Hamad Al Haroun v Qatar National Bank QPSC & Anor [2025] EWHC 1588 (Comm)

[2025] EWHC 1588 (Comm)Case No CL-2024-000435
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NLDate 26/06/2025
Before
MR JUSTICE FOXTON
Between
HAMAD AL HAROUNClaimant(1) QATAR NATIONAL BANK QPSCDefendants(2) QNB CAPITAL LLCDefendant
The Claimant in person for in personRumen Cholakov (instructed by Stephenson Harwood LLP) for DefendantsHearing Hearing dates: 18 and 19 June 2025.Further evidence: 20 June 2025.
Approved Judgment
[1]This judgment addresses three applications brought in proceedings commenced by the Claimant, Mr Al Haroun, against the First Defendant, Qatar National Bank (“QNB”), and the Second Defendant, QNB Capital LLC (“QNB Capital”).[2]The three applications before the court are: i) Mr Al Haroun’s application to amend, and substantially recast, his Particulars of Claim. ii) The Defendants’ application for reverse summary judgment or to strike out the existing claim. iii) The Defendants’ challenge to the court’s jurisdiction.

The background

[3]Before getting into the challenges, it is helpful first to set out the underlying factual position, as it appears from the documents filed.[4]Mr Al Haroun is a Kuwaiti citizen who now lives in the UK, and who was formerly associated with a Qatari company called Ettizan Financial and Real Estate (“Ettizan”), and who it is strongly arguable was Ettizan’s majority shareholder.[5]The proceedings arise against the following background. QNB was a substantial, but minority, shareholder in a Jordanian company called the Housing Bank for Trade and Finance (“HBTF”). Mr Al Haroun alleges that QNB wished to obtain a controlling interest in HBTF by acquiring the shareholding of the Jordanian Social Security Investment Fund of Jordan (“SSIF”), but that for various political reasons a direct sale from SSIF to QNB was not possible.[6]On Mr Al Haroun’s account, it was decided that the acquisition would proceed as follows: i) An SPA was to be signed between KRIC, an SPV associated with Mr Al Haroun and incorporated in Belize, and the SSIF to acquire the SSIF’s shares in HBTF. ii) There was a further contract by which Ettizan would acquire the HBTF shares from KRIC. iii) There would then be a transfer of the shares from Ettizan to QNB.[7]It is common ground that in October 2008, QNB entered into a loan agreement with Ettizan which was guaranteed by Mr Al Haroun (“the Loan Agreement”). The Loan Agreement is governed by Qatari law and provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Qatari civil courts (or any other courts chosen by QNB). Mr Al Haroun asserts (and it is clearly arguable) that the loan was to be used for the purpose of acquiring the shares in HBTF. QNB denies this and states that the loan related to Ettizan’s working capital requirements. Further: i) Clause 3 of the Loan Agreement provides for the provision of “Guaranteed cheque for an amount of: QR.25.000.000/-from Mr Hamad Ahmed Al Haroun” and a similar cheque from Mr Ali Abdul Qarder Al Salahi. It is QNB’s case that Mr Al Haroun provided a signed but undated cheque for QR 25.000.000 when the Loan Agreement was concluded, and that a second such cheque was provided by Mr Al Haroun on 22 October (such that it contends two signed cheques for QR 50.000.000 were provided by Mr Al Haroun). ii) Clause 5 provides that Ettizan and Mr Al Haroun are jointly and severally liable for the obligations arising.[8]By an agreement dated 20 January 2010 and renewed on 14 June 2011, Ettizan agreed to procure the HBTF shares from the SSIF, and QNB agreed to finance that acquisition, which provided a specific window for the transaction (“the HBTF Agreement”). The HBTF Agreement is governed by Qatari law and provides for LCIA arbitration with a Qatari seat unless agreed otherwise. Clause 9 of the HBTF Agreement provides:
“Except as required by law or regulation or already in the public domain, anything contained herein or disclosed in connection with the transactions contemplated by this Agreement shall be treated as confidential by the Parties, and shall not be disclosed publicly in any manner.”
[9]I have also been shown a sale and purchase agreement (“the SPA”) dated 18 March 2012 said to be between KRIC and the SSIF for the sale of shares in HBTF. That was concluded outside the window in the HBTF Agreement I have referred to, but I accept that it is strongly arguable that QNB had agreed to extend the window, and put a “backup bridge loan” in place if necessary (on the basis of what appears to be an email to this effect, albeit one whose authenticity is, apparently, not accepted by the Defendants, for reasons which were not developed at the hearing). This document is significant because it is almost the only contemporaneous reference to QNB Capital and I should therefore say something about it: i) There was an email from Mr Al Haroun from an Ettizan address on 4 October 2011 to a QNB email address asking Mr Ali Al Kuwari of QNB not to forget about extending the HBTF Agreement. ii) Mr Al Kuwari replied the same day, stating: “Consider it extended. Spoke to Ali and QNB Capital, we’ll also put in place a backup bridge loan just in case the main structure isn’t finished on time. Quick question: should the agreement be in KRIC’s name, Kuwait Capital’s, or do we have a different set up in mind? Il let Razif contact you”.