“Until the limited increases to remuneration that began to be implemented in 2022, there had been no increase in Criminal Legal Aid remuneration rates since 1998. Instead, there had been a steady series of cuts over the preceding 15 years.”
“On average firms were achieving a 5% net profit margin in crime. Larger firms with 40+ solicitors were achieving lower margins than smaller firms. Previous reductions in fees, specifically for crown court work, may not yet be fully reflected in these figures. Firms in London are the least profitable.”
“… [u]nless there is significant change to criminal legal aid, there is a real risk that the balance between defence and prosecution, which is at the heart of our adversarial justice system, will be unfairly tilted in favour of the prosecution.”
“The ultimate objective of the Criminal Legal Aid System is to provide legal advice and representation to those who most need it, in line with the Lord Chancellor’s statutory duty to ensure that legal aid is made available, and to uphold and ensure the constitutional right to access to justice. This objective will provide the foundation for all analysis and recommendations.”
“6.70 Criminal legal aid firms can neither attract new blood, because the fee levels restrict the salaries that can be offered, nor retain experienced practitioners because of the higher salaries offered by the CPS … In real terms fees have declined by about one third from 2008, and many fees have remained the same for 25 years. Profits too have declined, to a level well below those in other areas of legal practice and are at present unlikely to incentivise new investment in the sector or compensate business owners for the risks to which they are exposed. 6.71 The situation has also led to a significant imbalance between the resources available to the defence as compared to the prosecution, undermining the principle of equality of arms. … 6.72 I therefore recommend that the remuneration of criminal legal aid firms under the Regulations be substantially increased as soon as practicable.”
“7.20 Calculations by analysts in the Review team indicate that a sum of at least£100 million per annum is required to enable criminal legal aid providers to offer more competitive salaries and come nearer to achieving a more level playing field as between the prosecution and the defence. This is based on illustrative modelling which has been carried out to assess, in broad terms, how much criminal legal aid fees would have to increase by so that the gross salaries of solicitors and equity partners/shareholding directors working in CLA firms could become broadly equivalent to those in the CPS. This approximates to an increase of 15% above 2019/20 spend plus the modelled increase resulting from the accelerated items. This increase in funding could be distributed in a number of ways to achieve the desired outcomes.”
“7.22 Taking a baseline of 2019/20, plus the modelled impact of the accelerated measures, that would represent an overall additional increase in funding of some 15% on the solicitor’s side. As a cross-check, MoJ calculations indicate that it would cost some£61 million per annum to reverse the fee reduction of 8.75% dating from 2014, from which the taxpayer has had substantial benefit in the meantime. But simply reversing the 2014 pay cut would not in my view ensure sustainability, given the costs and other pressures arising since that fee cut nearly 8 years ago. 7.23 I emphasise that a sum of the order of a minimum of£100 million per annum does not necessarily put the criminal defence side “on a par” with the CPS in any precise sense. The private sector has to take risks and make investments. On that basis, one could legitimately argue for a higher sum than the minimum that I recommend. Moreover, it is not certain that the sum I suggest will suffice. I consider£100 million to be no more than a minimum starting point, to be kept under review going forward. 7.24 As indicated in the Introduction above, there is in my view no scope for delayed implementation of this recommendation, given particularly the expected increase in demand and the pressures of the back-log.”
“The MoJ should consider, in conjunction with the Advisory Board as appropriate, the extent of unmet need in criminal legal aid in Wales or England, for example in terms of particular geographical areas (whether rural locations, small towns or inner cities), particular types of user (such as suspects/defendants, or those with mental health issues), particular communities (such as those from a minority ethnic background) or particular types of work (such as appeals or prison law); and if so, how those needs should be met, in particular by support grants to not-for-profit or similar organisations, or other measures, with a view to pilot schemes. Such consideration should include new possible ways of working as discussed in Chapter 15, including “holistic models” that span both criminal and civil needs, focussing on the needs of the user.”
“15.14 Even with the reforms I recommend, it is not a given that the private sector will always be able to provide adequate criminal legal aid coverage in all areas. Particular difficulties arise for one reason or another in parts of Wales, the Isle of Wight, South West England and East Anglia, although there may also be problems in some inner cities as well. …”
“Whilst HMT are clear there is no more money for CLAIR, we have always held the position that we will need to revisit this position once we have received [the Bellamy] report and you have made a decision on the proposed Government response. Part of that discussion will also need to consider the extent to which there is further funding available, through our allocations process, to deliver on those recommendations – i.e. HMT will expect us to make some prioritisation choices before going to them for further funding.”
