Beth (a child)(Fact Finding: Fracture and Bruising), Re [2026] EWFC 156 (B)

[2026] EWFC 156 (B)

Case No SN25C50040

IN THE FAMILY COURT AT SWINDON

Date 26 June 2026

Swindon Combined Court

The Law Courts

Islington Street

Swindon SN1 2HG

Before

HIS HONOUR JUDGE RICHARD CASE

Re Beth (a child)(Fact Finding: Fracture and Bruising)

Between

WILTSHIRE COUNCILApplicant

MOTHER (1)Respondent

FATHER (2)Respondent

INTERVENOR (3)Respondent

BETH (THE CHILD) (4)Respondent

for Applicant:

Dylan Morgan, counsel instructed by the Applicant Council

for Respondents:

Elisabeth Hudson, counsel instructed by the First Respondent Mother

Ruth Slader, solicitor instructed by the Second Respondent Father

Neelo Shravat, counsel instructed by the Intervenor

James Vatcher, counsel instructed by the Fourth Respondent child by their Child’s Guardian, Jane Gould

Hearing Hearing dates: 15, 16, 17, 22 and 26 June 2026

This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given permission for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.

APPROVED JUDGMENT

This judgment was handed down at a hearing listed at 9.30am on 26 June 2026.

Contents Narrative summary 4 Findings Summary 4 Parties 7 Background 7 Chronology 7 Positions 8 Local Authority 8 Mother 8 Intervenor 8 Children’s Guardian 9 Evidence Summary 9 Law 10 Threshold 10 Fact Finding 11 Lying 16 Injuries 17 List of perpetrators 17 Findings/Threshold 21 Credibility 21 Mother 21 Intervenor 22 IM 25 Injuries 26 1: Injuries 26 2: Significant force required 31 3: No underlying condition 31 4: Self-infliction 31 6: Injuries evident to anyone present 33 5: Significant pain caused 34 7: Mechanism of injury evident to anyone present 34 8, 13 and 14: Infliction 35 15: Dishonesty about injuries 38 Allegations related to IMP 38 9: IMP present on 2 April 2025 38 10: Mother failed to disclose IM’s presence on 2 April 2025 to professionals or police 38 11: Intervenor knew IMP present on 2 April 2025 but failed to disclose it to professionals or police 40 12: Failure to disclose IMP’s presence prevented a full and timely investigation of Beth’s injuries 40 16: Withdrawn 41 17: IMP and IM relationship reported as “unhealthy”41 18: IMP considered unsafe by Mother and Intervenor 42 19: Beth allowed to be in presence of IMP by Mother 42 20: Failure to protect from IMP by Mother 43 Relationship with Intervenor 44 21: Continued relationship with Intervenor by Mother 44 Threshold 45

Narrative summary

[1]Beth (anonymised) is a very young child. The court had to decide how she was injured and whether she is safe. The court found that Beth suffered serious injuries:• A broken thigh bone (her femur was fractured)

• A bruise under her eye

• A bruise on her knee

[2]These injuries were not accidents and could not have happened during normal care and would have been obvious to the person caring for her at the time.

[3]The injuries were caused when Beth was alone with the Intervenor (the Mother’s partner at the time) and the Intervenor was not honest about what happened.

[4]The court did not find that the Mother caused the injuries and accepted that she did not know the injuries were going to happen and did not know that another risky person, the Intervenor’s mother’s partner, was present in the home at the time of the injuries. Even though the Mother did not cause the injuries, the court had concerns that she allowed Beth to be in a home with a man she thought was unsafe and continued her relationship with the Intervenor even when she knew he might have caused harm and she was not fully open with the police about that relationship.

Findings Summary

[5]I have made the following specific findings which are also set out in bold in the judgment below: Beth sustained:• . A spiral fracture of the left femur with associated bruising within a period between approximately 17.30 and 19.01 on 2 April 2025;

• . An injury causing bruising under right eye between approximately 18.20 and 19.20 on 2 April 2025; and

• . An injury causing a bruise on the outside of the right knee prior to observation at 09.57 on 3 April 2025. None of the injuries could have been caused by everyday handling. None of the injuries were the result of or more easily sustained by reason of an underlying medical condition. No plausible explanation for the injuries having been caused by either falls or other accidental means has been advanced. Bruising on the outside of the left leg was related to the fracture to the left femur. The injuries would have been evident to anyone present when they occurred. The fractured left femur would have caused significant pain and the bruising under the right eye and over the outside of the right knee would have caused pain, although not necessarily significant pain. The mechanism of injury would have been evident to anyone present: they would have been aware of an injury and, having been present, aware of what happened immediately before. The Intervenor caused the left femoral fracture, an injury causing bruising under the right eye and an injury causing bruising on the outside of the right knee whilst Beth was in his sole care between approximately 17.30 and 18.30 on 2 April 2025. The Intervenor has been dishonest about the injuries suffered by Beth. The Intervenor’s mother’s partner, IMP, was present in the Intervenor’s mother’s home whilst the Intervenor was caring for Beth on 2 April 2025. The Intervenor knew that IMP was present in the home on 2 April 2025 and failed to disclose it to professionals or the police when interviewed on 6 April 2025 or 13 October 2025. The Intervenor’s failure to disclose IMP’s presence in the home on 2 April 2025 prevented a timely investigation of Beth’s injuries. IM’s relationship with IMP was unhealthy. IMP was considered nasty and violent by the Intervenor and nasty and a risk to Beth by the Mother. The Mother allowed Beth to be in the same home as IMP, but was unaware of his presence in the home on 2 April 2025. The Mother permitted Beth to remain in the same home as IMP despite accepting he presented a risk to Beth through his use of cannabis and she would not have liked to be left alone with him. The Mother continued in a relationship with the Intervenor even when she was aware he may have caused injury to Beth. She lied to the police in saying she had no contact with him over the summer of 2025. Parties

[6]I am concerned with a child (I will call her Beth for the purpose of anonymisation) who is the daughter of the Mother. She is aged 2 and was aged around 15 months at all material times. Her Mother was in a relationship with the Intervenor at all material times. The Intervenor’s mother is IM (Intervenor’s Mother) and her partner at all material times was IMP (Intervenor’s Mother’s Partner). Beth is currently in the care of her maternal great aunt pursuant to an Interim Care Order. Background Chronology

[7]I take the following from the Local Authority’s case summary: 1.4.2025 to 3.4.2025. During this time Beth was in the care of the mother or Intervenor or both of them jointly. The 1.4.2026 was a Tuesday. On the 1.4.2025 up to the mid/late afternoon of that day the mother had sole care of Beth. The mother came to the home of the Intervenor (IM’s address) and Beth was in the care of both the mother and Intervenor for the remainder of that day and overnight. They all slept in the living room – Beth sleeping in a cot. On the 2.4.2025 Beth went with the Intervenor’s family (including the Intervenor and IM) and the mother to [various identified places] before going home to IM’s address. They all remained at IM’s home until IM and the mother left for a period in the afternoon (likely an hour on the basis of the phone downloads) leaving Beth in the care of the Intervenor during that time. … On 02.04.2025 mother took Beth to an out of hours walk in centre late in the evening due to her concern that she had an infected right toe [although the medical records suggest it was the right toe the Mother’s and Intervenor’s evidence is that it was the left toe]. The GP noted a purplish discolouration under her right eye, following mother mentioning that she wondered if she had a bruise there. The doctor at the walk in centre considered the mark to be sufficient to provoke a safeguarding referral. Beth was referred to the on call paediatric team at [] District Hospital and following an overnight admission was examined, when the bruise under her right eye was noted, together with several other bruises to her back and legs… During the ward round on the morning of 03.04.2025 Beth was upset when anyone touched her left thigh. Her thigh looked sore and warm to the touch, and she was not straightening her leg. She was examined midday and swollen bruising was noted to the area on the outside of the left leg, the one under her eye, on the front of her knees, one on her ankle on the inside leg, over the lumbar spine, one on the right and two on the left of the ribs on the back, and a small one over the buttock. An X-ray at 19.30 on 03.04.2025 showed a fracture to the left femoral shaft with some angulation and shortening, which was surrounded by a haematoma to Beth’s soft tissues… … On 08.04.2025 Beth was transferred from [] District Hospital to Southampton General Hospital to have an operation on her femur and a specific cast fitted to immobilise the leg and promote healing. She was discharged from SGH on 14.04.2025... The cast was removed on 08.05.2025 at Southampton General Hospital. The break to the femur has mended and she does not need physiotherapy. A repeat skeletal survey was undertaken which did not reveal any further issues. … The Intervenor and the mother remain under investigation by the police in relation to Beth’s injuries. They continue to be subject to bail conditions limiting their contact with [each] other and with Beth. Positions Local Authority

Positions

[8]The Local Authority invite me to make findings as set out in a schedule at [A160]. IMP was previously identified as a possible perpetrator but the Local Authority have withdrawn that allegation. In closing submissions the Local Authority invited me to make a pool finding, arguing that they had proved it was either the Mother or the Intervenor who caused Beth’s injuries. Mother

[9]The Mother has responded to the allegations in the above schedule. In essence, she denies inflicting injuries to Beth and denies failing to protect her. Intervenor

[10]The Intervenor denies inflicting injuries on Beth.

Children’s Guardian

[11]The Guardian has remained neutral.

Evidence Summary

[12]I have had the benefit of considering the bundle (references in the format [Axx]) and medical bundle (references in the format [MEDAxx]). I heard oral evidence from Dr Cardwell, paediatrician, the Mother, IM and the Intervenor. There is written evidence from Dr Johnson, paediatric radiologist, but permission was not given for him to give oral evidence.