[10]The shares in HBTF were not transferred by the SSIF. KRIC claims to be entitled to a $94m penalty from the SSIF by reason of the non-transfer. The SSIF challenged the validity of the SPA and an arbitration between KRIC and the SSIF took place in Switzerland, beginning in November 2013.[11]On 20 January 2013, the Qatari prosecution authorities made a seizure order which provided for a Mr Al Mutairi to take over management of the Ettizan group of companies. Mr Al Haroun alleges that Mr Al Mutairi had unlawfully sought to place himself in control of companies in which Mr Al Haroun had interests, including a company called Tatweer, as part of a dispute which arose between Mr Al Haroun and Mr Loay Al Kharafi, the vice-chair of Tatweer and someone whom Mr Al Haroun alleges is a member of one of the wealthiest families in the world.[12]Mr Al Haroun alleges that, acting on the basis of the seizure order, Mr Al Mutairi organised the transfer of various assets out of the Ettizan group. It is also alleged that Mr Al Mutairi took steps to adjust the public share register in Ettizan to Mr Al Haroun’s disadvantage, and to appoint various new directors, including a Mr Al Emadi, QNB’s CEO at the time.[13]Mr Al Haroun says that on 22 January 2013, he caused his Qatari lawyers to write to QNB informing QNB of the seizure and instructing it to freeze the accounts of Ettizan, Tatweer and their subsidiaries.[14]The Qatari prosecutor revoked the seizure order four weeks after it was made, but Mr Al Haroun alleges that the assets of the various companies had been dissipated and their records destroyed by that date. A later investigation by the Qatari prosecuting authorities concluded that the seizure order had been made without a legal basis and that the actions carried out pursuant to it were unlawful.[15]On 19 March 2013, QNB presented what it alleges is one of the cheques signed by Mr Al Haroun dated and for payment. The cheque was not honoured. QNB alleges that Mr Al Haroun provided it with signed but undated cheques as collateral for his guarantee obligations (see [7] above). Mr Al Haroun alleges that the signature is a forgery and I accept that this is arguably the case, and it is supported by three expert reports (with no contrary report being put in evidence by the Defendants). There is no suggestion that the Loan Agreement or the guarantee given by Mr Al Haroun were not binding on him.[16]After the cheque was returned unpaid, QNB filed a criminal complaint against Mr Al Haroun in respect of the dishonour of the cheque. There is a hotly contested issue of fact as to what happened thereafter: i) QNB alleges that it withdrew the complaint, and entered into a settlement agreement with Mr Al Haroun in August 2013 (which I shall refer to as “the Settlement Agreement”, without prejudice to the issue of whether there was any such agreement) under which a further signed cheque in the sum of QR 31.000.000 was provided by Mr Al Haroun. ii) Mr Al Haroun alleges that he was sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment in absentia, and that there was no Settlement Agreement, any document purporting to have that effect having been forged by QNB. iii) QNB presented the further cheque which was not honoured, and then commenced a fresh criminal complaint for which Mr Al Haroun was later sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment.[17]In the meantime, the arbitration between KRIC and the SSIF was continuing in Switzerland.[18]On 31 March 2014, Mr Al Kuwari, the acting CEO of QNB, provided the SSIF with a letter on QNB notepaper which I assume was provided for use in the arbitration and which was put in evidence by the SSIF in the arbitration. The letter denied that the HBTF Agreement related to SSIF’s shares in HBTF and alleged that the HBTF Agreement terminated automatically without being renewed or extended. It is arguable that the contents of the letter were false and knowingly so.[19]A draft Request for Arbitration (“RFA”) was prepared by lawyers acting for Ettizan for the purpose of a putative arbitration against QNB. This was done in the period between the filing of the 31 March 2014 Letter in the arbitration and the making of the award.[20]An award in SSIF’s favour was handed down on 20 August 2015, although I do not have a copy of the award. According to Mr Al Haroun, the claim failed for two reasons: i) It was found that the signature apparently from the SSIF on the SPA was forged. ii) It was found that KRIC was in breach of the SPA by reason of not having the funds to complete the transaction. The arbitration featured in the Decision of First Tier Tribunal Judge Hodgkinson of 5 October 2018 which upheld Mr Al Haroun’s asylum application. That refers to KRIC’s claim failing on the forgery ground, largely by reference to handwriting evidence, a conclusion as to the correctness of which Judge Hodgkinson expressed some doubt.[21]I am told that an application by KRIC to challenge the award was rejected by the relevant Swiss court in February 2017.[22]Ettizan was dissolved at some point following its liquidation on 7 September 2015, although the precise date is not clear.[23]On 26 October 2016, QNB brought civil proceedings against Mr Al Haroun and Ettizan before the Qatari courts in respect of alleged breaches of the Loan Agreement and the Settlement Agreement. Judgment was entered in QNB’s favour on 28 February 2018.[24]On 29 October 2020, QNB commenced proceedings against Mr Al Haroun in the Qatari courts under the cheque allegedly provided in connection with the Settlement Agreement, and obtained judgment.

