“Demolition of storage building and roadway. Construction of carbon negative live work unit, parking and restricted curtilage. Addition of landscape and biodiversity enhancements to the wider site and new access to the B2244. Stopping up of access to the northern boundary of the site.”
“The planning application site is in the Parish of Sedlescombe. Sedlescombe Parish Council has registered to speak at the Planning Committee meeting and made a submission on the application before the Agenda was published. The application site is not on the parish boundary. We have to apply the provisions as set out in our Constitution. Ticehurst Parish Council are not a relevant Parsh Council and as such have no entitlement to speak at the Planning Committee meeting under this provision. We are not denying Ticehurst Parish Council or any other Parish Council their right to object to the planning application. The Parish Councils have all made written representations on the applications which are set out in the Planning Committee report and will have been read by Members of the Planning Committee. To allow Ticehurst Parish Council to speak would open the Council up to challenge as this would be a departure from the rules as set out in our Constitution. There are similar provisions relating to Public Speaking Rights at Planning Committee at Paragraph 9.6 of Part 3 which allow members of the public who have made a submission on the application before the Agenda was published to address the Planning Committee. We do not consider that the representation made by Ticehurst Parish Council comes under these provisions as they are not a member of the public and their representation was not made on this basis but as a Parish Council.”
“Notwithstanding the officers’ advice and recommendation, this Committee grant planning permission on the basis that this is an innovative design, not an isolated development, and the benefits outweigh the potential harm to the High Weald national landscape.
“[41] The Planning Court - and this court to - must always be vigilant against excessive legalism infecting the planning system. A planning decision is not akin to an adjudication made by a court: see para 50 of my judgment in the East Staffordshire case. The courts must keep in mind that the function of planning decision-making has been assigned by Parliament, not to judges, but - at local level - to elected councillors with the benefit of advice given to them by planning officers, most of whom are professional planners, and - on appeal - to the Secretary of State and his inspectors. They should remember too that the making of planning policy is not an end in itself, but a means to achieving reasonably predictable decision-making, consistent with the aims of the policy - maker. Though the interpretation of planning policy is, ultimately, a matter for the court, planning policies do not normally require intricate discussion of their meaning. … [Planning officers and Inspectors] are entitled to expect - in every case - good sense and fairness in the court’s review of a planning decision, not the hypercritical approach the court is often urged to adopt. [42] The principles on which the court will act when criticism is made of a planning officer’s report to committee are well settled. To summarise the law as it stands:… (2) The principles are not complicated. Planning officers’ reports to committee are not to be read with undue rigour, but with reasonable benevolence, and bearing in mind that they are written for councillors with local knowledge: see the judgement of Baroness Hale of Richmond JSC in R (Morge) v Hampshire County Council[2011] PTSR 337 , para 36 and the judgement of Sullivan J in R v Mendip District Council, ex p Fabre [“Fabre”][2017] PTSR 1112 , 1120…”
“The principle that Inspector’s decision letters should be read and interpreted (and the adequacy of their reasoning judged) on the basis that they are addressed to a ‘knowledgeable readership’ applies with particular force to an officer's report to a planning committee, although in a different way. The purpose of an officer's report is not to decide an issue or to determine an application, but to inform the committee of considerations relevant to the application. The report is not addressed to parties interested in the application, let alone to the world at large, but to the members of the committee, who can be expected to have substantial local knowledge and an understanding of planning principles and policies. The Court should guard against undue intervention in policy judgments made by planning committees and respect their decisions unless it is clear that they have gone wrong in law:…….”
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it wasand what conclusions were reached on the ‘principal important controversial issues’, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. They should enable disappointed developers to assess their prospects of obtaining some alternative development permission, or, as the case may be, their unsuccessful opponents to understand how the policy or approach underlying the grant of permission may impact upon future such applications. Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision”
“There is of course the important difference that…the decision letter of the Secretary of State or a planning inspector is designed as a stand-alone document setting out all the relevant background material and policies, before reaching a reasoned conclusion. In the case of a decision of the local planning authority that function will normally be performed by the planning officers’ report. If their recommendation is accepted by the members, no further reasons may be needed. Even if it is not accepted, it may normally be enough for the committee’s statement of reasons to be limited to the points of difference. However, the essence of the duty remains the same, as does the issue for the court: that is….whether the information so provided by the authority leaves room for ‘genuine doubt….as to what (it) has decided and why.’”
