“Considerations when using ChatGPT and generative artificial intelligence software based on large language models.”
“The ability of LLMs [large language models] to generate convincing but false content raises ethical concerns. Do not therefore take such systems’ outputs on trust and certainly not at face value… It matters not that the misleading of the court may have been inadvertent, as it would still be considered incompetent and grossly negligent. Such conduct brings the profession into disrepute (a breach of Core Duty 5), which may well lead to disciplinary proceedings. Barristers may also face professional negligence, defamation and/or data protection claims through careless or inappropriate use of these systems. As set out above, the data used to ‘train’ generative LLMs may not be up to date; and can sometimes produce responses that are ambiguous, inaccurate or contaminated with inherent biases. Inherent bias may be invisible as it arises not only in the processing or training, but prior to that in the assembling of the training materials. LLMs may also generate responses which are out of context. For these reasons it is important for barristers to verify the output of AI LLM software and maintain proper procedures for checking the generative outputs.”
“All computers can make mistakes. AI language models such as ChatGPT, however, can be more prone to this. That is because they work by anticipating the text that should follow the input they are given, but do not have a concept of ‘reality’. The result is known as ‘hallucination’, where a system produces highly plausible but incorrect results.”
“Two lawyers… used ChatGPT – a large language model AI – to identify relevant caselaw. One prompted the tool to draft a court submission, which they submitted verbatim on behalf of their client. However, unbeknownst to them, the AI-generated legal analysis was faulty and contained fictional citations… …the AI output was entirely fabricated, falsely attributing nonsensical opinions to real judges and embellished with further false citations and docket numbers held by actual cases irrelevant to the matter at hand…. AI, while a promising tool, is not a replacement for human responsibility and oversight. A lawyer is answerable for their research, arguments, and representations under their core duties to the Court and to their client. These duties continue to hold true when utilising AI. This case demonstrates that it is more important than ever to understand the capabilities and limitations of a new technology to ensure that its contributions are genuine aids, not sources of misinformation.”
“All legal representatives are responsible for the material they put before the court/tribunal and have a professional obligation to ensure it is accurate and appropriate.”
“Legal research: AI tools are a poor way of conducting research to find new information you cannot verify independently. They may be useful as a way to be reminded of material you would recognise as correct. Legal analysis: the current public AI chatbots do not produce convincing analysis or reasoning.”
“The statutory duty underSection 188(3) of the Housing Act 1996 requires a local authority to provide interim accommodation when an individual has applied for a review of a homelessness decision.”
“…the authority may secure that accommodation is available for the applicant’s occupation pending a decision on review.”
“In R (on the application of El Gendi) v Camden LBC[2020] EWHC 2435 (Admin) , the High Court emphasized that failing to provide interim accommodation during the review process undermines the protective purpose of the homelessness legislation. The court found that such a failure not only constitutes a breach of statutory duty but also creates unnecessary hardship for vulnerable individuals. The Respondent’s similar failure in the present case demonstrates procedural impropriety warranting judicial review.”
“Moreover, in R (on the application of Ibrahim) v Waltham Forest LBC[2019] EWHC 1873 (Admin) , the court quashed a local authority decision due to its failure to properly consider the applicant’s medical needs, underscoring the necessity for careful evaluation of such evidence in homelessness determinations. The Respondent’s failure to consider the Appellant’s medical conditions in their entirety, despite being presented with comprehensive medical documentation, renders their decision procedurally improper and irrational. … The Appellant’s situation mirrors the facts in R (on the application of H) v Ealing LBC[2021] EWHC 939 (Admin) , where the court found the local authority’s failure to provide interim accommodation irrational in light of the applicant’s vulnerability and the potential consequences of homelessness. The Respondent’s conduct in this case similarly lacks rational basis and demonstrates a failure to properly exercise its discretion. … The Respondent’s failure to provide a timely response and its refusal to offer interim accommodation have denied the Appellant a fair opportunity to secure his rights under the homelessness legislation. This breach is further highlighted in R (on the application of KN) v Barnet LBC[2020] EWHC 1066 (Admin) , where the court held that procedural fairness includes timely decision-making and the provision of necessary accommodations during the review process. The Respondent’s failure to adhere to these principles constitutes a breach of the duty to act fairly. The Appellant’s case further aligns with the principles set out in R (on the application of Balogun) v LB Lambeth[2020] EWCA Civ 1442 , where the Court of Appeal emphasized that local authorities must ensure fair treatment of applicants in the homelessness review process. The Respondent’s conduct in failing to provide interim accommodation or a timely decision breaches this standard of fairness.”