Law

[13]I remind myself that the burden of proving the need for a public law order rests with the Local Authority on the balance of probabilities. Threshold

[14]I must consider if the Local Authority has proved that the threshold test set out in section 31(2) Children Act 1989 is met. It provides: (2) A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is satisfied –(a) that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and

(b) that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to – (i) the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or (ii) the child’s being beyond parental control.

[15]I remind myself that the relevant date for the purposes of making the assessment is the date on which the Local Authority initiated the procedure (Re M (Care

[16]In relation to threshold I refer to the summary of the principles set out by Sir James Munby (then the President of the Family Division) in Re A (a Child)

[2015] EWFC 11

which was given by Aikens LJ in Re J (a Child)

[2015] EWCA Civ 222

: “56. The fundamental principles underlined by the President in Re A, which, as I say, are not new and are based on statute or the highest authority or both, can, I think, be summarised thus: … v) It is for the local authority to prove that there is the necessary link between the facts upon which it relies and its case on Threshold. The local authority must demonstrate why certain facts, if proved, "justify the conclusion that the child has suffered or is at the risk of suffering significant harm" of the type asserted by the local authority." The local authority’s evidence and submissions must set out the arguments and explain explicitly why it is said that, in the particular case, the conclusion [that the child has suffered or is at the risk of suffering significant harm] indeed follows from the facts [proved]". vi) It is vital that local authorities, and, even more importantly, judges, bear in mind that nearly all parents will be imperfect in some way or other. The State will not take away the children of "those who commit crimes, abuse alcohol or drugs or suffer from physical or mental illness or disability, or who espouse antisocial, political or religious beliefs" simply because those facts are established. It must be demonstrated by the local authority, in the first place, that by reason of one or more of those facts, the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering significant harm [my emphasis]. Even if that is demonstrated, adoption will not be ordered unless it is demonstrated by the local authority that "nothing else will do" when having regard to the overriding requirements of the child’s welfare. The court must guard against "social engineering". vii) When a judge considers the evidence, he must take all of it into account and consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence, and, to use a metaphor, examine the canvas overall.

[17]In relation to failure to protect King LJ in Re G-L-T (Children)

[2019] EWCA Civ 717

said: 73. Unhappily, the courts will inevitably have before them numerous cases where there has undoubtedly been a failure to protect and there will be, as a consequence, complex welfare issues to consider. There is, however, a danger that significant welfare issues, which need to be teased out and analysed by assessment, are inappropriately elevated to findings of failure to protect capable of satisfying the s 31 criteria.

Fact Finding

[18]I remind myself of the fact-finding self-directions that I must give myself adapted from the helpful summary of Munby P in Re X (Children) (No 3)

[2015] EWHC 3651

: 20. …The principles are conveniently set out in the judgment of Baker J in Re L and M (Children)

[2013] EWHC 1569 (Fam)

, to which I was taken. So far as material for present purposes what Baker J said (and I respectfully agree) was this: “First, the burden of proof lies at all times with the local authority. Secondly, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Third, findings of fact in these cases must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation … Fourthly, when considering cases of suspected child abuse the court must take into account all the evidence and furthermore consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence. The court invariably surveys a wide canvas. A judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof. Fifthly, … Whilst appropriate attention must be paid to the opinion of … experts, those opinions need to be considered in the context of all the other evidence. It is important to remember that the roles of the court and the expert are distinct and it is the court that is in the position to weigh up the expert evidence against its findings on the other evidence. It is the judge who makes the final decision. Sixth, … The court must be careful to ensure that each expert keeps within the bounds of their own expertise and defers, where appropriate, to the expertise of others. Seventh, the evidence of the parents and any other carers is of the utmost importance. It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability. Eighth, it is common for witnesses in these cases to tell lies in the course of the investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress, and the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything (see R v Lucas

[1981] QB 720

).” [I address this further below]

[19]Munby P continued:21. To this admirable summary I add three further points.

22. First, that the legal concept of proof on a balance of probabilities “must be applied with common sense”, as Lord Brandon of Oakbrook said in The Popi M, Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds , Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Fenton Insurance Co Ltd

[1985] 1 WLR 948

, 956. 23. Secondly, that the court can have regard to the inherent probabilities: see Lady Hale in In re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (CAFCASS intervening)

[2008] UKHL 35

[2009] 1 AC 11

, para 31. But this does not affect the legal standard of proof, as Lord Hoffmann emphasised in the same case (para 15):

“There is only one rule of law, namely that the occurrence of the fact in issue must be proved to have been more probable than not. Common sense, not law, requires that in deciding this question, regard should be had, to whatever extent appropriate, to inherent probabilities. If a child alleges sexual abuse by a parent, it is common sense to start with the assumption that most parents do not abuse their children. But this assumption may be swiftly dispelled by other compelling evidence of the relationship between parent and child or parent and other children. It would be absurd to suggest that the tribunal must in all cases assume that serious conduct is unlikely to have occurred. In many cases, the other evidence will show that it was all too likely.” 24. Thirdly, that the fact, if fact it be, that the respondent … fails to prove on a balance of probabilities an affirmative case that she has chosen to set up by way of defence, does not of itself establish the local authority’s case. As His Honour Judge Clifford Bellamy recently said in Re FM (A Child: fractures: bone density) [2015] EWFC B26, para 122, and I respectfully agree: “It is the local authority that seeks a finding that FM’s injuries are non-accidental. It is for the local authority to prove its case. It is not for the mother to disprove it. In particular it is not for the mother to disprove it by proving how the injuries were in fact sustained. Neither is it for the court to determine how the injuries were sustained. The court’s task is to determine whether the local authority has proved its case on the balance of probability. Where, as here, there is a degree of medical uncertainty and credible evidence of a possible alternative explanation to that contended for by the local authority, the question for the court is not ‘has that possible alternative explanation been proved’ but rather it should ask itself, ‘in the light of that possible alternative explanation can the court be satisfied that the local authority has proved its case on the simple balance of probability’.”

[20]In relation to experts in Re B (Care: Expert)

[1996] 1 FLR 667

at 674 Butler-Sloss LJ said: I agree with the judgment of Ward LJ. Family judges deal with increasingly difficult child cases and are much assisted in their decision-making process by professionals from other disciplines: medical, wider mental health and social work among others. The courts pay particular attention to the valuable contribution from paediatricians and child psychiatrists as well as others, but it is important to remember that the decision is that of the judge and not of the professional expert. Judges are well accustomed to assessing the conflicting evidence of experts. As Ward LJ said, judges are not expected to suspend judicial belief simply because the evidence is given by an expert. An expert is not in any special position and there is no presumption or belief in a doctor however distinguished he or she may be. It is, however, necessary for a judge to give reasons for disagreeing with experts' conclusions or recommendations. That, this judge did. A judge cannot substitute his views for the views of the experts without some evidence to support what it is he concludes.

[21]In his President’s Memorandum on Witness Statements dated 10 November 2021 McFarlane P said: 14. Parties should understand that the court’s approach to witness evidence based on human memory will be in accordance with CPR PD 57AC, Appendix para 1.3. This states that human memory:a. is not a simple mental record of a witnessed event that is fixed at the time of the experience and fades over time, but

b. is a fluid and malleable state of perception concerning an individual’s past experiences, and therefore

c. is vulnerable to being altered by a range of influences, such that the individual may or may not be conscious of the alteration.

[22]I also direct myself to the judgment of Peter Jackson J (as he was) in Lancashire County Council v The Children

[2014] EWHC 3 (Fam)

: 9. To these matters I would only add that in cases where repeated accounts are given of events surrounding injury and death the court must think carefully about the significance or otherwise of any reported discrepancies. They may arise for a number of reasons. One possibility is of course that they are lies designed to hide culpability. Another is that they are lies told for other reasons. Further possibilities include faulty recollection or confusion at times of stress or when the importance of accuracy is not fully appreciated, or there may be inaccuracy or mistake in the record keeping or recollection of the person hearing and relaying the account. The possible effects of delay and questioning upon memory should also be considered, as should the effect on one person of hearing accounts given by others. As memory fades, a desire to iron out wrinkles may not be unnatural – a process which might inelegantly be described as “story creep” – may occur without any inference of bad faith.

[23]That should be borne in mind when considering perceived differences between accounts over time and generally when considering a witness’ recall.

[24]As regards demeanour I have regard to Peter Jackson LJ in B-M (Children: Findings of Fact)

[2021] EWCA Civ 1371

:25. No judge would consider it proper to reach a conclusion about a witness’s credibility based solely on the way that he or she gives evidence, at least in any normal circumstances. The ordinary process of reasoning will draw the judge to consider a number of other matters, such as the consistency of the account with known facts, with previous accounts given by the witness, with other evidence, and with the overall probabilities. However, in a case where the facts are not likely to be primarily found in contemporaneous documents the assessment of credibility can quite properly include the impression made upon the court by the witness, with due allowance being made for the pressures that may arise from the process of giving evidence. Indeed in family cases, where the question is not only ‘what happened in the past?’ but also ‘what may happen in the future?’, a witness’s demeanour may offer important information to the court about what sort of a person the witness truly is, and consequently whether an account of past events or future intentions is likely to be reliable.

