8.47.3 The ERA does not apply to police officers or special constables. Therefore, when clearance is withdrawn and suitable alternative employment cannot be identified, and/or the risk cannot be reasonably managed, the force should consider proceedings under thePolice (Performance) Regulations 2020 . 8.47.4 When a police officer’s or special constable’s RV clearance is withdrawn, they will be unable to access police information and systems. Unsupervised access to police premises will also not be permitted. As a result, the police officer will be unable to perform their role to a satisfactory level. This could, therefore, amount to gross incompetence and a third-stage meeting should be considered.”
“2.1 Police officers exercise significant powers. The misconduct regime is a key part of the accountability framework for the use of these powers. If public confidence in the police service is to be maintained, outcomes should be sufficient to demonstrate individual accountability for any abuse or misuse of police powers. These outcomes must be used to achieve organisational justice. ….. 2.3 The purpose of the police misconduct regime is threefold: 1. to maintain public confidence in and the reputation of the police service 2. to uphold high standards in policing and deter misconduct 3. to protect the public.”
“3.1 Misconduct is generally defined as unacceptable or improper behaviour Roylance v General Medical Council (No 2)[2000] 1 AC 311 : ‘Misconduct is a word of general effect, involving some act or omission which falls short of what would be proper in the circumstances.’ . The Conduct Regulations further define misconduct as ‘a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify disciplinary action’ Regulation 2(1), 23(2)(a) and 23(2)(b) of the Conduct Regulations. . 3.2 Regulation 41(15) of the Conduct Regulations provides that the person(s) conducting the misconduct proceedings must: ‘[…] review the facts of the case and decide whether the conduct of the officer concerned amounts— • in the case of a misconduct meeting, to misconduct or not; or • in the case of a misconduct hearing, to misconduct, gross misconduct or neither. Regulation 41(16) of the Conduct Regulations adds that they ‘must not find that the conduct of the officer concerned amounts to gross misconduct unless– (a) they are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that this is the case; or (b) the officer admits it is the case’. Regulation 61(16) contains the same provision for accelerated misconduct hearings (in respect of gross misconduct). ’ 3.3 …. 3.4 Under Regulation 2(1): • misconduct means a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify disciplinary action • gross misconduct means a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify dismissal 3.5 The power to determine outcome therefore arises after the person(s) conducting the proceedings have: • reviewed and determined the facts • established which, if any, Standards of Professional Behaviour have been breached • determined whether the conduct found proven against the officer amounts to misconduct, gross misconduct or neither. 3.6 The HOG allows persons considering more than one allegation against the same officer at a misconduct hearing to take the allegations together. They can treat them as a single allegation for the purposes of making an assessment, a finding, a determination or a decision in connection with conduct that is the subject matter of an allegation. 3.7 When assessing if a matter will proceed to misconduct proceedings, Regulation 23(5) of the Conduct Regulations provides that, where it is determined that there is no case to answer or no misconduct proceedings will be brought, the appropriate authority must assess which of the following is suitable: • the matter amounts to practice requiring improvement and should be referred to be handled by the RPRP • the matter should be dealt with through the Performance Regulations • no further action is required. Part 4 proceedings: Misconduct proceedings 3.8 Where the person(s) conducting the misconduct proceedings find that the conduct amounts to neither misconduct or gross misconduct following a misconduct meeting or hearing, they may direct that the matter is referred to be dealt with under the RPRP as prescribed in Regulation 42(1)(b), or a decision may be made that no further action is required. 3.9 The power to impose disciplinary action at the end of misconduct proceedings is contained in Regulations 42(1), (2) and (3) of the Conduct Regulations. 3.10 If the case against an officer is proven as misconduct, then disciplinary action will follow and the appropriate outcome from the available outcomes below must be decided upon….. 3.11 The available outcomes at a misconduct meeting are: Regulation 42(2) of the Conduct Regulations. • written warning • final written warning 3.12 The available outcomes at a misconduct hearing are: Regulation 42(3) of the Conduct Regulations. • written warning • final written warning • reduction in rank • dismissal without notice.”
“50.— Regulations for police forces. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Secretary of State may make regulations as to the government, administration and conditions of service of police forces. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), regulations under this section may make provision with respect to— … (e) the conduct, efficiency and effectiveness of members of police forces and the maintenance of discipline; (f) the suspension of members of a police force from membership of that force and from their office as constable; … (3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred by this section, regulations under this section shall— (a) establish, or (b) make provision for the establishment of, procedures for the taking of disciplinary proceedings in respect of the conduct, efficiency and effectiveness of members of police forces, including procedures for cases in which such persons may be dealt with by dismissal.”
