“01. By reason of the scale of the store proposed and location outside the defined town centre boundary, it would have a significant harmful impact upon the vitality and viability of Coleford Town Centre contrary to the aims and objectives of paragraph 27 of the NPPF [National Planning Policy Framework], paragraphs 13-18 of PPG – Ensuring the Vitality of Town Centres and Policy CSP.14 of the Core Strategy. 02. The application site is not sequentially preferable to a known suitable, available and viable alternative site within the town centre. Accordingly the proposal is contrary to the aims and objectives of paragraph 27 of the NPPF and Policy CSP.14 of the Core Strategy.”
“(a) It would recoup trade that had previously been lost to Coleford. (b) It would increase employment. (c) The Site was accessible and well connected to the town centre. (d) The sequential test fails because the town centre site was not comparable or suitable for the broad type of development. (e) It would add retail choice. (f) It would support economic regeneration. (g) It was sustainable development.”
“Revised information has been submitted regarding the sequential test and retail impact.”
“The Retail Assessment demonstrates that the proposal is in accordance with planning policy at all levels, including key policy tests of impact and the sequential approach to site selection. It confirms that there are no other sites within sequentially preferable locations elsewhere that should be considered appropriate. As the scale of development falls under the 2,500 sq.m. threshold for retail impact assessment, such an assessment is not required in this instance. However, a proportionate impact assessment has been undertaken in any case. The store proposal will deliver a number of major benefits to the Coleford area and the wider community, including the provision of a new limited assortment discount food store, providing increased retail competition and providing the local community with access to affordable, healthy and fresh produce; major employment/economic benefits in terms of construction and retail jobs; reduced unemployment within the area; increased retention of expenditure; and reduced vehicle shopping miles. The application proposal accords fully with the aims and objectives of planning policy towards retail development and there is no policy reason why permission should be withheld.”
“Apart from viability, the only reasons for dismissing these options are: the applicant’s self-imposed requirement for a particular number of dedicated parking spaces; the results of a parking accumulation analysis but appears to have ignored the adjacent car parking in the town centre; and, the trading performance of the new Aldi store in Ross-on-Wye.”
“It should be noted that ‘viability’ is not a stand-alone test for the sequential test in paragraph 24 of the NPPF. Indeed, the applicant also states that viability is not expressly referenced by the NPPF and merely suggest that the authority incorporate it into the concept of ‘suitability’.”
“The applicant’s assessment has been independently appraised on the Council’s behalf and the conclusions are that the proposed development is likely to have a significant financial impact on the health of Coleford town centre. The applicant estimates that the impact of the town centre’s convenience goods sector will be reduced by around 18%, the analysis undertaken on the Authority’s behalf estimates the impact to be 23%-27% of the current level of expenditure flowing to Coleford town centre diverted to the proposed store. Whichever impact estimate is used, it is considered that either amounts to a significant loss of trade for the town centre’s convenience goods sector. The applicant also suggests that the store will also act to ‘claw back’ trade attracted to other stores further afield and the Council’s Retail Study has also acknowledged that expenditure from the Coleford catchment area is being lost to other centres. In addition, it is acknowledged that the proposal could provide linked trips with the town centre as suggested by [the] applicant’s January 2016 household survey, estimating that some 55% will link their trips and help retain expenditure. However, the strength of these benefits is unclear in terms of how they may mitigate in part or in whole for the loss of trips to town centre food stores because the applicant has not provided sufficient information to make a full and proper assessment. It is considered, therefore, that limited weight should be given to this aspect. As a result, it is considered that the vitality and viability of the Coleford town centre will be significantly harmed by the proposed development, contrary to paragraph 27 of the NPPF and paragraphs 13-18 of the associated Planning Policy Guidance – Ensuring the Vitality of Town Centres.”
“… There is a sequentially preferable site within the centre that is also available and the resultant harm to the existing town centre is estimated to be significant, at between 18% and 27%. Whilst there are positive factors that are welcomed, this is not a balancing exercise as in a housing development and Paragraph 14 of the NPPF. Paragraph 27 is explicit and states that where an application fails to satisfy the sequential test or is likely to have a significant adverse impact upon town centre vitality and viability, it should be refused.”
“Moreover, it is considered that there have been no material changes in circumstances which could lead the authority to make a different decision to that of the refusal previously given. Indeed, the recent cases in Mansfield and Exeter, … [have] clarified a number of key issues relating to how to assess the suitability and availability of sites and the weight to be given to the preferences of individual operators. These matters reinforce the position that the scheme is unacceptable.”