“11. Plans and decisions should apply a presumption in favour of sustainable development….. For decision-taking this means:…. d) where there are no relevant development plan policies, or the policies which are most important for determining the application are out-of-date 8, granting permission unless: i. the application of policies in this Framework that protect areas or assets of particular importance provides a clear reason for refusing the development proposed 7; or ii. any adverse impacts of doing so would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in this Framework taken as a whole.”
“7 The policies referred to are those in this Framework (rather than those in development plans) relating to: habitats sites (and those sites listed in paragraph 187) and/or designated as Sites of Special Scientific Interest; land designated as Green Belt, Local Green Space, an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty, a National Park (or within the Broads Authority) or defined as Heritage Coast; irreplaceable habitats; designated heritage assets (and other heritage assets of archaeological interest referred to in footnote 72); and areas at risk of flooding or coastal change.”
“Planning policies and decision should avoid the development of isolated homes in the countryside unless one of the following circumstances apply:… (e) the design is of exceptional quality, in that it: -is truly outstanding, reflecting the highest standards in architecture, and would help raise standards of design more generally in rural areas; and -would significantly enhance its immediate setting, and be sensitive to the defining characteristics of the local area.”
“Great weight should be given to conserving and enhancing landscape and scenic beauty in …Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty which have the highest status of protection in relation to these issues. The conservation and enhancement of wildlife and cultural heritage are also important considerations in these areas…The scale and extent of development within all these designated areas should be limited, while development within their setting should be sensitively located and designed to avoid or minimise adverse impacts on the designated areas.”
“Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty are listed in footnote 7 and the most relevant polices in the Framework are paragraphs 176 and 177. A recent court of appeal case [the Court of Appeal decision in Monkhill Ltd v Secretary of State[2021] PTSR 1432 (“Monkhill”)] confirms that, if a proposal’s impact on an AONB is sufficient to provide a clear reason for refusal under NPPF 176 or 177, then the presumption in favour (or ‘tilted balance…’) should be disengaged. The decision-maker should therefore conduct a normal planning balancing exercise, applying appropriate weight to each consideration, to come to a decision. This will of course include giving great weight to the AONB as required by NPPF 176.”
“The following practical summary may assist practitioners in the field, so long as it is borne in mind that this does not detract from the more detailed analysis set out above: -It is, of course, necessary to apply section 38(6) in any event. -If the proposal accords with the policies of an up-to-date development plan taken as a whole, then unless other considerations indicate otherwise, planning permission should be granted without delay (paragraph 11(c) of the NPPF). -If the case does not fall within paragraph 11(c), the next step is to consider whether paragraph 11(d) applies. This requires examining whether there are no relevant development plan policies or whether the most important development plan policies for determining the application are out-of-date. -If paragraph 11(d) does apply, then the next question is whether one or more ‘footnote 6’ [now footnote 7] policies are relevant to the determination of the application or appeal (limb (i)). -If there are no relevant ‘footnote’ 6 policies so that limb (i) does not apply, the decision-taker should proceed to limb (ii) and determine the application by applying the tilted balance (and section 38(6)). -If limb (i) does apply, the decision-taker must consider whether the application of the relevant ‘footnote 6’ policy (or policies) provides a clear reason to refuse permission for the development. -If it does, then permission should be refused (subject to applying section 38(6))…Limb (ii) is irrelevant in this situation and must not be applied. -If it does not, then the decision-taker should proceed to limb (ii) and determine the application by applying the tilted balance (and section 38(6)).”