“(1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. (3) Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.”
“190. The Court has identified the following situations in which the above-mentioned exceptional circumstances may justify dispensing with a hearing: (a) where there are no issues of credibility or contested facts which necessitate a hearing and the courts may fairly and reasonably decide the case on the basis of the case file (see Döry v. Sweden, no. 28394/95, § 37,12 November 2002 , and Saccoccia v. Austria, no. 69917/01, § 73,18 December 2008 ); (b) in cases raising purely legal issues of limited scope (see Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden (no. 2),19 February 1998 , § 49, Reports 1998-I, and Mehmet Emin Şimşek v. Turkey, no. 5488/05, §§ 29-31,28 February 2012 ), or points of law of no particular complexity (see Varela Assalino v. Portugal (dec.), no. 64336/01,25 April 2002 , and Speil v. Austria (dec.), no. 42057/98,5 September 2002 ); (c) where the case concerns highly technical issues. For instance, the Court has taken into consideration the technical nature of disputes concerning social-security benefits, which may be better dealt with in writing than in oral argument. It has held on several occasions that in this sphere the national authorities are entitled, having regard to the demands of efficiency and economy, to dispense with a hearing, as systematically holding hearings may be an obstacle to the particular diligence required in social-security cases (see Schuler-Zgraggen, § 58, and Döry, § 41, both cited above). 191. By contrast, the Court has found the holding of a hearing to be necessary, for example: (a) where there is a need to assess whether the facts were correctly established by the authorities (see Malhous v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 33071/96, [60],12 July 2001 ); (b) where the circumstances require the court to form its own impression of litigants by affording them a right to explain their personal situation, on their own behalf or through a representative (see Göç, cited above [Göç v. Turkey [GC], no. 36590/97, ECHR 2002-V)., [51]; Miller, cited above [Miller v. Sweden, no. 55853/00,8 February 2005 ], [34] in fine; and Andersson v. Sweden, no. 17202/04, [57], 7December 2010); (c) where the court needs to obtain clarification on certain points, inter alia by means of a hearing (see Fredin v. Sweden (no. 2),23 February 1994 , [22], Series A no. 283- A, and Lundevall v. Sweden, no. 38629/97, [39],12 November 2002 ). 192. The Court has previously examined the question whether the lack of a public hearing at the level below may be remedied by a public hearing at the appeal stage. In a number of cases it has found that the fact that proceedings before an appellate court are held in public cannot remedy the lack of a public hearing at the lower levels of jurisdiction where the scope of the appeal proceedings is limited, in particular where the appellate court cannot review the merits of the case, including a review of the facts and an assessment as to whether the penalty was proportionate to the misconduct (see, for example, in a disciplinary context, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, cited above [Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium,10 February 1983 , Series A no. 58], [60]; Albert and Le Compte, cited above, [36]; Diennet, cited above [Diennet v.France,26 September 1995 , Series A no. 325-A], § 34; and Gautrin and Others v. France,20 May 1998 , [42], Reports 1998-III). 193. If, however, the appellate court has full jurisdiction, the lack of a hearing before a lower level of jurisdiction may be remedied before that court (see, for example, Malhous, cited above [Malhous v the Czech Republic [GC]. No. 33071/96,12 July 2001 ], [62], and, in a disciplinary context, A. v. Finland (dec.), no. 44998/98,8 January 2004 , and Buterlevičiūtė v. Lithuania, no. 42139/08, §§ “52-54,12 January 2016 ).”
“147. However, the rights deriving from these principles are not absolute. The Court has already ruled, in a number of judgments, on the particular case in which precedence is given to superior national interests when denying a party fully adversarial proceedings (Miryana Petrova, cited above, §§ 39-40, and Ternovskis, cited above, §§ 65-68). The Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in this area …. 148. The Court reiterates, moreover, that the entitlement to disclosure of relevant evidence is not an absolute right either. In criminal cases it has found that there may be competing interests, such as national security or the need to protect witnesses at risk of reprisals or keep secret police methods of investigation of crime, which must be weighed against the rights of the party to the proceedings…… 149. In cases where evidence has been withheld from the applicant party on public interest grounds, the Court must scrutinise the decision-making procedure to ensure that, as far as possible, it complied with the requirements to provide adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and incorporated adequate safeguards to protect the interests of the person concerned …..”