“Whilst some duty schemes are in trouble, they have been for some time, and we don’t have evidence of unmet need. We will try and find the numbers of duty calls that could not be dealt with by their own scheme and in those cases they are referred to a neighbouring scheme for help.”
“We only secured 50% of the money recommended in the SR [Spending Review, 2021-25]. If we were able to find 75% by finding savings within the department that is equivalent of an investment of£100m p.a. by 24/25. Against the projected volumes and estimated total spend in criminal legal aid in 24/25,£100m would only equate to 60% of CLAIR recommendations. Our judgement is that any uplift below 75% of the projected spend in criminal legal aid in 24/25 is likely to result in negative action from the professions, is unlikely to avert disruptive action and will be seen by practitioners as insufficient to improve the sustainability of the criminal legal aid service. [Bellamy] explicitly said in his report that “reversing the 2014 pay cut [8.75%] would not in my view ensure sustainability”
“The principal policy rationale behind the options assessed in this IA is equity. The Government considers the reforms necessary to achieve sustainable provision of legal aid, in order to promote access to justice, better achieve the aim of reflecting, and paying for, work done as well as increasing efficiency and protecting the taxpayer.”
“Given the department’s financial allocation we cannot increase fees any further at this point. However, respondents, including the Law Society and others, suggested that the further£20m p.a. that was proposed for investment in longer term reform proposals, including a reformed LGFS, the Youth Court and sustainability and development of solicitors’ practice would be better spent on increasing fees. We will consider these responses further and set out our conclusion in our full response in the autumn. We want to avoid embedding any perverse incentives in the fee schemes and want to do further work in relation to issues such as the role of PPE in the LGFS before we consider increasing fees any further. The increases (other than for VHCCS) will come into force on30 September 2022 and apply to cases where a determination is made on or after that date.”
“In response to [CLAIR] the Government identified£21.1m of the total£135m for high-level long term reform proposals. This funding was due to commence in 24-25 (the third year of the SR) and£11.6m is allocated for that year rising to£21.1m in steady state. We would reach 91% of steady state in 2025-26, and full steady state in 2026-27. … The Law Society … have warned that it would advise members that there is no viable future in criminal legal aid work if the Government does not offer the minimum 15% fee uplift recommended for solicitors by CLAIR by the end of November. Whilst [the Law Society] will welcome the allocation of the resource in the way proposed in option 2, this would bring the total uplift, based on 2024/25 case volumes, to the solicitor profession to around 11% (£84m ) …”
“In light of responses, we now assess additional funding on police station fees (Option 2) is preferable. This would mean re-allocating the proposed£21.1m in steady-state funding away from PDS expansion, training grants and LGFS reform. Instead, that funding would be allocated to police station work (£16m ) and youth court work (£5.1m ) and would allow for the first step towards harmonising fees (see police station submission). The package would benefit the whole solicitor profession, increasing the sustainability of the market and reduce, although not remove, the risk of the Law Society advising members not to undertake criminal legal aid work. Alongside this we would spell out a timetable for LGFS reform which will see any new spend incurred fall during the next spending review period.”
“… [t]he other options would have involved uplifting other elements of the LGFS without information on the potential impact of making such an uplift. Option 2D [the full CLAIR recommendation] would have involved a very large increase in LGFS basic fees (which would have been uplifted by 100%). However, there was no evidence on the likely impact of such a large increase to LGFS basic fees, and insufficient time to collect it in light of the need to respond urgently to the Report’s recommendations.”
“The£16 million represents the funding available for police station work. It was based on 2024/25 case volumes in steady state in the sense that it used the sum previously allocated for PDS expansion, training grants and LGFS reform, but expressed in 2024/25 case volumes.”
“13. … Below is a worked-through example based upon a£242.41 fixed fee, with the escape fee being£822 : Escape Fee Case (in a rare case, such as murder or “drug swallower” (with an interpreter) at stations close to ports Travel 1 hour 30 mins @£30.22 per hour£45.33 Attendance 10 hours @£58.97 per hour£589.70 Waiting 8 hours @£30.22 £241.79 Total value of time spent£876.79 The firm cannot claim for time between£242.41 and£822.54 . It can only claim the fixed fee plus any work done over the escape fee amount of£822.54 . In this case, the claim is therefore£54.25 +£242.41 =£296.66 . The firm has effectively lost£580.13 (or done that work for free).”
