“Let me be clear, it should be Parliament that makes the rules on immigration, it should be the government that makes the policy… and the Home Secretary is already looking at the legal loophole that we need to close in this particular case.”
“b… The family are living in a ‘profoundly dangerous’ situation in Gaza. However, this is likely to apply to the wider population. c… [S]upport for [Hamas] is far from universal, with a number of significant opposition groups active in Gaza. The opposition to Hamas from within the general population of Gaza is not so rare as to set this family apart from a reasonable proportion of that population. The findings of the UT inasmuch as their links to Fatah and opposition to Hamas do not appear to be so strong or consequential as to draw threats from that group (in a context of widespread reporting of their approach to those who oppose them). d… [I]nternal displacement; the difficulty in accessing essential items or employment; the ongoing risk to life in the event of renewed hostilities; or the separation from extended family is not exceptional in the Gaza context. f… [I]t is likely that representations along similar lines to those made in the family’s case could also be made by other individuals who may seek support to leave Gaza in the future. The family’s circumstances are likely to be faced by a significant number of individuals.”
“There are two main issues: a) does the BEL family meet the published eligibility criteria; and, if not, b) are any exceptional circumstances which would justify departing from published policy and granting the request by the BEL family. 1. Does the family meet the published eligibility criteria? Given the advanced nature of the request, I assume it is agreed by the parties that the family do not meet the published eligibility criteria. But for the avoidance of doubt, I have reviewed them against the criteria. They are not British nationals. Nor do any of the applicants have a spouse/partner or child under 17 living in the UK. Finally, although the Home Office has issued ‘minded to issue entry clearance letters’ for all the family members, those letters state that the issuance of an entry clearance vignette is subject to them attending a Visa Application Centre to enrol biometric information, and to satisfactory security and background checks. In other words, whilst a positive step towards securing the relevant UK visas, none of the applicants currently hold a UK visa or is guaranteed one. In short, they do not fall within any of the three limbs of the published policy (British Nationality; a spouse/partner or child in the UK; a valid UK visa for more than 6 months). They can only be considered for consular assistance if there are identified exceptional circumstances which would justify departure from the policy. 2. Are there identified exceptional circumstances? I have considered all the issues raised in the Bindman’s letter of 21 May and the other material that you have provided to me. As has been consistently noted, any discussion of what constitutes exceptional circumstances is difficult given the extreme nature of the situation in Gaza. That situation is particularly acute for children and other individuals and groups with additional vulnerabilities. However, the question here is whether the situation of the family is such that theirs is exceptional relative to any others seeking to leave Gaza. In particular, I need to consider if it is exceptional relative to those seeking UK consular support outside of our established policy. In terms of the family’s overall situation, their ‘profoundly dangerous’ situation is sadly similar to that of the vast majority of Gaza residents... Unfortunately, the family’s inadequate shelter, vulnerability to further attacks and lack of access basic supplies and medical treatment is not exceptional in Gaza. I have considered whether the number, age and vulnerability of their children is exceptional. The continued presence of the family, and particularly their four children, in Gaza is clearly not in their best interests. However, it is not evident how that is distinct from the many children affected by the conflict, including those seeking UK consular support outside our published policy. Although the Fatah connection was identified by the Upper Tribunal of the Asylum and Immigration Chamber in its decision of13 January 2025 , it is not clear why that is exceptional in the context of consular support… Finally, I have reviewed of the additional factors cited in the Bindmans’ letter of 21 May concerning possible changes in Israeli departure policy. Israeli policy – or the viability of departure requests – is not a relevant consideration to exceptionality. The FCDO policy is first and foremost focussed on the safe departure of British nationals and their direct dependants, and secondarily for those who fall within the specified exceptions. Nonetheless, I would note that no departures are guaranteed and that the process of securing exit remains highly uncertain, contingent on the agreement of several countries and institutions and often requires significant diplomatic intervention at multiple points. Current departure routes require permissions from Israel and Jordan at a minimum, previously the agreement of Israel and Egypt was required. Conclusion Despite the family’s acute vulnerability, the deteriorating situation in Gaza and the updated information provided in Bindmans’ letter of 21 May, I have concluded that their circumstances are not exceptional relative to others in Gaza. In particular, they are not exceptional relative to others seeking UK consular support outside our consular policy. On that basis, it is my decision that request should be declined.”
