Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina v Vladimir Olegovich Potanin (Case Management) [2026] EWFC 80

[2026] EWFC 80Case No FD18F00074IN FAMILY COURTVenue SITTING AT THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE, Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 20/04/2026
Before
MR JUSTICE MACDONALD
Between
Natalia Nikolaevna PotaninaApplicantVladimir Olegovich PotaninRespondent
Charles Howard KC, Deepak Nagpal KC and Jennifer Palmer (instructed by Hughes Fowler Carruthers) for ApplicantRebecca Carew Pole KC, Rebecca Bailey-Harris, Ben Wooldridge (who did not appear) and Jacob Turner (who did not appear)(instructed by Payne Hicks Beach) for RespondentHearing Hearing date: 24 February 2025
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 20 April 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................MR JUSTICE MACDONALDThis judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published.
[1]I am concerned with a case management hearing in financial remedy proceedings between Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina (hereafter, by convention, “the wife”) and Vladimir Olegovich Potanin (hereafter, by convention, “the husband”). The wife was granted unconditional leave to proceed with her application under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (hereafter, “the 1984 Act”) by the Court of Appeal on 4 September 2025. The wife is represented by Charles Howard KC, Deepak Nagpal KC and Jennifer Palmer of counsel. The husband is represented by Rebecca Carew Pole KC and Rebecca Bailey-Harris, Ben Wooldridge and Jacob Turner of counsel (Mr Woodridge and Mr Turner did not appear at the hearing).[2]Prior to the hearing, the court indicated to the parties that it considered that the following issues arose for consideration at the case management hearing, in the following order. The court is grateful to leading and junior counsel for structuring their submissions accordingly: i) Should these proceedings be adjourned generally, pursuant to the husband’s application, pending determination of proceedings commenced by the husband in the Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow? ii) If the proceedings are not adjourned generally, should this court direct a split hearing of the issues that fall to be determined on the wife’s application? iii) Should the stay on the financial disclosure directions contained in the order of Francis J dated 20 May 2022 be lifted and the directions varied or discharged? iv) Is it necessary for the court to direct jointly instructed expert evidence on Russian law in order to determine the substantive issues in this case? v) Should directions be made at this stage in relation to any licence application by the wife to the Office for Financial Sanctions Implementation (hereafter “the OFSI”)? vi) Should the court dispense with a Financial Dispute Resolution appointment in this case? vii) When should the matter be listed for final hearing? viii) What should the arrangements be for the attendance at future hearings by the husband?[3]In determining the case management issues between the parties, I have had the benefit of a court bundle and a supplementary court bundle, a bundle of authorities and helpful and comprehensive notes from leading and junior counsel. In light of the nature and extent of the case management issues arising between the parties, and the time estimate of one day given to the case management hearing, I reserved judgment on the disputed matters and now set out my reasons for making the case management directions I have determined are necessary to bring this matter to a timely resolution.

BACKGROUND

[4]The background has been set out extensively in a number of judgments at a number of levels. See Potanin v Potanina [2019] EWHC 2956 (Fam), [2020] Fam 189, Potanin v Potanina [2021] EWCA Civ 702, [2022] Fam 23, Potanina v Potanin [2024] UKSC 3, [2024] AC 1063, Potanina v Potanin [2025] EWCA Civ 1136, [2026] 2 WLR 352 and Potanina v Potanin(Costs) [2025] EWCA Civ 1223, [2026] 1 FLR 236. For the purposes of this judgment, it is necessary only to provide the central facts.[5]Both the wife and the husband were born in 1961 in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). They met at school and married in the USSR in 1983. Their marriage subsisted for 30 years. There remains a dispute regarding the date of the parties’ separation. The wife maintains that the parties did not separate until November 2013, when the husband issued divorce proceedings in what was, by then, the Russian Federation. The husband relies on the finding of the Russian court that the parties separated in 2007. The parties were divorced in Russia in February 2014. At the time of the divorce, both parties were 53 years of age and remained habitually resident in Russia.[6]During the course of the marriage, and following the collapse of the USSR, the husband accumulated what is, on any assessment, vast wealth. When the matter was before the Supreme Court in 2024, Lord Leggatt noted that the husband’s fortune was estimated, from published sources, to amount to US$20 billion (see Potanina v Potanin [2024] UKSC 3, [2024] AC 1063 at [13]). The greater part of the husband’s wealth comprises his beneficial interest in 30% of the shares in MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC. MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC is a Russian metals and mining company. It is the world’s largest producer of palladium and one of the world’s largest producers of nickel, platinum and copper. Publicly available information indicates that the market capitalisation of MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC as of February 2026 was some US$30 billion.[7]Following the pronouncement of the divorce in Russia in February 2014, the husband brought proceedings in Russia for division of the matrimonial property. It is accepted by both parties that under Russian law (as it was interpreted in this case) only the assets legally owned by the parties were included as matrimonial property, there being no concept of beneficial ownership under Russian law. Accordingly, whilst it is not disputed that the husband is the ultimate beneficial owner of the wealth accumulated during the marriage, including his beneficial interest in 30% of the shares in MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC, the vast majority of that wealth was not included by the Russian court when dividing the matrimonial property.[8]In the circumstances, within the proceedings for division of the matrimonial property in the legal ownership of the parties, the wife was awarded the equivalent of, on the wife’s case, US$ 41.5M and, on the husband’s case, US$ 84M. On either figure, the award made to the wife by the Russian court represented a fraction of what the wife’s award would have been had Russian law (as it was interpreted in this case) allowed for the inclusion as matrimonial property the assets beneficially owned by the husband. The wife contends that, in the circumstances, she received less than 1% of the wealth accrued by the parties during the course of the marriage. The wife has engaged in wider litigation, both in Russia and in other jurisdictions, in an effort to obtain half of the assets in the beneficial ownership of the husband. Those attempts have not met with success to date.[9]Up to the point of the parties’ divorce in Russia in February 2014, neither the wife nor the husband had any significant connection with the United Kingdom. In June 2014, however, the wife was granted a UK investor visa and, later in 2014, purchased a flat in London. The wife asserts that she has been based in London full time since 2017. At this hearing the wife asserted, through Mr Howard, that she is now not able to return to Russia.[10]On 8 October 2018, the wife issued an application under Part III of the 1984 Act for financial remedies following an overseas divorce. Relevant to certain of the case management questions that now arise for determination is the following description of the legislative scheme created by Part III of the 1984 Act contained in the judgment of Lord Leggat:
“[7] The scheme of the legislation is to give courts in England and Wales a very wide jurisdiction to entertain an application under Part III but to impose on the court a duty before exercising this jurisdiction to consider whether England and Wales is an appropriate venue for such an application. To confer jurisdiction on the English courts, it is enough (amongst other ways of qualifying) that either of the parties has been habitually resident in England and Wales for one year before proceedings under Part III are begun: see section 15(1). However, section 16(1) states: ‘Before making an order for financial relief the court shall consider whether in all the circumstances of the case it would be appropriate for such an order to be made by a court in England and Wales, and if the court is not satisfied that it would be appropriate, the court shall dismiss the application.’” ‘Before making an order for financial relief the court shall consider whether in all the circumstances of the case it would be appropriate for such an order to be made by a court in England and Wales, and if the court is not satisfied that it would be appropriate, the court shall dismiss the application.’”
[11]The extensive procedural history of the wife’s application under the 1984 Act is set out in the first instance decision of Cohen J (Potanin v Potanina [2019] EWHC 2956 (Fam), [2020] Fam 189), the decision of the Court of Appeal overturning the decision of Cohen J (Potanin v Potanina [2021] EWCA Civ 702, [2022] Fam 23), the decision of the Supreme Court overturning the decision of the Court of Appeal (Potanina v Potanin [2024] UKSC 3, [2024] AC 1063) and finally, the Supreme Court having remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal, the decision of the Court of Appeal overturning the first instance decision of Cohen J and granting the wife leave to bring an application under the 1984 Act (Potanina v Potanin [2025] EWCA Civ 1136, [2026] 2 WLR 352). Thus, the wife’s application under Part III of the 1984 Act has taken nearly 8 years to reach the permission stage.[12]The matter has now been allocated to me to determine the wife’s substantive application under the 1984 Act. Ultimately, the wife seeks an award from the English court capped at 50% of the value of:(i) the husband’s ultimate beneficial interest in 30% of the shares in MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC;(ii) the dividends paid on those shares since 2014; and(iii) a former matrimonial home in Russia known as “Autumn House”. Based on the market capitalisation of MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC as at February 2026, the value of the wife’s claim under the 1984 Act is in the region of US$5 billion.[13]Before turning to the determination of the case management issues in dispute before the court, three other matters of background require to be set out to provide the proper context.[14]First, on 29 June 2022, the husband became a designated person under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (hereafter “the 2019 Regulations”), which implement the Sanctions and Money Laundering Act 2018 (hereafter “the 2018 Act”). In addition to being sanctioned by the United Kingdom, the husband has also been sanctioned by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Ukraine and the United States of America. The wife has not been designated under the 2019 Regulations and has not been sanctioned in any other jurisdiction. The sanctions imposed on the husband by the United Kingdom include the following, which are applicable within the territory of the United Kingdom or in relation to United Kingdom subjects and legal entities registered in the United Kingdom, as well as in United Kingdom dependent territories: i) An asset freeze, freezing all funds or economic resources owned or controlled by the husband and prohibiting any United Kingdom subject transacting with the economic resources owned or controlled by the husband, pursuant to regulation 11 of the 2019 Regulations. ii) A travel ban, placing a prohibition on the husband entering or staying in the United Kingdom, pursuant to s.4 of the 2018 Act. iii) Trust services sanctions, preventing the provision of any trust services in the United Kingdom to the husband, pursuant to regulation 18C of the 2019 Regulations. iv) A director disqualification, prohibiting the husband from holding management positions in British companies. v) A public relations ban, preventing the husband being provided with services aimed at improving his image, pursuant to regulation 54C(1) of the 2019 Regulations.[15]The husband has been sanctioned as an individual who is not alleged to have committed any offence or otherwise engaged in wrongdoing. The husband relies on the description of sanctions of this nature given by the Supreme Court in Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] 3 WLR 346 at [1]:
“The people who can be subject to sanctions are not alleged to have committed any criminal offences or to have otherwise engaged in any wrongdoing either here or overseas. Ministers may target any individuals and businesses falling within broadly defined classes. Those people can then be subject to severe restrictions on their ability to travel, to deal with their own assets, to do business and to engage in many everyday activities. Their friends and colleagues are at risk themselves of committing criminal offences if they engage with the sanctioned person in any of a wide range of different ways. The decisions taken by Ministers in the exercise of those powers can therefore have a prolonged and potentially devastating effect on the individuals and their families.”
[16]The husband contends that a consequence of his having been designated as a sanctioned person under the 2019 Regulations has been the need to commence proceedings before the Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow pursuant to Articles248.1 and248.2 of the Russian Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code (as amended by Federal Law No.171-FZ from 19 June 2020). This court has before it a report on Russian law from Ms Olesya Petrol, a Russian lawyer specialising in Russian private law. The report was not prepared upon a joint instruction under Part 25 of the FPR 2010, but on the instruction of the husband, which course of action I deprecate. I determined, however, to admit it for the purposes of this hearing in circumstances where it assists the court with the question of the extent to which Russian law may impact on one or more of the case management directions the court may consider necessary. Ms Petrol describes the purpose of Article 248.1 of the Russian Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code as follows:
“It was introduced to the Russian legislation in 2020 in order to provide additional procedural guarantees to, inter alia, sanctioned Russian individuals by establishing exclusive jurisdiction of Russian courts over disputes involving the former.”
[17]The husband has made an application to the Arbitrazh Court for an order preventing the wife from initiating and continuing proceedings in State courts and arbitral tribunals located outside the Russian Federation. The grounds on which the husband relies in support of that application include that the sanctions imposed on him by the United Kingdom place him in a manifestly unequal position in relation to the wife and create significant obstacles to his effective access to justice in the United Kingdom. He further argues that the proceedings to determine the wife’s Part III application are aimed at reviewing and circumventing the final and binding judgments of the Russian courts, which have already resolved the property disputes between the husband and the wife and which have already been enforced by the parties.[18]The second matter of background providing the proper context for this hearing is that on 7 December 2021 Francis J, to whom the proceedings were then allocated, made case management directions in this matter. Those case management directions were confirmed on 20 May 2022. They have not been the subject of an appeal. Those directions were also stayed on 20 May 2022 following the Supreme Court granting the husband permission to appeal. The wife now seeks to revive the case management directions confirmed by Francis J on 20 May 2022. The husband contends that his designation as a sanctioned person under the 2019 Regulations constitutes a fundamental change of circumstances that, if the court is not minded to adjourn the proceedings and continue to the stay, necessitates the discharge of the case management directions made by Francis J pursuant to FPR r.4.1(6) and or s.31F(6) of the 1984 Act.[19]Finally by way of relevant background, the husband is also a party to commercial litigation currently ongoing in the King’s Bench Division in IPJSC United Company Rusal v Whiteleave Holdings Limited, Vladimir Potanin, Crispian Investments Limited and Roman Abramovich. The Commercial Court has handed down three case management judgments to date, two of which have been published (see [2025] EWHC 1995 (Comm) and [2026] EWHC 154 (Comm)). Of particular relevance to the decisions that now fall to be made by this court is the decision of Mr Nigel Cooper KC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court in the third case management hearing in those proceedings published as [2026] EWHC 154 (Comm). All references below to the decision of the Commercial Court are references to that latter case management decision.[20]At that hearing, the Commercial Court was concerned with the obligations of the husband to provide disclosure of documents held by PJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel and certain subsidiaries of PJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel on the basis that he has both legal and/or practical control of such documents for the purposes of CPR PD 57AD. The Commercial Court determined that question “purely for the purposes of determining the extent of his disclosure obligations in this action” and made clear it was not “expressing any view on the question of whether Mr. Potanin (or Whiteleave) has control of NN or its subsidiaries for any other purpose including for the purposes of the claims or counterclaims made in this action or for the purposes of any sanctions or counter-sanctions legislation.” In reaching its determination, the Commercial Court also noted that:
“In the context of whether it is just and proportionate to make a disclosure order against Mr. Potanin in the terms sought by Rusal, it is significant that the signatories, including Mr. Potanin, expressly agreed to the jurisdiction of the High Court because they will have done so in circumstances where it can be reasonably inferred that they and their advisers will have been aware that if a dispute arose which led to proceedings in this Court, disclosure in accordance with the requirements of the CPR would be a necessary step in any timetable to trial.”
[21]Having had the benefit of expert evidence from two expert witnesses on Russian law, and in circumstances I address in more detail below, the Commercial Court concluded in IPJSC United Company Rusal v Whiteleave Holdings Limited, Vladimir Potanin, Crispian Investments Limited and Roman Abramovich at [61] that:
“Overall, I am satisfied that there are avenues by which it is likely that any restrictions on Mr. Potanin’s control of relevant documents can be overcome. Of course, to the extent that they cannot, then this would be a ground on which Mr. Potanin was entitled to refuse disclosure of the particular documents concerned.”
DETERMINATION OF CASE MANAGEMENT ISSUES Adjournment Application