26. I therefore respectfully agree with what Macur LJ said in Re M (Children) at [12], with emphasis on the word ‘solely’: “It is obviously a counsel of perfection but seems to me advisable that any judge appraising witnesses in the emotionally charged atmosphere of a contested family dispute should warn themselves to guard against an assessment solely by virtue of their behaviour in the witness box and to expressly indicate that they have done so.” … 28…There will be cases where the manner in which evidence is given about such personal matters will properly assume prominence. As Munby LJ said in Re A (A Child) (No. 2)

[2011] EWCA Civ. 12

said at [104] in a passage described by the Judge as of considerable assistance in the present case: “Any judge who has had to conduct a fact-finding hearing such as this is likely to have had experience of a witness - as here a woman deposing to serious domestic violence and grave sexual abuse - whose evidence, although shot through with unreliability as to details, with gross exaggeration and even with lies, is nonetheless compelling and convincing as to the central core… Yet through all the lies, as experience teaches, one may nonetheless be left with a powerful conviction that on the essentials the witness is telling the truth, perhaps because of the way in which she gives her evidence, perhaps because of a number of small points which, although trivial in themselves, nonetheless suddenly illuminate the underlying realities.” 29. Still further, demeanour is likely to be of real importance when the court is assessing the recorded interviews or live evidence of children. Here, it is not only entitled but expected to consider the child’s demeanour as part of the process of assessing credibility, and the accumulated experience of listening to children’s accounts sensitises the decision-maker to the many indicators of sound and unsound allegations.

[25]In relation to electronic messages I remind myself of the observations in Stocker v Stocker

[2019] UKSC 17

in which Lord Kerr cautioned against “elaborate analysis of a tweet; it is likewise unwise to parse a Facebook posting for its theoretically or logically deducible meaning. The imperative is to ascertain how a typical (i.e. an ordinary reasonable) reader would interpret the message. That search should reflect the circumstance that this is a casual medium; it is in the nature of conversation rather than carefully chosen expression; and that it is pre-eminently one in which the reader reads and passes on”.

Lying

[26]I remind myself of the Lucas direction from R v Lucas

[1981] QB 720

, elaborated on by Macur LJ in Re A

[2021] EWCA Civ 451

: 54. That a witness’s dishonesty may be irrelevant in determining an issue of fact is commonly acknowledged in judgments…in formulaic terms:

“that people lie for all sorts of reasons, including shame, humiliation, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear, distress, confusion and emotional pressure and the fact that somebody lies about one thing does not mean it actually did or did not happen and/or that they have lied about everything”

. But this formulation leaves open the question: how and when is a witness’s lack of credibility to be factored into the equation of determining an issue of fact? In my view, the answer is provided by the terms of the entire ‘Lucas’ direction as given, when necessary, in criminal trials. 55. Chapter 16-3, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the December 2020 Crown Court Compendium, provides a useful legal summary:

“1. A defendant’s lie, whether made before the trial or in the course of evidence or both, may be probative of guilt. A lie is only capable of supporting other evidence against D if the jury are sure that: (1) it is shown, by other evidence in the case, to be a deliberate untruth; i.e. it did not arise from confusion or mistake; (2) it relates to a significant issue; (3) it was not told for a reason advanced by or on behalf of D, or for some other reason arising from the evidence, which does not point to D’s guilt. 2. The direction should be tailored to the circumstances of the case, but the jury must be directed that only if they are sure that these criteria are satisfied can D’s lie be used as some support for the prosecution case, but that the lie itself cannot prove guilt. …”

[27]What I have said above in relation to memory applies to a consideration of whether a person is, in fact, lying; that is to say, whether they are dishonestly not telling the truth.

Injuries

[28]Peter Jackson LJ summarised the questions to be answered in Re S (A Child: Adequacy of Reasoning)

[2019] EWCA Civ 1845

at paragraph 3:(1) Had the local authority proved that the injuries were inflicted as opposed to being accidental?

(2) If the injuries were inflicted, who had the opportunity to cause them?

(3) Of those people, could one person be identified on the balance of probabilities as having inflicted the injuries (a conventional 'known perpetrator' finding)?

(4) If only two people…could have caused the injuries, but the one responsible could not be identified it necessarily followed that there was a real possibility that each of them may have caused the injuries (an 'uncertain perpetrator' finding).

List of perpetrators

[29]The following summary of the law is taken from the Family Court Practice paragraph 2.312[20]: Uncertain perpetrator cases—If the judge cannot identify a perpetrator or perpetrators, it is still important to identify the possible perpetrators by asking whether the evidence establishes that there is a ‘likelihood or real possibility’ that a given person perpetrated the injuries in question (Re S-B (Children)

[2010] 1 FLR 1161

, SC; North Yorkshire CC v SA

[2003] 2 FLR 849

, CA). In such circumstances, it is all the more important to scrutinise the evidence carefully and consider whether anyone, and if so who, should be included as a possible perpetrator (Re S (A Child)

[2014] 1 FLR 739

, CA). However, it is not helpful for the judge to give an indication of percentages as to the likelihood that one or other of the possible perpetrators was responsible and judges should be cautious about amplifying in this way a judgment in which they have been unable to identify a speciﬁc perpetrator (Re S-B (Children)

[2010] 1 FLR 1161

, SC). In A (Children) (Pool of Perpetrators)

[2022] EWCA Civ 1348

the Court of Appeal reiterated that the evaluation of the facts which will enable a court to identify the perpetrator of an inﬂicted injury to a child will be determined on the simple balance of probabilities and nothing more. In this context, the Court of Appeal stated that judges should no longer direct themselves not to ‘strain’ to identify the perpetrator as the unvarnished test is clear: following a consideration of all the available evidence and applying the simple balance of probabilities, a judge either can, or cannot, identify a perpetrator. If he or she cannot do so, then, in accordance with Re B he or she should consider whether there is a real possibility that each individual on the list inﬂicted the injury in question. In Re B (A Child)

[2018] EWCA Civ 2127

, and Re B (Children: Uncertain Perpetrator)

[2019] EWCA Civ 575

, the Court of Appeal gave further consideration to so called ‘uncertain perpetrator’ cases. In Re B (Children: Uncertain Perpetrator), the Court of Appeal urged a change of terminology from ‘pool’ to ‘list’. The following principles can be drawn from the two authorities:(a) The concept of a ‘pool’ of perpetrators is one that seeks to strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual, including those of the child, and the imperatives of child protection;

(b) A decision by a court to place a person in a ‘pool’ of possible perpetrators does not constitute a ﬁnding of fact in the conventional sense in that that person is not proven to be a perpetrator but is rather a possible perpetrator;

(c) Where there are a number of people who might have caused the harm to the child, it is for the local authority to show that in relation to each of them there is a real possibility that they did so;

(d) Within this context, the question is whether it has been demonstrated to the requisite standard that a person is a possible perpetrator. Approaching the matter by considering who could be excluded from a ‘pool’ of possible perpetrators is to risk reversing the burden of proof. The court must consider the strength of the possibility that the person was involved as part of the overall circumstances of the case;

(e) In doing so, in future the court should ﬁrst consider whether there is a ‘list’ of people who had the opportunity to cause the injury;

(f) The court should then consider whether it can identify the actual perpetrator on the balance of probability and should seek to do so. At this stage, the correct legal approach is to survey the evidence as a whole as it relates to each individual in order to arrive at a conclusion about whether the allegation has been made out in relation to one or other on a balance of probability. Evidentially, this will involve considering the individuals separately and together and comparing the probabilities in respect of each of them. Within this context, the right question is not ‘who is the more likely?’ but rather ‘does the evidence establish that this individual probably caused this injury?’ In a case where there are more than two possible perpetrators, the Court of Appeal highlighted a clear danger in identifying an individual simply because they are the likeliest candidate, as this can lead to an identiﬁcation on evidence that falls short of a probability;

(g) Only if the court cannot identify the perpetrator to the civil standard of proof should it then go on to ask of each of those on the list whether there was a likelihood or real possibility that they caused the injuries. Only if there is, should that person be considered a possible perpetrator;

[30]The commentary in Family Court Practice continues: It is important to note that the court remains under a duty to consider the welfare of the child under ChA 1989, s 1(3) where that child has suffered injury and thereby signiﬁcant harm, even where it is not possible to say who the perpetrator of harm is (Re S (A Child)). Note that the Court of Appeal has suggested that, in the context of the requirements of the Children Act 1989, s 31(2), the terms ‘non-accidental’ and ‘accidental’ injury are, in addition to being tautologous and oxymoronic, unhelpful, the threshold criteria not being concerned with intent or blame but rather with an objective standard of care (Re S (Split Hearing)

[2014] 1 FLR 1421

, CA). Where the court is satisﬁed that the child has suffered signiﬁcant harm, the threshold conditions under ChA 1989, s 31(2)(b)(i) will be met in relation to that child even though the court is unable to identify who within the pool of possible perpetrators inﬂicted the harm: Lancashire County Council v B

[2000] 1 FLR 583

, HL, in which helpful guidance is given as to how evidence needs to be tested to establish the threshold criteria for the purposes of s 31 where the perpetrator is uncertain. In determining whether a person is properly included in the pool of potential perpetrators, it is essential that the court weighs any lies told by that person against any evidence that points away from them having been responsible for the injuries (H v City and Council of Swansea and Others

[2011] EWCA Civ 195

). In these ‘uncertain perpetrator’ cases, the correct approach is for the case to proceed at the welfare stage on the basis that each of the possible perpetrators is treated as such (Re O and N: Re B

[2003] 1 FLR 1169

, HL). The House of Lords held in that case that it would be grotesque if, because neither parent had been proved to be the perpetrator, the court had to proceed at the welfare stage as though the child were not at risk from either parent, even though one or other of them was the perpetrator of signiﬁcant harm. The judge conducting the welfare hearing should have regard to the facts found at the preliminary hearing when they leave open the possibility that a parent or carer was a perpetrator of proved harm and that conclusion should not be excluded from consideration.

Findings/Threshold

[31]I have considered each of the allegations below but have set them out in what I consider a more logical order than they have been pleaded; I have grouped them into injuries, involvement with IMP and the Mother’s relationship with the Intervenor and have then considered threshold more broadly. Before considering the allegations in detail I have drawn together the evidence on each of the Mother and Intervenor’s credibility and demeanour.

Credibility

[32]General observations of demeanour should never form the sole basis of any finding of fact but they are part of the broad canvas of assessment of credibility and they feed into the assessment of the allegations.

