“[C] is an absolute joy to meet and spend time with. She is equally charming and unintentionally funny given her mature mannerisms, expressive face and also the wise things she says which sound like a much older child. [C] is slightly shorter than most children her age but not noticeably so. She has beautiful strawberry blonde hair which she takes pride in having styled and worn nicely with clips or plaited. Her disability presents itself in 'seen' and 'unseen' ways; so [C] has one central top incisor tooth, internal nasal cavity changes which can impact on breathing when she isn't well. She also has (not noticeably) shorter arms and legs than most children. Her CIS means she has pronounced features, one central incisor tooth and a slightly pronounced forehead; this and her pituitary gland issues has meant that it has never been fully clear how [C] will develop around her learning, gross or fine motor skills. Thankfully she continues to surprise those around her and loves hobbies which help her development; dance, swimming, trips to the park and soft play. She is also a keen artist and cake maker! Internally; [C] cannot regulate her own adrenal system, which has potentially life-threatening consequences if her body [is] under 'stress' which can even include common childhood illness' / coughs and colds'. She therefore has a strict protocol for medication and if she ever becomes unwell - day and night (so disrupted sleep for anybody caring for her) to administer medication which means her 'cortisol levels' remain stable.”
“The arguments in favour were said to include: (1) that C had been cared for by the Ds for a significant period of time and was settled in the placement; (2) that she would not need to transition to another placement which was likely to be stressful for her; and (3) that the local authority would continue to provide support around contact with the birth family. The arguments against were said to be: (1) that C would not be cared for within her birth family; (2) that long-term foster care did not offer permanency; (3) that Mr and Mrs D could end the placement at any time, a risk which was of greater consequence here because of the potential for ongoing disruption to the placement from the mother; and (4) that C would remain a looked after child and subject to the intrusion and stigma that attached to a child in care. Balancing those arguments, the local authority had concluded that this option was not in C’s best interests.”
“Emotionally, I would advocate C is ‘home’, and this is who she sees as her parents. Many children have to consider the detachment process from their foster carers when adoption and permanency is needed to ‘tip the balance’ for the longer term stability. For C this is going to be no easy transition. Stress and the impact on her adrenal function could impact on the length and impact of transition or in the worst scenario [affect] C’s health… The balance in my view is so narrow, about whether C should be able to stay with her current carers whom she sees as her family, in spite of the obvious and worrying instability that brings, or whether the ‘risk’ is worth it to consider permanency through adoption so that she doesn’t have to spend potentially upwards of 15 years in long-term foster care”
“If I were satisfied that C could not return to her parents and I had a magic wand, I would be waving it incredibly hard to have this little girl stay where she is… It would avoid disruption for her. She would remain in a settled family home that she regards as her family. Her medical needs would all be met. She would have no disruption of her medical care. She would have a progression into the school she currently thinks she is going to in September, which is just up the road. In addition, most significantly, she would continue in some form or other to have contact with her birth family.”
“I have had numerous conversations with Mr and Mrs D following last week’s [permanency planning meeting]. The reality of C potentially moving to another family has made them reflect and reassess their position. First and foremost, they are worried that a move from their family will cause C disruption, upset and loss, they have made it clear that they wish to continue to care for C and find the thought of her leaving their family upsetting, they want to do all in their power to provide her permanence. Since C’s care plan changed to adoption Mr and Mrs D voiced that they wanted to adopt C but were hesitant to pursue adoption under an arrangement where allowances were means tested and reviewed annually (as this did not provide family financial security). … Mr and Mrs D understand that any adoption allowance would be means tested and reviewed annually, the reality of C having to move has made them reflect that they do not want this to prevent them continuing to care for C long term. Mr and Mrs D want to let the LA know that they want to be considered as prospective adopters. They understand that any adoption allowance would be lower than the fostering allowance they have been receiving and means tested annually. Unquestionably, it will be in C’s interests to be adopted by the Ds and we hope the LA will thoroughly explore them as potential adopters. It seems that the Ds’ reluctance to enter a financial arrangement that was means tested and reviewed annually is what has prevented the matter being pursued, now they are willing to proceed knowing any allowance will be annually reviewed.”
“In response to your email we would unquestionably look after C under long term foster care arrangement with [the agency]. The therapeutic support offered to C and carer support offered to us at present are highly valuable. Going forward we believe this will be highly beneficial as C continues to physically emotionally develop. We love C very much as [a] member of our family and are committed to doing all we can to secure permanency within our care. We are of course willing to be flexible, and have only ever over the proceedings tried to be as flexible as possible with the information provided to us.”