“The increases in funding made in September 2022 have not made any difference to the financial health of the firm because they have already been swallowed up by inflation. We have significant overheads such as utilities that have gone up but our fee income has not kept pace with it. We had to reduce office space by 50% in order to survive.”
“No modelling was carried out to assess the sustainability of the market for the immediate increase in funding taken forward. There are a number of reasons that additional modelling was not considered necessary to take the decision about the immediate level of fee uplift to introduce. Lord Bellamy’s recommendation on the amount of additional funding to provide legal aid solicitors was based explicitly, in light of the lack of reliable data, on a broad-brush assessment. While less than the sum he recommended, the amount of funding allocated to criminal legal aid solicitors in the Final Response amounts to a substantial increase on existing funding to be accompanied by immediate steps to reform the fee schemes which were not increased. The intention was, and remains, to revisit the amount of uplift once this reform has taken place. It would have been difficult to assess the impact of the smaller increase with any certainty, both in light of the lack of reliable data and because the amount of funding provided through the LGFS (and its PPE element in particular) varies significantly across different firms.”
“Solicitors’ salaries with the 15.5% CLAIR increase£43,300 CPS comparator£45,300 Equity Partner/Shareholding Director with the 15.5% CLAIR increase£76,300 CPS comparator£64,700 ” (If AGFS income were included, the remuneration for equity partner/shareholding director is slightly higher, and the variances set out below very slightly less.) with the 15.5% CLAIR increase£43,300 CPS comparator£45,300 Equity Partner/Shareholding Director with the 15.5% CLAIR increase£76,300 CPS comparator£64,700 ”
“… impl[ies] that CLA solicitors’ salaries would be 14.5% and 15.3% lower than their identified CPS equivalents at20 July 2022 and30 November 2022 under the Final Response. They would be 18.1% and 18.9% lower than their CPS equivalents at20 July 2022 and30 November 2022 under the Interim Response”.”
“… impl[ies] that CLA equity partners’ remuneration would be 6.4% and 5.4% higher than their CPS equivalents at20 July 2022 and30 November 2022 under the Final Response.”
“… would cause the gap between CLA lawyer and CPS equivalent salaries to grow to 7% and 11% under the Final and Interim responses relative to the CLAIR inc. AGFS figures reported by Iniesta-Martinez for both solicitor salaries and equity partner remuneration.”
“(1) The Lord Chancellor may make such arrangements as the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate for the purposes of carrying out the Lord Chancellor’s functions under this Part. … (3) The Lord Chancellor may by regulations make provision about the payment of remuneration by the Lord Chancellor to persons who provide services under arrangements made for the purposes of this Part. …”
“(1) Initial advice and initial assistance are to be available under this Part to an individual who is arrested and held in custody at a police station or other premises if the Director [of Legal Aid Casework] has determined that the individual qualifies for such advice and assistance in accordance with this Part (and has not withdrawn the determination). (2) The Director must make a determination under this section having regard, in particular, to the interests of justice. …”
“The Court reiterates that the protections afforded by art.6(1) and (3)(c), which lie at the heart of the present case, apply to a person subject to a ‘criminal charge’, within the autonomous Convention meaning of that term. A ‘criminal charge’ exists from the moment that an individual is officially notified by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence, or from the point at which his situation has been substantially affected by actions taken by the authorities as a result of a suspicion against him.”
“It must be obvious that if the Lord Chancellor failed to comply with his duty under LASPO ss.1(1), (2)(b) and 13(1), the court’s inevitable judgment against him would not be qualified by any considerations of respect for his role as primary decision-maker. He would simply be acting illegally, and the court would say so. But although the claimants assert that the November 2014 decision puts compliance with the LASPO duty at risk, they do not (and cannot) assert that it will be violated. If the new scheme goes badly wrong, the Lord Chancellor will have to mend it or adopt another. He accepts without cavil that he must ensure that criminal legal aid is made available to those who are entitled to it.”
“… [T]he Fees Order will be ultra vires if there is a real risk that persons will effectively be prevented from having access to justice.”