Mother

[33]The Mother gave evidence in a generally straightforward manner making concessions where appropriate.

[34]In the course of her oral evidence the Mother said for the first time that when she and the Intervenor were told of the fracture, “he said something whilst he was upset over it and I asked him what did you say, he muttered something, and he didn’t repeat it”. The Intervenor’s evidence was it was about going to the toilet as he felt sick and he did not mutter it under his breath. Potentially it was quite an important piece of evidence; the Mother knew in October that the Intervenor had also been arrested in relation to the injuries but did not tell police this and did not refer to it in any statement or when asked in-chief if there was anything more she could tell the court about the injuries. When I asked her about this she said, “Being asked about what happened when told about the fracture it jogged my memory”. I do not find this a particularly good explanation but do accept it could be a case of attaching undue weight to a simple lack of hearing and now under the forensic spotlight grasping at every possible suspicion.

[35]Despite the Mother saying she had not been in direct contact with the Intervenor since her arrest it was put to her in her second police interview that there was this exchange on Snapchat, deleted from the Intervenor’s phone: [H326] …4.30 on 5th April, where the Intervenor has said -- so this is the Intervenor to you on Snapchat: “If they ask if [IMP pseudonym] has touched Beth, say no and if they ask has Beth seen him, just say in a car, that is it babe”.

[36]The Mother says she was not aware of that exchange. The intervenor says he sent it to her [C111/38] although the timings suggest it was after her phone had been seized at 15.15 that day (see [H91]) which may explain her lack of knowledge.

[37]There is inconsistency in the Mother’s description of IMP and her interaction with him (see Allegation 18 and Allegation 19 below).

[38]There is inconsistency in the Mother’s description of her interaction with the Intervenor between April and October 2025 (see Allegation 21 below). As noted below, I found her explanation quite unsatisfactory.

[39]The Mother accepted she did not tell the police the truth about IM using her phone whilst driving on the evening of 2 April 2025 [H313/F-G].

Intervenor

[40]In closing on his behalf counsel for the Intervenor said he was shy and softly spoken in his oral evidence. I accept that.

[41]In his statement dated 17 April 2026 the Intervenor said whilst in hospital overnight on 2 to 3 April 2025 the Mother had said that Beth “had caught her leg in the hospital bed during the night” [C111/36]. The Mother has alleged that the Intervenor has fabricated this incident. She said: [C115] 5. Regarding the claim that I told the Intervenor that Beth had caught her leg in the cot bars during the night, I did not say that, and it did not happen.

[42]In her oral evidence she could not say why she thought he fabricated that. The Intervenor’s oral evidence was the Mother “said something like that, she said she woke up with Beth’s leg in the bar bit, in the hospital bed”. When asked why the Mother would now be denying it he did not know.

[43]As to the message sent at 16.30 on 5 April 2025 the Intervenor said: [C111]38. I accept that I sent the Mother a message via SnapChat at 16:39 hours, “if they ask if [IMP pseudonym] has touched Beth, say no and if they ask has Beth seen him, just say in a car, that is it babe”…

39. I am not able to provide a real explanation as to why I sent this message to the Mother. I think I was scared of Social Services finding out [IMP] was in the home due to their involvement with my siblings. The message was not sent to protect IMP.

[44]I note he did not tell the police this when interviewed on 6 April 2025; he was asked if there was “any evidence on his phone showing any communication with anybody where you have discussed the cause of Beth’s injuries” and he said there was not despite the message above having been sent the day before [H291].

[45]When he gave oral evidence he said he could not remember why he sent the message and later that he could not remember why he deleted it (he accepted he did delete it). There are three possible explanations for sending the message that I can think of:(1) He knew IMP had touched Beth and did not want to implicate him in any injury for fear of reprisal;

(2) He knew IMP had not touched Beth but thought the police might think IMP was involved in the injury in some way (perhaps because of his criminal history) and did not want him implicated for fear of reprisal; and

(3) He knew IMP had caused Beth injury and did not want to blame him for fear of reprisal and/or fear of Children’s Social Care involvement in his siblings’ lives given this happened in his mother’s home.

[46]As to why he deleted the message that may be because he knew it did not reflect well on him as it suggested there might be something to hide. Whatever the truth I find it extraordinary he cannot now remember why the message was sent or deleted and I simply do not believe it: It was a very specific message, sent in the context of concern about non-accidental injuries. What this suggests is a lack of candour on his part.

[47]He also accepts he was not truthful to the police when interviewed in April and October 2025 about IMP being in the house, his explanation is he was fearful of IMP (generally on [C112] although he does not explain how not mentioning his presence in the home would assist with that fear) and was “very aware of Social Services involvement with my younger siblings” [C112/45]. In his October 2025 interview he told the police he was scared of the threats IMP had made “to damage the house and that” [H353]. The denial in the October 2025 interview is sustained, even in the face of the Snapchat messages sent between him and his mother which suggest very clearly IMP was in the house (the messages are at [H129] and the sustained denial in the interview at [H334-H345]). Further, the denial is sustained when he was presented with a message sent from his phone to the Mother on 5 April 2025 saying “if they ask if IMP has touched Beth, say no” [H129] which also indicates he had been there on 2 April, otherwise why make that request at all (the denial in the interview is at [H349-H354]).

[48]I asked the Intervenor why he thought IMP “would have given you abuse if you’d told police the messages were about him” and he said, “Because he’s a violent person, he’s that type of person, if you say anything about him to anyone else, to the police, he will go mad”. Having read IMP’s police interview at [H401] I have some sympathy for that fear. IMP comes across as a highly erratic, violent person: the police allowed him to speak at length, the impression I get is that if they had not he would have become violent. The initial exchanges exemplify this (my emphasis): [H403] So I do not like them sort of -- I do not mean to be -- I have got to look at the floor because it will make me flip because I do not believe in shit like that, mate. The life sentence I just did in prison was high risk. They would not let us be around nonces, they would not let us live in certain hostels because I am not that sort of person, you understand me, yeah? So carry on. I just want to get it done mate. I have never been interviewed in my life or been questioned like this. I do not do that brother. Go on. Please carry on. [H404] Deal with this mate because in a minute I am just going to walk out and I just won’t bother with it, yeah. Because I rang in to the police station, they said it was NFA’d on Wednesday. This is what I am saying to you. [H405] I do not mean to shout. … How would I? Mate, come on. Don’t sit and patronise me. … I am what you call a face in the criminal world, mate, in the criminal world. Beat people up, fuck people up, don’t like nonces, don’t like paedophiles. Do you understand me? Do you understand me, yeah? That is where I am -- I don’t mean to shout in your face and I totally -- I am not like that, bud. Do you understand me mate, yeah? What is going on? Look at my prison records mate. Look at me prison records. I used to be a burglar. I used to be a burglar. I am not a robber. Robbery, what is going on? Burglar. Mate, what is happening here? What is going on? What is going on? It is making me fuming, absolutely fuming.

[49]If that is how he behaves in a police interview room having been arrested for Grievous Bodily Harm of a child and with his solicitor present it is easy to imagine how he might behave to the Intervenor and why the Intervenor may fear him. What I find incredibly telling is that the Intervenor was apparently so fearful he would not even accept messages so obviously about IMP were about him. Accordingly, to the extent that the Intervenor was untruthful to the police and has been, as I find it, untruthful about a lack of memory about the message that may be because of genuinely held fear about IMP.

[50]It did raise in me a suspicion about how much more fearful the Intervenor might be of IMP if IMP was in some way actually implicated in the injuries to Beth. I asked him about that after he was cross-examined about the deleted message above, I asked if there was anything else he did not tell the police because he was scared of IMP. He said no.

[51]There is also evidence the Intervenor was untruthful about the length of time his mother had been in a relationship with IMP, telling the police in the October 2025 interview it was “a couple of days” [H337].

[52]For completeness, he told the police that he would change Beth’s nappies “once when Mother comes to stay” and then she would “do the rest of it”. When asked about in oral evidence he said, “I did that once” but could not remember when. That appears to be different although, frankly, the evidence to the police on the point at [H269] is rather confused and the explanation he gave (“I had a lot of stuff going on in my head, I didn’t know what to say I was confused, I didn’t know what was going on”) is credible. IM

[53]Although not a party I make some brief observations on IM’s evidence. I conclude I cannot place any weight on her evidence save where it is corroborated by other evidence.

[54]When she gave oral evidence she was argumentative, dismissive, interrupted questions and seemed at great pains to protect herself and the Intervenor from any criticism. I did not find her to be a witness who was keen to get to the truth of what happened to Beth but rather she had a pre-determined view that none of the injuries could have been caused by her son and she was in no way at fault in her actions. She had an inability to reflect on her behaviour. She approached the case as if it was being played out on social media, a competition of loyalties and honour between the protagonists where support was earned through showing loyalty. She totally lacked any objectivity; she latched on to parts of questions at which she took what seemed to be manufactured or at least exaggerated offence. I repeatedly had to redirect her to the question actually being asked. Injuries 1:

Injuries

[55]The Local Authority allege four injuries: a) Spiral fracture of the left femur: accepted by the Mother and Intervenor; b) Bruise under right eye; accepted by the Mother and Intervenor; c) Bruise on the outside of the left leg above the knee: not seen by either Mother or Intervenor; and d) Bruise on the outside of the right knee: not seen by Mother but accepted by her, not seen by the Intervenor.

[56]In relation to the left femur fracture this was diagnosed by Dr Johnson and dated as “no older than 11 days of age on 03/04/25” [E27].

[57]The bruising was considered by Dr Cardwell at [E48-E49] and [E50/6.5.7]. He was not able to date the bruising but considered that the onset of swelling over the fracture site would have been “over a period of hours” [E52/6.10.2] and that it could increase over 24 hours [E61/3.4.3] but it is not a reliable feature to date a fracture [E61/3.4.2]. In relation to the consequence of a fracture (see a further consideration of this below under Allegation 6) he said: [E61] 3.2.2 I would not have expected that Beth would have been able to weight bear, walk or crawl without any signs of distress from the point she sustained the fracture.