The proceedings

[25]At this point, I turn to the history of the proceedings which has been no happier than the history of the commercial transactions proceeding them. The claim form was issued on 14 March 2024 in the King’s Bench Division. Master Eastman asked for the case to be transferred to the Commercial Court. I made an order accepting the case into the Commercial Court, a decision I have had cause to contemplate in the course of this hearing.[26]The causes of action advanced at that stage were that in sending the letter for use in the SSIF arbitration, the Defendants had made a false statement and breached confidentiality obligations (presumably owed under the HBTF Agreement). There may also have been a claim based on the proceedings brought by QNB against Mr Al Haroun in Qatar based on the allegedly forged cheque, although, if so, the cause of action relied upon is not clear.[27]The Defendants brought a jurisdiction challenge, and a summary judgment/strike out application, for which directions were given, and a CMC fixed. Eventually, the Court directed that certain of the issues raised by the applications be determined as preliminary issues, and gave directions for the service of evidence.[28]The preliminary issues which have been ordered (and which reflected the formulation of Mr Al Haroun’s claims at that time) are: i) Jurisdiction challenges based on: a) The Qatari jurisdiction clause in the Loan Agreement. b) Forum non conveniens considerations. c) The arbitration agreement in the HBTF Agreement. ii) An alleged res judicata plea relating to the issue of forgery (which has not featured in this hearing). iii) The summary judgment/strike out application.[29]The Defendants sought and obtained extensions of time in relation to the filing of their evidence. Mr Al Haroun applied to set one of those extensions aside. That application was refused by Dias J, who noted that in the witness statements filed by Mr Al Haroun and his solicitor in support of the application, and in associated correspondence, several false case citations had been given – either to cases which did not exist, or which did not support the propositions for which they were cited. Dias J referred the case to Linden J for consideration under the court’s Hamid jurisdiction, by which the court can address the conduct of legal professionals who have failed to comply with their legal duties in court proceedings (R (Hamid) v SSHD [2012] EWHC 3070 (Admin)).[30]The outcome of the Hamid hearing is reported at [2025] EWHC 1383 (Admin). The Divisional Court (the President and Jeremy Johnson J) accepted that Mr Al Haroun did not intend to mislead the court, and noted “his candour, his apology and his acceptance of responsibility” ([79]). It is apparent that it was Mr Al Haroun who had, through inappropriate use of AI, been the source of all the hallucinatory references cited both by himself and his solicitor, indicating a “hands on” involvement in aspects of litigation which are normally the domain of the lawyer, even though Mr Al Haroun is not legally qualified.[31]The directions given by the court for the determination of the preliminary issues included directions for the service of expert evidence. Mr Al Haroun had sought to serve multiple expert reports, and Picken J had ruled that the reports served without permission were not admissible. There was an attempt by Mr Al Haroun to refer to one of those reports at the hearing. However, in circumstances in which those reports were not in evidence, and the Defendants had not served evidence responding to them, I have had no regard to them.[32]The directions gave permission for experts on Qatari law. Mr Al Haroun served a report in the name of Professor Youssef Sayed Sayed Awad on 9 May 2025 (“the First Report”), in the form of what was said to be an English translation of an Arabic original. The responsive report of Dr Ashraf Feshawi served on 29 May 2025 stated of the First Report:
“… the vast majority of the articles cited are incorrectly relied on and not relevant to the subject matter he claims they regulate. When comparing the actual text of these articles with the interpretations provided, there is a clear disconnect. The provisions are not relevant to the points being argued, and address fundamentally different legal topics than the ones mentioned by Prof Awad.”
[33]Further: i) In addition, the First Report referred to what were said to be unpublished judgments of the Qatari Court of Cassation, copies of which have not been provided to the Defendants, with the result that the veracity and accuracy of these citations cannot be checked. ii) At least one of the propositions for which an unreported judgment is cited is slightly surprising: the suggestion that in one decision “the Qatari Court of Cassation has acknowledged that parties who are unable to safely access Qatari courts are exempt from enforcement of jurisdiction clauses”. iii) No Arabic version signed by Professor Awad has been produced. When an Arabic version did appear, it contains on it non-professional email addresses, rather than an email address from the Egyptian law firm where the author of the First Report says that they head a team of 15 lawyers, and of which they say they are a founding member. iv) Mr Al Haroun’s former solicitors have stated that, so far as they are concerned, the English version of the First Report is the original. v) No certificate certifying any translation has been produced (the report stating that the translation has been done “in house”). vi) The report is not verified by a statement of truth as required by PD 35 paragraph 3.3. vii) None of the legal sources cited are attached. viii) When referring to Article 820 of the Qatari Civil Code, its subject-matter is misdescribed in the body of the First Report but correctly described in the “Matrix of Legal Sources and Authorities”.[34]The issues raised by Dr Feshawi and the concerns about the First Report generally led to questions being asked of Mr Al Haroun and his previous solicitors about the provenance of the First Report, the responses to which did not resolve matters. That led to repeated efforts by the Defendants’ solicitors to contact Professor Awad at the law firm with which he is linked for the purposes of getting him to confirm that he had prepared the report. While Mr Al Haroun describes these attempts as intimidation, they are understandable against the background of the events which led to the Hamid referral and the issues raised by Dr Feshawi.[35]On 30 May 2025, Mr Al Haroun’s solicitors withdrew from the case as a result of what Mr Al Haroun described as “financial and logistical constraints.” Mr Al Haroun filed his own reply to Dr Feshawi’s report, stating that his solicitors’ “sudden withdrawal has hindered my ability formally to engage Dr Yousef as I had planned”, and he also hints at an inability to pay Dr Yousef. He states that:
“I have consulted informally with legal experts in Qatari law, and their insight have informed the arguments I present in this report”