“Mr Richards [counsel for the Lord Chancellor] submitted that it was for the Lord Chancellor’s discretion to decide what litigation should be supported by taxpayers’ money and what should not. As regards the expenses of legal representation, I am sure that is right. Payment out of legal aid of lawyers’ fees to conduct litigation is a subsidy by the state which in general is well within the power of the executive, subject to the relevant main legislation, to regulate. But the impost of court fees is, to my mind, subject to wholly different considerations. They are the cost of going to court at all, lawyers or no lawyers. They are not at the choice of the litigant, who may by contrast choose how much to spend on his lawyers.” (Emphasis in original)
“… [I]t would need to be shown that there is a real risk that the fee reductions imposed by the Regulations will result in some criminal defendants being denied adequate legal assistance. It further seems to us that what would need to be demonstrated is not just a possibility of individual instances of unfairness which would not undermine the integrity of the system but a risk of systemic unfairness of the kind discussed in the Howard League case.”
“does the policy in question authorise or approve unlawful conduct by those to whom it is directed?”
“We agree that this is a fundamental distinction for the purposes of analysis. If it is established that there has in fact been a breach of the duty of fairness in an individual’s case, he is of course entitled to redress for the wrong done to him. It does not matter whether the unfairness was produced by application of a policy or occurred for other reasons. But where the question is whether a policy is unlawful, that issue must be addressed looking at whether the policy can be operated in a lawful way or whether it imposes requirements which mean that it can be seen at the outset that a material and identifiable number of cases will be dealt with in an unlawful way.” (Emphasis added)
“In our view, the formulation of the test in Refugee Legal Centre is not a helpful way of approaching that issue. In future, the framework of analysis in UNISON should be applied instead.”
“In our view, on a proper understanding of the legal principles discussed above, the wider formulation of a test of systemic inherent unfairness in relation to a legal scheme which has been taken to be laid down in the line of cases stemming from Refugee Legal Centre will in most, if not all, circumstances dissolve into the Gillick principle and the UNISON principle, each with its own precise focus.”
“In UNISON this Court held that there is a fundamental right under the common law of access to justice, meaning effective access to courts and tribunals to seek to vindicate legal rights, which means that the executive is under a legal obligation not to introduce legal impediments in the way of such access save on the basis of clear legal authority …”
“68. In our judgment, UNISON[2020] AC 869 does not assist the respondent in this case and the Court of Appeal erred in thinking that it supported their approach in testing the lawfulness of criterion C. UNISON is concerned with the lawfulness of policy or delegated legislation which creates an unreasonable or unacceptable impediment to being able to have access to a court or tribunal for the determination of legal rights and obligations: see our judgment in the A case[2021] 1 WLR 3931 , para 80. But in the present case, nothing in the policy promulgated by the Secretary of State creates any impediment for an immigrant in gaining access to the courts for the determination of their rights. 69. As we have sought to explain in the A case (paras 73, 75 and 80), we respectfully consider that the Court of Appeal erred in the present case by mixing together the principle with which UNISON is concerned and the distinct jurisprudence on inherent systemic unfairness in cases such as Refugee Legal Centre[2005] 1 WLR 2219 in order to arrive at the test whichit applied in relation to criterion C. As we have mentioned, Mr Hermer did not seek to support the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in so far as it rested on the latter cases. 70. Similarly, we consider that, contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeal, the judgment of Lord Mance in the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission case[2019] 1 All ER 173 , para 82, provides no support for the test applied in this case: see our judgment in the A case, para 78. When reviewing, on a prospective basis, the compatibility of domestic legislationwith one of the Convention rights set out in theHuman Rights Act 1998 , Lord Mance said that ‘The relevant question is whether the legislation itself is capable of being operated in a manner which is compatible with that right, or, putting the same point the other way around, whether it is bound in alegally significant number of cases to lead to unjustified infringement of the right’. This is a test which is similar to that in Gillick, in that it involves comparison of two normative statements, by looking to see if action as directed by the legislation will necessarily involve a violation of the Convention right in a significant number of cases.” (Emphasis added)
“In the past 3-5 years, I had a nervous breakdown due to this job and was again prescribed anti-depressants for over a year, as well as sleeping tablets. I contemplated suicide. My wife wanted me to walk away as she thought I would kill myself. I couldn’t walk away as I am a 50% owner of the firm and have responsibilities to my staff and clients. I still have panic attacks and migraines over the finances of the firm and the work that we have to do just to keep the firm afloat. I constantly worry about the finances of the firm. I do all the Crown Court billing for the firm and despair every time a Crown Court bill is slashed by the LAA, usually due to issues over PPE. The LAA’s challenges to the LGFS bills make it almost impossible to do any financial planning. I work every day, including weekends and bank holidays. I take work away with me on every holiday. I have missed much of my daughter’s childhood, and I often see my wife when I go to bed. When I do sleep, I am woken by clients getting arrested and therefore called by the [DSCC]. My equity partner and I are the “back up” numbers for all our duty solicitors so if they miss a call one of us gets it.”