[58]His oral evidence was there would be an expected loss of function, “children would not move limb affected as much as they otherwise would”.

[59]The onset of bruising generally would be expected within one to two hours of injury [E52/6.10.4].

[60]In relation to more specific dating of the fracture I note the following: a) The Father said that on 30 March 2025 his parents had a video call with Beth whilst in the Mother’s care and that she was “seen jumping on the sofa” [C47/6]. Dr Cardwell’s oral evidence is that he would not have expected her to have been able to do that with the fractured femur; b) The Father said on 31 March 2025 there was as video call between him and Beth and she was “stood on the Mother’s legs bouncing” [C47/7]. Dr Cardwell’s oral evidence was that she would not have been able to do that with a fractured femur; c) The maternal grandmother described Beth standing on her reaching for the interior lights in the car [C66/2.1.4]. Dr Cardwell’s oral evidence was that she would not have been able to do that with a fractured femur;

[61]As counsel for the Local Authority submitted, there is no evidence of any injury on or before 1 April 2025. d) The Mother told the police in her interview that on 2 April 2025 she and Beth were at a farm where she “was walking a little bit” and stood “at a fence to look at the animals” [H245]. The Intervenor’s evidence largely corroborates this [C109/18]. Dr Cardwell’s oral evidence was that she would not have been able to do that with a fractured femur; and e) The Intervenor said later that day Beth played on a “scuttle bug” [C109/21]. Dr Cardwell’s oral evidence was that she would not have been able to play happily on that sort of toy with a fractured femur.

[62]If that evidence is correct, and there is nothing to suggest it is not, that would indicate that the femur was not fractured up to the point Beth was alone with the Intervenor at his mother’s house on 2 April 2025.

[63]Thereafter: f) In her first police interview the Mother confirmed that when she returned home there was no limping, Beth “didn’t really show any signs of discomfort” [H258] but in her oral evidence she said “she startled herself awake and then started crying” and “she’d got upset where she’d woken herself”. The Mother’s oral evidence was that having brushed Beth’s toe when she returned home there was not a scream but “more of like a whinge before she started to cry”, she agreed it was something she had not heard Beth do before, it was something out of the ordinary, something different. The Intervenor told the police Beth’s lower garment (he said trousers, the Mother said Beth was wearing leggings) was removed (the Mother disagreed they were removed, her evidence was just the sock was removed) and she screamed [H283]. Whichever it was there was something unusual in her response. There is a reference to Beth not letting the Mother “touch the foot at all” in a message from her to maternal grandmother [H138];

[64]This is the first point when there is any concrete evidence of a significant injury but the Mother and Intervenor related it to a toe infection which may be coincidental. The difficulty in finding the fracture was caused immediately before is some of the following evidence: g) The Mother’s oral evidence was that the visit to the walk-in centre was by car and Beth did not complain about being put into or taken out of the car seat, she did not cry out; h) Dr Cardwell was taken to the medical examination note from the walk-in centre at [MEDB17] and [MEDC15] which recorded an examination of intercostal and subcostal recession. He said that would have likely involved a skin-to-skin examination but not necessarily removal of clothing, it could have been lifted up to expose the chest. Likewise an assessment of perfusion would not necessarily involve removal of clothing. The examination appears to have been at or around 21.15 by reference to the hand-written note at [MEDC14]. The important point is no leg injury was observed; i) The Mother’s oral evidence was that on examination at the walk-in centre Beth’s sock was removed from her left toe and she did not scream when it was put back on but could not remember if she made a noise. She said that during the examination Beth was sitting on her lap which may have offered some protection to a fracture; j) The Mother’s oral evidence was that Beth was then taken to the hospital by car, again in the car seat and she could not remember Beth suffering discomfort when being put back in and then out of the car seat and in hospital Beth was “a bit more tearful…she never showed real signs of discomfort”; k) The note of presentation on arrival at hospital at 22.50 on 2 April 2025 [MEDC11] recorded “baby is crawling, standing up with support”. If that is accurate (and this was apparently a report from Mother and/or the Intervenor rather than a direct observation by the doctor) that would not be consistent with Dr Cardwell’s evidence of the likely consequence of a femoral fracture. Given it was a report rather than a direct observation at the time the report was made this may have been a report of general behaviour earlier on 2 April 2025, potentially prior to a fracture; l) The hospital note continued at [MEDC12] “sat on mum…blanching rash- face -back, torso, limbs -nappy rash”. Dr Cardwell’s oral evidence was that suggests a full survey and he agreed if the femoral fracture was present it was missed but “there is no description of palpation of limb but that would be part of a normal examination if there had been concerns about injury to a limb…I don’t think the examination would be complete enough to rule it out”. Consistent with this he had earlier said that if a clinician was observing the child over a period of time they would notice a differential use of the injured limb compared to uninjured “but not necessarily in a quick examination, you would have to make some effort to observe that”. The Mother’s oral evidence was that Beth remained on her lap whilst examined and only her sock was removed; m) Beth was examined by a Specialist Registrar at 00.35 on 3 April 2025 and no fracture was identified but the examination note recorded “upset ++ [therefore] difficult to assess rigorously” [MEDC16]. The reference to upset ++ may be consistent with a fracture; n) In her oral evidence the Mother said she changed Beth into onesie pyjamas removing her “skin tight but not too tight” leggings, she did not recall when that was save it was at the hospital (i.e. after the walk-in centre attendance). She did not recall any cries of pain but she was “really tired so not a struggle but it took a bit longer” than usual and when changing her nappy “she was just wriggly which was normal for her”; o) Beth was examined on a ward round at 09.57 on 3 April 2025 [MEDC17] when the record was reported as “gets very upset when touching left thigh, very sore, warm to touch, not straightening left leg”. This appears in a letter from the paediatric consultant at [E78] and the primary evidence is in the continuation page out of order at [MEDD46].

[65]Paragraph (f) and (m) above may be evidence of a fracture having been sustained by that point although it is equally consistent with the only issue being an infected toe. Paragraphs (g), (i), (j), (k) and (n) tend to suggest no femoral fracture, (h) and (l) are neutral and (o) suggests by 09.57 on 3 April 2025 the fracture had been sustained. When Dr Cardwell was asked about the possibility of doctors missing a femoral fracture on 2 April and in the early hours of 3 April 2025 he said it would depend on the extent of the examination, what the doctors were focused on, if they were focusing more on visible bruising to the eye and worries about the infected toe and “if the child was upset and distressed knowing it was the early hours of the morning, they may not have continued with a full and more detailed examination”. He also said that if she was “lying and not moving leg it would not necessarily be apparent she was in significant pain”. It is also relevant to record that the Mother’s oral evidence was that Beth was teething and Calpol had been administered at some point on 2 and 3 April and she was administering it every 6 hours. I can take judicial notice of the fact that may have masked symptoms to some extent.

[66]The WhatsApp records assist in timings: At [H137] there is a record of a call from maternal grandmother to Mother at 18.01 UTC which, on 2 April 2025, would have been at 19.01 BST and in oral evidence the Mother confirmed it would have been consistent with her discussing the infected toe with her mother, she thought she had called her mother but accepted she may have been wrong and “we do randomly call each other”. It places the Mother back in IM’s home at that time and Beth having experienced pain which was, at the time, related to the toe but which may have in fact related to the fracture. Then at [H138] there is a message from the maternal grandmother at 19.42 saying “are you going to walkin xxx” which corroborates a discussion about the walk-in centre and therefore the concern about the left toe by that time. The entry in the walk-in centre was at 21.15 [MEDC14] and the Mother’s evidence was of the bruise under the eye being noticed just before arriving at the walk-in centre at 20.00 [C35]. A message from the Mother to IM at 20.19 saying “were the only ones here” (sic) [H206] corroborates that. It follows from Dr Cardwell’s evidence that the likely time of injury would have been 1-2 hours before, that is to say between 18.20 and 19.20 or thereabouts although it could have been earlier if the bruising was present but was not observed before 20.19. It follows it could have been caused either when Beth was in the care of the Intervenor alone which is known to have been at least between 17.30 and 18.30 (see the Snapchat messages being sent between these times at [H129-H130]), before the Mother returned to IM’s home from dropping items for IM’s cousin, or when in the care of both the Intervenor and Mother after her return.

[67]There is no evidence at all of any injury being sustained in the hospital, no report of it, no report of unusual crying, no report of unusual movement. This is particularly the case between 00.35 and 09.57 on 3 April 2025 when the Mother and Intervenor’s evidence was broadly that Beth was co-sleeping with the Mother and the Intervenor was on a temporary bed alongside. Given my finding on Allegation 4 below I find it highly unlikely that a walking fall or some other accidental injury would have gone unobserved. That only leaves open the possibility of a non-accidental injury in hospital which both the Mother and Intervenor are concealing. If that were the case I would have expected one or both to report some pain response but to attribute it to an accidental cause. Further, I cannot ignore the fact that bruising to the eye is likely inflicted and sustained between 18.20 and 19.20 (see above and below) and whilst it is possible the femoral fracture and right eye bruising were sustained at different times the absence of any separate evidence of a pain response points against this.

[68]In light of the expert medical evidence and by reference to the contemporaneous reporting referred to and the admissions I accept the injuries are all proved on the balance of probabilities. As to timings, I can be certain of the fracture occurring after the Mother left with IM on 2 April 2025 and prior to the ward round note at 09.57 on 3 April 2025 but in fact am able to narrow that window on the balance of probabilities because I think it unlikely the fracture was sustained in hospital and most likely it had been sustained when the abnormal pain response was detected (and related to the toe) before 19.01 on 2 April 2025. I am satisfied that the bruising to the left leg likely related to the fracture (see below). I can be reasonably certain that the injury below the right eye occurred between approximately 18.20 and 19.20 on 2 April 2025. Finally, I can be certain the right leg injury occurred before 09.57 on 3 April 2025.