. The document sets out “Dr Awad’s likely response” to criticisms of his report and documents “Dr Awad might reference” or “might highlight” or what “Dr Awad would argue”.[36]Mr Al Haroun is not a lawyer in any jurisdiction nor (although this is less significant for present purposes) is he able to provide an independent assessment of the issues of Qatari law. Neither Mr Al Haroun’s views, nor those of the unidentified legal experts he says he has consulted, constitute admissible expert evidence in this case, nor do they fall within the parameters of the permission granted to adduce such evidence before the court.[37]On 12 June 2025, the Defendants filed a witness statement making a number of challenges to the First Report, and those challenges were repeated in the Defendants’ skeleton argument served the following day.[38]On 16 June 2025, the Defendants’ solicitors were sent an email from “dr.yousef@counsellor.com” (an email address which is not linked with the professional firm referred to in the First Report) which takes responsibility for the report and suggests that “any discrepancies, particularly those relating to the numbering of articles, are the result of translation variances and not any substantive revisions”. The email also refers to “nuances …. inevitably lost in the course of legal translation”. The email, written in perfect English, does not itself provide the corrected references, but attaches an undated and unsigned document in the Arabic langue which includes a number of different numerical references (which appear in “Eastern Arabic” in the sense of English numerical notation) and which correspond more closely in their subject-matter with the relevant provisions of the Qatari Civil Code.[39]On the same date, Mr Al Haroun filed his skeleton argument which makes various very serious allegations about attempts by the Defendants’ solicitors or unnamed intermediaries acting on behalf of the Defendants to bribe and/or intimidate Professor Awad, and also suggests that the principal of the El Motahedon law firm in Cairo where Professor Awad works had confirmed Professor Awad’s authorship of the First Report to the Defendants’ solicitors (something which I have been told on instructions did not happen and which has since been confirmed by a witness statement). The skeleton made various unparticularised allegations against Dr Feshawi including “past academic irregularities” and suggested that Dr Feshawi held a professional grievance against Professor Awad which had led him to criticise the First Report.[40]In the evening of 17 June 2025, Mr Al Haroun served a further witness statement. This alleges that Dr Feshawi had offered Professor Awad a position in the Sultan Al Abdullah law firm where he works, which Professor Awad had turned down, and that he had asked Professor Awad to supervise his PhD thesis which Professor Awad had declined to do “due to concerns of academic dishonesty and misconduct”. The statement repeats the allegations of intimidation and bribery, and the allegation that the senior partner of El Motahedon has confirmed the authenticity of report.[41]The witness statement attached a four page electronic document, once again written in fluent English, and with something of a flourish, said to come from Professor Awad. This suggested that he had provided his opinion in his capacity as a Professor of Law and not in connection with his role in the El Motahedon law firm. The statement seeks to confirm Professor Awad’s authorship of the First Report and its essential accuracy, attributing the matters raised to translation issues and linguistic nuances. It also gives evidence of the bribery and intimidation allegations raised by Mr Al Haroun in his skeleton, suggesting these came via unidentified “Egyptian lawyers”. It provided the same two non-professional email addresses for Professor Awad as the letter. The statement suggested that Professor Awad had known Dr Feshawi for “many years”, that Dr Feshawi did not have the linguistic competence to produce a report in English and which hinted at unspecified failings in Dr Feshawi’s academic integrity. The statement suggests that Professor Awad declined an invitation from Dr Feshawi to join the Sultan Al-Abdullah law firm in 2008 and that in 2013 Professor Awad refused to supervise Dr Feshawi’s PhD. Both the personal attack, and what can only be described as advocacy on behalf of Mr Al Haroun in the closing part of the statement, are not appropriate from an expert, and are indicative of a lack of detachment on the part of the writer.[42]I have carefully considered Dr Feshawi’s criticisms, conscious that two lawyers often disagree as to what proposition a legal source supports, and that there can be greater scope for divergences in view when the materials in issue are translated sources concerning a legal system with which the court is not familiar. In addition, it is not uncommon to find criticisms of the kind which Dr Feshawi advances that some relevant part of the article has not been drawn to the reader’s attention (of the “your Lordship was not taken to ….” variety which remain an unwelcome feature of Commercial Court advocacy). I have also carefully considered the other evidence on this issue, including the witness statement and letter said to be from Professor Awad. Having done so: i) I am satisfied that the matters pointed out by Dr Feshawi go beyond legitimate differences of interpretation, and cause serious concern as to the reliability of the First Report. In particular, I have found it difficult to see how the process of translation could change the numbering of articles of the Civil Code (particularly when the original includes those numbers in a linguistic notation requiring no translation). ii) I can see no legitimate reason for criticising Dr Feshawi for raising these issues. It was entirely appropriate for him to do so. iii) There are a number of unanswered questions about the email and witness statement and of the accompanying Arabic text. The absence of any material linking the author of the First Report and these materials to a verified professional address is unfortunate. iv) However, in the course of his submissions Mr Al Haroun handed up pages from a website which showed that a Professor Awad was part of the El Motahedon firm. In addition, Mr Al Haroun made the valid point that the attempts made by Stephenson Harwood LLP to contact El Motahedon had come to his attention directly from El Motahedon before they were deployed in the litigation, suggesting that Mr Al Haroun was known to the firm where Professor Awad works. Finally, I was sent emails showing that after the hearing, the El Motahedon had forwarded a copy of the email said to come from Professor Awad to Stephenson Harwood LLP, copied to one of the email addresses used in the communications said to come from Professor Awad. v) The result is that I am willing to proceed on the basis that there is an Egyptian lawyer called Professor Awad at El Motahedon, that he has at some point had involvement with Mr Al Haroun, and that he prepared the First Report. vi) In all the circumstances, I do not feel able to place any weight on the allegations of attempted bribery and intimidation of Professor Awad. I accept Stephenson Harwood LLP’s denial confirmed by witness statement that they received any response from the El Motahedon firm, still less one confirming the authenticity of the First Report. There is no reliable evidence of the alleged contacts with Professor Awad by unnamed intermediaries. vii) Treating the First Report as genuine, the fact remains that no satisfactory explanation has been offered for the many basic errors it contains. viii) Further, some of the positions taken in the First Report can, on a very cursory review, be seen to be obviously incorrect. In particular, on the key issue of limitation, Article 219 clearly provides the limitation period for claims in tort, as Dr Feshawi confirms, and the First Report offers no explanation as to why this is not so. The 15 year period which the First Report refers to, which appears in Article 403 and not Article 429 as the First Report suggests, appears in a section of the Civil Code dealing with termination of obligations and only applies to the extent that no other period is provided for (cf. Article 219). ix) As I have noted, I am concerned that if the later communications come from Professor Awad, they suggest a lack of impartiality. x) Finally, Professor Awad is a lawyer who practises in Egypt who offers no detail of his “extensive direct engagement with Qatari law”. While I accept Qatari law is influenced by Egyptian law, his direct experience of Qatari law, whatever it might be, cannot compare with that of Dr Feshawi who is the senior partner of a Qatari law firm, and who had headed its litigation department for 23 years.[43]In these circumstances, the position before the court so far as expert evidence of Qatari law is concerned is as follows: i) For the reasons I have given, I do not feel able to place significant reliance on the First Report. ii) Mr Al Haroun’s “report” does not constitute admissible expert evidence. iii) Dr Feshawi’s report comes from a lawyer practising in the relevant jurisdiction and is supported by accurate citations. There is nothing to support the suggestion that Dr Feshawi may have been motivated by some form of grudge when pointing out the basic errors in the First Report.