“108. From this review of authorities I derive the following propositions: i) Even in criminal proceedings the right conferred by Article 6(3)(d) to cross-examine is not absolute. It is subject to exceptions referable to the absence of the witness sought to be cross-examined, whether by reason of death, absence abroad or the impracticability of securing his attendance. ii) In criminal proceedings there is no “sole or decisive” rule prohibiting in all circumstances the admissibility of hearsay evidence where the evidence sought to be admitted is the sole or decisive evidence relied on against the defendant. iii) In proceedings other than criminal proceedings there is no absolute entitlement to the right to cross-examine pursuant to Article 6(3)(d). iv) However disciplinary proceedings against a professional man or woman, although not classified as criminal, may still bring into play some of the requirements of a fair trial spelt out in Article 6(2) and (3) including in particular the right to cross-examine witnesses whose evidence is relied on against them. v) The issue of what is entailed by the requirement of a fair trial in disciplinary proceedings is one that must be considered in the round having regard to all relevant factors. vi) Relevant factors to which particular weight should be attached in the ordinary course include the seriousness and nature of the allegations and the gravity of the adverse consequences to the accused party in the event of the allegations being found to be true. The principal driver of the reach of the rights which Article 6 confers is the gravity of the issue in the case rather than the case’s classification as civil or criminal. vii) The ultimate question is what protections are required for a fair trial. Broadly speaking, the more serious the allegation or charge, the more astute should the courts be to ensure that the trial process is a fair one. viii) In disciplinary proceedings which raise serious charges amounting in effect to criminal offences which, if proved, are likely to have grave adverse effects on the career and reputation of the accused party, if reliance is sought to be placed on the evidence of an accuser between whom and the accused party there is an important conflict of evidence as to whether the misconduct alleged took place, there would, if that evidence constituted a critical part of the evidence against the accused party and if there were no problems associated with securing the attendance of the accuser, need to be compelling reasons why the requirement of fairness and the right to a fair hearing did not entitle the accused party to cross-examine the accuser.”
“12. It is plainly necessary that a disciplinary hearing should be fair not least because of the potentially grave consequences of such proceedings for someone in the position of the Claimant. Fairness requires that there be a hearing at which an accused officer has the opportunity to question the witnesses against him where he disputes the factual allegations made by those witnesses….”
“There must be very few cases where the lack of an oral hearing (with examination and cross-examination of witnesses) would make it unduly difficult for the ISA to make findings of fact applying its own judgment to the material. It is only in very few cases that a decision-making body is faced with a conflict of evidence which it resolves solely or even primarily on the basis of the demeanour shown by the witnesses. There is usually something else. It may be that the account given by one person is self-contradictory or inconsistent with the account that he or she gave on a different occasion; or doubt may be cast on its accuracy by a document; or one account is supported by the evidence of other apparently credible and reliable witnesses, whereas the other stands on its own; or one account is incredible or at least improbable. In any event, as Lord Bingham of Cornhill said in The Business of Judging (2000), p 9, “the current tendency is (I think) on the whole to distrust the demeanour of a witness as a reliable pointer to his honesty.”
“In my judgment, Parliament cannot have intended that in a case of misconduct which, as in a case such as the present, led to a dismissal, a police force can choose to bypass the 2008 Regulations, specifically issued to lay down appropriate procedures and safeguards for police officers, including Special Constables, in cases of misconduct.”
“49. Where a person or body has a power expressed in wide or general terms then that power cannot be used to defeat the intention of other provisions directed to the particular circumstances and giving protections or imposing restrictions intended to apply in those circumstances. Lord Bingham expressed the principle thus in R v Liverpool CC ex p Baby Products Association (November 1999): "a power conferred in very general terms plainly cannot be relied on to defeat the intention of clear and particular statutory provisions". Similarly, the majority in R(Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union[2017] UKSC 5 ,[2018] AC 61 explained, at [51], that wide-ranging prerogative powers could not be used to "frustrate the purpose of a statute or a statutory provision, for example, by emptying it of content or preventing its effectual operation".”