[69]I conclude on the balance of probabilities: Beth sustained: a). A spiral fracture of the left femur with associated bruising within a period between approximately 17.30 and 19.01 on 2 April 2025; b). An injury causing bruising under right eye between approximately 18.20 and 19.20 on 2 April 2025; and c). An injury causing a bruise on the outside of the right knee prior to observation at 09.57 on 3 April 2025. 2: Significant force required

[70]The Local Authority allege in relation to each injury that significant force would have been required to cause the injury, force in excess of “everyday handling”. The Intervenor accepts this in relation to all injuries alleged. The Mother “acknowledges” that is the medical evidence. I take that to be an admission. It is consistent with the medical evidence (left femur fracture [E28], bruising [E51/6.8.2]) and I make this finding on the balance of probabilities: None of the injuries could have been caused by everyday handling. 3: No underlying condition

[71]It is accepted that no underlying medical condition could have resulted in lesser force being needed to cause the injuries. That is consistent with the medical evidence of Dr Johnson [E27] and Dr Cardwell [E50/6.6.2] and I find: None of the injuries were the result of or more easily sustained by reason of an underlying medical condition. 4: Self-infliction

[72]The Local Authority allege the injuries could not have been caused by Beth. The Mother and Intervenor accept this in relation to the fracture but not the bruising.

[73]For completeness, in relation to the fracture Dr Johnson considered a femoral fracture from a fall whilst taking a few steps would be unusual but could not be totally excluded [E28]. He considered he had “not been provided with any suitable explanation of significant force” and “an unexplained fracture of this nature in a child of her age raises concerns regarding possible inflicted non-accidental injury” [E28]. In particular, “lying and twisting around in a hospital bed would not create sufficient force to cause a femoral fracture, even accounting for the fact that her leg was trapped in the bars of the bed. This action may create a suitable twisting mechanism, but in my opinion, would not generate sufficient force” [E90].

[74]In relation to the bruise under the right eye Dr Cardwell said: [E48] 6.4.17 Although an accidental, unwitnessed fall which resulted in impact with a firm object or surface could be considered as a cause for this bruise, this would have been painful and upsetting for Beth and I would have expected her upset following such an injury would have been recognised by her carer around that time. 6.4.18 The absence of a behavioural description or recollection of an incident, and the unusual site for an accidental bruise in a 15 month old child, leads me to conclude in my opinion this is more likely the result of a non-accidental impact injury.

[75]In relation to the bruise on the outside of the left leg Dr Cardwell considered the swelling as the likely consequence of the left femur fracture [E48/6.4.19] and the bruising as being “possibly related to the fracture itself” [E496.4.19] and the considerations above therefore apply. Given there is no other plausible explanation it seems likely on the balance of probabilities that the bruising in this location was indeed related to the fractured femur.

[76]In relation to the bruise on the outside of the right knee Dr Cardwell said: [E49] 6.4.20…accidental falls onto firm surfaces may result in bruising to this area, the extent of the bruising indicates that Beth has had forceful injuries to the outside of her right knee. 6.4.21 In view of the extent of the bruising, I would have expected this to have been a painful injury for Beth and that she would have been upset and tearful in a way that was different to her normal upset and periods of unsettledness and that this would have been apparent to her parents or carers at the time and memorable that she had sustained a significant injury to the outside of her right knee. 6.4.22 The absence of a recalled memory of how this significant bruising occurred, and the extent of bruising present, leads me to be more concerned this is a likely non-accidental injury.

[77]On the basis of this evidence I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities: No plausible explanation for the injuries having been caused by either falls or other accidental means has been advanced. Bruising on the outside of the left leg was related to the fracture to the left femur.

[78]To be clear, I cannot, absent other evidence, conclude they were inflicted, the fact the Mother and Intervenor cannot recall and point to possible causes does not, without more, mean they were inflicted. 6: Injuries evident to anyone present

[79]The Local Authority allege that the occurrence of injury would have been evident to anyone present. This is accepted in relation to the fracture by both the Mother and Intervenor and the Mother accepts it in relation to the left leg and right knee bruising.

[80]The Intervenor denies it in relation to the eye, left leg and right knee bruising and the Mother denies it in relation to the eye bruising.

[81]In relation to the left femur Dr Johnson considered that Beth “would have been in pain and shown signs of distress which would have lasted some moments” [E28] and “it would be reasonable to assume that anyone witnessing this event would have realised that Beth had suffered harm, although they may not have realised that she had sustained a fracture” [E90]. As above, Dr Cardwell related the bruising and swelling to the outside of the left leg to this fracture. He considered that Beth would have been upset and distressed at the time of the fracture and “likely to have shown reduced movement and then pain and discomfort if the leg was moved, touched or held, even in normal handling” [E51/6.10.1] and it “would have been evident to person or persons not present at the time the injury was caused” [E52/6.10.3]. He later clarified: [E61] 3.2.2 I would not have expected that Beth would have been able to weight bear, walk or crawl without any signs of distress from the point she sustained the fracture.

[82]His oral evidence was that her response to being handled would be “pain different from how she would usually present” including when having her nappy changed.

[83]In relation to the bruise under the right eye Dr Cardwell’s evidence (set out above under Allegation 4) is that it would have been expected to have been recognised by the carer at the time it was sustained because of Beth’s likely response.

[84]In relation to the bruise to the outside of the right knee Dr Cardwell’s evidence (set out above under Allegation 4) is that Beth would have been upset and tearful in a way different from normal and this would have been “apparent to her parents or carers at the time and memorable” [E49/6.4.21]. More generally he said: [E52] 6.10.4 Bruises - Although she is likely to have displayed discomfort and upset at the time she sustained the bruises, this is likely to have been relatively short lived. It is then likely that the injuries would only be apparent to those not present at the time she sustained the injuries once the areas of bruising developed which is likely to be over the next hour or two.

[85]On that evidence I find, on the balance of probabilities: The injuries would have been evident to anyone present when they occurred. 5: Significant pain caused

[86]It is alleged all four injuries would have caused significant pain when suffered. This is accepted by the Mother and Intervenor in relation to the fracture but not the other injuries.

[87]Given the evidence set out above under Allegation 6 I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities that: The fractured left femur would have caused significant pain and the bruising under the right eye and over the outside of the right knee would have caused pain, although not necessarily significant pain. 7: Mechanism of injury evident to anyone present

[88]The Local Authority allege anyone present would have been aware of the mechanism and that it was “far in excess of reasonable handling”. This is accepted by the Mother but only in relation to the fracture by the Intervenor.

[89]By reason of my conclusion above in relation to Allegation 6 (injuries evident to anyone present) it follows, on the balance of probabilities, that: The mechanism of injury would have been evident to anyone present: they would have been aware of an injury and, having been present, aware of what happened immediately before. 8, 13 and 14: Infliction

[90]The Local Authority allege Beth was in the care of the Mother and/or the Intervenor when the injuries occurred and that the injuries were inflicted (intentionally or recklessly) by the Mother or the Intervenor and they have not provided an accurate account for the injuries. If the injuries were inflicted by the Intervenor the Local Authority allege the Mother allowed them to be caused by failing to make protective decisions about who should care for Beth.

[91]Both deny the allegations; there are no identified risk factors for either of them, no domestic abuse allegations, no substance misuse and no allegations either have lost their temper with each other or with Beth or been unable to offer good care to Beth.

[92]The Intervenor’s evidence as to 2 April 2025 was in part: [C109]21. IM, the Mother and [siblings of the Intervenor] then went to [relative’s] house with the clothes, leaving Beth at home with me. She lives about a 5-minute drive away. Beth and I spent a further 5 minutes outside, with Beth playing with a scuttlebug for 2 minutes, on the grass area. The temperature had dropped, and Beth was getting a bit cold and tired - she was crying and rubbing her eyes- so I took her off the scuttlebug to go back inside.

22. I carried Beth into the living room and we both sat on the sofa. Beth was sat next to me, and then crawled up on to me and laid on my chest, before falling asleep. I was messaging my mother whilst Beth was asleep on my chest.

[93]He then described discovering that IMP was in the house, he knew that “he was violent towards my mother when they were together” and the discovery “was really scary”. His 15-year-old brother went up to speak to IMP, IMP and him “have had altercations in the past”. IMP did not come down but the Intervenor’s brother “may have left” and “updated his story [to say he was leaving home] so I think there must been something said that upset him” [C110/26]. Then he continued: [C110] 26. During this time Beth was still asleep and only woke up when my mother, the Mother and brothers came home…

[94]The Mother’s evidence is that there were no concerns about Beth except a sore left big toe which led to the attendance at the walk-in centre. The bruise under the eye came on just before arriving at the walk-in centre at about 20.00 on 2 April 2025 [C35]. In her next statement she identified a possible cause as Beth “trying to twist and wriggle herself off the bed” whilst in hospital on 3 April 2025 at around 23.00 when she was changing a nappy [A46/7]. Whilst she says this was on 3 April the context of her statement is that it was actually late on 2 April and I think this is a date error. It is not entirely clear why this was not raised earlier; the Mother says it was because there was new information on timescales and “the fact that the injury was a spiral fracture” [A46]. The fact it was not identified as a spiral fracture earlier does not seem to have any bearing on reporting possible causes of injury. In any event, this is ruled out as a plausible explanation for injury.

[95]Having identified the likely timing of injury above there are two relevant time periods for the fracture and eye injury: when the Intervenor was in the house with IMP and at least one sibling and when the Mother, IM and the other siblings returned and before presentation at the walk-in centre.