“The proposed site is not sequentially preferable to a known suitable and available alternative within the defined town centre. In addition the vitality and viability of Coleford town centre would be adversely affected by the proposed development. Accordingly, as stated by paragraph 27 of the NPPF and paragraphs 13-18 of the associated PPG – Ensuring the Vitality of Town Centres, when an application fails to satisfy the sequential test or is likely to have significant adverse impact on town centre vitality and viability, it should be refused.”
“Although the Aldi proposal would indeed attract new investment and job opportunities to the wider Coleford settlement, I am not convinced that this development will provide any regenerative benefits for Coleford town centre.”
“If regard is to be had to the development plan for the purpose of any determination to be made under the planning Acts the determination must be made in accordance with the plan unless material considerations indicate otherwise.”
“Local planning authorities should apply a sequential test to planning applications for main town centre uses that are not in an existing centre and are not in accordance with an up-to-date Local Plan. They should require applications for main town centre uses to be located in town centres, then in edge of centre locations and only if suitable sites are not available should out of centre sites be considered. When considering edge of centre and out of centre proposals, preference should be given to accessible sites that are well connected to the town centre. Applicants and local planning authorities should demonstrate flexibility on issues such as format and scale.”
“When assessing applications for retail … development outside of town centres, which are not in accordance with an up-to-date Local Plan, local planning authorities should require an impact assessment if the development is over a proportionate, locally set floor space threshold (if there is no locally set threshold, the default threshold is 2,500 square metres). This should include assessment of: • The impact of the proposal on existing, committed and planned public and private investment in a centre or centres in the catchment area of the proposal; and • The impact of the proposal on town centre vitality and viability, including local consumer choice and trade in the town centre and wider area, up to 5 years from the time the application is made. For major schemes where the impact will not be realised in 5 years, the impact should also be assessed up to 10 years from the time the application is made.” • The impact of the proposal on existing, committed and planned public and private investment in a centre or centres in the catchment area of the proposal; and • The impact of the proposal on town centre vitality and viability, including local consumer choice and trade in the town centre and wider area, up to 5 years from the time the application is made. For major schemes where the impact will not be realised in 5 years, the impact should also be assessed up to 10 years from the time the application is made.”
“Where an application fails to satisfy the sequential test or is likely to have significant adverse impact on one or more of the above factors, it should be refused.”
“Some may think this an unusual and even unsatisfactory situation, but it comes about because in this country planning decisions are taken by democratically elected councillors, responsible to, and sensitive to the concerns of, their local communities. … Democratically elected bodies go about their decision-making in a different way from courts. They have professional advisors who investigate and report to them. Those reports obviously have to be clear and full enough to enable them to understand the issues and make up their minds within the limits that the law allows them. But the court should not impose too demanding a standard upon such reports, for otherwise their whole purpose will be defeated: the councillors either will not read them or will not have a clear enough grasp of the issues to make a decision for themselves. It is their job, and not the court’s to weigh the competing public and private interests involved.”
“With regard to the speeches of the members which have been referred to, I should imagine that probably hardly any decision of a body like the London County Council … could stand if every statement which a member made in debate were to be taken as a ground of the decision. I should think that there are probably few debates in which someone does not suggest as a ground for decision something which is not a proper ground; and to say that, because somebody in debate has put forward an improper ground, the decision ought to be set aside as being found on that particular ground is wrong.”
“… I have grave reservations about the usefulness of this sort of exercise when there is no allegation of bad faith. These reservations in part arise out of the theoretical difficulties of establishing the reasoning process of a corporate body which acts by resolution. All one knows is that at the second that the resolution was passed the majority were prepared to vote for it. Even in the case of an individual who expressly gave his reasons in council half an hour before, he may well have changed them because of what was said subsequently in debate.”
“It is known that the board, while maintaining its contention that it has no obligation to give reasons … often volunteers them. In such cases it is accepted, consonantly with decisions such as that of Hutchison J in R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex p. Cummins [1992] 1 PIQR 81, that the reasons are open to scrutiny and review upon ordinary public law principles, which may include the question of their adequacy. It follows that, since reasons were given in the present case, it is not necessary to decide whether there was a legal obligation to give them. Once given their adequacy falls to be tested by the same criteria as if they were obligatory.”