“62. My understanding of the effect of the general principles set out above and of those decisions concerning constables is that where there is an issue as to whether particular conduct took place the protections provided by the Conduct Regulations should not be circumvented. In such cases the procedures laid down by those regulations should normally be followed. A failure to do so is likely to mean that a dismissal based on the misconduct is unlawful as in Monger. However, where the conduct (or at least the relevant acts) amounting to misconduct is admitted or otherwise not in dispute then it is not necessarily the position that the use of other procedures instead of or in addition to those of the Conduct Regulations is precluded. It is clear from Farmer and the Strathclyde Police case that it can be lawful to dispense with a probationer's services other than through the misconduct route even when the basis for taking that course is behaviour which could amount to misconduct. The critical question in such a case will be whether the effect of the course adopted is (a) to undermine or subvert the protections provided for a constable accused of misconduct or (b) amounts instead to the legitimate use of a different power for its intended purpose. The lawfulness of the action will depend on both the particular circumstances and the particular procedures which are being used. In relation to the former the presence or absence of a factual dispute will be of great significance and is normally likely to be determinative. As to the latter there will need to be close analysis of the nature and purpose of the powers being used.”
“90. The factors supporting the view that the Vetting Decision was lawful are compelling. It is to be remembered that this not a case where the allegation against the Claimant was dismissed in the misconduct proceedings or where an assertion of gross misconduct had been made and rejected by a panel with a subsequent vetting decision being based on disputed facts. Here there was no material dispute of fact. 91. No one factor is determinative by itself but looking at matters in the round the position is that the misconduct proceedings and the review of the Claimant's vetting clearance were different processes in which different, but related, criteria were applied. Moreover, and significantly the Vetting Code of Practice and the APP to which the Defendant was required to have regard called for the review to be undertaken in these circumstances. For such a review to be undertaken properly it could not simply mirror the outcome in the misconduct proceedings but had to be a genuine review of the vetting clearance having regard to all the considerations relevant to such a review. Although there is force in the Claimant's point that primacy should be accorded to the conclusion reached in the misconduct proceedings as to the measures necessary to maintain professional standards and public confidence it cannot outweigh the factors in favour of lawfulness. In particular it cannot prevail against the fact that the requirement that there was to be a review of the Claimant's vetting clearance is strongly indicative that this was to be a full and not an attenuated review. The Claimant did not go as far as to say that there should not be a review but her case amounts to saying that the only lawful outcome of such a review in these circumstances would be for her recruitment vetting clearance to remain in place. That would render the review a pointless exercise in circumstances such as those of the Claimant and, indeed, in most cases where the constable in question does not have an enhanced vetting clearance. The APP requires the review to be undertaken whenever misconduct proceedings result in a written warning or a final written warning. If the Claimant's position is correct that means the APP requires an exercise to be undertaken in all such cases even though in very many of them that exercise will be pointless. The unlikelihood of the APP being intended to have that effect strongly indicates that the review called for by section 8.50.1 was to be a full review not constrained by the outcome of the misconduct proceedings. 92. The ultimate outcome of the misconduct, vetting, and regulation 13 processes was that the Claimant was discharged in circumstances where her conduct had not resulted in dismissal under the Conduct Regulations. That, however, was not because the vetting or regulation 13 processes unlawfully subverted the outcome of the misconduct proceedings but instead because those processes were applied properly and by reference to the criteria applicable and relevant to them in the particular circumstances. It follows that the Vetting Decision was not unlawful even though it led to the discharge of the Claimant.”
“….. Having gathered the necessary information and intelligence, each case must be decided on its own merits, taking all relevant information into account. Assess the risks posed by the individual to the public and the police service, giving consideration to threats, vulnerability and impact. In making a decision, this does not establish a precedent, as each case is considered on its own merits. In making vetting decisions where adverse information has been considered, the decision maker must apply the vetting test. 1. Are there reasonable grounds for suspecting that the applicant, a family member or other relevant associate: - is, or has been, involved in criminal activity - has financial vulnerabilities (applicant only) - is, or has been, subjected to any adverse information 2. If so, is it appropriate, in all the circumstances, to refuse vetting clearance?”