[96]Given the nature of the fracture and likely pain response it seems very unlikely that after the Mother, IM and the other siblings returned that the Mother or the Intervenor could have caused injury without someone being aware. The fact that the Mother has not sought to blame the Intervenor even under threat of permanent removal of her daughter from her care suggests the injury was not inflicted by the Intervenor in that time period: she would have been aware and is likely to have reported it by now. That leaves infliction by her as a possibility but I rule that out on the balance of probabilities as well because of an absence of evidence from the Intervenor or IM that they witnessed such an injury being inflicted, heard it or witnessed the immediate aftermath. Save for when brushing the toe or removing the sock which plainly could not have caused a fracture there was no report of unusual pain response. Again, it would seem unlikely that IM at least would not have reported this given her evident antipathy to the Mother when she gave oral evidence. That view is also consistent with the Mother reporting the bruising to the eye at the walk-in centre when the doctor appears not to have noticed it, that is not obviously the action of a perpetrator.

[97]For completeness I note that IMP told the police that he “didn’t hear any crying, I didn’t hear any noise” whilst he was upstairs during the period of time the Mother was absent on 2 April 2025 [H407]. However, he has not been called to give evidence and he did not previously engage with proceedings when the Local Authority were putting him forwards as a possible perpetrator. I cannot attach any relevant weight to his evidence.

[98]Those conclusions lead me to consider the first time period, whilst the Mother, IM and the siblings were out and Beth was in the Intervenor’s sole care. Consistent with an injury being caused in that period is Beth waking on the Mother’s return and being distressed for a short period and an abnormal pain response which was related to the toe. Accordingly, I am drawn to the conclusion that the fracture occurred whilst Beth was in the sole care of the Intervenor.

[99]A fall whilst taking a few steps is not totally excluded by Dr Johnson (see Allegation 4 above) but this would have been a memorable injury even if accidental (see Allegation 5 above), one apparent to anyone present (see Allegation 6 above) and significant force would have been required (see Allegation 2 above). It is not for the Intervenor to prove an alternative, non-inflicted, cause but the absence of recollection of what might have innocently explained the injury is a relevant factor to consider. The complete absence of any recollection by the Intervenor of any incident or pain response approaching that which would have been expected from two injuries (the femoral fracture and the eye injury) even when interviewed just a few days post injury is suspicious. It is also unlikely that two separate accidental injuries requiring greater force than normal handling occurred in the same short time period.

[100]The burden is on the Local Authority to prove infliction as opposed to accidental cause. I am satisfied on the evidence above they have done that. Accordingly, I conclude that the Local Authority have proved the Intervenor perpetrated the fracture. By parity of reasoning, I make the same finding in relation to the eye injury.

[101]I have heard very little evidence in relation to the right leg injury and unlike the fracture and eye injury have not been able to narrow down the injury window but given I have concluded that the Intervenor inflicted two injuries and this third injury required greater than normal handling or a memorable accident it would be consistent to find the bruising to the right leg was also inflicted by him. The timescale fits in that bruising would be expected within 1-2 hours but on the Mother’s account Beth’s leggings were not removed until later on 2 April by which time she was “really tired” and “wriggly” so the bruise may have been missed by the Mother. I also note the absence of either the Intervenor or Mother recollecting an incident in hospital which may account for the injury and nothing untoward has been reported in the hospital records that would account for a later injury.

[102]Accordingly, I make these findings on the balance of probabilities: The Intervenor caused the left femoral fracture, an injury causing bruising under the right eye and an injury causing bruising on the outside of the right knee whilst Beth was in his sole care between approximately 17.30 and 18.30 on 2 April 2025.

[103]I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Mother failed to make safe and protective decisions about who should care for Beth. There is no evidence Beth was at risk from the Intervenor and I have found she was unaware IMP was present on 2 April 2025. 15: Dishonesty about injuries

[104]The Local Authority allege that anyone present when Beth suffered the injuries has been dishonest.

[105]The Mother accepts this but denies she was present.

[106]The Intervenor denies this because he was not present. Given the premise of the allegation (“any person present”) the Intervenor has not directly responded to the allegation.

[107]The allegation is directly related to Allegation 13 and logically the allegation is proved on the balance of probabilities given that if either were present they have not explained how the injuries occurred.

[108]From what I have set out above I make the following findings on the balance of probabilities: The Intervenor has been dishonest about the injuries suffered by Beth. Allegations related to IMP 9: IMP present on 2 April 2025

[109]The Local Authority allege that IMP, was present in IM’s home whilst the Mother and Intervenor were caring for Beth on 2 April 2025. The Mother and Intervenor agree the Mother was out for a period of time in the early evening whilst Beth was in the care of the Intervenor. It is during this time they agree IMP was present. The Mother denies she was aware of it at the time. I cannot identify when IMP arrived or left and accordingly I find on the balance of probabilities: The Intervenor’s mother’s partner, IMP, was present in the Intervenor’s mother’s home whilst the Intervenor was caring for Beth on 2 April 2025. 10: Mother failed to disclose IM’s presence on 2 April 2025 to professionals or police

[110]The Mother denies this; she says that she had been informed that IM and IMP’s relationship had terminated.

[111]Her written evidence was that she was out for some of the day leaving Beth in the care of the Intervenor and on return said: [C76] 20. I do not recall noticing IMP’s presence at the house during this time, but I spent most of the time outside watching the children. I don’t remember going upstairs, so it is possible he was upstairs whilst I was there.

[112]This was clarified in a later statement. Prior to leaving Beth in the care of the Intervenor she had not noticed IMP’s presence, he may have been upstairs whilst she was there but she spent “most of the time outside watching the children” [A59/24] and having gone out and then returned did not recall seeing him. She was focusing on Beth who, after waking up, was distressed [A59/25]. It does not appear in issue that the lounge area is separate from the stairs and hallway (that was IM’s oral evidence). It follows, if IMP was upstairs when the Mother returned home, he may have left without her being aware of his presence.

[113]There are some reported Snapchat messages in the police disclosure that are from IM’s phone to the Intervenor; at around 17.31 the sender was asking the Intervenor to check up on someone later referred to by IMP’s pseudonym [H129]. In her second police interview the Mother denied sending these messages, save that in amongst the various messages the sender asks “How Beth X” and the Intervenor replied “She’s alright” [H129] and she thought that might have been her using IM’s phone because she had forgotten to take hers with her.

[114]In her police interview in October 2025 the Mother had told police that that IM was not using her phone to contact the Intervenor “because she was driving” [H313/F]. When she gave oral evidence she said in fact IM was using her phone and said, “When I told police that she was not using it whilst driving that was not true, in fact she was using it whilst driving”. IM disagreed saying she was driving and telling the Mother what to write in the messages but when she was asked if she wrote any of the messages whilst she was driving she said “I don’t think so, I can’t remember” which was somewhat equivocal. In any event, as set out above, I do not find I can place any weight on IM’s evidence save to the extent it is corroborated.

[115]In a handwritten document the Intervenor provided for a hearing on 10 December 2025 he seems to suggest that it was his mother, IM, who messaged him to ask if IMP had left and he replied saying that he was still in the home [C73.C]. That is consistent with the Mother’s evidence although I accept he may have assumed it was IM given the messages were from her phone.

[116]In the course of her police interview IM said that the Mother would have been aware of IMP’s presence in the home because of the messages above (see [H389]). That of course would depend on whether the Mother was in fact sending the messages, which in fact IM later seemed uncertain about.

[117]When IMP was interviewed by police he appeared to say that there was a discussion between him and the Mother before the Mother went out to drop clothes at IM’s cousin’s, he said: [H409] So we comes back. So we are talking, blah blah blah and the Intervenor’s missus has came in and she said “I am warning you”. Anyway, so she has gone back out and I am like “mate, if we want to talk, we talk. This is our house”. Well, IM’s house. You know.

[118]That said, later in the interview he seemed to row back from that being on 2 April (see [H413-H414]) and he has not been called to give evidence and attempts to engage him earlier in the proceedings when he was considered in the pool of perpetrators by the Local Authority failed. His evidence has not been tested and I can only place very limited weight on that which is set out above.

[119]I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Mother was aware IMP was present in the home on 2 April 2025, accordingly she could not have disclosed it to professionals. Given the Mother’s hostility towards IMP (see allegation 18 below) I think it would have been highly unlikely she would have left Beth in the home with the Intervenor if she had known IMP was present. Her reluctance to tell the police that IM was using her phone whilst driving is understandable and as I have noted above I attach no weight to IM’s evidence save where it has been corroborated. 11: Intervenor knew IMP present on 2 April 2025 but failed to disclose it to professionals or police

[120]This is accepted by the Intervenor (and for completeness see the October police interview at [H338] where he flat out denied it repeatedly). I note that he also fabricated an explanation for the messages between his mother and himself about IMP ([H129]) saying they were in fact about his brother (see [H339-H341]). I find: The Intervenor knew that IMP was present in the home on 2 April 2025 and failed to disclose it to professionals or the police when interviewed on 6 April 2025 or 13 October 2025. 12: Failure to disclose IMP’s presence prevented a full and timely investigation of Beth’s injuries

[121]This is accepted by the Intervenor.

[122]Given my finding above that the Mother was not aware IMP was in the home the Local Authority cannot prove this allegation against her.

