E (A Child) (Disclosure to Regulator & Naming of a Witness in a Judgment), Re [2025] EWFC 423

[2025] EWFC 423

Case No SD23P00094

IN THE FAMILY COURT

Venue Royal Courts of Justice

Date 16/07/2025

Strand

London

WC2A 2LL

Before

MS JUSTICE HENKE

Re: E (A Child) (Disclosure to Regulator & Naming of a Witness in a Judgment)

Hearing Hearing date: 10 June 2025

June Venters KC leading Rachel Temple (instructed by Freemans Solicitors) for the Applicant

Elizabeth Traugott (instructed by Jung & Co. Solicitors) for the First Respondent

Janet Bazley KC leading Melissa Elsworth instructed by Wannops Solicitors) for the Second Respondent

Nairn Purss (instructed by Cura Law) for the Interested Party

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10am on 16 July 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail. The judgment is published by circulation to the National Archives at 10:30am on 5 December 2025, having awaited the judgment of the Court of Appeal in[2025] EWCA Civ 1563, published on 2 December 2025.

.............................

MS JUSTICE HENKE

This judgment was given in private. The judge gives permission for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of this judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media and legal bloggers, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so may be a contempt of court.

[1]On 16 April 2025 I circulated my draft judgment to the parties after a lengthy fact-finding hearing in a Private Law Children Act 1989 case concerning a child, E. The relevant case number is SD23P0094. On 2 May 2025 I formally handed down the judgment in the fact-find hearing in private. The accredited media, namely the BBC and Ms Tickle, attend the fact finding hearing. The BBC has also attended some of the case management hearings that preceded it and the subsequent hearings. Ms Tickle has attended the case management hearings when she has been available. On 24 July 2024 I made a Transparency order within the Private Law proceedings. That order remains in force.

[2]The Transparency order in this case was made in standard terms. Thus, the prohibition in S92(2) Children Act 1989 continues to apply (see below). In the context of this case, it is also relevant to note that the terms of the Transparency Order do not prevent the identification of anyone named in a published judgment.

[3]It is agreed by all the parties to the Children Act application that the judgment in the fact-find should be published as soon as possible. Publication of a judgment is however a matter for the discretion of the court. It falls to me to decide whether to publish the fact-finding judgment as well as a number of associated issues. Those issues initially included whether the parents should be named in any judgment which is published; and whether Aimee Dover, the psychotherapist who worked with the subject child’s sibling D, should be named in any judgment that is published. In addition, the father, strongly supported by the Child’s Guardian, has applied for permission to disclose the fact-find judgment to the therapist's regulatory body and her current employers.

[4]During the proceedings before me on 10 June 2025, the contentious issues between the parties narrowed when it became common ground that the father’s application for the parents to be named should be adjourned to the conclusion of the Children Act proceedings. Before me, Ms Dover took the position that if I considered the fact-finding judgment should be disclosed to her regulatory body, any relevant LADO and her current employers, then she would not oppose that disclosure. She argued strongly that she should not be named in any published judgment.

The Relevant Background

[5]The applications before me arise out of a fact-finding judgment which is lengthy. Within that judgment I set out the facts fully. I made many significant findings. That fact-finding judgment will be published at the same time as this and provides the factual context in which I make the decisions captured within this judgment. Within the fact-finding judgment I found that Aimee Dover began working with D, in a therapeutic capacity on 7 February 2022. From that date until the date of D’s death, Ms Dover provided D with counselling on a regular, almost weekly, basis. Initially Ms Dover provided such services through a Community Development Association (CDA). That is a registered charity providing, amongst other services, counselling to those within their area. Their counselling service is BACP accredited. The last session Ms Dover had with D under the umbrella of the CDA was 6 June 2022. Thereafter Ms Dover provided counselling to D on a private basis. On 17 December 2023 D died by suicide. Her last counselling session with Ms Dover had been on 1 December 2023.

[6]Ms Dover is a qualified and BACP Registered Integrative Psychotherapist for children, young people and families. She currently works in schools and within the private sector. She was a witness of fact in the fact-finding hearing. Within my fact-finding judgment I made findings against her, at paragraphs 619-630. Within the analysis section of my judgment, particularly at paragraphs 729-745, I considered the impact of the findings I have made about Ms Dover on the allegations D came to make against her father. The findings I made against Ms Dover were within the ambit of the hearing before me and were all based on issues put to her in cross-examination on behalf of the Father and the Guardian. Ms Dover was given an opportunity to intervene in the proceedings to defend herself before the findings were made. She did not take that opportunity.

[7]I circulated my draft fact-finding judgment to the parties on 16 April 2025. At the conclusion of my draft judgment in the fact-find, I said this: 766 […] I will on 2 May 2025 when this judgment is formally handed down, consider what directions need to be made to further E’s future welfare. In the meantime, this judgment has been circulated in draft on 16 April 2025 to the parties and their lawyers. To enable the hearing on 2 May to be productive, I permit this draft to be shared with the parties and their lawyers. However, it MUST not be published by anyone.767. I will be grateful to receive suggested typographical, grammatical and other minor suggestions for amendment by close of play on 30 April 2025.

768. At the hearing on 2 May 2025 I will consider what directions are necessary to further the private law proceedings which relate to his Child Arrangements. I will also consider the ambit and remit of any publication of this judgment.

769. Ms Dover is invited to attend the hearing on 2 May 2025. Given the criticism made of her in this judgment, I will at that hearing consider whether she should be named in any published judgment. She should know of those criticisms; hence she may have a draft of this judgment BUT only that section which refers to her. That section of the judgment as disclosed to her must NOT be published. She is advised to seek legal advice.

[8]Accordingly, a copy of the relevant parts of my draft judgment were forwarded to Ms Dover by the solicitor for the child acting on the instructions of the Guardian. They also notified her of the hearing before me on 2 May 2025 and informed her that she, together with her legal representative, had been invited to attend that hearing to make representations on why she should not be named. By email at 18.15 hrs on 1 May 2025, Ms Dover responded to the solicitor for the child. She had been, she said, searching for legal representation for the hearing before me on 2 May 2025 but had been unable to do so. Within the email she stated that: It is my wish to have my name redacted from the judgment should it be published, for both personal and professional reasons, but at this moment, I am unable to provide you with a legal representative to appropriately relay this effectively to Her Ladyship. Please accept my apologises for not being able to attend tomorrow’s hearing. The message from Ms Dover was properly relayed to this court by the solicitor for the child.

[9]Having read the above email and heard submissions from the then parties on 2 May 2025 I directed that Ms Dover and any legal representative whom she instructs are invited to attend the next hearing. For the avoidance of doubt, Ms Dover may disclose the fact-finding judgment to any legal representative whom she instructs. Ms Dover is put on notice that the court will be determining, at the next hearing, issues including whether she is named within the published fact-finding judgment; and whether the fact-finding judgment is disclosed to her regulator and the schools/organisations for which she currently works. If Ms Dover seeks to oppose either of these issues, she or her legal adviser must file and serve a skeleton argument upon the other parties and the court by the date 7 days in advance of the next hearing, with the parties having permission to file and serve skeleton arguments in response by 11am on the working day before the next hearing. For the avoidance of doubt, permission is granted to the parties for a suitably redacted version of this approved order to be sent to Aimee Dover.

[10]To enable the next hearing to be effective, I ensured that Ms Dover had a full copy of my fact-finding judgment as handed down formally on 2 May 2025. At the same hearing, I directed the father to make formal application by C2 in relation to his application for the parents to be named in my judgment. His application is dated 8 May 2025.

The Hearing Before Me

[11]At the hearing before me the father was represented by Ms Venters KC leading Rachel Temple, Ms Traugott appeared with Ms Chhina for the mother and Ms Bazley KC led Ms Elsworth for the child instructed through the Guardian. At the hearing Ms Dover was represented by Mr Purss of Counsel.