DETERMINATION OF CASE MANAGEMENT ISSUES

[22]I am satisfied that these proceedings should not be adjourned generally with liberty to restore pending determination of proceedings commenced by the husband in the Russian Arbitrazh Court.[23]The husband contends that these proceedings should be adjourned pending the outcome of his application pursuant to Articles248.1 and248.2 of the Russian Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code for an order preventing the wife from initiating and continuing proceedings in state courts and arbitral tribunals located outside the Russian Federation. In short, his submission is that it would be premature for these proceedings to move towards determination when he has an outstanding application for an anti-suit injunction which, if successful, would prohibit the wife from pursuing her application in this jurisdiction.[24]The husband also relies more generally in support of his application for an adjournment on the impact of him having been sanctioned by the United Kingdom. In particular, the husband submits as follows: i) In circumstances where the wife is now a British citizen, she is a ‘national’ within the meaning of s.21 of the 2018 Act and, therefore, the asset freeze imposed on the husband will now preclude her from ‘dealing with’ any award made by this court, regardless of where she is or how the sum is paid, unless she is granted a licence by the UK government. ii) In circumstances where the wife seeks 50% of the value of the husband’s beneficial interest in MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC and in the dividends paid thereon since 2014, and where the husband contends that he does not have liquid assets to meet an obligation running into the sum of billions of pounds, an award could only be met by the sale of shares, with enforcement by way of security over them. iii) Any acquisition by a British citizen of shares or property interests in Russia would breach regulation 18B of the 2019 Regulations (the husband also submits that any steps towards execution of an award would involve disposition of an asset of strategic importance to Russia and would therefore likely engage the interest of the governments in both jurisdictions). In these circumstances, even were the wife to secure an award, there “can be no certainty” that the wife will be able to obtain the sums awarded or be able to enforce against such sums. iv) Whilst the husband is able to pay his legal fees under a current General Licence INT/2025/72323088 issued by the OFSI, the licence places numerous restrictions on the ability of the husband to pay for legal services. These include a cap on fees of £2M, which the husband submits is “a very small figure” in the context of the sums at issue in the proceedings and their complexity. In the circumstances, the husband is unable to obtain the full range of legal and ancillary services, restricting his access to justice. v) Any adverse costs order made against the wife in these proceedings could only be paid by her to the husband if the OFSI issue a licence permitting that payment (see PJSC National Bank Trust and another v Mints [2024] KB 559 at [215]). Whilst the wife has applied for a licence from the OFSI to pay the costs order made against her by the Supreme Court, no licence has yet been issued. vi) The husband is unable to attend hearings in this jurisdiction by reason of the travel ban imposed on him and the asset freeze would preclude him from engaging private security to ensure his safety in this jurisdiction. Whilst these activities are, in theory, capable of being the subject of a licence, it is unlikely such licences would be granted. This puts him as a disadvantage as a litigant in these proceedings. vii) The husband is precluded from obtaining public relations services from United Kingdom entities. Where personal, financial and reputational matters are in issue in these proceedings, it is oppressive for him to be required to enter into proceedings where the wife is free to disseminate into the public domain whatever allegations she chooses whilst the husband is severely hampered in his ability to respond.[25]Relying on the foregoing matters, the husband submits that for the court to proceed to hear the wife’s application under Part III whilst he remains a sanctioned individual would be to force him to litigate with “one hand tied behind his back” in circumstances where there is no immediate necessity to move to the next stage of the Part III proceedings.[26]The wife submits that although the timing of the husband’s application to adjourn is designed to imply a change of circumstances, Article 248.1 of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code was introduced two years before the husband was sanctioned on 29 June 2022. The wife points to the fact that at no point in the proceedings to date, including after the date he was sanctioned, has the husband referred to the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code limiting his ability to participate in these proceedings. The wife acknowledges the difficulty she may be placed in by the husband’s litigation in the Arbitrazh Court, including the potentially limited effectiveness of anti-anti-suit injunctions as discussed in Magomedov & others v PJSC Transneft & others [2024] EWHC 1176 (Comm), [2024] 4 WLR 48 and Google v Tsargrad [2025] EWHC 94 (Comm), [2026] 1 All ER (Comm) 75 should she choose to apply for one. However, the wife submits that where she satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of s.15 of the 1984 Act, and the leave test in s.13 of that Act, the Russian court cannot interfere with the jurisdiction of this court and its procedure on the basis of an order in personam against her, it being a matter for her whether and how she responds to any order made by the Arbitrazh Court in Russia, including making an application for an anti-anti-suit injunction.[27]The wife further submits that it is self-evident that the husband has been able to participate in these proceedings notwithstanding his designation as a sanctioned individual. She submits that this position is further reinforced by the fact that the husband is involved as a party to the proceedings in the King’s Bench Division, a matter listed for a 14-week trial commencing in April 2027. The wife further notes that there is nothing to prevent the husband participating in the proceedings remotely, as he has done at this hearing, if he is not able to attend hearings in person.[28]With respect to the question of the impact on these proceedings of an application by the husband to the Arbitrazh Court under Article 248.1 of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code, the following aspects of the expert report of Ms Petrol are pertinent: i) It is “not entirely clear” whether the exclusive jurisdiction of the Russian courts under Article 248.1 encompasses all disputes with sanctioned individuals, including those which would normally be considered by a court of general jurisdiction, or rather is limited to those disputes whose subject matter is generally assigned to the commercial courts jurisdiction in the Russian Federation. ii) On a literal interpretation of Article 27(6) (which provides that commercial (arbitrazh) courts shall consider cases regardless of whether the parties to the legal relationship from which the dispute or claim arose are legal entities, individual entrepreneurs or other organizations and citizens) Article 248.1 encompasses all disputes with sanctioned individuals. iii) This interpretation of Article 248.1 “arguably” corresponds with the legislative intent of the Russian Duma, Ms Petrol citing the opinion of Professor A.F. Voronov in Voronov A.F. Amendments to the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code of the Russian Federation to Protect the Rights of Individuals Subject to Sanctions in: Military-Industrial Complex: Legal Issues, 2020, No. 5. P. 18. iv) Whilst there are cases where disputes involving foreign restrictive measures have been referred to commercial (arbitrazh) courts from courts of general jurisdiction (see for example, Ruling of the Second Cassation Court of General Jurisdiction No. 8G-24449/2025 dated 17 September 2025), Ms Petrol is not aware of any cases in which the issue of referring a family dispute to a commercial (arbitrazh) court based on Article 248.1 of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code has arisen (although she cautions that, post 2022, whilst sanctioned individuals customarily divorced in the courts of general jurisdiction, the sanctioned status of the spouse and/or the issue may simply have not been brought to the attention of the court of general jurisdiction). v) If Article 248.1 does not bring family disputes within the jurisdiction of the commercial (arbitrazh) courts, it is possible that a Russian court of general jurisdiction could consider applying Article 248.1 to an issue of international jurisdiction by analogy pursuant to Article 1(4) of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code, where there is no rule in the Civil Procedure Code governing international jurisdiction for disputes with sanctioned individuals.[29]In the foregoing context, Ms Petrol opines that a Russian court is likely to find that the dispute being considered by the English court in these proceedings under Part III of the 1984 Act falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of Russian court, either as a result of direct application of Article 248.1(1) of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code or by way of analogy pursuant to Article 1(4) of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code.[30]Whilst the wife contends that the husband’s application under Article 248.1(1) of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code is advanced on grounds that are erroneous and that the application is vexatious, those are matters exclusively for the Russian Arbitrazh Court, based on that court’s interpretation of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code.[31]However, for the purposes of considering the husband’s adjournment application, it is tolerably clear that the outcome of the husband’s application to the Arbitrazh Court is dependent on that court, or a Russian court of general jurisdiction, being satisfied that Article 248.1(1) applies to proceedings of the type that this court is seised of, namely financial remedy proceedings between private individuals following divorce. Whilst Ms Petrol opines that a Russian court is likely to find that the dispute being considered by the English court falls into the exclusive jurisdiction of Russian courts, reading Ms Petrol’s expert opinion as a whole I am satisfied that that outcome is far from inevitable. This is particularly so in circumstances where the description of the Russian judicial system in Ms Petrol’s report characterises commercial (arbitrazh) courts as follows:
“As regards case law, the Russian judicial system includes two main court branches: firstly, the courts of general jurisdiction which deal mostly with criminal and civil cases involving individuals; and secondly, “commercial (arbitrazh)” courts which deal predominantly with the commercial disputes involving legal entities and individual entrepreneurs. The commercial (arbitrazh) courts deal with personal bankruptcy proceedings as well.”
[32]Following the case management hearing, the court was sent further documentation that indicates the Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow conducted a hearing on the husband’s application on 26 February 2026. The Arbitrazh Court accepted the application as having been filed in compliance with Articles 125 and 126 of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code, directed that the matter be heard in closed session and directed a preliminary hearing on 26 March 2026. However, on the face of the documents, the question of whether Article 248.1 applies to foreign proceedings of the type that this court is seised appears to remain a live one. It would also appear that the Arbitrazh Court made no substantive interim order. This court was subsequently informed that a substantive hearing has been listed for 4 May 2026.[33]In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the fact of the husband’s current application to the Arbitrazh Court is not a reason to adjourn these proceedings generally. Whilst the question of leave has been heavily contested, the English court’s jurisdiction to hear an application under the 1984 Act has never been disputed. The wife’s application under Part III of the 1984 Act was issued as long ago as 8 October 2018. On a broad assessment, some £14M in costs have already been incurred by the parties and the application has only reached the stage of leave having been granted. There is an urgent need for this matter to be determined.[34]In these circumstances, the fact that the Arbitrazh Court may consider that Article 248.1 of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code applies to foreign proceedings of the type that this court is seised and, if it does, may make an order preventing the wife from initiating and continuing proceedings in a court located outside the Russian Federation, I am satisfied that this is not a reason to delay the determination of the wife’s application still further. If the Arbitrazh Court does grant substantive relief, it might be necessary for this court consider whether a stay of the English proceedings should be granted consequent upon any anti-suit injunction made by the Arbitrazh Court and/or any application made to this court by the wife for an anti-anti-suit injunction, having regard to the principles applicable in this jurisdiction (see The Eleftheria [1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep 237 at 94, Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP and others v Deutsche Bank AG and Deutsche Bank Securities Inc [2009] EWCA Civ 725, [2010] 1 WLR 1023 at 56 and Croda Europe Ltd v Agform Ltd [2025] EWHC 2462 (Comm) at [21]). Until that time, however, I am satisfied that this court should continue to case manage these proceedings towards a timely resolution.[35]I am further satisfied that there is no force in the husband’s submission that his status as an individual sanctioned under the 2019 Regulations prevents him from participating effectively in these proceedings.[36]I accept the wife’s submission that the husband’s contention that he is unable to participate, and is prejudiced, in the proceedings is undermined by the facts. The husband has, self-evidently, been able to participate in these proceedings, up to and including a successful appeal to the United Kingdom Supreme Court, notwithstanding his designation as a sanctioned individual from 29 June 2022. I further accept that the husband’s contended inability to participate in these proceedings as a sanctioned individual is undermined by the fact that the husband is actively involved as a party to proceedings in the King’s Bench Division. As he has done at this hearing, the husband is able to participate in these proceedings remotely if he is not able to attend hearings in person by reason of his sanctioned status.[37]In the circumstances, the husband’s application to adjourn these proceedings generally is refused. The court will therefore proceed to make case management directions to enable the matter to proceed as expeditiously as possible to a final hearing.

