Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina v Vladimir Olegovich Potanin (No 2) (FDA) [2026] EWFC 148

[2026] EWFC 148Case No FD18F00074IN FAMILY COURTVenue SITTING AT THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE, Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 23/06/2026
Before
MR JUSTICE MACDONALD
Between
Natalia Nikolaevna PotaninaApplicantVladimir Olegovich PotaninRespondent
Charles Howard KC, Deepak Nagpal KC and Jennifer Palmer (instructed by Hughes Fowler Carruthers) for ApplicantRebecca Carew Pole KC, Rebecca Bailey-Harris, Ben Wooldridge and Jacob Turner (who did not appear)(instructed by Payne Hicks Beach) for RespondentHearing Hearing date: 16 June 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 23 June 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives..............................MR JUSTICE MACDONALDThis judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the
[1]I am again concerned with financial remedy proceedings between Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina (hereafter, by convention, “the wife”) and Vladimir Olegovich Potanin (hereafter, by convention, “the husband”). The wife was granted unconditional leave to proceed with her application under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (hereafter, “the 1984 Act”) by the Court of Appeal on 4 September 2025. The wife is represented by Charles Howard KC, Deepak Nagpal KC and Jennifer Palmer of counsel. The husband is represented by Rebecca Carew Pole KC, Rebecca Bailey-Harris, Ben Wooldridge and Jacob Turner of counsel (Mr Turner did not appear at the hearing).[2]Given the need to keep this case moving forward in a timely fashion, this short judgment deals with the limited case management disputes that arose at the FDA held on 16 June 2026. A separate judgment will deal with the more substantial and complex question of the arrangements for the husband to give evidence at the final hearing by video link from the Russian Federation, on which the court heard full submissions from leading counsel at the FDA.[3]The following case management issues fall for determination by the court, on which the court heard submissions from both parties: i) The questions that are properly to be included in the Wife’s questionnaire. ii) The identity of the single joint expert on Russian law. iii) The questions that are properly to be put to the single joint expert on Russian law. iv) Certain ancillary case management directions.[4]In determining the case management issues between the parties, I have had the benefit of a court bundle, a bundle of authorities and helpful and comprehensive Notes from leading and junior counsel

BACKGROUND

[5]The background to this matter is set out in my judgment of 20 April 2026 (neutral citation [2026] EWFC 80). I do not repeat it here. For the purposes of this short judgment, the most important contextual information is contained in the Schedule of Issues filed and served by each party for the FDA (see FPR r.9.14(5)(c)). Read together, those Schedules indicate that the parties consider that the broad issues for the court at the final hearing listed in November 2026 will be as follows: i) Whether the husband has provided full and frank disclosure of his assets and resources. ii) Whether, if it is necessary and possible to determine, there is a ‘lacuna’ in Russian law or a misapplication by the Russian courts of Russian law, giving rise to an injustice requiring to be remedied by an order under Part III of the 1984 Act. iii) Whether, save in relation to the wife’s claim, or that part of her claim, that relates to her reasonable needs, the court should make an order on the wife’s application for financial remedies under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, having considered whether it would be appropriate for an order to be made by a court in England and Wales having regard to s.16 of the 1984 Act and, if so, what that order should be having regard to all the circumstances and in particular those matters set out in s.25(2)(a)-(h) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. iv) Whether the Court should award the wife a fair share of the parties’ wealth built up during the marriage and, if so, what that fair share should be? v) Whether the Court should make an award to that meets the wife’s reasonable capital and income needs and what those reasonable capital and income needs are.[6]It is also important to note that, in the context of the foregoing issues, in submitting that the court should not make any order at all on the wife’s application for financial remedies having regard to s.16 of the 1984 Act, the husband relies on the assertion any order made by the English court would not be recognised or enforced in the Russian Federation and that the husband has no assets in the jurisdiction of England and Wales.[7]As I have noted, the parties made submissions on areas of dispute concerning the questionnaires, the expert evidence and certain other ancillary case management issues.