[12]To determine the issues before me I have received submissions in writing from all parties and on behalf of Ms Dover. At the hearing on 10 June 2025, I heard supplemental oral submissions. I am grateful to all for the hard work and the concise, focused submissions I have both read and heard.

The Legal Framework

[13]The proceedings before me are ongoing. Thus, both S12 Administration of Justice Act 1960 and S97 Children Act 1989 apply - Clayton v Clayton

[2006] EWCA Civ 878

[14]S97(2) Children Act 1989 states that: (2) No person shall publish to the public at large or any section of the public any material which is intended, or likely, to identify—(a) any child as being involved in any proceedings before the High Court, a county court or a magistrates' court in which any power under this Act or the Adoption and Children Act 2002 may be exercised by the court with respect to that or any other child; or

(b) an address or school as being that of a child involved in any such proceedings. Contravention of these requirements is a criminal offence but by s 97(4): (4). The court or the Lord Chancellor may, if satisfied that the welfare of the child requires it and, in the case of the Lord Chancellor, if the Lord Chief Justice agrees, by order dispense with the requirements of subsection (2) to such extent as may be specified in the order.

[15]S12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 states(1) The publication of information relating to proceedings before any court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except in the following cases, that is to say— (a) where the proceedings— (i) relate to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors; (ii) are brought under the Children Act 1989 or the Adoption and Children Act 2002; or …

(2) Without prejudice to the foregoing subsection, the publication of the text or a summary of the whole or part of an order made by a court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except where the court (having power to do so) expressly prohibits the publication. […] (4) Nothing in this section shall be construed as implying that any publication is punishable as contempt of court which would not be so punishable apart from this section (and in particular where the publication is not so punishable by reason of being authorised by rules of court).

[16]In Re B (A Child) (Disclosure)

[2004] 2 FLR 142

, FD, Munby J said: Section 12(1)(a) of the Administration of

Justice Act 1960 has the effect of prohibiting the publication of:

'information relating to proceedings before any court sitting in private … where the proceedings (i) relate to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors; (ii) are brought under Children Act 1989; or (iii) otherwise relate wholly or mainly to the … upbringing of a minor.' (ii) Subject only to proof of knowledge that the proceedings in question are of the type referred to in s 12(1)(a), the publication of such information is a contempt of court. (iii) There is a 'publication' for this purpose whenever the law of defamation would treat there as being a publication. This means that most forms of dissemination, whether oral or written, will constitute a publication. The only exception is where there is a communication of information by someone to a professional, each acting in furtherance of the protection of children. […] (v) Section 12 does not of itself prohibit the publication of: (a) the fact, if it be the case, that a child is a ward of court and is the subject of wardship proceedings or that a child is the subject of residence or other proceedings under the Children Act 1989 or of proceedings relating wholly or mainly to his maintenance or upbringing; (b) the name, address or photograph of such a child; (c) the name, address or photograph of the parties (or, if the child is a party, the other parties) to such proceedings; (d) the date, time or place of a past or future hearing of such proceedings; (e) the nature of the dispute in such proceedings; (f) anything which has been seen or heard by a person conducting himself lawfully in the public corridor or other public precincts outside the court in which the hearing in private is taking place; (g) the name, address or photograph of the witnesses who have given evidence in such proceedings; (h) the party on whose behalf such a witness has given evidence; and (i) the text or summary of the whole or part of any order made in such proceedings. (vi) Section 12 prohibits the publication of: (a) accounts of what has gone on in front of the judge sitting in private; (b) documents such as affidavits, witness statements, reports, position statements, skeleton arguments or other documents filed in the proceedings, transcripts or notes of the evidence or submissions, and transcripts or notes of the judgment (this list is not necessarily exhaustive); (c) extracts or quotations from such documents; (d) summaries of such documents. These prohibitions apply whether or not the information or the document being published has been anonymised.'

[17]Section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 itself does not prevent the identification of witnesses - British Broadcasting Corporation v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council & X & Y

[2007] 1 FLR 101

, FD.

[18]The court has power to allow disclosure of information which would otherwise be prohibited from publication – see FPR 2010 rules 12.73-75 and PD 12G. As noted by Gwynneth Knowles J in Re Z (below), the scheme of the current rules is that communication of information relating to children proceedings falls into three categories: a) communications under rule 12.73(1)(a), which may be made as a matter of right; b) communications under rule 12.73(1)(c) and Practice Direction 12G paragraphs 1 and 2, which may be made but are subject to any direction by the court, including in appropriate circumstances, a direction that they should not be made, and c) other communications, which under 12.73(1)(b) may only be made with the court's permission.

[19]It is common ground in the case before me that neither (a) or (b) above applies and that the fact-finding judgment can only be disclosed to Ms Dover’s regulatory body and to the relevant LADO and the schools in which she works currently under (c). Thus, any permission for communication to Ms Dover’s regulator or a current school or to the relevant LADO must come by way of the court's permission under r.12.73(1)(b) FPR 2010. In in Re Z (Disclosure to Social Work England; findings of domestic abuse)

[2023] EWHC 447 (Fam)

Gwynneth Knowles J observed at paragraph 22 that the court's discretion to permit disclosure pursuant to rule 12.73(1)(b) is not unconstrained. Within her judgment, Gwyneth Knowles J reviewed the relevant case law. At paragraphs 64-65 of her judgment, she gave guidance on the steps to take when considering making disclosure to a regulatory body.

[20]FPR r12.73 (2)states that “Except as provided for under rule 12.73A, nothing in this Chapter permits the communication to the public at large, or any section of the public, of any information relating to the proceedings. The wording is plain. Unless rule 12.73A applies, the scheme provided by the current rules does not permit communication to the general public of any information relating to proceedings heard in private.

[21]However, the court may permit disclosure to the public at large under its inherent jurisdiction - Lord Dyson MR in Re C (A Child)

[2016] EWCA Civ 798

, and see the judgment of the Supreme Court in Abbasi (below).

[22]The court has a duty to act consistently with the parties’ competing ECHR rights pursuant to S6 Human Rights Act 1998. A decision to publish a judgment involves balancing ECHR 8 and 10. What is required is an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case. Lord Steyn, in Re S (Identification: Restrictions on Publication)

[2004] UKHL 47

at paragraph 17, said: First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing test.

[23]It is necessary to measure the nature of the impact on the child of the proposed publication. The interests of the child are not paramount, although they are a primary consideration they can be outweighed by the effect of other considerations - ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

[2011] UKSC 4

. The right to respect for private and family life can include the wellbeing and psychological integrity of the individual.

[24]Articles 8 of the ECHR states that:8.1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

8.2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

[25]

Article 10 of the ECHR

states that10.1 Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. [...]

10.2 The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

[26]The detailed guidance to the judiciary and practitioners, 'Transparency in the Family Courts: Publication of Judgments Practice Guidance' issued on 19 June 2024 by Sir Andrew McFarlane, President of the Family Division (2024 Guidance) states under 'Publication and Guidance: Purpose and Scope' at paragraphs 1.2-1.4: 1.2 This guidance is intended to assist judges, parties and professionals to make sound representations and decisions about whether a particular judgment should be published and what anonymisation would be necessary and proportionate in order to facilitate that without compromising private and family life. 1.3 This guidance is intended to align with the courts' duties to balance any ECHR rights, and to be consistent with relevant statute where applicable, and acknowledges that in each case the court will need to consider whether an adjustment to the general approach / process set out in this guidance is required in order to strike the right balance. 1.4 Nothing in this Guidance affects the exercise by the judge in any particular case of any powers otherwise available to regulate the publication of material relating to the proceedings. For example, where a judgment is likely to be used in a way that would defeat any attempt at anonymisation, it is open to the judge to refuse to publish the judgment or to make an order restricting its use. In every case the terms on which publication is permitted are a matter for the judge and will usually be set out by the judge in a rubric at the start of the judgment.