[123]Although the Intervenor has admitted the allegation in full I do not in fact find the Local Authority can prove it in full. There was an investigation of IMP’s involvement in Beth’s injuries both by the police when they interviewed IMP on 20 October 2025 and by the Local Authority placing him in the pool of possible perpetrators. There is no evidence the delay prevented a full investigation but I accept on the balance of probabilities it prevented a timely investigation and I find: The Intervenor’s failure to disclose IMP’s presence in the home on 2 April 2025 prevented a timely investigation of Beth’s injuries. 16: Withdrawn

[124]This allegation has been withdrawn. 17: IMP and IM relationship reported as “unhealthy”

[125]The Local Authority allege the Mother and Intervenor have reported IM’s relationship with IMP was “unhealthy including but not limited to IMP speaking inappropriately and/or abusively to IM” and the Mother “has also noted safeguarding concerns connected to IMP’s substance misuse”.

[126]The Intervenor has not responded to the allegation.

[127]In her response to the schedule of findings the Mother admitted hearing IMP calling IM “fat” but not that she was aware IMP was otherwise abusive. That is somewhat different from her statement at [C74/12] in which she recalls hearing IMP and IM arguing “on one, maybe two occasions”. It is also different from her statement at [A58/10] in which she said as the relationship deteriorated she heard them arguing “on occasions, being quite nasty to her”.

[128]In relation to substance misuse she implicitly accepts IMP was using cannabis but says he did not use it at IM’s home.

[129]In oral evidence the Intervenor described IMP as “a violent person”, said IMP and IM argued when IM returned home on 2 April 2025 and said he was scared of IMP because of “the way he went for my mum”.

[130]For her part IM accepted in oral evidence that she was scared of IMP.

[131]On the admissions and evidence set out above I make the following findings on the balance of probabilities: IM’s relationship with IMP was unhealthy. 18: IMP considered unsafe by Mother and Intervenor

[132]The Intervenor accepts this. He told police in his October interview that IMP was “nasty” and “he is violent” [H337]. In oral evidence he said IMP was “a violent person”.

[133]The Mother accepts she considered IMP to be “undesirable” not unsafe. She explained she considered him undesirable because “he was a cannabis user” [C75/7]. That is not fully consistent with her evidence set out above about them IMP and IM arguing and IMP being quite nasty, nor her reported action of “asking if IMP was at the house before my visits, choosing not to go if he was” [A58/12] which suggests something more than just considering him “undesirable”. In her second police interview when asked about what she knew about him she said, “Not a lot. All I know is that he is nasty” [H318]. That is an unusual comment about someone and not consistent with someone who is undesirable but not unsafe. That view is also consistent with her later telling the police in the same interview that, in answer to the question “did you feel safe around him?”, “I would not have liked to be left alone with him” [H319].

[134]In her oral evidence she accepted that leaving Beth in the same home as IMP would have been “taking a risk” although she later clarified that related to him “having a joint”. Whatever the reason on that evidence I make the following finding on the balance of probabilities: IMP was considered nasty and violent by the Intervenor and nasty and a risk to Beth by the Mother. 19: Beth allowed to be in presence of IMP by Mother

[135]The Local Authority allege the Mother allowed Beth “to spend time in IMP’s presence which has included Beth being exposed to IMP speaking inappropriately and abusively and his cannabis use”.

[136]This is denied by the Mother who said the interaction was “limited” because IMP “kept out of the way in IM’s bedroom upstairs” and on only one occasion were raised voices from the bedroom heard and the Mother asked IMP and IM to be quiet and thereafter she decided not to take Beth to the home anymore.

[137]That is contradicted by the Intervenor who described the following interaction: [C112] 48. I am also aware of an incident whereby IMP describes the Mother going into the bedroom and shouting at him and ‘trying to cave his head in’. I can recall an incident when the Mother got angry at IMP; IMP and IM were upstairs, he was being nasty to my mum [IM], calling her names and smashing her belongings. The Mother went upstairs and confronted him. She said, ‘I suggest you get out the house, you’re nasty, I don’t want to see you again’. I could hear what was being said but could not see as I was downstairs with Beth, who was asleep. IMP continued shouting and damaging things, so mum had to call the police. I cannot recall when this was but there should be a police log.

[138]In her interview with police IM eventually appears to recall that IMP was present in the house on 2 April 2025 and that must have been the day she was attacked by IMP having returned home with the Mother and some of the Intervenor’s siblings (see [H388]).

[139]I make the following findings on the balance of probabilities: The Mother allowed Beth to be in the same home as IMP, but was unaware of his presence in the home on 2 April 2025. 20: Failure to protect from IMP by Mother

[140]This is denied by the Mother, she says she was unaware of risks from IMP save that he had a robbery conviction when he was a teenager and he smoked cannabis but not when she was present in IM’s home and, as above, decided not to visit again when she heard IMP and IM arguing.

[141]On the basis of the findings above I make the following further finding on the balance of probabilities: The Mother permitted Beth to remain in the same home as IMP despite accepting he presented a risk to Beth through his use of cannabis and she would not have liked to be left alone with him. Relationship with Intervenor 21: Continued relationship with Intervenor by Mother

[142]The Local Authority allege the Mother was not prepared to consider the Intervenor may have caused injuries to Beth and continued her relationship with him. She says she “stopped communication” for a number of months but had no reason to suspect him of causing injury (and implicitly resumed communication) but she learned he had withheld information about IMP being “of an abusive nature” during her second police interview on 13 October 2025 and thereafter she had no contact [A179-A180].

[143]In her second statement dated 8 October 2025 she said: [A45] On the advice of my solicitor at the time, I initially stopped contact with the Intervenor after my arrest on 5th April. I didn’t re-establish contact with the Intervenor until a couple of months ago [i.e. August 2025]. Following information learnt during my Police interview on 13th October I am no longer in a relationship with the Intervenor.

[144]Since the second police interview was definitely 13 October the date of this witness statement must be inaccurate.

[145]In her parenting assessment, concluded around August 2025 [F134], it was reported that she “has not had any contact with the Intervenor on the advice of her solicitor but as far as she was aware, they remain in a relationship. She said she had not seen him “properly” since April 2025” [F143]. It is not clear when this information was communicated but it does not seem to be entirely consistent with what was said in the second statement. In the second police interview on 13 October 2025 the Mother said the only communication had been when she dropped a birthday present off for the Intervenor, the inference from the answer to questions was that this was in July 2025 [H315]. When she came to give oral evidence she admitted “I told the police that I had not had contact with the Intervenor when I had seen him over the summer…I did it out of pure fear”, the reference to “it” being the lie to police.

[146]That was explored in cross-examination. She was asked why she met up with the Intervenor and said she wanted “some sense of normality…I had no reason to suspect he knew anything”. That makes little sense; she knew on her account she did not cause what is accepted to be a non-accidental injury and the other person caring for Beth, to her knowledge at the time, was the Intervenor. She said “I thought it was a freak accident”. I asked her why she did not tell the police “out of pure fear”. Again, her answer made very little sense to me. She said she had a phobia of the police from when she was young yet gave a long police interview on two occasions answering wide ranging questions. When I asked her about that inconsistency she changed her explanation to her not wanting the police to think she and the Intervenor “were trying to put a story together or something”. I found her evidence quite unsatisfactory.

[147]Even at the time of the parenting assessment, the Intervenor was under investigation for causing injury to Beth, as was the Mother. She confirmed in the second police interview she was aware he had been arrested although she did not say when that was [H315]. She was clear she had not inflicted injury so by deduction it either must have been the Intervenor or at least there was a reasonable chance it was. Yet in her parenting assessment she was reported to have said: [F145] 5.8 The Mother told me that if Beth returned to her care, the Intervenor would not be involved to begin with. She said she would prioritise rebuilding their bond and resuming the routine they had. The Mother said in time, she would return to meeting the Intervenor in the community for small periods of time with Beth. She said if this went well, she would then ask the Intervenor to visit her family home. In time, the Mother said she would “love” for them to continue the level of contact they were having before…

[148]I make the following findings on the balance of probabilities: The Mother continued in a relationship with the Intervenor even when she was aware he may have caused injury to Beth. She lied to the police in saying she had no contact with him over the summer of 2025.

Threshold

[149]In light of the findings I have made I am satisfied that Beth suffered significant physical harm when in the care of the Intervenor but the question is whether that or any of the findings are attributable to the Mother. It is important to distinguish between the circumstances at the time the injuries were inflicted and the position thereafter when the Mother became aware of the risk. At the time of the injuries, I have not found that the Mother knew, or ought to have known, that the Intervenor posed a risk of causing physical harm to Beth. I have also found that she was not aware that IMP was present in the home on 2 April 2025. In those circumstances, I do not find that the significant harm suffered by Beth is directly attributable to any failure on the part of the Mother at that time to protect her.

[150]Following the events of April 2025, the Mother was aware that Beth had suffered non-accidental injuries at a time when the Intervenor had been caring for her. Even if she did not accept that he was the perpetrator, she must have been aware that there was, at the very least, a real possibility that he had caused the injuries. Despite that, I have found that she continued in a relationship with the Intervenor, was not candid with the police about the nature and extent of that relationship and she contemplated a gradual reintroduction of the Intervenor into Beth’s life.

[151]In addition, I have found that the Mother permitted Beth to be in a home where IMP was present, notwithstanding her own assessment that he was “nasty” and a risk and that she would not wish to be left alone with him. Whilst she was not aware of his presence on the critical date, her willingness to expose Beth to that environment is relevant to the assessment of risk.

[152]Taken together, these findings demonstrate a deficit in the Mother’s ability to recognise and respond appropriately to risk. In particular, her continuation of a relationship with a person who may have caused serious harm to Beth, coupled with a lack of candour about that relationship, gives rise to a real and ongoing risk of Beth suffering further significant physical harm in her care.

[153]I am therefore satisfied that the Local Authority has established, on the balance of probabilities, that Beth is likely to suffer significant harm and that such harm is attributable to the care likely to be given to her by the Mother not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give.

Order

Threshold Conditions)

[1994] 2 FLR 577

) but subsequent events and behaviour are capable of providing relevant evidence about the position before the relevant date (Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria)

[2007] 1 FLR 2050