Questionnaires

[8]The wife agrees to answer the questions set out in the husband’s questionnaire. By contrast, the husband objects to the vast majority of the questions set out in the wife’s questionnaire, or seeks to amend such of those questions as he does agree to answer. In the circumstances, the court was required to go through the wife’s questionnaire question by question.[9]The wife submits that whilst she has capped her claim at 50% of the husband’s Norilsk Nickel shares, of the dividends received thereon since 2014 and of the value of Autumn House, that does not mean that the court will not need to know the totality of the husband’s assets in order to conduct its assessment by reference to s.25 of the 1973 Act and to test the outcome against the principle of fairness. The wife further asserts that, where the husband is raising lack of enforceability in the Russian Federation as a reason it is not appropriate to make an order under Part III of the 1984 Act, it is important for the court to test that assertion against information that illuminates the location of his assets. Whilst rejecting the proposition that she is required to contextualise her questions by indicating the source of the information she has relied on to formulate her questions, the wife contends it comes from the pleadings in the litigation in which the husband is involved in IPJSC United Company Rusal v Whiteleave Holdings Limited, Vladimir Potanin, Crispian Investments Limited and Roman Abramovich [2025] EWHC 1995 (Comm) and [2026] EWHC 154 (Comm), from public records in Cyprus and from publicly available information regarding the whereabouts of yachts.[10]The husband submits that this is a case in which he has sufficient funds to honour any order the court might make, either on a sharing claim as capped or on a needs basis. Accordingly, the husband contends that, having regard to the information that is publicly available with respect to the largest asset in this case, Interros, the information sought by the wife’s questionnaire is largely unnecessary and disproportionate.[11]On 20 April 2026 this court lifted the stay on the order of Francis J that provided as follows:
“The parties shall file and exchange financial disclosure comprising a full Form E (with no attachments if the party so chooses) or an abbreviated Form E and a Capital Schedule (defined in the order as a schedule that must (a) identify the asset or interest; (b) identify where the asset or interest is located; (c) identify the legal owner of the asset or interest and the beneficial owner of the asset or interest; (d) provide an approximate value of the asset or interest; and (e) provide an explanation as to the basis upon which the value has been provided).”
[12]The husband chose to complete a full Form E. The husband contends that the information in the Form E provides a “sufficiently indicative value” of the assets to make a fair decision. The husband also reminds the court of his sanctioned status, and is concerned that any dissemination of countersanctions information exposes him to further sanctions measures from other foreign states.[13]Having listened carefully to the competing submissions as to the wife’s questionnaire, I am satisfied that the [questions set out in the unredacted version of the judgment], derived from the original sixty-two questions in the wife’s questionnaire, should be answered by the husband.[14]It would not be proportionate to set out the court’s detailed reasoning in relation to each and every question that the court considers should be answered by the husband. FPR r.9.15(2)(a) requires the court to determine the extent to which any questions seeking information under r.9.14(5)(c) must be answered and what documents requested under the same rule must be produced. FPR r.9.14(c) requires the questions asked to be posed by reference to the concise statement of issues between the parties. I am satisfied that those questions [set out in the unredacted version of the judgment] are appropriate in circumstances where they inform the issues to be determined by the court by reference to the parties’ Schedules of Issues, including the objection to making any order based on lack of enforceability, have a prima facie evidential foundation and cover a proportionate period of time having regard to the issues before the court.[15]The replies to the questionnaires should be sent to the court and served by 4.00pm on 14 July 2026. There is an issue between the parties as to whether the court should provide for Schedules of Deficiencies and Supplemental Questionnaires at this point or only once the replies to the questionnaires have been filed and served. The parties have agreed to attend a pFDR on 17 and 18 September 2026. In circumstances where this matter is not listed for further directions before the pFDR and where the pFDR is taking place during the High Court vacation, I am satisfied that provision should be made at this stage for Schedules of Deficiencies and Supplemental Questionnaires.[16]In the circumstances, I shall direct that the parties have permission, if so advised to serve any Schedule of Deficiencies in respect of the replies to the questionnaire and any supplemental Questionnaire and request for further documents. Those documents shall not exceed 4 pages in length using at least 12 point font and 1.5 line spacing and will identify clearly whether a particular question/request is a deficiency or a supplemental question. Those documents shall be served by 4pm on 28 July 2026 and shall be replied to by 4.00pm on 18 August 2026.