Split Hearing

[38]I am further satisfied that the court should not direct a split hearing of the issues that fall to be determined in this application.[39]Leave having been granted to the wife under s.13 of the 1984 Act by the Court of Appeal, ss.16 to 18 of the 1984 Act provide, as at the time the wife’s application was issued and prior to the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, as follows (subsections 16(3) and (4) were repealed after the United Kingdom left the European Union by Schedule 1(1) para.13(3)(b) and (c) of the Jurisdiction and Judgments (Family) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019):
“16 Duty of the court to consider whether England and Wales is appropriate venue for application. (1) Before making an order for financial relief the court shall consider whether in all the circumstances of the case it would be appropriate for such an order to be made by a court in England and Wales, and if the court is not satisfied that it would be appropriate, the court shall dismiss the application. (2) The court shall in particular have regard to the following matters— (a) the connection which the parties to the marriage have with England and Wales; (b) the connection which those parties have with the country in which the marriage was dissolved or annulled or in which they were legally separated; (c) the connection which those parties have with any other country outside England and Wales; (d) any financial benefit which the applicant or a child of the family has received, or is likely to receive, in consequence of the divorce, annulment or legal separation, by virtue of any agreement or the operation of the law of a country outside England and Wales; (e) in a case where an order has been made by a court in a country outside England and Wales requiring the other party to the marriage to make any payment or transfer any property for the benefit of the applicant or a child of the family, the financial relief given by the order and the extent to which the order has been complied with or is likely to be complied with; (f) any right which the applicant has, or has had, to apply for financial relief from the other party to the marriage under the law of any country outside England and Wales and if the applicant has omitted to exercise that right the reason for that omission; (g) the availability in England and Wales of any property in respect of which an order under this Part of this Act in favour of the applicant could be made; (h) the extent to which any order made under this Part of this Act is likely to be enforceable; (i) the length of time which has elapsed since the date of the divorce, annulment or legal separation. (3) If the court has jurisdiction in relation to the application or part of it by virtue of the Maintenance Regulation and Schedule 6 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Maintenance) Regulations 2011, the court may not dismiss the application or that part of it on the ground mentioned in subsection (1) if to do so would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of that Regulation and that Schedule. (4) In this section, “the Maintenance Regulation” means Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 including as applied in relation to Denmark by virtue of the Agreement made on 19th October 2005 between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark. 17 Orders for financial provision and property adjustment. (1) Subject to section 20 below, on an application by a party to a marriage for an order for financial relief under this section, the court may— (a) make any one or more of the orders which it could make under Part II of the 1973 Act if a divorce order, nullity of marriage order or judicial separation order in respect of the marriage had been made] in England and Wales, that is to say— (i) any order mentioned in section 23(1) of the 1973 Act (financial provision orders); and (ii) any order mentioned in section 24(1) of that Act (property adjustment orders); and (b) if the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, make one or more orders each of which would, within the meaning of that Part of that Act, be a pension sharing order in relation to the marriage. (c) if the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, make an order which would, within the meaning of that Part of that Act, be a pension compensation sharing order in relation to the marriage. (2) Subject to section 20 below, where the court makes a secured periodical payments order, an order for the payment of a lump sum or a property adjustment order under subsection (1) above, then, on making that order or at any time thereafter, the court may make any order mentioned in section 24A(1) of the 1973 Act (orders for sale of property) which the court would have power to make if the order under subsection (1) above had been made under Part II of the 1973 Act. 18 Matters to which the court is to have regard in exercising its powers under s. 17. (1) In deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 17 above and, if so, in what manner the court shall act in accordance with this section. (2) The court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who has not attained the age of eighteen. (3) As regards the exercise of those powers in relation to a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular have regard to the matters mentioned in section 25(2)(a) to (h) of the 1973 Act and shall be under duties corresponding with those imposed by section 25A(1) and (2) of the 1973 Act where it decides to exercise under section 17 above powers corresponding with the powers referred to in those subsections. (3A) The matters to which the court is to have regard under subsection (3) above— (a) so far as relating to paragraph (a) of section 25(2) of the 1973 Act, include any benefits under a pension arrangement which a party to the marriage has or is likely to have and any PPF compensation to which a party to the marriage is or is likely to be entitled,] (whether or not in the foreseeable future), and (b) so far as relating to paragraph (h) of that provision, include — (i) any benefits under a pension arrangement which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, a party to the marriage will lose the chance of acquiring, and (ii) any PPF compensation which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, a party to the marriage will lose the chance of acquiring entitlement to. (4) As regards the exercise of those powers in relation to a child of the family, the court shall in particular have regard to the matters mentioned in section 25(3)(a) to (e) of the 1973 Act. (5) As regards the exercise of those powers against a party to the marriage in favour of a child of the family who is not the child of that party, the court shall also have regard to the matters mentioned in section 25(4)(a) to (c) of the 1973 Act. (6) Where an order has been made by a court outside England and Wales for the making of payments or the transfer of property by a party to the marriage, the court in considering in accordance with this section the financial resources of the other party to the marriage or a child of the family shall have regard to the extent to which that order has been complied with or is likely to be complied with. (7) In this section— (a) “pension arrangement” has the meaning given by section 25D(3) of the 1973 Act, and (b) references to benefits under a pension arrangement include any benefits by way of pension, whether under a pension arrangement or not, and (c) “PPF compensation” means compensation payable under— (i) Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Pensions Act 2004 (pension protection) or any regulations or order made under it, (ii) Chapter 1 of Part 3 of the Pensions Act 2008 (pension compensation sharing) or any regulations or order made under it, or (iii) any provision corresponding to the provisions mentioned in sub-paragraph (i) or (ii) in force in Northern Ireland.” (a) the connection which the parties to the marriage have with England and Wales; (b) the connection which those parties have with the country in which the marriage was dissolved or annulled or in which they were legally separated; (c) the connection which those parties have with any other country outside England and Wales; (d) any financial benefit which the applicant or a child of the family has received, or is likely to receive, in consequence of the divorce, annulment or legal separation, by virtue of any agreement or the operation of the law of a country outside England and Wales; (e) in a case where an order has been made by a court in a country outside England and Wales requiring the other party to the marriage to make any payment or transfer any property for the benefit of the applicant or a child of the family, the financial relief given by the order and the extent to which the order has been complied with or is likely to be complied with; (f) any right which the applicant has, or has had, to apply for financial relief from the other party to the marriage under the law of any country outside England and Wales and if the applicant has omitted to exercise that right the reason for that omission; (g) the availability in England and Wales of any property in respect of which an order under this Part of this Act in favour of the applicant could be made; (h) the extent to which any order made under this Part of this Act is likely to be enforceable; (i) the length of time which has elapsed since the date of the divorce, annulment or legal separation. (a) make any one or more of the orders which it could make under Part II of the 1973 Act if a divorce order, nullity of marriage order or judicial separation order in respect of the marriage had been made] in England and Wales, that is to say— (i) any order mentioned in section 23(1) of the 1973 Act (financial provision orders); and (ii) any order mentioned in section 24(1) of that Act (property adjustment orders); and (b) if the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, make one or more orders each of which would, within the meaning of that Part of that Act, be a pension sharing order in relation to the marriage. (c) if the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, make an order which would, within the meaning of that Part of that Act, be a pension compensation sharing order in relation to the marriage. (a) so far as relating to paragraph (a) of section 25(2) of the 1973 Act, include any benefits under a pension arrangement which a party to the marriage has or is likely to have and any PPF compensation to which a party to the marriage is or is likely to be entitled,] (whether or not in the foreseeable future), and (b) so far as relating to paragraph (h) of that provision, include — (i) any benefits under a pension arrangement which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, a party to the marriage will lose the chance of acquiring, and (ii) any PPF compensation which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, a party to the marriage will lose the chance of acquiring entitlement to. (a) “pension arrangement” has the meaning given by section 25D(3) of the 1973 Act, and (b) references to benefits under a pension arrangement include any benefits by way of pension, whether under a pension arrangement or not, and (c) “PPF compensation” means compensation payable under— (i) Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Pensions Act 2004 (pension protection) or any regulations or order made under it, (ii) Chapter 1 of Part 3 of the Pensions Act 2008 (pension compensation sharing) or any regulations or order made under it, or (iii) any provision corresponding to the provisions mentioned in sub-paragraph (i) or (ii) in force in Northern Ireland.”