The test for granting permission to amend and summary judgment

[44]I was referred to the familiar authorities of Easyair Ltd (t/a Openair) v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) and AC Ward & Sons Ltd v Catlin (Five) Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1098, [24] on the principles to be applied on applications for summary judgment and Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91 on applications for permission to amend. It is not necessary to set those principles out but I have kept them in mind.

The conspiracy and dishonest assistance claims

[45]These claims arise out the seizure of Ettizan’s business in January 2013 and the subsequent dissipation of its assets, including QNB’s failure to act on a faxed request sent on Mr Al Haroun’s instructions directing QNB to freeze Ettizan’s bank accounts. Limitation[46]I accept that the applicable law of this claim is Qatari law. These are clearly claims in delict to which the limitation period in Article 219 (for claims for damage caused by unlawful acts) applies. The suggestion in the First Report that a 15-year period applies is one on which I am unable to place any reliance for the reasons I have given, and derives from a section of the Civil Code not dealing with claims in tort.[47]Article 219 provides that time runs from the date on which the aggrieved party first becomes aware of the damage and the person responsible for it (with a 15-year longstop). In this case, it is clear that Mr Al Haroun had the requisite knowledge within a short period of the events: i) On his own evidence, Mr Al Haroun was informed about the seizure by employees of Ettizan at the time, and he instructed lawyers to send a fax to QNB seeking freezing of the accounts on 22 January 2013. ii) On his own evidence, he complained about the alleged seizure to the General Prosecutor of Qatar who revoked the seizure order within 4 weeks (albeit by then Mr Al Haroun says that the damage had been done). iii) The claim against QNB is premised on Mr Al Emadi, its CEO at the time, becoming a director of Ettizan as a result of the seizure. This was clearly known to Mr Al Haroun in January 2013 because Mr Al Emadi was named in the amended commercial registration certificate. Mr Al Haroun does not suggest that he only later learned of Mr Al Emadi’s involvement. On the contrary, he states that he was advised not to pursue proceedings in 2013 after Mr Al Emadi was appointed Minister of Finance. iv) Mr Al Haroun clearly knew by the time he was in a position to regain control of Ettizan in mid-2013 (by which time he says it was a worthless shell) that QNB had not frozen Ettizan’s accounts. v) Further, I would note that Mr Al Haroun arrived in this jurisdiction on 23 April 2015 and sought asylum on 22 October 2015. No explanation has been offered as to why proceedings could not have been commenced in this jurisdiction then, even assuming that they could not have been commenced before. vi) It should be noted that the claims arising from the January 2013 seizure order are similarly long-time barred under English law (I am not persuaded that there is any material difference in this case between the point at which time would begin to run under Article 219 of the Qatari Civil Code and the position under s.32 of the Limitation Act 1980). In these circumstances, it is not necessary in this context to address the possibility of disapplying the Qatari limitation period under ss.2(1) or 2(2) of the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984.[48]It is not presently clear to me when Mr Al Haroun became aware that the allegedly forged cheque had been presented for payment in March 2013, dishonoured, and criminal proceedings commenced. While this fact is relied upon as evidence that QNB was party to the January 2013 seizure (on the basis of the alleged coincidence of timing), the presentation of the cheque is not relied upon in support of the conspiracy claim as an unlawful means: i) The loss allegedly suffered through the January 2013 seizure is said to have been completed within the period of four weeks of the seizure order, i.e. prior to the presentation of the cheque. ii) There is no claim in the draft amended Particulars of Claim for any loss arising from the presentation of the cheque or the criminal proceedings. The loss claimed relates to the assets of Ettizan. iii) No legal basis for any cause of action based on the presentation of the cheque is pleaded.