Expert Evidence

[17]A further issue between the parties is that of the identity of the expert on Russian law, the principle of that joint instruction being agreed. As indicated in the judgment of the court in April 2026, given the current dispute between the parties as to the position under Russian law, and the central role arguments as to the effect of Russian law are likely to have at the final hearing, an expert report on Russian law is plainly necessary.[18]The wife proposes three experts in Russian law based in the United Kingdom: Professor Yarik Kryvoi, Mr Drew Holiner and Dr Andrey Shirvindt. The husband proposes three experts based in the Russian Federation: Associate Professor Dmitrii Malbin, Dr. Alan Bayramkulov and Dr. Feodor Vyacheslavov.[19]At the heart of the dispute between the parties as to which of these experts should be jointly instructed is the wife’s contention that any expert based in the Russian Federation is vulnerable to indirect political influence, given the husband’s status, power and influence in that jurisdiction. The husband rejects of that assertion. More specifically, the wife objects to Mr Malbin on the grounds that he was until recently a partner in the same law firm where as the husband’s sole expert in the Rusal litigation and, until 2023, worked in the same law firm that acted for the husband in the asset division proceedings in Russia. Ms Carew Pole sensibly accepted that, if this is the case, then Mr Malbin would not be suitable for instruction as a single joint expert in this matter. The wife further asserts that Mr Malbin has already given partial comments to the Russian media regarding the husband’s application for an anti-suite injunction. The wife also objected to Dr. Vyacheslavov on the grounds that she “understands” that he spoke at a conference in 2025 in favour of arrangements against “unfriendly” jurisdictions.[20]On the part of the husband, he submits that there are determinative advantages to the instruction of an expert in Russian law who practices in the Russian Federation. He further contends that, beyond her fear that he will do so, the wife places before the court no evidence that he would seek, directly or indirectly, to use his influence to place pressure on an expert based in the Russian Federation. Finally, the husband raises specific objections to Professor Kryvoi on the grounds that he has published articles critical of the state of the rule of law in the Russian Federation and of the Russian President.[21]In addition to it being necessary to have an expert in Russian law, I am satisfied that it would be preferable for that evidence to be given by an expert practicing in Russia. Whilst the wife asserts that the husband’s status, power and influence in Russia risks indirect influence being brought to bear on a Russian based expert, the court must base its decision on the evidence before it, evaluated in accordance with the rules of court, rather than general assertions. I am satisfied that, applying ordinary principles, Mr Malbin is not suitable for instruction as an expert in these proceedings as a former member of the law firm that acted for the husband in the asset division proceedings in Russia. However, there is no cogent evidence before the court that either Dr Bayramkulov or Dr Vyacheslavov would be vulnerable to such pressure.[22]Whilst the wife says through counsel’s note that she “understands” that Dr Vyacheslavov at a conference in 2025 in favour of arrangements against “unfriendly” jurisdictions, there is no evidence that he did so nor any indication of the context of any such comments. The letter of instruction to the single joint expert will make clear that pursuant to FPR r.25.3 the expert owes their duty to the court in this jurisdiction and not to the parties. The court will be able to evaluate the extent to which they have honoured that duty when deciding what weight can be attached to their evidence.[23]Of those two experts, on the information available to the court, Dr. Vyacheslavov has the greater knowledge of Russian matrimonial and property law and has provided evidence in the Family Division before. In the foregoing circumstances, I am satisfied that there should be a direction that the parties shall instruct Dr. Feodor Vyacheslavov to act as a single joint expert and to provide a report on matters of Russian law.[24]There were also a series of disputes between the parties as to the extent and formulation of the questions to be put to the expert on Russian law, albeit that by the time the parties came into court those disputes had narrowed.