“(a) Reasonable grounds for suspicion 26 In Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB[2007] QB 415 , the Court of Appeal dealt with the problem of control orders under thePrevention of Terrorism Act 2005 .Section 2(1) of the 2005 Act allowed the Secretary of State to make control orders if he or she had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers CJ said, at paras 59—60: “59. The test of reasonable suspicion is one with which the Strasbourg court is familiar in the context of article 5.1(c) of the Convention. “Having a “reasonable suspicion” presupposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence”: Fox, Campbell and Hartley v United Kingdom(1991) 13 EHRR 157 , para 32. 60. Whether there are reasonable grounds for suspicion is an objective question of fact. We cannot see how the court can review the decision of the Secretary of State without itself deciding whether the facts relied upon by the Secretary of State amount to reasonable grounds for suspecting that the subject of the control order is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity.” 27 The second part of the test under section 2(1) required a consideration by the Secretary of State of whether it was necessary, for the purposes of protecting the public, to make a control order. Lord Phillips CJ said, at para 63: “Whether it is necessary to impose any particular obligation on an individual in order to protect the public from the risk of terrorism involves the customary test of proportionality. The object of the obligations is to control the activities of the individual so as to reduce the risk that he will take part in any terrorism-related activity. The obligations that it is necessary to impose may depend upon the nature of the involvement in terrorism-related activities of which he is suspected. They may also depend upon the resources available to the Secretary of State and the demands on those resources.”
“reasonable grounds for suspicion requires the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person may have done acts within section 1(9) [of the 2005 Act]” 29 There is considerable authority for the proposition that intelligence, without more, is capable of giving rise to reasonable suspicion: see, for example, Hussien v Chong Fook Kam[1970] AC 942 , 949 and O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary[1997] AC 286 , 294 and 296. (b) Sufficiency of evidence 30 Plainly, the best evidence of involvement in criminal activity is the existence of relevant criminal convictions or cautions. But the NVP expressly recognises that there may be circumstances in which security clearance will be refused because of intelligence which falls short of the certainty provided by convictions or cautions. There are a number of decisions in which the courts have stressed the need for such material to be used cautiously, usually in the context of enhanced criminal record certificates: see, for example, R (C) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police[2010] EWHC 1601 (Admin) and R (K) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police[2013] EWHC 1555 (Admin); [2013] ACD 343. 31 When considering intelligence of this kind, the decision-maker (and subsequently the court) must bear in mind what Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said in In re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof )[1996] AC 563 , 586: “When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability . . . Built into the preponderance of probability standard is a generous degree of flexibility in respect of the seriousness of the allegation . . . The more improbable the event, the stronger must be the evidence that it did occur before, on the balance of probability, its occurrence will be established.” (c) The balancing exercise 32 To the extent that the vetting process under the NVP involves a balancing exercise, between the interests of the police and public on the one hand, and the interests of the person being vetted on the other, I consider that a helpful approach is that set out by the Supreme Court in R (L) v Comr of Police of the Metropolis (Secretary of State for the Home Department intervening)[2010] 1 AC 410 . That was another case concerned with an enhanced criminal record certificate (“ECRC”) and the disclosure of information. It was concerned with the sort of information caught bysection 115(7)(a) of the Police Act 1997 which, as Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury MR said at para 77, could include information which either was not relevant or only peripherally relevant but which would unfairly blacken the applicant’s name, unjustly prejudice her prospects of obtaining the post, or simply embarrass her. The issue was whether the information “ought to be included”, which provided the requisite balancing exercise. Lord Neuberger MR went on, at para 81: “Having decided that information might be relevant under section 115(7)(a), the chief officer then has to decide under section 115(7)(b) whether it ought to be included, and, in making that decision, there will often be a number of different, sometimes competing, factors to weigh up. Examples of factors which could often be relevant are the gravity of the material involved, the reliability of the information on which it is based, whether the applicant has had a chance to rebut the information, the relevance of the material to the particular job application, the period that has elapsed since the relevant events occurred, and the impact on the applicant of including the material in the ECRC, both in terms of her prospects of obtaining the post in question and more generally.”