“[51] Paragraph 172 points out that National Parks, the Broads and AONBs have ‘the highest status of protection’ in relation to the conservation and enhancement of landscapes and scenic beauty. Not surprisingly, therefore, paragraph 172 requires ‘great weight’ to be given to those matters. The clear and obvious implication is that if a proposal harms those objectives, great weight should be given to the decision-maker’s assessment of the nature and degree of harm. The policy increases the weight to be given to that harm. [52] Plainly, in a simple case where there would be harm to an AONB but no countervailing benefits, and therefore no balance to be struck between ‘pros and cons’, the effect of giving great weight to what might otherwise be assessed as a relatively modest degree of harm, might be sufficient as a matter of planning judgment to amount to a reason for refusal, when, absent that policy, that might not be the case. But where there are also countervailing benefits, it is self-evident that the issue for the decision-maker is whether those benefits outweigh the harm assessed, the significance of the latter being increased by the requirement to give ‘great weight’ to it. This connotes a simple planning balance which is so obvious that there is no interpretive or other legal requirement for it to be mentioned expressly in the policy. It is necessarily implicit in the application of the policy and a matter of planning judgement. The ‘great weight’ to be attached to the assessed harm to an AONB is capable of being outweighed by the benefits of a proposal, so as to overcome what would otherwise be a reason for refusal.”
“[50] How then should the policy in paragraph 176 be understood? This question has already, in effect, been considered by this court, both in Bayliss…and Monkhill... [51] In Bayliss the court was concerned with the predecessor policy in paragraph 115 of the original version of the NPPF, which referred to the concept of ‘great weight’ in very similar terms to the first sentence of paragraph 176 in the present version. The relevant issue concerned the effect of development on an …AONB, not a National Park, but the ‘great weight’ concept applied to both - as it does in the present version of the policy. Sir David Keene said (in para 18 of his judgment) that there was no indication in the inspector's decision letter that he had failed to take account of the policy in paragraph 115. He was ‘not required to use the words “great weight” as if it was some form of incantation.’ This part of the policy ‘has to be interpreted in the light of the obvious point that the effect of the proposal on an AONB will itself vary: it will vary from case to case; it may be trivial, it may be substantial, it may be major.’ Sir David added that the ‘decision-maker is entitled to attach different weights to this factor depending upon the degree of harmful impact anticipated’; that in his view ‘it would be irrational to do otherwise’; and that [t]he adjective ‘great’ in the term ‘great weight’ therefore does not take one very far’ (para 18). He did not suggest, however, that there might be a level of harm to an AONB or National Park, or to its setting, which might not even engage the application of the policy at all. Applying the policy in a particular case would require the decision maker to consider the appropriate degree of weight to give to the level of harm he found, conscious of the Government’s policy that ‘great weight’ is to be given to the conservation and enhancement of landscape and scenic beauty in these areas with the highest status of protection. [52] In Monkhill the court was not directly concerned with the meaning of the expression ‘great weight’. It was concerned with the question of whether that part of the policy could provide a clear reason for the refusal of planning permission, within the scope of the policy for the presumption in favour of sustainable development in paragraph 11(d) of the NPPF. But the court recognised that, the ‘real sense’ of the policy was ‘an expectation that the decision will be in favour of the protection of the “landscape and scenic beauty” of an AONB, or against harm to that interest.’ Thus, ‘if the effects on the [AONB] would be slight, so that its highly protected status would not be significantly harmed, the expectation… might be overcome’, or ‘it might be overcome if the effects of the development would be greater, but its benefits substantial’. This ‘will always depend on the exercise of planning judgement in the circumstances of the individual case’ (para 30). The court therefore agreed with what Sir David Keene had said in the passage I have quoted from his judgement in Bayliss (see para 32 of the leading judgement [Sir Keith was here referring to his own judgment]). [55] the crucial question here… is not the meaning of the words ‘great weight’ in the first sentence of paragraph 176 of the NPPF, taken in their own context. It is whether, on a fair reading of the relevant parts of the inspector's decision letter, his assessment of the likely effects of this development on the setting of the National Park, in which he appears to have accepted that those effects would indeed be harmful, shows how he gave ‘great weight’ to the conservation and enhancement of the landscape and scenic beauty in the National Park, as the policy in paragraph 176 effectively requires. As was held in Bayliss, he was not obliged to use the words ‘great weight’ or even to refer to the paragraph 176 policy by name. But in my view his assessment did have to demonstrate that he had approached the question of harm to the National Park with the ‘great weight’ principle in mind.”