Entitlement to sue

[49]In addition, the claims arising out of this incident are claims of Ettizan and not of Mr Al Haroun. It was common ground between the First Report and Dr Feshawi that there is rule against a shareholder recovering a company’s loss in Qatar. This issue is dealt with in the proposed amended Particulars of Claim by a contingent plea that if the losses are reflective, Mr Al Haroun “may claim” as a creditor or “may seek to bring a derivative claim”. It should be noted that no such claim has as yet been asserted in the statement of case (which was settled by leading and junior counsel on Mr Al Haroun’s behalf).[50]Putting that issue to one side, the evidence of Dr Feshawi is that claims of this kind are possible under Qatari law, but only before a company has been dissolved and liquidated, which Ettizan was in 2015. That issue is not addressed in the First Report, beyond stating that shareholders can claim for “distinct harm unrelated to corporate losses” under Article 67 of the Commercial Companies Law or possibly of the Qatari Civil Code. Neither of these provisions appear to have anything to do with derivative actions. A later schedule said to emanate from Professor Awad suggests that this was intended to be a reference to the liability for intentional harm under Article 195 of the Qatari Civil Code. The draft Particulars of Claim plead loss of the value of Mr Al Haroun’s shareholding and Ettizan’s cash in its bank accounts. Neither of these are personal losses.[51]Given the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence in the First Report on this topic, my general comments on the state of the Qatari law evidence before me, and the obvious sense in Dr Feshawi’s opinion that a derivative claim cannot be advanced on behalf of a non-existent entity, I am satisfied that this provides a further reason why these claims do not have a realistic prospect of success.

The other issues raised

[52]I can deal briefly with the other issues raised: i) I am not persuaded that any liability which QNB might have in respect of the January 2013 seizure would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Loan Agreement, such that any such claim would have to be pursued in Qatar or the high threshold for not enforcing that agreement overcome. The alleged presentation of the cheque after the seizure order had been made and revoked, and the relevant damage done and the cause of action complete, is not enough. ii) I accept the draft Particulars of Claim provide no basis for the allegations made against QNB Capital, which are not arguable. The highest the pleading puts matters is that “the Claimant believes that the Second Defendant was or may have been involved … but the Claimant is unable to plead further pending disclosure”. That does not allege, still less support an arguable claim against QNB Capital, and indeed the draft Particulars of Claim do not plead that QNB Capital was a party to the conspiracies pleaded or the seizure and its aftermath. iii) I have not found it necessary to consider whether the pleaded facts reveal an arguable case against QNB itself arising from Mr Al Emadi’s involvement.

The claim for procuring breach of contract

[53]This claim rests upon the alleged effect of the letter sent by QNB to the SSIF and deployed in the arbitration between KRIC and SSIF (“the March 2014 Letter”), which I accept was arguably false, dishonest and written for the purpose of damaging KRIC’s claims in the arbitration. I can well understand on that basis why Mr Al Haroun feels a strong sense of grievance about the March 2014 Letter. However, it is nonetheless necessary to identify a viable cause of action before this claim can proceed.[54]The only cause of action put forward at the hearing, and which features in the draft Particulars of Claim settled by leading and junior counsel, is the allegation that the sending of the letter assisted a breach by the SSIF of the SPA. The SPA is governed by Swiss law, but the draft Particulars of Claim accept that the claim in tort for assisting or procuring breach is governed by Qatari law.

Limitation

[55]On that basis, for the reasons I have already given, I am satisfied that it is clear beyond argument that this involves the application of the three-year limitation period in Article 219. It is clear that the claim is time barred: i) Clearly Mr Al Haroun knew that the March 2014 Letter had been sent by QNB because he was involved in the arbitration in which it was deployed. ii) Indeed, Mr Al Haroun caused Ettizan to instruct lawyers who prepared an RFA for a claim against QNB based on the production of the March 2014 Letter. iii) Mr Al Haroun knew the result of the award when it came out in 2015, and of the failure of the attempt to challenge the award in February 2017. iv) If the latter date is taken as the date when time begins to run (although there is a strong argument that the cause of action was complete and the requisite knowledge present when the award was published in August 2015) then the claim is obviously time-barred under English law as well, such that ss.2(1) and (2) of the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 are not engaged.

Entitlement to sue

[56]In addition, I accept that the entitlement to claim would be KRIC’s, as the contracting party, not Mr Al Haroun’s. It would appear that KRIC is owned by a sister company of Ettizan. The draft Particulars of Claim do not purport to assert any derivative or creditor claim on behalf of KRIC nor address how this might be done, and what the status of KRIC or its parent is. All that is said is that “the Claimant intends to apply to join KRIC”, something which has not been done. This provides a further reason why this claim stands no realistic prospect of success.

Is it arguable that there has been a breach of contract?

[57]In any event, I do not think it arguable that the deployment by one arbitrating party of false evidence in an arbitration (whether from itself or a third party) is actionable by the losing party as a breach of contract. Applying the presumption that Swiss law is to the same effect as English law (which, given the strong pro-arbitration policy of both jurisdictions seems reasonable), the sole remedy against SSIF in this scenario would be to challenge any award using the procedures available before the supervisory court. Allowing a claim for breach of contract would wholly undermine the finality of arbitration awards and be inconsistent with the duty to give effect to such awards on the part of signatories to the New York Convention, including Switzerland: see by analogy Elektrim SA v Vivendi Universal SA [2007] EWHC 11 (Comm) and in relation to tortious claims against third parties in respect of evidence given in arbitration Commercial Bank of Dubai v Al Sari [2024] EWHC 3304 (Comm), [116]-[117].