[27]The 2024 Guidance includes the following under 'key principles of anonymisation' 5.1 The general process set out below (Table 1) is intended to represent a reasonable starting point for the approach to the anonymisation of children judgments for the purposes of publication. It is not intended to be a fixed or rigid default position, but in many cases this general approach or something close to it will represent good practice. It is the responsibility of the court to consider in each case whether the general approach set out is appropriate or if some adjustment is required. 5.2. Advocates are expected to consider whether the default position is consistent with their instructions and their clients’ interests, and if not to raise these issues with the court when the question of publication becomes live, and in line with any directions the court may make for representations on the issue. 5.3. In children cases, if the name of a professional or expert witness is not mentioned in a published judgment, s12 Administration of Justice Act 1960 does not operate to prohibit identification of that professional by others (Re B (A Child) v The Mother & Ors

[2004] EWHC 411 (Fam)

[2004] 2 FLR 142

). Any specific prohibition on identification of a professional will need specific justification (and a specific direction). Generally, protection of the identity of professional witnesses will be justified only where it is necessary to protect the Article 8 rights of the child / family concerned. Anonymisation may be justified on other grounds depending on the specific facts. 5.4. The court should consider each item in Table 1 below individually and in combination. By removing one identifying feature, it may be possible to leave another feature in the judgment, that will better preserve the integrity of the judgment or enhance a reader’s ability to understand the case and reasons. 5.5. In summary however, the key principles of anonymisation are: 5.5.1. The law in the Family Court is the same as in any other jurisdiction, including the application of the open justice principle. 5.5.2. Anonymisation is only permissible where specifically justified on the facts of the case. 5.5.3. Anonymise / redact where necessary to protect the identity of the subject child and family members (as a function of the child’s Article 8 rights encompassing welfare) 5.5.4. Anonymisation of professionals is only usually justified where its purpose is to ensure the anonymisation of the child/family. A speculative concern about harassment or criticism is insufficient. 5.5.5. Anonymisation is not a zero sum game: removal of one fact or item may obviate the need to redact a more important fact or piece of information, thus facilitating publication of a more informative / useful version of a judgment. 5.5.6. Avoid prejudicing criminal investigation / proceedings. 5.5.7. Take particular care in cases involving complaints or descriptions of sexual assault or abuse.

[28]In Tickle v BBC

[2025] EWCA Civ 42

Sir Geoffrey Vos MR stated: 43. In Scott v. Scott

[1913] AC 417

(Scott v. Scott), the House of Lords explained the principles of open justice in the context of nullity proceedings. Viscount Haldane LC said at 439 that:

"[a] mere desire to consider feelings of delicacy or to exclude from publicity the details which it would be desirable not to publish is not, I repeat, enough as the law now stands. I think that to justify an order for hearing in camera it must be shown that the paramount object of securing that justice is done would really be rendered doubtful of attainment if the order were not made"

. Lord Atkinson said at 463 that:

"[t]he hearing of a case in public may be, and often is, no doubt, painful, humiliating, or [a] deterrent both to parties and witnesses, and in many cases, especially those of a criminal nature, the details may be so indecent as to tend to injure public morals, but all this is tolerated and endured, because it is felt that in public trial is to be found, on the whole, the best security for the pure, impartial and efficient administration of justice, the best means for winning for it public confidence and respect"

. Lord Shaw of Dunfermline described the "publicity in the administration of justice" as "one of the surest guarantees of our liberties". A violation of the principle of open justice would be "an attack on the very foundations of public and private security". 44. The open justice principle was more recently summarised by Lord Judge CJ in R (on the application of Mohamed) v. Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs

[2010] EWCA Civ 65

at [38] as follows: Justice must be done between the parties. The public must be able to enter any court to see that justice is being done in that court, by a tribunal conscientiously doing its best to do justice according to law. For that reason, every judge sitting in judgment is on trial. So it should be, and any exceptions to the principle must be closely limited. In reality very few citizens can scrutinise the judicial process: that scrutiny is performed by the media, whether newspapers or television, acting on behalf of the body of citizens. Without the commitment of an independent media the operation of the principle of open justice would be irremediably diminished. 45. This principle is applicable as much in family proceedings as in any other proceedings. The statutory limitations contained in section 12 of the AJA 1960 and section 97 do not displace the open justice principle or create any separate "shielded justice" environment. They provide a degree of privacy for certain proceedings relating to children according to their terms. Munby J explained at [83]-[86] in Re B (A Child) (Disclosure)

[2004] EWHC 411 (Fam)

[2004] 2 FLR 142

(Re B) the court's jurisdiction to relax and increase the statutory restrictions on reporting, and the reasons for those restrictions. Lord Dyson MR (with whom McFarlane and Burnett LJJ agreed) in Re C (A Child) (Private Judgment: Publication)

[2016] EWCA Civ 798

[2016] 1 WLR 5204

approved what Munby J had said in Re B at [12], and said this at [22]-[23]: The judge [Pauffley J] rightly recognised at para 10 of her judgment that open justice is at the heart of our system of justice and vital to the rule of law. As she said, it promotes the rule of law by letting in the light and allowing the public to scrutinise the workings of the law. There is a particular need for the media to act as a public watchdog in care proceedings in the Family Court "because of the intrusion or potential intrusion into family lives of those concerned and what could be a serious interference by the state in family life". She rightly also recognised that this was a powerful argument in favour of publication. As the Practice Guidance makes clear, permission for the publication should have been given unless there were compelling reasons why not to do so. The Practice Guidance accurately reflects the law. 46. The President of the Family Division published an article entitled Confidence and Confidentiality: Transparency in the Family Courts in October 2021. It led to the Reporting Pilot, for which Guidance was published in August 2024. It is, perhaps, sufficient to refer to [21] of Sir Andrew McFarlane's article which makes clear that the Family Court, as I suggested in oral argument, is not "another country". He said this: The Family Courts are part of the overall justice system. 'Open justice' is a fundamental constitutional imperative, to which there may be exceptions. Through open justice, the workings of the justice system are held up to public scrutiny by hearings being open to the public and/or by permitting media reporting of the proceedings. The work of the Family Court is of significant importance in the life of our society, yet, as is plain, the current limited degree of openness does not permit effective public scrutiny. It is by openness that judges are held to account for the decisions they make so that the public can have confidence that they are discharging their important role properly. 47. In Various Claimants v. Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority

[2021] EWHC 2020 (QB)

, [2022] EMLR 4 (IPSA) at [52], Nicklin J recently cautioned, in the context of MPs, against excessive caution in evaluating the risks that might arise from open justice: Finally, and as Mr Barnes QC frankly recognised, the evidence put forward by the Claimants falls a long way short of demonstrating a credible risk that if the Claimants were named (and their addresses provided) that they would be exposed to some risk of harm. There might exist a very small number of people whose attitude towards MPs (and those who work for them) is so hostile that they might conceivably be moved to offer some threat of physical violence to them, but this risk is remote. The Claimants have not put forward any credible and specific evidence that one or more Claimants is at particular risk of any such threat. The civil justice system and the principles of open justice cannot be calibrated upon the risk of irrational actions of a handful of people engaging in what would be likely to amount to criminal behaviour. If it did, most litigation in this country would have to be conducted behind closed doors and under a cloak of almost total anonymity. As a democracy, we put our faith and confidence in our belief that people will abide by the law. We deal with those who do not, not by cowering in the shadows, but by taking action against them as and when required. 48. In Abbasi v. Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust

[2023] Fam 287

(Abbasi),

[2023] EWCA Civ 331

, the Court of Appeal was concerned with the anonymity of physicians who had treated children before their deaths. The UKSC's decision on the appeal is awaited. Lord Burnett CJ emphasised at [75]-[78] the "high value attached to freedom of speech in our domestic common law order which is reflected in article 10 of the [ECHR]". At [118]-[119], Lord Burnett endorsed Lord Steyn's emphatic holding at [20] in Re S that it was not for the courts "except in the most compelling circumstances" to create new exceptions to the principles of open justice. The judge drew comfort at [56] from [118] in Abbasi, where Lord Burnett referred to the courts being astute to protect individuals caught up in litigation, and to the fact that experience had shown that end-of-life proceedings could cause "a firestorm on social media". I make two points at this stage. First, judges are not people "caught up in litigation" (as to which see the next section of this judgment). Secondly, Lord Burnett concluded [118] by making clear that indefinite anonymity orders required "careful scrutiny, clear evidence and an intense evaluation of competing interests". 49. Finally, in this connection, I would record and approve what Nicklin J said in PMC, where he refused an application for the anonymity of a child claimant to a clinical negligence claim. I have already mentioned that the judge said he disagreed with a part of the dictum. Nicklin J said this at [41]: Whilst, in a very broad sense, in assessing the engaged convention rights on any application for a derogation from open justice, the Court is carrying out a 'balance' between them, the scales do not start evenly balanced. The Court must start from the position that very substantial weight must be accorded to open justice. Any balance starts with a very clear presumption in favour of open justice unless and until that is displaced and outweighed by a sufficiently countervailing justification. That is not to give a presumptive priority to Article 10 (or open justice), it is simply a recognition of the context in which the Re S 'balance' is being carried out. 50. We have not been referred to any authority that minimises the importance of open justice. Indeed, section 12(4) of the HRA 1998 (see [42] above) provides expressly that:

"[t]he court must have particular regard to the importance of the [ECHR] right to freedom of expression"

. It does not seem to me to matter whether section 12(3) of the HRA 1998 was strictly applicable (on the basis that the court was restraining publication "before trial"), since section 12(1) certainly was engaged (the court was considering whether to grant relief which might affect the exercise of the ECHR right to freedom of expression)

[29]The Supreme Court has recently given judgment in Abassi v Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals and others

[2025] UKSC 15

. The court held that: […] in proceedings concerned with the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment of children, the High Court had jurisdiction to grant injunctions protecting the identities of clinicians and other hospital staff involved in that treatment, including injunctions contra mundum, where and for so long as the injunction was necessary(i) to protect the interests of those children or the administration of justice, in exercise of its inherent parens patriae powers, or

(ii) to prevent interference with a hospital trust's performance of its statutory functions, in exercise of the so-called “ Broadmoor jurisdiction”, or

(iii) to protect the rights of clinicians and other hospital staff, in proceedings brought or continued by those individuals (or one or more representatives of them) in reliance on their rights, notably under the tort of invasion of privacy; that, thus, clinicians and hospital staff could be protected in the context of disputes over the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment under one of those three causes of action (which were not mutually exclusive), the first two of which were available to hospital trusts and the third of which was available to the clinicians and hospital staff themselves; that although the powers of the High Court under section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 and section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 were in principle wide enough to enable it to issue injunctions to protect the Convention rights of clinicians and other hospital staff in proceedings brought by hospital trusts if that was the only way in which those rights could receive practical and effective protection, such circumstances did not exist where such protection could be afforded under one of those three causes of action; that, therefore, an application for such an injunction should be based on the relevant cause of action (whether the parens patriae jurisdiction, the Broadmoor jurisdiction or the rights of the clinicians) rather than simply on section 6(1) of the 1998 Act or section 37(1) of the 1981 Act ; but that the jurisdiction to grant such an injunction had to be exercised compatibly with Convention rights, particularly the rights of the clinicians and the child's parents under articles 8 and 10 respectively of the Convention for the Protection of Humans Rights and Fundamental

[30]In the lead judgment, Lord Reed PSC and Lord Briggs JSC (with whom Lord Hodge DPSC and Lord Stephens JSC agreed) confirmed that the inherent equitable jurisdiction is sufficiently wide to enable it to grant an injunction when failure to do so would be incompatible with Convention Rights but went on to qualify that confirmation as follows:86. ............That was the basis on which Lord Steyn preferred to analyse an application for a contra mundum injunction to prevent the naming of a defendant in criminal proceedings, in order to protect the private life of her child, in In re S at para 23, although the application had been made under the parens patriae jurisdiction. As Lord Rodger of Earlsferry JSC observed in In re Guardian News and Media Ltd

[2010] 2 AC 697

, para 30 , reliance on section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act removed any doubts that might otherwise have existed (at that time) as to the general availability of a remedy under English law to protect rights to privacy as required by article 8.

87. However, domestic causes of action are the means by which compliance with Convention rights, including those protected by article 8 , is normally secured. The function of the Convention is generally to set a boundary which domestic law cannot go beyond without contravening international obligations: as Lord Mance JSC said in Kennedy v Information Comr

[2015] AC 455

, para 46 , “ the Convention rights represent a threshold protection”. The Convention does not prescribe what the content of domestic law must be within that boundary. On the contrary, the European court allows a margin of appreciation to national authorities. Our domestic law is determinative of rights and obligations within that margin of appreciation.

88. Accordingly, in situations where the Convention has what is sometimes described as “horizontal” as contrasted with “vertical” effect—that is to say, where it requires domestic law to secure Convention rights by regulating the legal relations between private individuals or bodies, as distinct from the legal relations between private individuals and the state—domestic law normally complies with the Convention by providing an appropriate cause of action, thereby enabling parties to apply to the court for a remedy which will protect their Convention rights. As Baroness Hale of Richmond stated in Campbell v MGN Ltd

[2004] 2 AC 457

, para 132 :

“The 1998 Act does not create any new cause of action between private persons. But if there is a relevant cause of action applicable, the court as a public authority must act compatibly with both parties’ Convention rights.” [...] 92. Although articles 8 and 10 of the Convention are of unquestionable importance, their function is different, as we have explained. Inevitably, since the European court decides specific complaints that domestic authorities have exceeded what is permissible under the Convention , rather than determining the content of domestic law within those limits, its judgments have not established a body of rules or principles which is as rich or detailed as that existing or emerging in our domestic law. Rather, the judgments in cases where articles 8 and 10 are involved are based on an assessment of the facts of individual cases, drawn from a wide variety of legal contexts across the jurisdictions of the Council of Europe, and considered after the domestic proceedings have been completed. The focus of the judgments, in cases concerned with articles 8 and 10 , is usually on whether the national margin of appreciation has been exceeded. It can be difficult to derive from them rules more specific than the broad statements of principle which have been repeated over decades. Accordingly, as Lord Mance JSC said in Kennedy v Information Comr [2015] AC 455, para 46 , “the natural starting point in any dispute is to start with domestic law, and it is certainly not to focus exclusively on the Convention rights, without surveying the wider common law scene”

. That point (and others we have made about the relationship between the common law and Convention rights) is illustrated by the reasoning in R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor (Nos 1 and 2)

[2020] AC 869

, para 64 and Fearn v Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery

[2024] AC 1

, paras 113 and 206 ; see also QX v Secretary of State for the Home Department

[2024] 3 WLR 547

, para 53 . 93. Seen against that background, the reasoning of Lord Steyn in In re S

[2005] 1 AC 593

, which based the court’s jurisdiction in that case on section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act , was highly unusual (as we will explain, it also depended on a broad approach to the remedial scheme of the Human Rights Act ). However, it reflected the absence from English law, at that time, of any general cause of action for the invasion of privacy: see Campbell v MGN Ltd , decided a few months before In re S , and Wainwright v Home Office

[2004] 2 AC 406

, decided the previous year. Accordingly, the juridical basis of any general right to privacy (as distinct from more specific rights, such as the right in equity to protect the confidentiality of personal information) could only be found in article 8 itself, as given effect by the Human Rights Act . One might add that the novelty in In re S lay more in Lord Steyn’s reasoning than in what the courts actually did, as the Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion as the House of Lords in the exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction. 94. The law has moved on since In re S. In more recent times, the courts have been willing to develop the common law when necessary in order to meet the requirements of the Convention , and have deprecated the tendency in some earlier cases to see the law solely in terms of the Convention itself: see, for example, R (Guardian News and Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court

[2013] QB 618

, para 88 , R (Osborn) v Parole Board

[2014] AC 1115

, paras 54–63 , and Kennedy v Information Comr , para 46. In particular, the common law has evolved to provide a cause of action protecting rights relating to privacy, as we have explained at paras 79–80 above. That cause of action is available to clinicians who are threatened with wrongful invasions of their privacy.