[40]The husband contends that s.16 and s.18 of the 1984 Act constitute a distinct two-stage process. First, a determination of whether in all the circumstances an order is “appropriate”, and the dismissal of the claim if it is not. Second, if the court is satisfied that it is appropriate to make an order then, having regard to all the circumstances and in particular those matters set out in s.25(2)(a)-(h) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, a determination of what orders should be made. Accordingly, the husband contends that this court should order a split hearing whereby: i) At a Stage I hearing it is determined, as a preliminary issue, whether pursuant to s.16 of the 1984 Act it is appropriate for the English court to make any order at all (the ‘Stage I hearing”); then (subject to the outcome of the Stage I hearing); ii) At a Stage II hearing it is determined what orders should be made under s. 17 of the 1984 Act.[41]The wife resists this course of action and submits that all of the elements of her application should be determined by the court at a single hearing. The wife relies in support of her submission on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Zimin v Zimina [2017] EWCA 1429, [2018] 1 FCR 164 at [98], in which the court stated that:
“[98] The judge expressed the view that because of the interrelationship between the various sections of the MFPA 1984 both limbs of an application should be considered at a single hearing and split hearings should be avoided. I agree...in my judgment, leave having been given to bring proceedings pursuant to section 13, the question of whether it is appropriate thereafter to make an order and, if so, the quantum of any order should be determined at one composite hearing.”
[42]As the husband concedes, I am bound by the decision in Zimin v Zimina. However, in circumstances where the foregoing statement of principle was obiter dicta (the point in issue before the Court of Appeal being whether it was appropriate for a lump sum order to have been made), and where that statement of principle was expressed in terms of the approach that “should” be adopted and not the approach that “must” be adopted, it is appropriate to consider the competing arguments of the parties in a little more detail.[43]The husband concedes that “in virtually every case” the court should consider the s.16 factors alongside the s.18 factors of the 1984 Act when determining an application for which leave has been given under s.13. The husband contends, however, that this case is “extreme on its facts” and has a number of “overwhelmingly magnetic features” which, if accepted by the court, would lead inexorably to the conclusion that it is not “appropriate” for the court to make an order. Accordingly, and consonant with the overriding objective, the husband submits that the matter should be listed for a what he terms a “section 16 hearing”.[44]The “magnetic features” on which the husband relies as being relevant to the question of whether it is “appropriate” for the purposes of s.16 of the 1984 Act for the court to make any order are based largely on the report of Ms Petrol, and are as follows: i) The lack of any connection with England and Wales during the course of the parties’ marriage, their longstanding connection to Russia, the extent of the overseas proceedings that have taken place in Russia and the quantum of the order made in those proceedings by the Russian court. ii) The husband’s sanctioned status and the concomitant impact of the sanctions regime in this jurisdiction and the counter-sanction regime in the Russian Federation, in particular the fact that the exclusive jurisdiction provisions under Art 248.1 of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code mean that the Russian court will impose a monetary penalty on the wife if she disobeys any Russian court order to discontinue these proceedings secured by the husband in the Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow. iii) The size of the award sought by the wife of some US$5 billion and its geo-political ramifications in circumstances where there cannot be a share transfer in this case and, accordingly, the wife seeks the disposition of a major Russian strategic asset, in which both the Russian and United Kingdom governments are likely to take an interest. iv) The manifest obstacles to the payment of any award. The wife will find it difficult to obtain a licence from the United Kingdom Government, in particular where the wife seeks an award of some US$5 billion, absent which the wife would herself breach English law relating to sanctions wherever in the world she is paid. Further, Russian Federal Law No. 173-FZ means that virtually all Russian banks are designated under sanctions regimes in the United Kingdom, the EU and the US, in consequence of which the wife could only ever be paid a sum of money by the husband in roubles in the Russian Federation, although no Russian bank is likely to execute a request for the payment of money because of the lack of any prospect of this court’s judgment being recognised by a Russian court. v) The wife will find it difficult, if not impossible, to enforce any order made by this court in circumstances where there is no relevant international treaty between the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom, where, in any event, the Russian Court will refuse to enforcement a judgment in the Part III proceedings if it considers the dispute to fall with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Russian courts, where the Russian court is likely to consider the claims pursued in the Part III proceedings to be res judicata and where a Russian court is likely to view a judgment and order pursuant to Part III of the 1984 Act as contrary to Russian public policy.[45]By way of response, the wife resists the husband’s characterisation of this case as “extreme on its facts” by reason of his sanctioned status. The wife points to the question of making financial orders against a ‘designated person’ being at the heart of the issues in R v R [2015] EWCA Civ 796, [2016] Fam. 153 (albeit concerning a different sanctions regime).[46]The wife further points to the fact that this is the first time in this litigation that the husband has sought a split hearing, contending it is a yet further tactic to delay the proceedings. The wife submits that the issue of a split hearing was not raised before Francis J, nor did Francis J indicate that such an approach was appropriate in this case. This notwithstanding that many of the factors relied on by the husband were extant in 2022. The wife further reminds the court that the judgment of Cobb LJ in the Court of Appeal made no mention of a split hearing having given leave and remitted the matter. Rather, Cobb LJ proceeded at [114] on the basis that all the circumstances fell to be considered together at a single hearing, having noted at [9(viii)] that s.16 of the 1984 Act has “an obvious mutual interplay with section 18” in light of the observations made in Agbaje at [71]. The wife submits that, in the foregoing context, the application made by the husband under Art 248.1 of the Commercial (Arbitrazh) Procedure Code cannot legitimately form part of a justification for directing a course specifically deprecated by the Court of Appeal in Zimin v Zimina.[47]As to a licence from the United Kingdom government, the wife submits that the OFSI Scheme exists, that the wife has not yet applied for a licence (in circumstances where no details can yet be given as to what she is seeking to be licenced) and that, accordingly, there is no reason to think that the wife would not be able to receive a licence in order to have paid to her any award the court may make in these proceedings. The wife points to the fact that the legislation governing the sanctions regime does not have as its purposes the frustration of orders made by the English court so as to deprive a spouse of that which the court has held to be their lawful entitlement.[48]Finally, the wife argues that, in circumstances where the version of s.16 of the 1984 Act in force prior to the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union governs the wife’s claim, it is not possible to dismiss her needs claim under s.16 of the 1984 Act. The wife relies on the following conclusions of Cobb LJ in the Court of Appeal at [101], it being uncontroversial that by the time of her application in November 2019 the wife was habitually resident in England and Wales:
“[101] Section 16(3) of the 1984 Act provided that if the court had jurisdiction in relation to the application or part of it by virtue of the Maintenance Regulation, the court could not dismiss the application or that part of it on the ground mentioned in section 16(1) of the 1984 Act “if to do so would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of that Regulation”
. As I have said above, the Maintenance Regulation was so crafted as to make it easier for a maintenance creditor (traditionally the weaker party) to enforce his or her rights, by giving them the right to choose where to sue the maintenance debtor. Section 16(3) does not in terms disapply section 16(1) and (2) entirely where one of the qualifying criteria of the Maintenance Regulation is satisfied, but in order to give effect to its obvious statutory purpose of ensuring that the application of the Maintenance Regulation takes precedence, the court must be precluded from deciding that it was not “appropriate” (section 16(1) ibid) for the case to proceed in England and Wales if that would frustrate the maintenance creditor’s right to choose where to enforce their rights.”[49]In the circumstances, the wife submits that there would be no point in this case in having a split hearing when there will need to be a final hearing on her needs claim in any event, which cannot be dismissed for want of it being appropriate under s.16 of the 1984 Act.[50]Having considered the competing arguments, and having regard to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Zimin v Zimina, I am satisfied that it is not appropriate to direct a split hearing in this case. The rationale for the approach taken in Zimin v Zimina is clear on the face of the statute.The need to consider “all of the circumstances” in deciding whether an order is appropriate explains why the concept of a split hearing has been rejected as an approach, as explained by Lord Collins in Agbaje v Agbaje [2010] UKSC 10, [2010] 1 AC 628 at [71]:
“[71] To take up some of the points made in the preceding paragraphs, the proper approach to Part III simply depends on a careful application of sections 16, 17 and 18 in the light of the legislative purpose, which was the alleviation of the adverse consequences of no, or no adequate, financial provision being made by a foreign court in a situation where there were substantial connections with England. There are two, interrelated, duties of the court before making an order under Part III. The first is to consider whether England and Wales is the appropriate venue for the application: section 16(1). The second is to consider whether an order should be made under section 17 having regard to the matters in section 18. There are two reasons why the duties are interrelated. First, neither section 16(2) nor section 18(2)(3) refers to an exhaustive list of matters to be taken into account. Section 16(1) directs the court to have regard to “all the circumstances of the case” and section 16(2) refers the court to certain matters “in particular”
. Second, some of the matters to be considered under section 16 may be relevant under section 18, and vice versa. An obvious example would be that section 16(2)(e) refers the court to the financial provision which has been made by the foreign court. Plainly that would be relevant under section 18. So also the direction in section 18(6) to the court, in considering the financial resources of a party, to have regard to whether an order of a foreign court has been complied with would plainly be relevant in considering whether England is the appropriate venue.”[51]In the circumstances, and for the reasons I have set out, I decline to direct a split hearing of the wife’s application in this case.