“To sum up, there was strong evidence to support the view that it was in the interests of C's welfare to remain with Mr and Mrs D. She is settled there, receiving high quality care. She has formed a close relationship with her carers and members of their family. It is the only home she has ever known. She has very complex and demanding medical and therapeutic needs which Mr and Mrs D are able to meet. She is highly vulnerable to suffering a serious, possibly life-threatening, adverse reaction to stress from disruption to her routine. She is expecting to go to a local school in the vicinity of the Ds' house. Although there have been difficulties with contact, remaining with Mr and Mrs D would allow her to retain an element of direct contact with her birth family. In my view, long-term foster care was an option which should have been considered and evaluated alongside the other options in accordance with case law, as part of "a balancing exercise in which each option is evaluated to the degree of detail necessary to analyse and weigh its own internal positives and negatives and each option is then compared, side by side, against the competing option or options." For the reasons set out above, however, the judge's analysis of the realistic options for C's future care was flawed. She failed to deal clearly with the option of long-term foster care with the Ds, to the extent that at the appeal hearing the parties were unable to agree whether it had been treated as a realistic option or not. The appellant's argument in the first two grounds of appeal that the judge did not have sufficient evidence that long term foster care with the current carers was not a realistic option and that there was further information which should have been obtained before the decision was made has been strongly reinforced by the recent emails. It seems clear that Mr and Mrs D are no longer saying that they cannot continue to care for C unless they receive support at the current level. Even if the option of long-term foster care with the Ds was not a realistic option at the time of the hearing, it has unquestionably become so now.”
“At [the remitted] hearing, the court will have to consider all the realistic options for C's future. Although I have expressed the view on the basis of the evidence now available that long-term foster care with Mr and Mrs D is a realistic option, I am expressing no view as to which option should ultimately preferred. There were other options before the judge and further realistic options may emerge. For example, as anticipated in the recent emails, Mr and Mrs D may decide to proceed with their own adoption application. Although we were not addressed on this at the hearing, it seems to me that they could initiate this process by serving notice on the local authority under s.44(3) of the 2002 Act. There will be arguments for and against the various options which the judge conducting the rehearing will have to evaluate.”
“Where the application is for a care order empowering the local authority to remove a child or children from the family, the judge in modern times may not make such an order without considering the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 Art 8 rights of the adult members of the family and of the children of the family. Accordingly, he must not sanction such an interference with family life unless he is satisfied that that is both necessary and proportionate and that no other less radical form of order would achieve the essential end of promoting the welfare of the children.”
“The test for severing the relationship between parent and child is very strict. Only in exceptional cases and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare, in short, where nothing else will do.”
“Before proceeding any further, it is necessary for us to go back to first principles and to emphasise a number of essential considerations that judges must always have in mind, and we emphasise this, at every stage of the process. Regrettably, the continuing lack of attention to what has been said in previous judgments necessitates our use of plain, even strong, language.”
“The language used in Re B is striking. Different words and phrases are used, but the message is clear. Orders contemplating non-consensual adoption – care orders with a plan for adoption, placement orders and adoption orders – are "a very extreme thing, a last resort", only to be made where "nothing else will do", where "no other course [is] possible in [the child's] interests", they are "the most extreme option", a "last resort – when all else fails", to be made "only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare, in short, where nothing else will do": see Re B paras 74, 76, 77, 82, 104, 130, 135, 145, 198, 215.”
"the court should begin with a preference for the less interventionist rather than the more interventionist approach. This should be considered to be in the better interests of the children … unless there are cogent reasons to the contrary."
‘(6) Before making an adoption order, the court must consider whether there should be arrangements for allowing any person contact with the child; and for that purpose the court must consider any existing or proposed arrangements and obtain any views of the parties to the proceedings.’
“Good relationships between adoptive parents and birth parents helps to create positive experiences for children, whereas conflict is associated with higher levels of depression, anxiety, and behavioural difficulties.”
“I accept these findings and factor them into my analysis of the application before me. Each case is very different on its facts because we are dealing with people in a myriad of different circumstances and family dynamics. But what was once a closed door is now very much an open one and any court considering making an order as life-changing as an adoption order must carefully consider whether it would be in the child’s best interest to keep this door to the original family open through indirect and direct contact.”