[31]In relation to open justice, their Lordships said this 117. Over a century ago the House of Lords recognised, in Scott v Scott (para 38 above), that cases concerning children are an exception to the general principle that justice is to be administered in public. As Lord Shaw of Dunfermline stated (p 483):

“… the jurisdiction over wards and lunatics is exercised by the judges as representing His Majesty as parens patriae. The affairs are truly private affairs; the transactions are transactions truly intra familiam; and it has long been recognized that an appeal for the protection of the court in the case of such persons does not involve the consequence of placing in the light of publicity their truly domestic affairs.” 118. The privacy of proceedings concerning children has also long been recognised in legislation. Currently, rule 27.10(1) of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 (SI 2010/2955) provides that family proceedings are to be held in private, subject to the court directing otherwise. There is no indication that such a direction was given in the Haastrup proceedings. Rule 27.11(2) prohibits any person from being present during any hearing other than, among others, “(b) a party to the proceedings” and “(f) duly accredited representatives of news gathering and reporting organisations”

. Rule 27.11(3) provides:

“At any stage of the proceedings the court may direct that personswithin paragraph (2)(f) and (ff) shall not attend the proceedings or any part of them, where satisfied that— (a) this is necessary— (i) in the interests of any child concerned in, or connected with, the proceedings; (ii) for the safety or protection of a party, a witness in the proceedings, or a person connected with such a party or witness; or (iii) for the orderly conduct of the proceedings; or (b) justice will otherwise be impeded or prejudiced.”

The power conferred by rule 27.11(3) can be exercised by the court on its own initiative or pursuant to representations by, among others, a party, any witness, any children’s guardian or an officer of CAFCASS. Those rules were in force at all times material to these proceedings. Accordingly, the judge could have excluded the media representatives from the hearing under rule 27.11(3), in the unlikely event that they were unwilling to respect the anonymity of the witnesses (unlikely, because the media had not opposed the grant of the injunction or sought its variation or discharge in order to enable their reports of the proceedings to include the witnesses’ identities). He could have done so either on his own initiative or pursuant to representations by King’s or Isaiah’s CAFCASS guardian: representations which would have been highly likely, in order to protect the clinicians and Isaiah, if there had been any question of the witnesses’ identities being published. 119. Against this background, the first point to be made is that it is established by Scott v Scott that the open justice principle had no application to the Haastrup proceedings. There is no constitutional principle that is infringed by a prohibition on the publication of the names of witnesses in proceedings held in private under the parens patriae jurisdiction. 120. We also note that section 12(1) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 provides that the publication of information relating to proceedings before any court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except in certain specified circumstances, including “(a) where the proceedings – (i) relate to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors”. As Munby J said in Kelly v British Broadcasting Corpn

[2001] Fam 59

, 72, summarising a number of earlier authorities, “in essence, what section 12 protects is the privacy and confidentiality: (i) of the documents on the court file and (ii) of what has gone on in front of the judge in his courtroom”. Accordingly, it covers the names of the witnesses who gave evidence or provided statements, the identities of the experts who provided reports, and the contents of their evidence, statements and reports. It follows that, by virtue of section 12, the publication of the witnesses’ and experts’ names, either by the media or by the parents, would have rendered them liable to proceedings for contempt of court. That reflects the common law: In re Martindale

[1894] 3 Ch 193

; In re De Beaujeu’s Application for Writ of Attachment against Cudlipp

[1949] Ch 230

. For that reason also, the injunction could not be regarded as impinging upon open justice. 121. In view of the fact that a direction was given in the Abbasi case that future attended hearings were to be held in public (subject to a proviso that the court could exclude any person, other than a party, where it was in the interests of justice to do so), we should add that, even if the Abbasi case had proceeded to a public hearing, it does not necessarily follow that the injunction would have impinged unlawfully on the open justice principle. If oral evidence had been given, or statements or reports adduced, by the clinicians whose anonymity was protected by the injunction, it would have been open to the judge to exclude the public or to take the less drastic step of permitting their names to be withheld (see, for example, Attorney General v Leveller Magazine Ltd

[1979] AC 440

). If the public were excluded, the position would be the same as in the Haastrup proceedings. If the names were withheld, the court could exercise its power under section 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 to give directions prohibiting their publication. In those circumstances, the injunction would not prevent the publication of anything which could otherwise have been published. 122. It is also necessary to consider the submission advanced on behalf of the parents that the court cannot lawfully derogate from the principle of open justice for the benefit of individuals who are neither parties nor witnesses in the proceedings, because to do so would be incompatible with

article 6(1) of the Convention

. 123. Article 6(1) provides that, in the determination of civil rights and obligations, “everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing”. However, the requirement to hold a public hearing is subject to exceptions. This is apparent from the text of article 6(1) itself, which contains the proviso that:

“the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.”

Furthermore, it is established in the case law of the European court that, even in a criminal law context, where there is a high expectation of publicity, it may on occasion be necessary under article 6 to limit the open and public nature of proceedings in order, for example, to protect the safety or privacy of witnesses or to promote the free exchange of information and opinion in the pursuit of justice: see, among many other authorities, Doorson v The Netherlands

(1996) 22 EHRR 330

, para 70 . 124. The submission advanced on behalf of the parents is insufficiently nuanced to reflect this approach. As the proviso to article 6(1) makes clear, exceptions to the open justice principle are capable of being justified if, among other things, they are necessary in the interests of public order, or to protect the interests of a child (as in B v United Kingdom

(2001) 34 EHRR 19

), or in the interests of justice. As we have explained in our discussion of In re C

[1990] Fam 39

and the subsequent case law, and in our discussion of the Broadmoor principle, injunctions prohibiting the identification of clinical and other staff in proceedings of the present kind are in principle capable of being justified on one or more of those grounds.

[32]At paragraph 128 of the judgment, their Lordships then turned to the proper application of the Convention: 128. The proper application of the Convention requires a more structured approach than the concept of “balancing” rights might suggest. In assessing whether there has been a breach of article 10 (or, mutatis mutandis, a breach of article 8 ), the court begins by asking whether there was an interference prescribed by the law. The next question is whether it pursued a legitimate aim, ie an aim which can be justified with reference to one or more of the matters mentioned in article 10(2) (or article 8(2) , as the case may be). The remaining question is whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society. It is at that stage that the court may be required to strike a fair balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention which may come into conflict with each other: Axel Springer AG v Germany

(2012) 55 EHRR 6

, para 84 .

[33]Theis J in A Local Authority v X and Y

[2025] EWFC 126

at paragraph 65 and 66 considered Abassi (above) and stated:65. The Supreme Court also made clear as between proceedings held in open court and those held in private, the principle of open justice not being breached in the latter case where orders prohibited the publication of the names of witnesses in proceedings held in private under the parens patriae jurisdiction. This is apparent from [51], [120]-[121] and [124]. This supports the position there is no presumption in favour of open justice, no weighted balance and that the court simply undertakes the Re S balancing exercise by reference to the competing Convention rights engaged, neither Article 8 nor Article 10 having precedence over the other. The balancing exercise is highly fact specific to each individual case. The Supreme Court went on to add at [160]: “The need for restrictions of freedom of expression to be established convincingly reflects the fact that freedom of expression is, as the European court said in Axel Springer AG v Germany, “one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s selffulfilment” (para 78). That does not in any way imply that the interests protected by article 10 have, as such, precedence over the interests protected by article 8. Clearly, there are many situations in which restrictions on freedom of expression are justified in order to protect the rights of others (including rights protected by article 8), as article 10(2) itself recognises. Furthermore, the weight to be attached to freedom of expression, and to privacy, will plainly depend on the circumstances of the particular case.”