“I think President Trump has a brilliant vision. It’s called free choice. If people want to stay, they can stay, but if they want to leave, they should be able to leave... We’re working with the United States very closely about finding countries that will seek to realise what they always say—that they wanted to give the Palestinians a better future.”
“The suffering of civilians in Gaza has reached new depths. The Israeli government’s aid delivery model is dangerous, fuels instability and deprives Gazans of human dignity. We condemn the drip feeding of aid and the inhumane killing of civilians, including children, seeking to meet their most basic needs of water and food. It is horrifying that over 800 Palestinians have been killed while seeking aid. The Israeli Government’s denial of essential humanitarian assistance to the civilian population is unacceptable. Israel must comply with its obligations under international humanitarian law. … We call on the Israeli government to immediately lift restrictions on the flow of aid and to urgently enable the UN and humanitarian NGOs to do their life saving work safely and effectively. We call on all parties to protect civilians and uphold the obligations of international humanitarian law. Proposals to remove the Palestinian population into a ‘humanitarian city’ are completely unacceptable. Permanent forced displacement is a violation of international humanitarian law.”
“We would summarise our views as to what the authorities establish as follows: (i) It is not an answer to a claim for judicial review to say that the source of the power of the Foreign Office is the prerogative. It is the subject matter that is determinative. (ii) Despite extensive citation of authority there is nothing which supports the imposition of an enforceable duty to protect the citizen. The European Convention on Human Rights does not impose any such duty. Its incorporation into the municipal law cannot therefore found a sound basis on which to reconsider the authorities binding on this court. (iii) However the Foreign Office has discretion whether to exercise the right, which it undoubtedly has, to protect British citizens. It has indicated in the ways explained what a British citizen may expect of it. The expectations are limited and the discretion is a very wide one but there is no reason why its decision or inaction should not be reviewable if it can be shown that the same were irrational or contrary to legitimate expectation; but the court cannot enter the forbidden areas, including decisions affecting foreign policy. (iv) It is highly likely that any decision of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as to whether to make representations on a diplomatic level, will be intimately connected with decisions relating to this country’s foreign policy, but an obligation to consider the position of a particular British citizen and consider the extent to which some action might be taken on his behalf, would seem unlikely itself to impinge on any forbidden area. (v) The extent to which it may be possible to require more than that the Foreign Secretary give due consideration to a request for assistance will depend on the facts of the particular case.”
“No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national”
“56. Process rationality includes the requirement that the decision maker must have regard to all mandatorily relevant considerations and no irrelevant ones, but is not limited to that. In addition, the process of reasoning should contain no logical error or critical gap. This is the type of irrationality Sedley J was describing when he spoke of a decision that ‘does not add up – in which, in other words, there is an error of reasoning which robs the decision of logic’: R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ex p. Balchin[1998] 1 PLR 1 , [13]. In similar vein, Saini J said that the court should ask, ‘does the conclusion follow from the evidence or is there an unexplained evidential gap or leap in reasoning which fails to justify the conclusion?’: R (Wells) v Parole Board[2019] EWHC 2710 (Admin) , at [33]. 57. Outcome rationality, on the other hand, is concerned with whether – even where the process of reasoning leading to the challenged decision is not materially flawed – the outcome is ‘so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it (Associated Wednesbury Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation[1948] 1 KB 223 , 233-4) or, in simpler and less question-begging terms, outside the ‘range of reasonable decisions open to a decision-maker (Boddington v British Transport Police[1999] 2 AC 143 , 175).”
“even if a decision-maker starting with a blank canvas might have a wide discretion how to proceed in order to achieve the result required, he might proceed in stages and gradually structure his consideration of how to move forward. A decision-maker who structured his approach in this way might adopt criteria as a guide for himself. If he does so, the rationality of his decision-making might in principle be tested by reference to the rationality of his assessment whether his own chosen criteria have been satisfied. The rationality of steps in his reasoning could in this manner be assessed in a more precise and determinate way.”
“It may be said (as Gloster J suggested[2013] EWHC 168 (Admin) at [78]) that there is a difference between formulating or reformulating policy, and considering exceptions to policy once made. In many contexts, no doubt, that may be a significant difference, where for example the making of policy is itself subject to a formal process, perhaps including consultation, distinct from its application in individual cases. However, in the present context that seems a distinction without a difference. Our review of the development of policy shows that, on the one hand, policy submissions were made to ministers without any formal procedure, and generally in response to issues raised by individual cases.”