The remaining issues raised

[58]Once again, I can deal with the remaining issues which arise shortly: i) I accept on the limited evidence before the court that KRIC’s claim against the SSIF failed for two reasons, only one of which was ostensibly connected with the March 2014 Letter. While it might be said that the evidence as to the lack of financing on the KRIC side might itself have cast doubt on the veracity of the signature purportedly applied on the SSIF side, that is a weak argument, and such material as there is before the court suggests that it was the handwriting analysis which was the key. In those circumstances, I have serious doubts as to whether the procuring breach of contract claim is arguable on this ground as well, but I would have wanted to see if better evidence could be obtained as to what exactly was decided in the award before reaching a final view. ii) Had any “triple derivative” claim been asserted (it would appear that there is an intermediate company between Mr Al Haroun and KRIC, namely what has been described as a sister company of Ettizan), then it would not have been open to either QNB or QNB Capital to assert the obligation to arbitrate in the SPA, neither being party to the arbitration agreement in question. iii) I accept that there is no arguable basis for a claim against QNB Capital in the draft amended Particulars of Claim. However, no such claim is asserted. The jurisdiction application Reliance on the jurisdiction and arbitration agreements

The jurisdiction application

[59]The first basis for the jurisdiction challenge is the reliance on: i) the exclusive Qatari jurisdiction clause in the Loan Agreement between Ettizan, Mr Al Haroun and QNB; and ii) the LCIA arbitration agreement in the HBTF Agreement between Ettizan and QNB.[60]For the reasons set out above: i) I am not persuaded that the conspiracy claim relating to the January 2013 seizure order falls within the jurisdiction clause in the Loan Agreement. The reliance on the fact of the presentation of the cheque after the seizure to support QNB’s alleged involvement in the prior conspiracy is not sufficient to engage the jurisdiction clause when the dispute, properly characterised does not (see by analogy Mozambique v Privinvest Shipbuilding SAL [2023] UKSC 32, albeit in the context of s.9 of the Arbitration Act 1996). ii) Had a cause of action been advanced premised on the presentation of a forged cheque in March 2013, I accept that it is likely that this would have fallen within the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the Loan Agreement, although it would be necessary to consider the precise cause of action and how it was formulated before reaching a concluded view. The Loan Agreement provided for the provision of a guarantee cheque from Mr Al Haroun in the sum of QR 25.000.000 (clause 3) and imposes various obligations on Mr Al Haroun as guarantor, and it is not disputed that he is a party to the Loan Agreement in that capacity. A claim that a cheque of QR 25.000.000 from Mr Al Haroun’s cheque book was presented with a forged signature is clearly a dispute arising out of the Loan Agreement. However, no such claim has been pleaded, and, at the jurisdictional stage, it is the facts as pleaded which are key (HRH Emere Godwin Bebe Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell plc [2021] UKSC 3, [22] and [103]-[106]). iii) I do not see how the claim in relation to the March 2014 Letter falls within LCIA arbitration agreement in the HBTF Agreement, because the pleaded complaint is the procuring of a breach of the SPA, and the claim is that of KRIC which is not a party to the HBTF Agreement.