66. At [155], [159] and [181] in Abbasi the Supreme Court addresses the need for the court to consider and scrutinise the cogency of any evidence relied upon to support any right or to justify any restrictions of them.

The Arguments

[34]It is right that I should capture the arguments raised before me within this judgment. In doing so I concentrate on the contentious issue before me, namely whether or not Ms Dover should be named in any published judgment. .

The father’s argument

[35]The father considers the judgment should be published. On his behalf it is submitted that it falls within The President’s Practice Guidance and paragraphs 3.6, 3.8 (i) and (xii). In addition, there are further public policy reasons advanced on behalf of the father. They are set out in detail in the skeleton argument filed on his behalf. In summary they are that the public interests are furthered by publishing judgments. Publication demystifies the work of the Family Court. Publication of this judgment will, it is said, show how the Family Court deals with allegations of serious domestic abuse and counter allegations of alienating behaviours without fear or favour. The judgment is said to illustrate how participation directions can be used effectively to achieve best evidence.

[36]I am reminded that the subject child’s article 8 right is in play. It is submitted that the nature of the impact of publication that interferes with privacy rights is to be measured objectively; the mere fact that the child is too young to understand does not mean there is no such impact: Weller v Newspapers Ltd

[2015] EWCA Civ 1176

, 13

[2016] 1 WLR 1541

at [20] (Lord Dyson MR). But when measuring that impact the court should not simply assume, or treat it as inevitable, that publicity would have an adverse impact; in each case, the impact of publication on the child must be assessed by reference to the evidence before the court: Clayton v Clayton

[2006] EWCA Civ 878

at [51].

[37]The President’s Guidance at paragraph 4.2 states “Some thought may need to be given to what is meant by identification or anonymisation. Is the court dealing with a generalised risk of identification, a risk of identification by peers or in the child’s local community, or a risk of the child identifying him/herself as the subject of a published judgment? The court will need to consider the nature, likelihood and severity of any such risk and any potential mitigations in making a decision”.

[38]On behalf of the father it is submitted that with redactions as to the children’s names, location of this family, the schools, and other identifying features, the subject child’s identity can largely be protected, if the court considers it necessary

[39]In relation to the issue of whether I should permit disclosure of the judgment to Ms Dover’s regulators and her current employers, I was taken to RE Z (disclosure to Social Work England: Findings of Domestic Abuse)

[2023] EWHC 447 (Fam)

which sets out the law in detail.. On behalf of the father it is argued that the Court has made serious findings against Ms Dover. It is right that she is identified. Specifically, it is said that:a. There is a general public interest in identification of professionals where there has been serious professional failings and irregularity as the Court found in this case.

b. Ms Dover lost her professionals objectivity.

c. It is important to identify where professionals fail to recognise the limits of their experience and expertise. They pose a risk of harm to those who believe them to have expertise that they do not actually possess.

d. Ms Dover, it is said, was not honest in aspects of her evidence. It is in the public interest to identify where professionals become so comprised that they resort to dishonesty under oath.

[40]I am reminded that the President’s guidance on publication of judgments and the anonymisation of professionals states “5.5.4 Anonymisation of professionals is only usually justified where its purpose is to ensure the anonymisation of the child/family. A speculative concern about harassment or criticism is insufficient”. It is submitted that the Court must consider whether there is any reason not to publish Ms Dover’s name.

[41]Responding to the arguments raised on behalf of Ms Dover, I was reminded on behalf of the father that no authority has been provided for the submission that a special category of accountability attaches to professionals who are employed by the state as opposed to those who operate in private practice. Ms Dover’s duties/responsibilities, it is submitted, when working as a psychotherapist are determined by her professional body, not her employer. In any event, Ms Dover initially worked with D through a publicly funded provision and is now working in schools.

[42]On behalf of the father it is said that there is no evidence that identifying Ms Dover will lead to ‘jigsaw’ identification of any of the children. Ms Dover’s relationships with D was a private therapeutic one. There should be no online or other association between Ms Dover and this family in the public domain. There is no evidence provided by Ms Dover, or set out in the skeleton argument, that demonstrates any real risk of this happening if she is named.

[43]It is argued on Ms Dover’s behalf that she may face bullying/vilification. However, in response I was taken to the Guidance - “A speculative concern about harassment or criticism is insufficient” - to justify anonymisation. It is submitted that nothing in the skeleton argument goes beyond speculation. Ms Dover has not filed any medical or other evidence to support the contention that there would be a significant psychological impact upon her such that the balance would fall in favour of anonymisation. On behalf of the father, it is not accepted that Ms Dover’s Article 8 rights extend to protecting her from the publication of adverse findings per se. It falls to Ms Dover’s regulatory body to explore whether professional consequences arise from her conduct towards D. But it is said to be specifically in the public interest to know that it is said that she failed to adhere to reasonable professional standards, she lacked impartiality in her therapeutic relationships with a young, vulnerable child, and she provided the external appearance of professionalism . It is argued that it is in the public interest to reveal this, not least because Ms Dover continues to engage, in a professional capacity, with vulnerable young people, where there is no evidence of insight, change, re-training or other proper mitigation that might persuade the Court that the risk has reduced.

[44]On behalf of the father, it is submitted that the Court has a duty to safeguard children. Ms Dover continues to work with children in her current role. It is important that her fitness to continue to do so is raised with her professional body. The judgment sets out the Courts concerns and findings succinctly and clearly. It also explains how and why the Court came to these conclusions. Ms Dover has already referred herself to BACP. That referral and anything that arises from it will be better informed by the Court’s findings. They are not binding. They are informative. would inevitably lead to the identification of the children, including

The mother’s argument

[45]The mother accepts that the fact-finding judgment should be published. Further, on her behalf it is acknowledged that the decision to name Ms Dover in its judgment is ultimately a matter for the Court. The mother does however raise a concern that there is a possibility that, by naming Ms Dover, the children of the family, including the subject child will be identified. I am reminded that that is a concern raised by the President in the Publication of Judgments Practice Guidance (2024) in Table 1. It is submitted that it is not known, for example, whether D told anyone about Ms Dover or whether knowing Ms Dover’s identity could lead to jigsaw identification because of the location of her practice. These are said to be issues that should be explored in more depth.

[46]In relation to disclosing the judgment to Ms Dover’s regulator and employer, it is submitted on behalf of the mother that that is a matter for the court.

Ms Dover’s Argument

[47]On behalf of Ms Dover, it is said that it is a matter for my discretion whether I permit my judgment to be disclosed to her regulator, the relevant LADO and the schools and other organizations where she currently works. If I consider it necessary and proportionate to permit the disclosure, then I am told Ms Dover will not oppose that course. She has, in any event, referred herself to BACP and raised matters with her current employers although she has not sent them a copy of my judgment.

[48]It is said on Ms Dover’s behalf that given the protracted nature of her therapeutic relationship with D, the secondary devastating effect of D’s suicide has had on Ms Dover cannot be overemphasised on a personal level. The findings I have made in relation to her professional conduct are said to compound her own sense of devastation.

[49]Ms Dover, through submissions, sought to contextualise the findings I made about her record keeping. Through counsel she says that her primary motive was one of safeguarding. She has never had a complaint lodged against her within her professional practice and she followed the appropriate guidelines when D began to make allegations of rape.

[50]It was submitted on behalf of Ms Dover that the facts of this case warrant anonymization of her name. She was not, at the relevant time, working in a state based professional role but was engaged on a private basis. This is said to distinguish her from the level of public accountability of those who hold public roles such as a police officers, social workers, or judges- see for instance – Tickle & Anor v The BBC & Others

[2025] EWCA Civ 42

is said to be distinguished on the facts.

[51]Within the skeleton argument filed on Ms Dover’s behalf it is submitted that Ms Dover and her interactions with D are extensively referenced within my fact-finding judgment. The court, it is said, will want to ensure that the anonymisation of the parents and the children is maintained. It is argued that I should consider whether Ms Dover’s identity in any way traces back to the subject child.