“Clients … sometimes waive their rights and are interviewed because it has been impossible for us to get to them quickly enough before they buckle and just want to get their interviews over and done with. This happens more frequently than it did before due to the lack of available staff and the number of police stations required to be covered at any one time with a limited level of staff.”
“The other 10% of duty schemes (amber and red schemes) are functioning; however, for the majority, a further reduction in provider/duty solicitor numbers that results in them being no longer viable have very limited, sustainable, operational solutions. This is illustrated by the consultations held over summer 2022 over the Barnstaple and Skegness duty schemes where short-term, unsustainable, solutions are now in place. … … We have employed short-term solutions in Barnstaple and Skegness, but a short/medium term policy intervention (e.g. fee levels) is required in those and other schemes in order to increase capacity. We are therefore engaging MoJ policy leads on this point for consideration as part of the policy response to CLAIR.”
“The LAA monitors capacity and takes action to ensure that criminal legal advice remains accessible in the event of issues. Usually, this entails merging schemes with neighbouring ones to increase the number of duty solicitors available. There are limits to this approach, particularly when it comes to the blue duty schemes on Slide XX. These are schemes with fewer than 7 duty solicitors, that are in rural areas with distant neighbouring schemes. In summer 2022, consultations were held to explore merging Barnstaple and Skegness with their neighbouring schemes. However, the neighbouring schemes were only willing to provide exceptional or voluntary coverage for these schemes, and short-term solutions have been implemented on that basis.”
“we’ve got an issue on 2 duty solicitor schemes where we’ve essentially seen failures in the local duty solicitor market. There is simply no appetite from local firms to cover these rural schemes any more. The result is that in both areas we have insufficient numbers of firms and duty solicitors to effectively cover the rotas from 1 October.”
“Another example is provided by looking at schemes where there is only one duty solicitor. The LAA closely monitors the operation of these and other smaller schemes to ensure that there is sufficient capacity to cover available rota slots. However, whilst for some schemes this reflects capacity issues that are being addressed, for others the scheme is functioning either because of the low levels of demand or because the single duty solicitor is supported by a larger number of fee earners.”
“50. For the reasons set out in some detail above, the LAA is satisfied that there is currently adequate provision of criminal legal aid services across all areas of England and Wales. There are no schemes without duty solicitors. The schemes where there is one duty solicitor, or a small number of duty solicitors, are able to service the needs of that particular area. The LAA carefully monitors the operation of smaller schemes to ensure that there is sufficient capacity to cover available rota slots. Where problems arise, the LAA has a series of steps which it can take to ensure coverage. For these reasons, the LAA does not accept the Law Society's claim that there is existing market failure in the criminal legal aid market. 51. The LAA nonetheless accepts that some of the solutions currently in place are not viable in the long term. In the October 2022 capacity review, the LAA sounded a note of caution that in some areas (particularly Barnstaple and Skegness), while short term operational solutions have been deployed, they were unlikely to be sustainable in the medium/long term and there were limited viable solutions that the LAA could utilise as an alternative. The capacity review, therefore, highlighted that policy intervention would be required to increase capacity in these schemes.”
“Our data is limited. We don’t know what unmet need is. We generally use the proxies of offices and providers rather than practitioners supplemented by market intelligence from provider engagement. Even in the case of duty solicitors where we can cite total practitioners, we know that police station accredited representatives are regularly used to increase capacity but have limited insights into overall numbers devoted to this work. Therefore, variations in office/provider numbers does not necessarily equate to changes in practitioners.”