[25]Whilst Ms Carew Pole’s submission that each party simply asking the questions they wish to as a means of determining the dispute on this issue has an initial attraction, ultimately I consider that to be disproportionate and a recipe for confusion. In the circumstances, and having regard to the tabulated document provided by the wife and the composite draft order submitted by the parties, the court is satisfied that the following questions should be set out in Annex 1 to the order and put to Dr. Vyacheslavov: i) What is the general approach of the Russian courts to the division of assets on divorce? ii) How does the Russian court determine the applicable law governing the division of assets and, where Russian law is applicable, what are the relevant legal principles? iii) Are there circumstances in which a Russian court can apply foreign law to determine whether the spouses (or either of them) own an asset and, if so, what are those circumstances? iv) Is there a doctrine of precedent under Russian law, i.e. the decisions of the higher courts are binding on the lower courts? If there is no doctrine of precedent, are there any circumstances in which the lower court might take into account the decision of a higher court and, if so, how? v) What are the powers of the Russian Constitutional Court, can it review a decision on the merits and did it do so in this case? vi) Is there a limitation period under Russian law in respect of a claim for the division of assets on divorce? If so, how is that period calculated? vii) Are there circumstances under Russian law in which assets not owned directly the spouses (or either of them) but held beneficially by the spouses (or either of them) can be taken into account by the Russian court in proceedings for the division of assets following divorce? viii) Under Art 90 of the Russian Family Code, or any other relevant provision of Russian Law, does Mrs Potanina have a claim for alimony, either as at the date of the divorce or at the present time. If so, what principles govern determination of the extent of that claim and what might the extent of her claim be? ix) Does Russian law require the court to take account of a former spouses ‘needs’ when deciding the division of assets on divorce? If so, what are the principles that the court applies in determining ‘need’? x) Are there any provisions in Russian law restricting or limiting the ability of Mr Potanin to provide financial disclosure into the English financial remedy proceedings, in particular in relation to provisions that have come into force since 2022? xi) What are the potential consequences under Russian law of any breach by Mrs Potanina of the anti-suit injunction made by the Russian Arbitrazh Court on 18 May 2026? Is the court able to impose penalties for breach and, if so, does this require a further application by Mr Potanina? xii) Are there any provisions in Russian law that restrict or limit the ability of Mr Potanin to make payments pursuant to an order of the English court? xiii) To what extent would an English court order requiring the payment of money or the transfer of property under Part III of the Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1984 be recognised and be capable of reciprocal enforcement in the Russian Federation? xiv) Would the answer to question (xiii) above be different by reason of: a) The judgments of the Russian court set out in the agreed chronology of foreign proceedings? b) A breach by Mrs Potanina of the anti-suit injunction made by the Russian Arbitrazh Court on 18 May 2026? c) The United Kingdom ceased to be classified as an ‘unfriendly State’ by the Russian Federation? xv) For each of the answers provided to the questions above, please identify and provide references for any relevant provisions of the Russian Family Code and any relevant case law.

Ancillary Matters

[26]Finally, a number of further minor matters were the subject of disagreement between the parties. I am satisfied that each party should serve on the other party a concise narrative statement dealing with all the relevant factors listed in ss. 16(2) and 18(2)-(3) of the 1984 Act by 4.00pm on 8 September 2026. It is the intention of the court that those statements will stand as the substantive statements of the parties with no need for further evidence to be filed ahead of the Final Hearing.[27]With respect to the provision of written proposals ahead of the pFDR, I am satisfied that those should be exchanged by 4pm on 28 August 2026.

CONCLUSION

[28]For the reasons set out above, I will make an order in the terms set out in Schedule 1 below.[29]The provisions relating to the husband’s application for Letters of Request are omitted from that order and will be dealt with in a separate order following the court handing down a separate judgment on that issue.