“In my view, she should at this stage have considered all the questions in paragraph 18 of the Guidance, namely: (a) is the information from a credible source? (b) are there any special circumstances which lead the decision maker to consider that the information is unlikely to be true? (c) is the information so without substance that it is unlikely to be true?” 34 The judge stressed that the credibility or reliability of the allegations was a relevant factor to consider in the proportionality balancing exercise, because otherwise the decision-maker is not considering whether the means employed were proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, or whether a fair balance had been struck between the interests of the community and the protection of the individual’s rights. This approach was not criticised in the subsequent appeal.” “59. The test of reasonable suspicion is one with which the Strasbourg court is familiar in the context of article 5.1(c) of the Convention. “Having a “reasonable suspicion” presupposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence”: Fox, Campbell and Hartley v United Kingdom(1991) 13 EHRR 157 , para 32. “Whether it is necessary to impose any particular obligation on an individual in order to protect the public from the risk of terrorism involves the customary test of proportionality. The object of the obligations is to control the activities of the individual so as to reduce the risk that he will take part in any terrorism-related activity. The obligations that it is necessary to impose may depend upon the nature of the involvement in terrorism-related activities of which he is suspected. They may also depend upon the resources available to the Secretary of State and the demands on those resources.” “When assessing the probabilities the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of probability . . . Built into the preponderance of probability standard is a generous degree of flexibility in respect of the seriousness of the allegation . . . The more improbable the event, the stronger must be the evidence that it did occur before, on the balance of probability, its occurrence will be established.” “Having decided that information might be relevant under section 115(7)(a), the chief officer then has to decide under section 115(7)(b) whether it ought to be included, and, in making that decision, there will often be a number of different, sometimes competing, factors to weigh up. Examples of factors which could often be relevant are the gravity of the material involved, the reliability of the information on which it is based, whether the applicant has had a chance to rebut the information, the relevance of the material to the particular job application, the period that has elapsed since the relevant events occurred, and the impact on the applicant of including the material in the ECRC, both in terms of her prospects of obtaining the post in question and more generally.” “In my view, she should at this stage have considered all the questions in paragraph 18 of the Guidance, namely: (a) is the information from a credible source? (b) are there any special circumstances which lead the decision maker to consider that the information is unlikely to be true? (c) is the information so without substance that it is unlikely to be true?”
“On this basis, I believe the threshold has clearly been met – there is significant adverse information within the allegations which is unlikely to be entirely devoid of truth, plus LDM’s admitted risk taking behaviour, plus his lack of respect to colleagues.”
“14.3 The aim of the procedures is to improve performance and attendance in the police service and they are intended to be positive and supportive. All such procedures should be dealt with in a timely manner, while maintaining confidence in the procedures. Early intervention by line management is often the best practice …. 14.4 In general terms, the test of a good outcome will be improvement in performance and attendance. There will, however, be cases where it will be appropriate for managers to take formal action and the procedures are outlined in this section. …. 14.7 Therefore, in making a decision whether the performance or attendance is unsatisfactory or not, the person(s) conducting the meeting will need to exercise reasonable judgement and give appropriate careful consideration to the evidence.”
“20. In summary, it is the AA’s submission that where an officer’s vetting clearance is removed, the officer will be grossly incompetent because: (a) Recruitment Vetting is the lowest level of vetting and is a requirement of every MPS officer’s role; and (b) In any event, the officer will be unable to perform their role to a satisfactory level because they will be unable to have unsupervised access police assets including police information, systems and premises. The Issues for the Panel First issue: Gross Incompetence 21. The panel must decide pursuant to regulation 45(1)(c) whether “the performance of the officer concerned constitutes gross incompetence, unsatisfactory performance or neither”. 22. The withdrawal of PC [Y]’s RV clearance has rendered him grossly incompetent. There can be no dispute that: (a) PC [Y]’s vetting clearance was withdrawn on [date]. (b) PC [Y] appealed that decision. (c) The appeal was dismissed …. (d) There has been no challenge to the vetting appeal decision by way of judicial review. 23. While PC [Y] complains about the decision to withdraw his RV clearance or the appeal process, that is not a matter over which the panel has any jurisdiction. The vetting clearance decision (and appeal) stands as a lawful and binding public law decision until such time as it is quashed following any successful claim for judicial review. No such remedy has been sought by PC [Y]. 24. Therefore, this panel is concerned solely with the question of whether the withdrawal of RV clearance renders PC [Y] grossly incompetent and, if yes, the appropriate outcome. 25. As to whether the withdrawal of his vetting clearance has rendered PC [Y] grossly incompetent, the panel must consider whether, pursuant to regulation 4(1), he has “a serious inability … to perform the duties of the officer’s rank or the role the officer is currently undertaking to a satisfactory standard or level…to the extent that dismissal would be justified”. 26. The AA submits that PC [Y] does have such a serious inability. Without vetting clearance, PC [Y] cannot have unsupervised access to police premises or any access to police information systems. He cannot perform the duties of his rank or role at all, let alone to a satisfactory standard or level. A police officer cannot realistically be found alternative police duties or an alternative police role that does not require any vetting clearance. 27. This much is recognised in the Vetting Code of Practice at [5.87] and APP Vetting at [8.47.4]…. 28. Accordingly, the AA submits that PC [Y] is grossly incompetent and, moreover, that there is no other finding reasonably open to the panel in circumstances of the case.”