“The above (inadequate) materials also fail to collect, or prompt collection of, any evidence regarding the quality of CLA provision, despite the substantial objective evidence of the issues, and the causal connection between those issues and current levels of legal aid fees. The MoJ had before it not only the CLAIR report, which was unprecedented in its resourcing, but the MoJ also had available to it a significant body of qualitative and quantitative research available from academics, NGOs and other reporting bodies. In light of this evidence, before considering the response to the Recommendations, any reasonable decision maker would consider it necessary to enquire into the demands placed on duty solicitors and providers through their working conditions and fee levels; the availability and uptake of legal advice and representation (including by reference to factors such as regional area, age, other protected characteristics, type of offence and mode of trial); the increasing proportion of unrepresented defendants and the causal connection between this and issues with delay/access to legal aid; the effect on case outcomes of being unrepresented; the management, frequency and effects of conflicts of interest arising.”
“79A. Further, after the claim was issued, the Lord Chancellor, has confirmed that “[n]o modelling was carried out to assess the sustainability of the market for the immediate increase in funding taken forward” (Daly 1 §93) and that the model produced by CLAIR to match salaries of CLA firms with those in the CPS (whilst available to the Lord Chancellor) was “not used … as part of any MoJ work” (Response, §5). The Lord Chancellor states that modelling was not necessary because the Central Recommendation was based on a “broad brush” assessment (Daly 1 §93). That is wrong, and is [in] any event no adequate justification for the Lord Chancellor’s failure to undertake any evidenced-based analysis prior to making the Remuneration decision: see further Miller 2 §22-30. Thus, the Remuneration Decision was irrational for the further reason that it was not based on any evidence that the level of funding provided was in fact sufficient to meet the objectives of the Central Recommendation and the Review.”
“… risk is about local gaps not overall supply; the cause of the risk is varied and cannot be linked back to a single root cause … [there is] not one single straightforward formula which could accurately capture supply requirements in a single location. Therefore any assessment can only be general/indicative …”
“… it is for a court of law to determine whether it has been established that in reaching his decision unfavourable to the council he had directed himself properly in law and had in consequence taken into consideration matters which upon the true construction of the Act he ought to have considered and excluded from his consideration matters that were irrelevant to what he had to consider: see [Wednesbury]. Or, put more compendiously, the question for the court is, did the Secretary of State ask himself the right question and take reasonable steps to acquaint himself with the relevant information to enable him to answer it correctly?”
“In circumstances where the Defendant was receiving and acknowledged clear signals of a system in dysfunction, as predicted in the Review, the failure to conduct any form of consequential research to better understand the causative link between (i) legal aid rates and (ii) the quality of legal advice and representation in fact provided; the availability and uptake of legal advice and representation; and the increased proportion of unrepresented defendants before rejecting the Central Recommendation and making the Non-Intervention Decision, was irrational.”
“The second ground on which the Lord Chancellor’s Decision is challenged encompasses a number of arguments falling under the general head of ‘irrationality’ or, as it is more accurately described, unreasonableness. This legal basis for judicial review has two aspects. The first is concerned with whether the decision under review is capable of being justified or whether in the classic Wednesbury formulation it is ‘so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it’: see Associated Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp[1948] 1 KB 223 , 233-4. Another, simpler formulation of the test which avoids tautology is whether the decision is outside the range of reasonable decisions open to the decision-maker: see e.g. Boddington v British Transport Police[1999] 2 AC 143 , 175 per Lord Steyn. The second aspect of irrationality/unreasonableness is concerned with the process by which the decision was reached. A decision may be challenged on the basis that there is a demonstrable flaw in the reasoning which led to it – for example, that significant reliance was placed on an irrelevant consideration, or that there was no evidence to support an important step in the reasoning, or that the reasoning involved a serious logical or methodological error. …”
“It is declared that: (1) The Lord Chancellor’s failure, during the decision-making process, to ask whether fee increases at lower levels than the 15% recommended in the CLAIR Report would, or might, still deliver the aims and objectives of the CLAIR Report, was irrational and breached his Wednesbury duty. (2) The Lord Chancellor’s failure to undertake any modelling to ascertain whether the aims and objectives of the CLAIR Report, in particular ensuring the sustainability of criminal legal aid, would be furthered if fee uplifts lower than the 15% recommended by the CLAIR Report were implemented, was irrational and breached his Tameside duty of sufficient enquiry.”