[52]It is submitted that I should take into account the digital playground of modern life; bullying behaviour is an all too common feature where vilification of an individual can have an extremely deleterious impact on them both personally and socially. Publication of her identity would, it is said, inevitably result in a permanent online profile involving the current case.

[53]It is said that I should consider the possible impact on Ms Dover who it is said is a therapist who not only intended to do no harm, but to do good. I am reminded on behalf of Ms Dover that when making my decision on whether or not to publish her name I must take into consideration her right to private and family life under

Article 8 ECHR

. The personal and potentially psychological impact of such publication on Ms Dover and the impact on her career, her right to work and developments as a psychotherapist.

[54]I have properly taken to the relevant parts of Practice Guidance being issued by the President of the Family Division on the19th June 2024 under the heading ‘Transparency In The Family Courts - Publication of Judgments’. In particular I was taken to paragraphs 2.4, 3.11-12, 5.3 and 5.5.4 on behalf of Ms Dover.

The Guardian

[55]The Guardian in writing and orally strongly supported the father’s application for Ms Dover to be named in any fact-finding judgment. The Guardian also continued to seek for the full fact-finding judgment to be sent to Ms Dover’s regulatory body, the relevant LADO and to her employers. I was told the Guardian remains gravely concerned that Ms Dover without completing any remedial work or training continue to practice with vulnerable children and young people. It was submitted that Ms Dover does not appear to accept the findings made against her and seeks to minimise and excuse her conduct. The Guardian was anxious that the vulnerable children and young people with whom Ms Dover continues to work should be protected.

My Decisions with My Reasons

[56]I shall give my decision in relation to each of the issues before me in turn. Should I permit disclosure of my judgment to BACP, the relevant LADO and the school(s) at which Ms Dover currently works?

[57]I begin by considering E’s interests. He is the subject of protracted and highly contentious private law proceedings. He has suffered a number of adverse childhood events, not least the death of his sibling D whom he still grieves. His relationship with his father and the paternal family had ceased and is only now being reconstructed. The private law proceedings are now consolidated with public law proceedings in which final welfare decisions have yet to be made. No one before me suggests that disclosure of the judgment to Ms Dover’s regulatory body, the relevant LADO or the schools at which she works will impact on E himself. E does not attend at a school where Ms Dover works. He has no professional or personal relationship with her. The disclosure sought will not impact the Children Act proceedings of which he is the subject and thus indirectly impact him.

[58]As to the welfare interests of other children generally. I factor in that Ms Dover continues to provide counselling to young people and children. According to Ms Dover they all have their vulnerabilities and many are neurodiverse. I have made serious findings against Ms Dover that are critical of her record keeping and the impact her work had on D; on D’s mental health; and on what D came to allege. Those that use Ms Dover’s services place their trust in her. They and those who employ her expect high standards.

[59]I factor into my decision making the gravity of the findings I have made. Ms Dover has not reflected upon my findings and accepted them. Instead, she has sought to excuse her conduct. She has taken no remedial steps in relation my criticisms of her. On behalf of the Guardian, it is submitted that the devastating impact on D and her mental health of Ms Dover’s “therapy” cannot be over-emphasised. The Guardian argues that if she continues to practice as she has in the past, then other children and vulnerable young people remain at risk. I agree with that submission.

[60]There is a strong public interest in disclosing the fact-find judgment to the BACP, the relevant LADO and the school(s) at which she works. The BACP exists to regulate the work of psychotherapist and ensure high professional standards. Although Ms Dover has self-referred to BACP, what she has told her regulatory body is not known. What is known is that they do not yet have a copy of the fact-finding judgment. Its disclosure will enhance their investigations but not be determinative of it. A LADO is part of a local authority safeguarding team. They play a central role in ensuring the safety and protection of children in various professional settings including schools. They consider, amongst other matters, whether a person has acted in a manner incompatible with safely working with children and vulnerable young people. My findings against Ms Dover are directly relevant to their safeguarding role. The schools in which Ms Dover works place considerable trust in her and her work.

[61]I place in the balance that the disclosure proposed will impact Ms Dover’s right to privacy. Potentially it will impact on her ability to work and her livelihood. That said, I also place in the balance that Ms Dover does not object to the disclosure as proposed and has raised no specific arguments against it nor has she evidenced the potential impact of disclosure upon her and her ability to work; she has stated those as general propositions.

[62]The disclosure sought impacts E’s confidentiality and his right to privacy. However, appropriate anonymisation by removing the names of E and his siblings, his parent; names, names of schools and the names of the witnesses other than Ms Dover can minimise the risk that E and his family will be identified. Safeguards can also be put in place to ensure that disclosure is for a defined purpose only. Thus, disclosure to BACP can be limited to their investigation into Ms Dover’s fitness to practice. Disclosure to the relevant LADO can be limited to their exercise of their safeguarding functions. Disclosure to the school(s) need not be to the whole of the teaching staff and can be restricted to disclosure to a person within a school such as the Head Teacher or the Safeguarding Lead. It can be a condition of disclosure that there is to be no onward transmission without prior court approval. Those restrictions will, of course, become otiose if I decide that Ms Dover should be named in any version of the fact-find judgment that is published.

[63]The fact-find was held in private subject to a Transparency Order. The importance of maintaining the privacy of the proceedings to encourage candour and frankness is weighty. It is only if parties and witnesses are candid with the court that the court can have the best evidence upon which it can proceed to make future welfare decisions for children. Fear of publication can inhibit frankness.

[64]I take into account the Article 6 and Article 8 rights of E, the parties to the fact-find and Ms Dover. Standing back and balancing all the factors in this case for and against disclosure, I consider that the balance falls firmly in favour disclosure to the BACP; to the relevant LADO; and to the headteacher and safeguarding lead of the school(s) at which she is currently working. The need for public safety outweighs the privacy rights engaged in this case, including Ms Dover's right to privacy. I consider that such disclosure is lawful, necessary and proportionate.

[65]I will redact the fact-finding judgment to remove material which might cause E and his family to be identified Should the fact-finding judgment be published and if so, should Ms Dover be named in any published judgment?

[66]Whether I publish my judgment in the fact-find is ultimately a matter for me in the exercise of my discretion. My task is to strike a balance between the rights that favour publication and the rights of the subject child, their family and Ms Dover to respect for their private and family life. I must conduct an intensive and fact-sensitive scrutiny of the competing considerations. I must evaluate various factors that tend to favour publication and those against. I must consider and scrutinise the cogency of any evidence relied upon to support any right or to justify any restrictions of them.

[67]All parties to the private law proceedings (father, mother and the Guardian on behalf of E) agree that I should publish my fact-finding judgment in an anonymised form. Ms Dover does not seek to prevent publication, just her being named within it.

[68]I have been taken by all parties to the Practice Guidance issued on 19 June 2024 by the President of the Family Division - Transparency in Family Courts, Publication of Judgments. I was specifically referred to paragraphs 3.6 and 3.8 of that Guidance which state: 3.6. Judges should always consider publishing a judgment in any case where: i. the judgment involves a novel point of law or establishes a legal precedent; or ii. the judge concludes that publication would be in the public interest for a fact specific reason; and iii. a written judgment already exists in publishable form or the judge has already ordered that the judgment be transcribed. 3.7. Save for the above, there is no requirement for a case to fall within a certain category for it to be deemed suitable for publication. A judge is invited to exercise their discretion to consider as potentially publishable such cases as are representative of the judge’s individual caseload. 3.8. Categories of case where the judgment may be particularly suitable for publication include: i. contested fact-finding hearings; […] xii. Decisions, whether final or interim, involving significant litigation misconduct or disproportionate litigation;

[69]The parties’ agreement to the publication of an anonymised version of the judgment is a tacit acknowledgement of(i) the public interest in the workings of the Family Court and the subject matter of the fact-find before me and

(ii) that the fact-finding judgment can be anonymised in such a manner as to preserve the confidentiality of E and his family. In those circumstances it is accepted by all that the balance falls firmly in favour of publication. I accept that it does and have already stated an intention to publish the fact-finding judgment in an anonymised form. The contentious issue for me to determine is whether to name Ms Dover within that published judgment.