“If the claimant’s analysis was correct, the mere act of recording some reasons for a decision in the minutes of the meeting would trigger an obligation on local planning authorities to provide legally adequate reasons in every case where planning permission was granted, even though the Secretary of State has made an order, laid before Parliament, which does not require local planning authorities to give reasons for the grant of planning permission. This would be surprising. As recently as 2013, the Secretary of State, pursuant to his duties under theTown and Country Planning Act 1990 , decided it was appropriate to remove the duty to give ‘summary reasons’ for the grant of planning permission …”
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the ‘principal important controversial issues’, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need only refer to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospect of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”
“I agree with submissions made by the defendant and the [interested party] that Lord Brown’s formulation in South Buckinghamshire, which applies where a minister or inspector is giving a decision on appeal, is not the standard to be applied to a local planning authority’s decision to grant planning permission. Planning appeals are an adversarial procedure akin to court or tribunal proceedings, in which opposing parties make competing submissions, and the decision-maker adjudicates upon them, giving reasons for his conclusions on the ‘principal important controversial issues’, limited to ‘the main issues in dispute’ not ‘every material consideration’ … In contrast, a local planning authority is an administrative body, determining an individual application for planning permission. Its reasons ought to state why planning permission was granted, usually by reference to the relevant planning policies. But it is not conducting a formal adjudication in a dispute between the applicant for planning permission and objectors, and so it is not required to give reasons for rejecting the representations made by those who object to the grant of planning permission.”
“… Whereas a minister’s decision on appeal is intended to be a ‘stand-alone’ document which contains a full explanation of the Secretary of State’s reasons for allowing or dismissing an appeal, a local planning authority’s reasons for granting planning permission by their very nature do not present a full account of the local planning authority’s decision-making process, in which the planning officer’s report is a crucial part. It is expected that the report will form the background to the reasons. I also consider it would be unduly onerous to impose a duty to give detailed reasons, as proposed by the claimant, given the volume of applications which have to be processed.”
“For these reasons, I consider that where a local authority planning committee gives reasons for a grant of planning permission it need only summarise the main reasons for the decision and can do so briefly. The committee is not required to set out each step in its reasoning, nor indicate which factual matters were accepted or rejected. Indeed, as the committee will comprise a number of councillors who may well have reached their shared conclusion by different routes, it would be impractical and undesirable for the committee to set out its step-by-step reasoning. …”
“I do not consider that this causes any unfairness since those who have a particular interest in the outcome will already be well aware of the competing arguments and recommendations. An unsuccessful objector can safely assume that his objections were either not accepted or were not considered of sufficient weight to outweigh the case in favour of the application.”
“I would by no means suggest that this reasoning is wrong in principle: the differences between an inspector’s decision after a planning inquiry and a planning authority’s resolution to grant permission are real enough. … That said, I think that Lang J’s approach needs to be treated with some care. Interested parties (and the public) are just as entitled to know why the decision is as it is when it is made by the authority as when it is made by the Secretary of State.”
“A local planning authority which is going to authorise a development which will inflict substantial harm on an AONB must surely give substantial reasons for doing so.”
“Where the Planning Committee is disposed to disagree with the Council’s officers – especially in an AONB case – it must (‘if but briefly’) engage with the officers’ reasoning.”
“… This is an unusual case. … The scale of the proposed development is unprecedented in an AONB. This judgment … should not be read as imposing in general an onerous duty on local planning authorities to give reasons for the grant of permissions, far removed from the approach outlined by Lang J in Hawksworth. As Lord Brown said in South Buckinghamshire, ‘the degree of particularity required depend[s] entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision’.”
“An obvious example of such a circumstance is, in principle, where a local planning authority has changed its mind and decided to grant planning permission for a development which it has previously refused … I say ‘in principle’ because it may be plain from all the surrounding circumstances why the council has changed its mind, as was the case in ex p. Chaplin (per Pill LJ at p. 53). There may be cases where reasons should be set out in a minute. … Equally, there may be cases where that would be unnecessary in the light of the factual background. I am satisfied that this case falls into the latter category … If there has been an earlier refusal, as recommended by a planning officer, followed by a grant of planning permission, contrary to the planning officer’s considered recommendation, some explanation will be required, since by definition it will not be possible to find it in the officer’s report. So it will be necessary to search elsewhere for the reasons why the members decided to change their minds. In such circumstances, it might well be sensible at the very least to record the members’ reasons in the form of a minute …”
“The principle is not limited to decisions of an Inspector/the Secretary of State. It requires an earlier material decision to be taken into account. A decision is material unless it is distinguishable. A decision maker in a subsequent matter therefore should (a) decide whether the earlier decision is distinguishable; (b) if not distinguishable, then any disagreement must weigh the earlier decision and give reasons for departure from it. …” (a) decide whether the earlier decision is distinguishable; (b) if not distinguishable, then any disagreement must weigh the earlier decision and give reasons for departure from it. …”
“People just want choice and the town centre site was simply not suitable for Aldi.”
“The High Court – (a) must refuse to grant relief on an application for judicial review … if it appears to the Court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred.” (a) must refuse to grant relief on an application for judicial review … if it appears to the Court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred.”
“In this section ‘the conduct complained of’ … means the conduct (or alleged conduct) of the defendant that the applicant claims justifies the High Court in granting the relief.”