“We regret to say that we still do not see the point you are making by correlating any errors in citations to the issues addressed in the request for judicial review in this matter. Admittedly, there could be some concessions from our side in relation to any erroneous citation in the grounds, which are easily explained and can be corrected on the record if it were immediately necessary to do so. What you have not done is to refute the veracity of the points and legal arguments that prevailed against your position and any failures of your client to measure up to its obligations under the 1996 Act. Indeed, it appears that you have not only taken any and all of our paraphrases and references out of context, but that you have also misinterpreted the context, scope and authority of section 188(3) of the said Act. We do not think that our duty of care should go so far as to provide legal interpretation of the laws for your benefit, but we hasten to say that section 188(3) provides for discretionary action in relation to section 202 and so long as that duty falls outside section 189B(2). It is not a broad brushed discretion that results from the ‘May’ in that subsection. We therefore do not quite grasp in what context you say: Haringey have a discretion. There is no obligation. So let us agree that the citation errors can be corrected on the record ahead of our April hearing. Apart from adding our deepest apologies, we do not consider that we are obliged to explain anything further to you directly. You may better serve your organisation by giving attention not to the normative discoveries you have made, but whether you can locate the authorities in support of the points raised, which points you are clearly in agreement with, as demonstrated both by conduct in offering the necessary relief to our client and acting in accordance with the mandate of your client. We hope that you are not raising these errors as technicalities to avoid undertaking really serious legal research. Treating with citations is a totally separate matter for which we will take full responsibility. It appears to us improper to barter our client's legal position for cosmetic errors as serious as those can be for us as legal practitioners. For the foregoing reasons alone, your claim for costs and the costs of your letters are rejected as without foundation. Your response or arguments in defence cannot rely on errors in citation to prevail but on the evidential and meritorious basis of your points. We will prepare the bundle index and send this to you shortly for your consideration.”
“I do not understand that explanation or how it hangs together. If she herself had put together, through research, a list of cases and they were photocopied in a box, this case could not have been one of them because it does not exist. Secondly, if she had written a table of cases and the ratio of each case, this could not have been in that table because it does not exist. Thirdly, if she had dropped it into an important court pleading, for which she bears professional responsibility because she puts her name on it, she should not have been making the submission to a High Court Judge that this case actually ever existed, because it does not exist. I find as a fact that the case did not exist. I reject Miss Forey’s explanation.”
“I do not consider that it was fair or reasonable to say that the erroneous citations could easily be explained and then to refuse to explain them. Nor do I consider it was professional, reasonable or fair to say it was not necessary to explain the citations. The assertion that they agreed to correct the citations before April never came true, for they never did. The assertion that no further explanation or obligation to provide an explanation was necessary or arose is, in my judgment, quite wrong. Worst of all, the assertion that the citations are merely cosmetic errors is a grossly unprofessional categorisation.”
“64. …It is wholly improper to put fake cases in a pleading. It was unreasonable, when it was pointed out, to say that these fake cases were “minor citation errors” or to use the phrase of the solicitors, “Cosmetic errors”
“I… was able to locate a case R (Kelly and ORS) v Birmingham[2009] EWHC 3240 (Admin) . Foolishly I did not take a copy of the Judgment to Court I can see from the similarities to what I had wrongly described as being the case of R (on the application of El Gendi) v Camden London Borough Council EWHC 2435 (Admin), that this would have been the case that I had been referring to in the Skeleton Argument, but with a wrongful citation. I realise now that this case did not in any event relate to s188(3) of the Housing Act but to s188(1).”
“The court is deeply troubled and concerned by the fact that in the course of correspondence with the court and in the witness statements of both Mr Al-Haroun and Mr Hussain, reliance is placed on numerous authorities, many of which appear to be either completely fictitious or which, if they exist at all, do not contain the passages supposedly quoted from them, or do not support the propositions for which they are cited: see the attached schedule of references prepared by one of the court’s judicial assistants. It goes without saying that this is a matter of the utmost seriousness. Primus Solicitors are regulated by the SRA and Mr Hussain is accordingly an officer of the court. As such, both he and they are under a duty not to mislead or attempt to mislead the court, either by their own acts or omissions or by allowing or being complicit in the act or omissions of their client. The administration of justice depends upon the court being able to rely without question on the integrity of those who appear before it and on their professionalism in only making submissions which can properly be supported. Putting before the court supposed “authorities” which do not in fact exist, or which are not authority for the propositions relied upon is prima facie only explicable as either a conscious attempt to mislead or an unacceptable failure to exercise reasonable diligence to verify the material relied upon. For these reasons, the court considers it appropriate to refer the case for further consideration under the Hamid jurisdiction, pending which all questions of costs are reserved.”