[70]It is argued on behalf of Ms Dover that naming her may lead back to the identity of E and his family becoming known. The mother shares that concern. However, there is no evidence that the therapeutic relationship between D and Ms Dover is in the public domain. Indeed, it is accepted on behalf of Ms Dover that there is no known public connection between Ms Dover and D whether in the real world or on the internet. On behalf of the mother it is argued that D may have told her friends and peers that Ms Dover was counselling her. However, against that broad submission is the fact that there is no evidence that D did tell them. Within the remit of the fact-finding hearing and within the hearings since then, no evidence has been placed before me that even suggests that D had ever told her friends or peers of her therapeutic relationship with Ms Dover.

[71]I have considered whether naming Ms Dover will lead back to the identity of E. Amongst his peers and those that know him and his family, there is a risk of identification that I acknowledge. However, that risk does not come from any association between him and Ms Dover or D and Ms Dover. It exists as a result of the factual matrix set out in the judgment, in particular the suicide of D. It exists because those close to E and D and their family will already now the facts set out in my judgment. There is a risk that by publishing this judgment in anonymised form, E will come to see it and know of it. However, a narrative for E has already been settled within the proceedings. It is basic and will be developed within therapy over time as he comes to terms with the factual matrix of this case which is his own history. Steps have already been taken to enable him to know, in a manner that is suitable for his age and understanding, what has happened and why it has happened. His parents, his brother C and his wider family are protective of him. E is unlikely to access the published judgment himself, and his parents, brother and wider family are, in my judgment, unlikely to bring it to his attention. There is always a risk that some member of the public in the small community in which E lives may bring it to his attention. Whether Ms Dover is named in that judgment does not augment or detract from any such risk. In any event, the risk is small and, if it were to come to fruition, E would simply read a judgment which describes his lived experience and the narrative that he will be given in a therapeutic context. Any potential impact of the publication of the judgment itself is thus mitigated.

[72]I factor in that Ms Dover’s name is heavily referenced throughout my judgment. However, the number of times a person is mentioned does not establish a connection between Ms Dover and the subject child E. Ms Dover was D’s psychotherapist. She is heavily referenced within my judgment because she was an important witness of fact. The sessions she had with D impacted on D’s mental health and the allegations she came to make. The impact the counselling Ms Dover gave D on the allegations D came to make is of interest to the public as is its impact on D’s mental health.

[73]I take into account paragraph 5.5.4 of the President’s Guidance 2024: Anonymisation of professionals is only usually justified where its purpose is to ensure the anonymisation of the child/family. A speculative concern about harassment or criticism is insufficient

[74]I place in the balance Ms Dover’s Article 8 right to private and family life. I take into account the possible impact of being named on her emotional and psychological integrity. I have been told in argument that she has suffered as a result of D’s death. I acknowledge that Ms Dover worked with D for a protracted period. On behalf of the Father, it is submitted on a proper evidential basis that Ms Dover lost her objectivity when working with D. I accept that submission. It is, in part, because she lost her objectivity and has no insight into that failing that there is a public interest in naming her. Against that I factor in, that it is her relationship with D that adds to the grief and sense of loss that I accept, as a matter of common sense, that Ms Dover is likely to have suffered. However, there is no evidence that Ms Dover has been specifically impacted, emotionally or psychologically, by the findings I made against her. The submissions made about the possibility of harm arising are broad, non-specific and are not rooted in evidence. In reality, they amount to an observation that there is a possibility that her emotional and psychological integrity may be impacted if I publish her name, just as the emotional and psychological integrity of any professional witness may be impacted if named in a judgment.

[75]I acknowledge that there is a possibility that Ms Dover’s financial security and income may be at risk if she is named in the judgment. But against that I factor in that it is the specific disclosure of the judgment to the current schools at which she works, the LADO and BACP that is likely to have a greater impact on her ability to work, than naming her in the judgment. It falls to Ms Dover’s regulatory body to explore whether professional consequences arise from her conduct towards D and the LADO to determine whether any safeguarding issues arises.

[76]It is submitted that publication of Ms Dover’s identity would inevitably result in a permanent online profile involving the current case in which she will be named. I take into account that digital playground of modern life; bullying behaviour is an all too common feature where vilification of an individual can have an extremely deleterious impact on them both personally and socially. However, there is no evidence before this court to support the submission that that risk would become a reality in this case.

[77]As outlined above, it is submitted on behalf of Ms Dover that there is a distinction between the public interest in identifying those who work for public bodies and those who work in private practice. That submission, it seems to me, misses the point. Ms Dover is an accredited psychotherapist. She is a professional working with vulnerable young people and children. That role and how she practices attracts the public interest, not whether she works within or without the public sector. In any event, I note that Ms Dover worked in the past as a psychotherapist with D through CDA, a charity funded by a local authority and thus public money. Currently Ms Dover works in state schools.

[78]I place in the balance that Ms Dover has not demonstrated any acceptance or understanding of the findings I have made against her. That is relevant because it means that she has taken no remedial action to improve her practices. I have already agreed with the Guardian that absent such remedial action Ms Dover continues to pose a risk to children and vulnerable young people. It is in the public interest to know the findings I have made against her.

[79]I factor into my decision making that open justice is of vital importance to a democratic society and a properly functioning judicial system. With public scrutiny comes a greater knowledge and understanding of the work of the Family Courts and that is in the public interest. I consider that scrutiny is an important aspect of accountability in a democratic society. It holds our court system and the Family Court, in this instance, up to the light. It has a high value. Publication of the fact-finding judgment supports the principle of open justice. The anonymisation proposed in this case does not detract from the public’s ability to scrutinise the court process and my findings.

[80]There is a genuine public interest in how the Family Court conducts itself; in how the Family Court determines allegations of domestic abuse and counter-allegations of alienating behaviours; and how the court facilitates and enables vulnerable parties and witnesses to give their best evidence in Children Act proceedings. I place in the balance against that that having hearing such as the fact-find in this case in private encourages candour and frankness. Holding hearings in public and publishing judgments may inhibit the candour and openness of some who give evidence before the court and thus diminish the quality of evidence upon which decisions concerning children are taken.

[81]Having scrutinised the competing factors and the evidence before the court, I remind myself that there is no precedence, no weighted balance, in favour of Article 10 or Article 8. I make my decision balancing all the competing factors and on the facts, as specific to this case. In my judgment on the facts of this case, that balance comes down in favour of identifying Ms Dover in the fact-finding judgment when it is published. I consider that such identification is both necessary and proportionate.

[82]This judgment will be published on 30 July 2025 together with the suitably anonymised fact finding judgment. The delay between hand-down and publication is deliberate. It will provide a period wherein Ms Dover can seek legal advice about whether she wishes to seek permission to appeal and a stay on publication pending determination of that application. The delay will also enable all parties to the Children Act proceedings to consider the fact-finding judgement and check that it has been properly anonymised before publication.

Should the father’s application for any published judgment to name the parents be adjourned?

[83]That leave one final issue – namely whether the parents should be named as the father contends that they should be. The parties before me on 10 June agreed between themselves that the father’s application for the parent’s to be named should be adjourned to the final hearing. The arguments in favour of adjourning the application are persuasive. The welfare aspect of the case is at a sensitive stage. The subject child E is now under an interim care order and placed in a family bridging placement. All parties before me agree that E should have direct contact with his father. In September 2025, I will consider whether E should live with his father, his mother, or whether there should be a shared care arrangement. That hearing may or may not result in final orders. The case needs careful managing. Both parents need to be able to focus on their child’s future welfare. Publishing his parent’s names and thus identifying him at this stage would simply raise the temperature of the case when what is needed is a way forward which puts E front and centre. Publishing his parents’ names at this stage would be an unwelcome distraction from what should be the primary focus of the proceedings, namely E’s future welfare.

[84]That is my judgment.