“[62] We do not have to go as far as the judge and find that the inspector’s conclusion in para 49 of the decision letter was, on its face, irrational. It is enough to conclude…that in this part of this decision-making the reasons he gave failed to meet the standard required. Even for an audience familiar with this ‘principal important controversial [issue]’…..and with the parties’ evidence and submissions about the effects of the development on the setting of the National Park, it is not clear how, or even if, the inspector has resolved that controversy. It is not clear whether he gave any weight, or conceivably no weight at all, to the harm he identified in para 47 of the decision letter. And it is not clear how that degree of weight can be reconciled with the whole policy in paragraph 176 of the NPPF, including the requirement to give ‘great weight’ to ‘conserving and enhancing landscape and scenic beauty in National Parks.’ [63] Clarity on those matters is not too much to expect of the reasons given on one of the main issues in the section 78 appeal. The level of harm identified by the inspector in para 47 of the decision letter - ‘moderate adverse and not significant’ - was not merely negligible. And it is not obvious how that finding of harm can be squared with the conclusion in the final sentence of para 49 that the setting of the National Park would not be ‘materially affected.’ Even if those two conclusions could be regarded as consistent with each other, it would still be unclear whether the harm identified by the inspector carried any weight in his planning balance, or, if it did, how that amount of weight could be seen as compatible with the ‘great weight’ principle in the Government’s policy for National Parks. That is unclear in para 49 of the decision letter. It remains so in para 57, and in paras 82-92. I accept that the inspector did not have to voice the words ‘great weight’ but he did have to show how he had applied that part of the paragraph 176 policy, and how it had influenced the planning balance, if it did. [64] In my view, therefore, the council’s complaint on this ground is justified. The inspector’s reasons are defective. They leave a substantial doubt that that he has lawfully applied relevant national policy to one of the main issues in the section 78 appeal.”
“Whilst planning officers’ reports should not be equated with inspectors’ decision letters, it is well established that, in construing the latter, it has to be remembered that they are addressed to the parties who will be well aware of the issues that have been raised in the appeal. They are thus addressed to a knowledgeable readership and the adequacy of their reasoning must be considered against that background. That approach applies with particular force to a planning officer’s report to a committee. Its purpose is not to decide the issue, but to inform the members of the relevant considerations relating to the application. It is not addressed to the world at large but to council members who, by virtue of that membership, may be expected to have substantial local and background knowledge. There would be no point in a planning officer’s report setting out in great detail background material, for example, in respect of local topography, development planning policies or matters of planning history if the members were only too familiar with that material.”
“Policy seven. The development of new homes in the open countryside will only be permitted where there are special circumstances, full time agriculture and other rural occupation workers where there is up to date evidence of an essential need of the business for the occupier to live in that specific location as supported by the County land agent.”
“the reasons given by the Proposer for wishing to approve the application were that the proposed development accords with Policy 7 of [the Local Plan], where the agricultural justification and need for a workers dwelling is considered to outweigh the harm to the landscape and scenic beauty of the Cornwall [AONB].”
“This is because [the statement in the minutes] ..is simply a conclusion and does not articulate any planning reasons which led to that conclusion. There is no explanation which identifies the reasons why the proposed development justified damaging the AONB, an area which enjoys the highest level of protection…..”
“(3) It is a question of fact whether inability to attend a planning committee meeting results in any prejudice to the person excluded.. (4) Relevant factors might include whether the person exclude has already made representations, whether orally at a previous meeting or in writing; whether he has expressed a wish to speak; whether has been provided with an update following an earlier meeting; and whether the person excluded could have added to points already made by others.. (5) However in a particular case, the person excluded might have lost the opportunity to respond to the oral presentation by officers and to persuade members to a view which differed from that of the officers..”