A stay application

[61]On this basis, the only “jurisdictional” point potentially available is that the court should not exercise any jurisdiction it has but should stay the proceedings on the basis that Qatar is manifestly the most convenient forum. This involves a two-stage test (applying Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460): i) At stage 1, the defendant must establish that there is another forum which is “clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English forum” (p.477E). ii) If the defendant discharges this burden, then at stage 2 the burden of proof shifts to the claimant to show, using cogent evidence, that “there are special circumstances by reason of which justice requires that the trial should nevertheless take place in this country” (p.476E).[62]I would note that on the basis on which the forum conveniens issues arise on my findings, the higher (and reverse) burden faced by a party seeking to persuade the court not to give effect to an exclusive jurisdiction clause as summarised by Henshaw J in Zephyrus Capital Aviation Partners ID Ltd v Fidelis Underwriting Ltd [2024] 4 WLR 47, [125], [143], [157] is not engaged, albeit that test would have been engaged had Mr Al Haroun brought a cause of action based on the presentation of the allegedly forged cheque.[63]In this case, it is possible to narrow the enquiry at the outset because Mr Al Haroun accepts that Qatar would clearly and distinctly be the most appropriate forum but for one thing: he says he cannot get a fair trial there. In approaching that issue, I gratefully adopt the summary of the relevant principles set out by Cockerill J in Al-Aggad v Al-Aggad [2024] EWHC 673 (Comm): i) The claimant is required to prove “objectively by cogent evidence” the circumstances which require the English court to proceed with the claim, notwithstanding the fact that it is not the appropriate forum to hear it. It is not sufficient for the claimant's evidence to simply “raise grave doubts” about such circumstances ([23]). ii) The burden of proving that a particular forum is not practically available falls solely upon the claimant, and this must be discharged by cogent, positive and objective evidence (ibid). iii) Where there is a “divergence of opinion” between the experts on a question of foreign law or practice at stage 2, such that the “answer is not clear” to the court, “considerations of comity and caution” preclude the court from concluding that the foreign forum would not deliver justice to the claimant. The court will start with the working assumption, for which comity calls, that courts in other judicial systems will seek to do justice in accordance with applicable laws, and will be free from improper interference or restriction (ibid). iv) There is no difference in the standard of proof applied to an allegation that the claimant will not practically be able to access the foreign forum due to their personal circumstances, and an allegation that they will not receive justice in that forum, the “overarching test” being “one of real risk that the claimant will not obtain justice in the foreign forum” ([32]).[64]The first issue which arises is whether there is a real risk of Mr Al Haroun being unable to attend a trial in person. I should immediately state that I am amply satisfied that there is. Mr Al Haroun has been convicted in absentia on two occasions and sentenced to two three year terms of imprisonment. I was shown a police document recording Mr Al Haroun’s identification details and referring to the Qatari cheque offence and the Qatari authorities’ request for judicial arrest. If his presence is required in Qatar to bring his claim, I am satisfied that Qatar is not an available forum to Mr Al Haroun for the purposes of the second stage of the Spiliada test.[65]The second issue which arises is whether there is a real risk of Mr Al Haroun being unable to bring proceedings in Qatar without being physically present there. This breaks down into a number of sub-issues. Given the contingent nature of this issue, I will deal with matters shortly: i) I accept the evidence of Professor El Shazly that Qatari civil procedure allows remote participation in litigation, including the giving of evidence remotely (Article 17 of Law No (8) of 2023, promulgating the Judicial Authority Law). Professor El Shazly is involved in training members of the Qatari judiciary and local lawyers and I am satisfied he is able to speak to the practical realities of litigating in Qatar and not just the position “on paper”. While the First Report asserts that claimants in substantive hearings cannot appear remotely, no source is cited for this proposition, and I am unable to place weight on bare assertions in the First Report for the reasons I have already set out. In any event, the First Report also states that attendance by a properly authorised attorney is an alternative to attendance in person. ii) I accept that to be in a position to instruct Qatari lawyers himself, Mr Al Haroun is required to execute a power of attorney (Article 54 of Law 23 of 2006), and that to do this, he will need a document which verifies his identity. iii) If Mr Al Haroun needs to visit Kuwait in order to renew his Kuwaiti identity card (which has expired), I am satisfied that there is a real risk of him being arrested and extradited to Qatar. I am also satisfied that there is a real risk of Mr Al Haroun being arrested by the Kuwaiti authorities. He has been convicted and sentenced in absentia in Kuwait, and while a pardon has been issued by the Emir in respect of those convictions, the nature and circumstances of the original convictions and commentary around the pardon have persuaded me that a real risk of arrest remains. iv) I accept that there is a real risk that Mr Al Haroun cannot renew his Kuwaiti ID (which has expired) at the Kuwaiti Embassy in London because biometric requirements introduced in Kuwait require his presence in Kuwait. v) Given Mr Al Haroun’s evidence that POAs issued to Qatari lawyers in connection with proceedings in 2013 and 2015 had lapsed, and the likelihood that these are time and subject-matter limited, I am not persuaded that I can exclude a realistic possibility that a new POA is required (even assuming that the same lawyers were willing to act). vi) However, I am satisfied that Mr Al Haroun can establish his identity for the purposes of executing a POA through the identity document he was issued by the UK authorities when granted indefinite leave to remain in this jurisdiction. Indeed it is apparent that he has already used that document to instruct lawyers in Switzerland. A letter from the Swiss Federal Department of Justice of 9 August 2024 deployed by Mr Al Haroun states that on 10 July 2024, Swiss lawyers acting for him sent a letter “accompanied by a power of attorney” and a copy of “the applicant’s English passport.” I accept that the document in question was not a passport, but it is a photographic ID document issued by the UK authorities which Mr Al Haroun has confirmed he has used for the purposes of international travel. I was offered no cogent explanation of why this document could be used to grant a POA to Swiss lawyers but not Qatari lawyers. vii) It follows that Mr Al Haroun has failed to meet the burden imposed on him at stage 2 of the Spiliada test of showing a real risk that Qatar is not available to him as a forum. Had this issue been live, and a stay granted, it would have been open to Mr Al Haroun to apply to lift the stay had events shown that instructing a Qatari law firm in this way was not possible. The merits of some puddings can only be properly tested by consumption.[66]That leaves the issue of whether there is cogent and positive evidence of a real risk that Mr Al Haroun would not get justice in Qatar due to political intervention in his trial. It is said that the risk of such intervention arises from the fact that QNB is 50% owned by the Qatari state sovereign wealth fund, and that its Chairman is the Minister of Finance. As to this: i) Mr Al Haroun submitted an expert report from Dr Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, an academic who I accept has considerable expertise as to the extent to which civil liberties and human rights, including the right to a fair trial, are respected in states in the Gulf region, including Qatar. Dr Ulrichsen has provided a balanced and nuanced report, which is careful not to overstate the position. ii) Dr Ulrichsen states that “judicial independence in Qatar is more robust than in most neighbouring states”, but cites a number of examples of cases which have given rise to international concern about the independence of the Qatari judiciary. It is notable that the examples involve criminal offences with a political flavour, or cases in which a member of the ruling family benefited from what is said to be an unjustifiably favourable result in a legal dispute in the Qatari courts. Dr Ulrichsen fairly notes that these “may be isolated cases or they may be symptomatic of a deeper set of issues and I do not possess the necessary information to make a qualified judgment”. iii) I do not regard the fact that QNB is 50% state owned as sufficiently cogent evidence of there being a real risk of state interference in Qatari court cases in which it is involved. QNB is an essentially commercial undertaking active in the banking sphere. It is clear that it does lose cases in the Qatari courts. The issues in this case do not engage control of a strategically significant industrial sector or a media outlet, but are essentially financial. The amount of money in issue is, for QNB, of very small proportions. iv) While the former CEO who became a director of Ettizan in the aftermath of January 2013 seizure later became Minister of Finance in July 2013, he was fired as a Minister in May 2021 and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for corruption and money-laundering in January 2024. There was no suggestion that Mr Al Kuwari, who signed the 14 March 2014 Letter was either a government figure or a member of the ruling family at the relevant time. v) In these circumstances, Mr Al Haroun has failed to present cogent evidence of the kind required to satisfy the stage 2 Spiliada test. The court’s working assumption “that courts in other judicial systems will seek to do justice in accordance with applicable laws, and will be free from improper interference or restriction” has not been displaced. vi) Had I not struck the proceedings out, I would, therefore have stayed them.[67]For these reasons, Mr Al Haroun’s claims are summarily dismissed.

Cited in 1 later judgment