Disclosure Directions

[52]I am satisfied that the stay on the directions made by Francis J on 20 May 2022 should be lifted and that those directions now must be complied with. The directions comprise the following: i) The parties shall file and exchange financial disclosure comprising a full Form E (with no attachments if the party so chooses) or an abbreviated Form E and a Capital Schedule (defined in the order as a schedule that must(a) identify the asset or interest;(b) identify where the asset or interest is located;(c) identify the legal owner of the asset or interest and the beneficial owner of the asset or interest;(d) provide an approximate value of the asset or interest; and(e) provide an explanation as to the basis upon which the value has been provided). ii) The parties shall, within the full Form E or abbreviated Form E, each set out their case in relation to the Autumn House, including its value, their case as to legal and beneficial ownership and their understanding of the current position. iii) The wife shall serve an updated chronology and the husband shall provide any amendments no later than 14 days thereafter. iv) The parties shall file and exchange a statement of issues and, if so advised, a questionnaire. v) In the event that the matter proceeds beyond FDR, either party shall be at liberty to apply to the court for sections 2.1 to 2.14 and 2.20 of the Form E to be completed by the other party.[53]The husband contended that the question of the precise nature and extent of his disclosure obligations in this case should be adjourned to a further hearing to be listed after a “Stage 1” hearing or at a further directions hearing. Pending that hearing, the husband submitted that he should not be required to make any financial disclosure that would put him in breach of what have been termed “the Russian Confidentiality Rules”. Used inRusal v Whiteleave Holdings Limited & Ors as a short hand description for potential Russian law restrictions on the dissemination of documents which contain(i) commercial secrets,(ii) insider information,(iii) personal data of individuals or(iv) information which might undermine Russian countersanctions measures. However, in circumstances where the court declined to direct a split hearing and has the benefit of the expert report secured by the husband from Ms Petrol, the question of the impact of the Russian Confidentiality Rules, and thus the nature and extent of the husband’s disclosure obligations, can be dealt with at this hearing.[54]The husband seeks to discharge the directions made by Francis J on 20 May 2022 that require him to provide disclosure by way of completing any part of Form E or Abbreviated Form E and Capital Schedule. The husband relies on the report of Ms Petrol as establishing a number of adverse consequences for him of the Russian Confidentiality Rules in the event that he is compelled by this court to provide disclosure in these proceedings. The husband submits that his sanctioned status, his private and public profile in Russia and the impact of the wider sanctions in place against him and entities in which he has an interest argue against ordering him to make disclosure. Further, the husband contends that disclosure is unnecessary in this case in circumstances where it is clear on the evidence that, as Francis J put it in May 2022, he can afford to meet the wife’s claims on “whatever basis she may put them”.[55]In the foregoing context, the husband relies on the following aspects of Ms Petrol’s expert report on Russian law: i) Under Russian law (specifically, Articles 48(1) and 56 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation) a principle of the separate legal personality of legal entities constitutes a general restriction on the disclosure of information, such that a shareholder in, or a CEO of, a company does not have access to the documents of the company’s subsidiaries and cannot instruct subsidiaries to disclose information owned by them. ii) It is illegal under Russian law (specifically, Federal Law No.98-FZ dated 29 July 2004) to disclose commercially secret information without the consent of the owner of that information. The scope of commercially secret information is the subject of what Ms Petrol describes as the “broadest possible definition”. Namely, data of any nature (production, technical, economic, organisational, and other), as well as information about methods of professional activity, which has actual or potential commercial value or because it is unknown to third parties, third parties do not have free access to it on legal grounds because it is unknown to third parties, and the owner of such information has introduced a regime of commercial secrecy in relation to it. Illegal disclosure of commercial secrets is punishable under Parts 2 to 4 of Art 183 of the Russian Criminal Code and Ms Petrol opines that disclosure also gives rise to a range of civil liabilities (in Rusal v Whiteleave Holdings Limited & Ors the court found, however, on the basis of the expert evidence that it is “clear that the owner of commercially secret information can consent to a third party having access to it”). iii) Russian law (specifically, Federal Law No.152-FZ dated 27 July 2006) stipulates a broad limitation on disclosure of personal data, although the subject of personal data is able to consent in writing to disclosure of their personal data, including for use in foreign court proceedings. Even if consent is given, the Russian authorities may block the transfer of personal data to a foreign country. Article 12 of the Law on Personal Data requires notification of the Russian authorities when personal data is transferred to a foreign country. A prohibition may be justified on a variety of grounds, ranging from state security to the protection of rights, freedoms, and interests of citizens. iv) The counter-sanctions measures implemented by the Russian Federation contain wide-ranging measures restricting the disclosure of counter-sanctions information, defined broadly as information of any nature (production, technical, economic, organisational and other) concerning transactions completed or planned by Russian individuals or legal entities participating in foreign trade activities in the fields of foreign trade of goods, works, services, information and/or intellectual property for the purposes of meeting the needs of the domestic market of the Russian Federation, the dissemination of which may result in the introduction of restrictive measures against the parties to such transactions by foreign states, state associations, unions and/or international organisations. v) Russian law prevents publicly quoted companies from disclosing information about affiliated persons; information about companies controlled by the company; information about shareholders of the company and/or other companies controlled by the company, information about persons who control the company’s subsidiaries and information about the company’s subsidiaries. These rules bind the husband as CEO of MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC. vi) Foreign court orders on disclosure are not binding for Russian individuals and companies and cannot be enforced in Russia as they are not final judgments. However, Russian courts may assist foreign courts in obtaining documents at their request under international treaty. The Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters is in force between Russia and the United Kingdom. A Russian court may, at the request of an English court, issue an order for disclosure of information that will be binding on Russian citizens, companies and state bodies. The Russian court may refuse to grant a foreign court’s request for assistance if it could harm the sovereignty of Russia or threaten its security, violate the fundamental principles of Russian law, or otherwise contradict the public order of Russia.[56]The wife seeks disclosure in the terms ordered by Francis J, which she reminds the court was not the subject of an appeal and which this court has only limited powers to revisit. The wife contends that she simply seeks to reinstate directions that were found to be proportionate having regard to the issues in the case, as already adjudicated on by Francis J. The wife submits that nothing in the report of Ms Petrol prevents the husband from making the very limited disclosure directed by Francis J, particularly in circumstances where: i) The change of circumstances relied on by the husband to vary or discharge the order of Francis J relates to his having been sanctioned, which does not engage the general restrictions on disclosure under Russian law which already subsisted at the time Francis J made his order on 20 May 2022 and on which the husband only now seeks to rely. ii) By seeking disclosure in the terms ordered by Francis J on 20 May 2022, the wife is not seeking information belonging to any company. iii) The expert report of Ms Petrol does not take account of the very limited terms of the order of Francis J, under which the husband is not required to provide any attachments with his Form E and to disclose under the alternative Capital Schedule only that information that is within his own knowledge and control. There is no analysis of how and why the limited disclosure order of Francis J falls foul of the counter-sanctions provisions under Russian law and nothing to demonstrate that the husband cannot provide the limited disclosure directed concerning his own wealth. iv) The disclosure ordered by Francis J is the husband’s disclosure of information concerning his own wealth, for which he is entitled to give consent. In so far as the consent of a nominee is required, there is no evidence before the court that such consent would be withheld by that nominee. v) In so far as the wife is seeking the disclosure of documents from MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC (which she asserts she is not), the husband’s argument that the “Russian Confidentiality Rules” prevent disclosure orders being made against him in this regard has been rejected by the King’s Bench Division in Rusal v Whiteleave Holdings Limited & Ors, in which the Commercial Court considered whether a disclosure order should be made against the husband in respect of documents held by MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC and certain subsidiaries, and concluded that “there are avenues by which it is likely that any restrictions on Mr. Potanin's control of relevant documents can be overcome”. vi) As made clear in Various Claimants v Standard Chartered PLC [2025] EWCA Civ 1581 at [79]-[82], it is well established that a party may not resist disclosure on the basis of a theoretical breach of foreign law. In circumstances where Ms Petrol does not provide an answer to the fifth question put to her (“What is the likelihood of prosecution and/or other punitive measures being pursued by Russian authorities in the event of a breach of any of the provisions of Russian law?”), there is no evidence on which the court could find that the husband faces a real risk, meaning an actual risk, of sanction and/or penalty as required by Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2019] EWCA Civ 449, at [81]. vii) The wife is willing to give further undertakings if the court considers it appropriate in order to preserve the confidentiality of disclosed information and is bound by the implied undertaking of confidentiality in any event.[57]As the husband recognises, in circumstances where he is requesting the discharge of the order of Francis J, he must be able to demonstrate one or more of the matters neatly encapsulated by Mostyn J in Thum v Thum [2019] EWFC 25, [2019] 2 FLR 546 at [36]:
“[36] In order to succeed on an application under FPR 2010, r 4.1(6) or s 31F(6) of the 1984 Act, the applicant must have acted promptly and must show either that there had been a material change of circumstances since the order was made; or that facts on which the original decision was made had been misstated; or that there had been a manifest mistake on the part of the judge in formulating the order (see Tibbles v SIG plc (trading as Asphaltic Roofing Supplies) [2012] EWCA Civ 518, [2012] 1 WLR 2591, at para [39] and Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1537, [2014] 1 WLR 795, at para [44]). In addition, save in a case where fraud is alleged, the applicant must show that the evidence in support could not have been made available with due diligence at the original hearing (see GM v KZ (No 2) (Set-Aside) [2018] EWFC 6, [2018] 2 FLR 469 and Takhar v Gracefield Developments Ltd and Others [2019] UKSC 13, [2019] 2 WLR 984).”
[58]In Various Claimants v Standard Chartered PLC the Court of Appeal reviewed the law and held as follows, citing the judgment of Gross LJ in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury:
“[79] Gross LJ referred to a number of authorities, including Abacha. At para 62, he cited a passage from Matthews and Malek, Disclosure (5th ed.) at para. 8.26, without expressing any doubts about it: “The court may take into account, in deciding whether to order disclosure, the fact that compliance with the order would or might entail a breach of foreign law… It will…need to be shown that the foreign law contains no exception for legal proceedings, and that it is not just a text, or an empty vessel, but is regularly enforced, so that the threat to the party is real. Even so, the court has a discretion and, on the basis that English litigation is to be played according to English and not foreign rules, it will rarely be persuaded not to make a disclosure order on this ground. More often than not where foreign law is raised as an objection, any threat of a sanction abroad against the disclosing party is found to be more illusory than real.” [80] At para 63, Gross LJ said: “Pulling the threads together for present purposes: (i) In respect of litigation in this jurisdiction, this Court (i.e., the English Court) has jurisdiction to order production and inspection of documents, regardless of the fact that compliance with the order would or might entail a breach of foreign criminal law in the “home” country of the party the subject of the order. (ii) Orders for production and inspection are matters of procedural law, governed by the lex fori, here English law. Local rules apply; foreign law cannot be permitted to override this Court’s ability to conduct proceedings here in accordance with English procedures and law. (iii) Whether or not to make such an order is a matter for the discretion of this Court. An order will not lightly be made where compliance would entail a party to English litigation breaching its own (i.e., foreign) criminal law, not least with considerations of comity in mind (discussed in Dicey, Morris and Collins, op cit, at paras. 1-008 and following). This Court is not, however, in any sense precluded from doing so. (iv) When exercising its discretion, this Court will take account of the real – in the sense of the actual – risk of prosecution in the foreign state. A balancing exercise must be conducted, on the one hand weighing the actual risk of prosecution in the foreign state and, on the other hand, the importance of the documents of which inspection is ordered to the fair disposal of the English proceedings. The existence of an actual risk of prosecution in the foreign state is not determinative of the balancing exercise but is a factor of which this Court would be very mindful. (v) Should inspection be ordered, this Court can fashion the order to reduce or minimise the concerns under the foreign law, for example, by imposing confidentiality restrictions in respect of the documents inspected. (vi) Where an order for inspection is made by this Court in such circumstances, considerations of comity may not unreasonably be expected to influence the foreign state in deciding whether or not to prosecute the foreign national for compliance with the order of this Court. Comity cuts both ways.” [81] At para 64 Gross LJ emphasised that the relevant risk under foreign law was the actual risk of prosecution, not whether there was a breach of foreign law without more. At para 70(i) he described the inquiry into the actual risk of prosecution (as opposed to whether the conduct would breach foreign law) as essentially a factual one (albeit informed by foreign law evidence). At para 70(iii) he said that in approaching that inquiry the burden was on the party resisting disclosure and that the court was entitled to use its own intelligence in scrutinising the evidence. In the same passage he referred to the expert evidence about other prosecutions. [82] At para 3 Gross LJ said that where there is a tension between the constraints of foreign law on the one hand, and the need for the documents in question to ensure a fair disposal of the action in this jurisdiction on the other, the balance is to be struck by judges sitting at first instance, making discretionary, case management decisions. This court will only interfere if the judge has erred in law or principle or has (in effect) reached a wholly untenable factual conclusion.” “The court may take into account, in deciding whether to order disclosure, the fact that compliance with the order would or might entail a breach of foreign law… It will…need to be shown that the foreign law contains no exception for legal proceedings, and that it is not just a text, or an empty vessel, but is regularly enforced, so that the threat to the party is real. Even so, the court has a discretion and, on the basis that English litigation is to be played according to English and not foreign rules, it will rarely be persuaded not to make a disclosure order on this ground. More often than not where foreign law is raised as an objection, any threat of a sanction abroad against the disclosing party is found to be more illusory than real.” “Pulling the threads together for present purposes: (i) In respect of litigation in this jurisdiction, this Court (i.e., the English Court) has jurisdiction to order production and inspection of documents, regardless of the fact that compliance with the order would or might entail a breach of foreign criminal law in the “home” country of the party the subject of the order. (ii) Orders for production and inspection are matters of procedural law, governed by the lex fori, here English law. Local rules apply; foreign law cannot be permitted to override this Court’s ability to conduct proceedings here in accordance with English procedures and law. (iii) Whether or not to make such an order is a matter for the discretion of this Court. An order will not lightly be made where compliance would entail a party to English litigation breaching its own (i.e., foreign) criminal law, not least with considerations of comity in mind (discussed in Dicey, Morris and Collins, op cit, at paras. 1-008 and following). This Court is not, however, in any sense precluded from doing so. (iv) When exercising its discretion, this Court will take account of the real – in the sense of the actual – risk of prosecution in the foreign state. A balancing exercise must be conducted, on the one hand weighing the actual risk of prosecution in the foreign state and, on the other hand, the importance of the documents of which inspection is ordered to the fair disposal of the English proceedings. The existence of an actual risk of prosecution in the foreign state is not determinative of the balancing exercise but is a factor of which this Court would be very mindful. (v) Should inspection be ordered, this Court can fashion the order to reduce or minimise the concerns under the foreign law, for example, by imposing confidentiality restrictions in respect of the documents inspected. (vi) Where an order for inspection is made by this Court in such circumstances, considerations of comity may not unreasonably be expected to influence the foreign state in deciding whether or not to prosecute the foreign national for compliance with the order of this Court. Comity cuts both ways.”
[59]The general restrictions on disclosure under Russian law subsisted at the time Francis J made his order. The “material change of circumstances since the order was made” now relied on by the husband to seek the discharge the directions of Francis J is, therefore, the fact of his having been sanctioned. In this context, and having regard to the authorities dealing with the extent to which a breach of foreign law allows a party to avoid disclosure, in order to make good his assertion of a material change of circumstances, the husband must be able to demonstrate that disclosure of relevant information by way of completing any part of Form E or Abbreviated Form E and Capital Schedule is likely to be a breach of Russian law and, that being so, that he is at a real risk, meaning an actual risk, of the penalties set out in Ms Petrol’s report being imposed. Namely, the imposition of an administrative fine on individuals in the amount of five thousand to ten thousand Rubles, on officials from forty thousand to fifty thousand Rubles, or disqualification for up to three years, and on legal entities from one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand Rubles, except in cases where disclosure of such information entails criminal liability. I am not satisfied that the husband can so demonstrate.[60]Whilst the husband contends that to complete any part of Form E or Abbreviated Form E and Capital Schedule as ordered by Francis J will or may place him in breach of the counter-sanction provisions of the Russian Federation, notwithstanding his sanctioned status the Commercial Court in this jurisdiction has found that the husband is able to provide disclosure of documents held by PJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel and certain subsidiaries. The Commercial Court was satisfied in IPJSC United Company Rusal v Whiteleave Holdings Limited, Vladimir Potanin, Crispian Investments Limited and Roman Abramovich that there is no general principle under Russian law that it is not in a company’s interest for the CEO to search for and disclose company documents to defend claims made against them, the judge noting that the expert in those proceedings had cited examples of Russian cases in which a director had been able to use company documents to defend divorce proceedings. In any event, there is no evidence before the court on which to make a finding that the husband is at an actual risk of prosecution and/or penalty were he to remain obligated to provide the disclosure directed by Francis J in the order of 20 May 2022.[61]In the foregoing circumstances, I am not satisfied that the husband has demonstrated a “material change of circumstances since the order was made” such as to justify the variation or discharge of Francis J’s case management order of 20 May 2022.[62]Accordingly, where the disclosure ordered by Francis J remains proportionate to the issues that fall for determination in this case, and necessary to determine those issues, I am satisfied that the stay on that order should now be lifted and the directions set out in the order of 20 May 2022, for disclosure by way of completing any part of Form E or Abbreviated Form E and Capital Schedule, questionnaires and other First Appointment documents, and further hearings through to a final hearing, should now be complied with under a revised case management timetable towards final hearing.

