“[a] mere desire to consider feelings of delicacy or to exclude from publicity the details which it would be desirable not to publish is not, I repeat, enough as the law now stands. I think that to justify an order for hearing in camera it must be shown that the paramount object of securing that justice is done would really be rendered doubtful of attainment if the order were not made”
“[t]he hearing of a case in public may be, and often is, no doubt, painful, humiliating, or [a] deterrent both to parties and witnesses, and in many cases, especially those of a criminal nature, the details may be so indecent as to tend to injure public morals, but all this is tolerated and endured, because it is felt that in public trial is to be found, on the whole, the best security for the pure, impartial and efficient administration of justice, the best means for winning for it public confidence and respect”
“[t]he court must have particular regard to the importance of the [ECHR] right to freedom of expression”
“The need for restrictions of freedom of expression to be established convincingly reflects the fact that freedom of expression is, as the European court said in Axel Springer AG v Germany, “one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self- fulfilment” (para 78). That does not in any way imply that the interests protected by article 10 have, as such, precedence over the interests protected by article 8. Clearly, there are many situations in which restrictions on freedom of expression are justified in order to protect the rights of others (including rights protected by article 8), as article 10(2) itself recognises. Furthermore, the weight to be attached to freedom of expression, and to privacy, will plainly depend on the circumstances of the particular case.”
“Under the terms of the Pilot, reporters who attend private family hearings will be permitted to report upon the case where such reporting would normally be prohibited by the ‘automatic restraints’ imposed by the operation ofsection 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 ….Section 97 of the Children Act 1989 (protecting the anonymity of a subject child during proceedings) will continue to apply, and the Transparency Order will usually provide for its effect to be extended until 31 December in the year of the youngest subject child’s 18th birthday: see Clayton v Clayton[2006] EWCA Civ 878 ”. [emphasis added] “The Protocol seeks to afford due respect to two principles: •Children and their relatives who are parties to family law cases heard in private are almost always entitled to anonymity (the Anonymity Principle). • The work of the state in the form of the family court and the agencies associated with it should be as transparent as possible in order to command public confidence, to promote best practice and to facilitate public accountability (the Transparency Principle)”
“i) what any concluded s.8 proceedings related to, and if there are proceedings continuing which do not fall within s.97(2), to what they relate; ii) the name, address or photograph of the child; iii) the name, address or photograph of the other parties; iv) the date, time or place of the next hearing and of all future hearings of the proceedings; v) the nature of the dispute in the proceedings; vi) anything which has been seen or heard by a person conducting himself lawfully in the public corridor or other public precincts outside the court in which the hearing in private is taking place; and vii) the text or summary of the whole or part of any order made in the proceedings.”
“5.1. The general process set out below (Table 1) is intended to represent a reasonable starting point for the approach to the anonymisation of children judgments for the purposes of publication. It is not intended to be a fixed or rigid default position, but “in many cases this general approach or something close to it will represent good practice. It is the responsibility of the court to consider in each case whether the general approach set out is appropriate or if some adjustment is required.” 5.5. In summary however, the key principles of anonymisation are: 5.5.1. The law in the Family Court is the same as in any other jurisdiction, including the application of the open justice principle. 5.5.2. Anonymisation is only permissible where specifically justified on the facts of the case. 5.5.3. Anonymise / redact where necessary to protect the identity of the subject child and family members (as a function of the child’s Article 8 rights encompassing welfare) 5.5.4. Anonymisation of professionals is only usually justified where its purpose is to ensure the anonymisation of the child/family. A speculative concern about harassment or criticism is insufficient. 5.5.5. Anonymisation is not a zero sum game: removal of one fact or item may obviate the need to redact a more important fact or piece of information, thus facilitating publication of a more informative / useful version of a judgment. 5.5.6. Avoid prejudicing criminal investigation / proceedings. 5.5.7. Take particular care in cases involving complaints or descriptions of sexual assault or abuse.”