Expert Evidence on Russian Law

[63]The husband secured a report from Ms Petrol unilaterally. The court has admitted that report at this hearing to inform the question of the husband’s adjournment application. The wife now submits that she should be permitted to adduce her own expert evidence in response, the wife rejecting a number of contentions made by Ms Petrol. The husband submits that if the parties are not able to agree the contents of Ms Petrol’s report, the court should direct a jointly instructed expert report on Russian law.[64]Having regard to the issues touched on in this judgment, it is clear that it will be necessary in this case for the court to give permission for expert evidence dealing with matters of Russian law to determine the substantive application under Part III of the 1984 Act. Neither party sought to argue against this proposition, the question centring on whether permission should be given to the husband to rely on Ms Petrol’s report, with the wife securing her own report, or whether a jointly instructed expert report should be directed. Given the current dispute between the parties as to the position under Russian law, and likely central role arguments as to the effect of Russian law are likely to have at the final hearing, I am satisfied that any expert report on Russian law should be a joint report secured in accordance with the relevant rules of court.[65]As to the nature and scope of the questions to be posed to the jointly-instructed expert, given the limited amount of time afforded to the wife prior to this hearing to digest the legal issues raised by Ms Petrol, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to defer directions with respect to expert evidence to the First Appointment, informed by a properly constituted Part 25 application in accordance with the FPR.

Directions for licence application to the OFSI

[66]It is only possible to make limited directions at this stage in relation to any licence application by the wife to the OFSI.[67]There is no evidence before the court that the wife is able to make a prospective licence application to the OFSI licensing her, in principle, to receive any money or property that may be awarded by this court in the financial remedy proceedings. In any event, I am sceptical that the OFSI would be prepared to grant a licence in such terms without knowing the amount / value of any financial award. In the circumstances, I do not consider it possible at this stage of the proceedings to give detailed directions concerning any licence application to be made by the wife to permit the payment to her of the substantive award she seeks pursuant to a court order to be made in these proceedings.[68]The court would, however, be assisted by knowing at this stage(a) what steps are required to apply for a licence from the OFSI,(b) what information is required by the OFSI in support of any licence application and(c) the timescales for the determination of any licence application. I intend to direct that the wife files and serves her narrative account of the steps she has taken to apply to the OFSI for a licence for payment of a costs award and that the information specified at (a) to (c) should be included in so far as it is available to the wife from the OFSI.[69]It is my intention also to direct that both the wife and the husband disclose their communications with OFSI to date and thereafter on a rolling basis. However, as part of the process of submitting corrections to the draft judgment, the husband raised the possibility that, were that disclosure to include correspondence in respect of the provision of legal services to him and the payment of his legal fees, such disclosure may raise issues of privilege and regulatory issues where the licence for the receipt of fees is that of his instructing solicitors. The wife disputes that this raises an issue. In the circumstances, at present the direction will encompass the disclose their communications with OFSI to date and thereafter on a rolling basis save for correspondence in respect of the provision of legal services to the husband. The court will consider any competing submissions on the latter at the first appointment. FDR[70]I am not prepared to dispense with a Financial Dispute Resolution appointment in this case.[71]The order of Francis J dated 20 May 2022 directed that an FDR appointment before Moor J on 3 November 2022 remain listed. Pursuant to FPR 2010 r.9.15(4) the court must, at a First Directions Appointment, direct that the case be referred to an FDR appointment. The only circumstances where this mandatory requirement is excused is(a) where the first appointment or part of it has been treated as an FDR appointment and the FDR appointment has been effective; or(b) there are exceptional reasons which make an FDR appointment inappropriate. In the context of the terms of FPR 2010 r.9.15(4), Peel J held as follows in GH v GH [2024] EWHC 2547 (Fam), [2024] 4 WLR 90 regarding the importance of the FDR:
“[5] The FDR (which for these purposes includes the increasingly popular Private FDR) is an integral part of the court process. Its value has been proved time and again. Its without prejudice status allows the judge to look behind the litigation posturing which is so familiar in these cases and give clear, robust views. Anecdotally, it facilitates settlement in a significant number of cases. It is not only relatively straightforward cases which are susceptible to settlement at FDR. So, too, are complex cases. In my personal experience, even the most intractable case can yield to settlement at the FDR. The purpose of it is to enable the parties to hear (probably for the first time) an independent evaluation of the likely outcome, and the risks (in terms of costs, uncertainty, delay and emotional toll) of continued litigation. The FDR judge is there to tell the parties if their proposals are sound or devoid of merit, or if particular points or arguments are or are not likely to find favour at trial. It is often those hard cases where one or other party appears utterly intransigent that the FDR judge’s indication and observations can be of greatest utility. The FDR judge is well able to deal with factual issues (such as, in this case, W’s earning capacity), not by determining them but by expressing a view as to how they appear on the available evidence and how relevant they are. The FDR judge is also well able to give a clear overview even if (as the judge assumed to be the case here) one or other party’s position is not fully crystallised. [6] It is very hard to envisage a situation where the FDR should be dispensed with. Perhaps if one party has not engaged at all, including not attending court hearings, and has stated that they will not attend the FDR. No doubt there are other situations which might justify proceeding from First Appointment to final hearing without the FDR. But these will be very few and far between.”
[72]It is clear that the parties are far apart in terms of their positions. Neither party has to date made an open offer. The wife expressed frank scepticism as to the husband’s willingness to negotiate and, in the circumstances, questioned the point of an FDR in this case. The husband submitted that it is in the interests of justice to endeavour to avoid a 15-day final hearing in this matter and submitted that an FDR should be directed in this matter.[73]As Peel J noted, independent of the chances of a case being resolved through the process of an FDR, there is merit in enabling the parties to hear a robust and independent evaluation of the likely outcome of their dispute, and of the risks of continued litigation, in terms of costs, uncertainty, delay and the emotional toll of continued litigation. This is no less true in complex and seemingly intractable cases such as this one. In these circumstances, and where it remains hard to envisage any situation in which it is appropriate to dispense with an FDR, I am satisfied that this case does not come close to the type of exceptional circumstances that might justify such a course. In the circumstances, the court intends to make provision for an FDR, either court-facilitated or private, in this case.[74]Whilst this hearing has, in effect, acted as a ‘first appointment’ following the matter being remitted by the Court of Appeal, in light of the need to determine the question of expert evidence on Russian law, to consider the disclosure provided pursuant to the directions set out in the order of 20 May 2022 and to deal with directions for the FDR, I am satisfied that a further directions hearing will be required in this matter ahead of the case being listed for an FDR.

Final Hearing

[75]Having regard to the length of these proceedings, which commenced some 8 years ago, it is essential that this matter is now listed for final hearing of the wife’s application, not least to provide the parties with a fixed date against which to ensure that the matter is ready for trial, but also to ensure that these very long running proceedings are now finally brought to a close. In the circumstances, I propose to list the final hearing before me with a time estimate of 15 days in November 2026. A pre-hearing review will also be listed ahead of that final hearing.

Husband’s attendance at future hearings

[76]There is an obligation on parties under FPR r.27.3 to attend hearings. With respect to the arrangements for the attendance at future hearings of the husband, the reality is set by the travel ban prohibiting the husband entering or staying in the United Kingdom, pursuant to s.4 of the 2018 Act. Any steps to alter that reality are unlikely to be commensurate with the aim of this court to resolve these proceedings in November. In the circumstances, I propose to permit the husband to attend future hearings remotely.[77]At the hearing, there was no suggestion by the husband that he is unable to give evidence in these proceedings from Russia by way of video link should this become necessary at the final hearing. However, as part of the process of submitting corrections to the draft judgment, those representing the husband properly drew the attention of the court to the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal in Potanin v Charity Commission for England & Wales [2026] UKFTT 271 (GRC), handed down two days after the case management hearing. That decision judgment records at paragraph [77] that the husband was refused permission to give oral evidence by video link from Russia.[78]It is clear from the judgment of the Tribunal that the issue of the ability of the husband to give evidence by video link from Russia arose in the context the decision in Agbabiaka (evidence from abroad, Nare guidance) Nigeria [2021] UKUT 286 (IAC) and the (then applicable) Guidance Note from the President of Tribunals on taking evidence from overseas. There was no suggestion in Agbabiaka that it was a decision intended to prescribe practice in the family court and the considerations in family cases may be said to be different to those pertaining in civil cases (see Newcastle CC v JK [2025] EWHC 1767 (Fam) at [110] to [123]). However, I did not hear detailed submissions on the ability of the husband to give evidence from Russia in financial remedy proceedings and I forebear from reaching any conclusions on this point. In so far as it remains in issue, it will need to be dealt with in argument at the first appointment. I will direct the husband to indicate ahead of the first appointment whether he is willing and able to give evidence by video link should that course become necessary at any final hearing, including the arrangements that have been put in place (if any) for him to give evidence at the forthcoming trial in the King’s Bench Division in IPJSC United Company Rusal v Whiteleave Holdings Limited, Vladimir Potanin, Crispian Investments Limited and Roman Abramovich.

CONCLUSION

[79]In conclusion, I am satisfied that the following case management orders and directions should now be made: i) The husband’s application to adjourn these proceedings generally is refused. ii) The husband’s application for a direction that there be a split hearing is refused. iii) The stay on the case management order of Francis J dated 20 May 2022 is lifted and disclosure will take place in accordance with that order under a revised case management timetable. iv) The parties shall file and serve any Part 25 application for a jointly-instructed expert report on Russian law. v) The wife shall file and serve a statement of evidence of the steps she has taken to apply to OFSI for a licence for payment of a costs award to include, in so far as the information is available from the OFSI,(a) what steps are required to apply for a licence from the OFSI,(b) what information is required by the OFSI in support of any licence application and(c) the timescales for the determination of any licence application. vi) Each party shall file and serve copies of their communications with OFSI to date and thereafter on a rolling basis, save for correspondence with the OFSI relating to the provision of and payment for legal services to the husband. vii) The husband shall file and serve a statement, confirming whether he is willing and able to give evidence by video link should that course become necessary at any final hearing, including confirmation the arrangements that have been put in place (if any) for him to given evidence at the forthcoming trial in IPJSC United Company Rusal v Whiteleave Holdings Limited, Vladimir Potanin, Crispian Investments Limited and Roman Abramovich. viii) The husband shall provide to the wife with those details of his bank account(s) necessary to enable the wife to progress her application to OFSI for her costs in the Court of Appeal. ix) The matter shall be listed for a further directions hearing to consider, inter alia, the following issues: a) Any Part 25 application for a jointly-instructed expert report on Russian law. b) Any outstanding issue with respect to the disclosure by the husband of his correspondence with the OFSI dealing with the provision or and the payment for his legal fees. c) The arrangements for the husband to give oral evidence from abroad at any final hearing of this matter. d) Any directions arising from disclosure having taken place in accordance with the order of 20 May 2022 and directions towards an FDR. x) The matter shall be listed for an FDR on a date to be fixed at the next directions hearing. xi) The final hearing shall be listed with a time estimate of 15 days in November 2026.[80]I will invite leading and junior counsel to draft an order accordingly for my approval.

Cited in 2 later judgments