"[47] It is, of course, the case that matters have moved on very substantially since Re C. When Re C was decided, theChildren Act 1989 was not in force and adoption proceedings were not designated as family proceedings. Accordingly, if there was to be post-adoption contact between siblings or other members of the adopted child's family, the only way that could be enforced was by conditions being written into the adoption order undersection 8 of the Children Act 1989 . Equally, back in those days it was more common, as Lord Ackner himself points out, for there to be no contact between family members and the adopted child after an adoption order had been made; although, of course, he recognises that there were exceptions to that rule. [48] We were shown s 1 of the newAdoption and Children Act 2002 , which is due in force later this year, which demonstrates the clear change of thinking there has been since 1976, when the Adoption Act was initially enacted, and which demonstrates that the court now will need to take into account and consider the relationship the child had with members of the natural family, and the likelihood of that relationship continuing and the value of the relationship to the child. [49] So contact is more common, but nonetheless the jurisprudence I think is clear. The imposition on prospective adopters of orders for contact with which they are not in agreement is extremely, and remains extremely, unusual."
"It is a strong thing to impose on adoptive parents, it is "extremely unusual" to impose on adoptive parents, some obligation which they are unwilling voluntarily to assume, certainly where, as here, the adoption order has already been made. Was there a proper basis for taking that extremely unusual step? In our judgment, there was not. The judge found that the adoptive parents were genuine when they express their concerns, so what was the justification for imposing on them something they conscientiously and reasonably objected to, particularly when, as we have seen, they say that they have not ruled out the possibility of letting the natural parents have photographs in the future? As we have said, they are not to be saddled with an order merely because a judge takes a different view. The adoptive parents are J's parents; the natural parents are not. The adoptive parents are the only people with parental responsibility for J. Why, unless circumstances are unusual, indeed extremely unusual - and here in our judgment they are neither - should that responsibility be usurped by the court? We can see no good reason either on the facts or in law. On the contrary, there is much force in the point they make, that they wish their status as J's parents to be respected and seen to be inviolable - not for themselves but in order, as they see it, to give J the best chance for the adoption to be successful."
“A placement for adoption hearing has the potential for having an important influence upon the development of any subsequent long-term contact arrangements. As required by ACA 2002, s 27(4), the court must consider the issue of contact and any plans for contact before making a placement for adoption order. The court's order may well, therefore, set the tone for future contact, but the court must be plain that, as the law stands, whilst there may be justification in considering some form of direct contact, the ultimate decision as to what contact is to take place is for the adopters and that the court will be 'extremely unusual' for the court to impose a contrary arrangement against the wishes of adopters.”
“When [the mother] does not agree with professional's views, she can passionately challenge and defend her own point of view. This can sometimes be to an intense level, leaving professionals intimidated and fearful of her response, which impacts on [the mother’s] ability to establish positive relationships with those around her.”
‘she still feels given all the options her main and first option would be for [C] to come home to her care’
“During the family time I observed there were interactions that [C] reacted to. [F] made a comment about her teeth which [M] noticed and then became the subject of some bickering to not mention things like this in front of her. I also noticed when he kissed her on the face and she recoiled. [M] said ‘she doesn’t like that remember’. Often [M] and [F] spoke over each other, which culminated in them realising [C] couldn’t get her views known and [M] said to [F] ‘let her speak’. I sensed overt and false positivity which [C] didn’t seem to enjoy; particularly when being tickled in the ribs, she pulled back. At several stages in response to questions or directions from her parents [C] bared and gritted her teeth and grunted. [F] blew raspberries on her to which she said ‘I don’t like that’. At one stage [C] looked watchful from [M] to the supervisor then back to me as [M] made a comment about her hair saying ‘where’s your curly hair gone?’ [C] was trying to explain that [Mrs D] had done her hair today. [M] had made an assumption that [Mr or Mrs D] had straightened it and started to protest about how inappropriate that was given [C]’s age. The supervisor noted it but tried to direct [M]’s attention back to the task, [M]’s disapproval was clear in her face and voice. The hostility was overt and [C]’s response to this was to stop, watch and seem uncertain.”
“The LA is not considering any other permanence option outside of adoption, and the relative merits of placing C in an alternative adoptive family remains the same as shared above. However, it is noteworthy to state that while C can transfer her attachment to the new carers, it may present some challenges. The LA is hopeful that an adoptive placement with alternative carers is achievable with a robust transition plan, child-focused direct work, an attachment-focused therapeutic input and working together with the Ds.”
“I have never been more frustrated in representing a child in any matter than I have in these proceedings; delay after delay has been caused by the inefficiency and lack of clarity in the local authority care planning and changing the plans for [C] at almost every stage. She has had no consistency in her life offered through the local authority being her ‘corporate parent’ or advocate in these proceedings other than her foster carers and myself.”
“Given that [Mr and Mrs D] have had to spend most of the past 3 years defending their care of [C], negotiate with social workers about her care package and needs, have allegations made against them (including inferences by her parents and professionals that they are financially motivated to care for [C]) now expecting them to consider willingly facilitate post-adoption contact is absurd and shows no consideration of what has happened with the birth parents or the carers, not least any impact on [C] if the kind of behaviour we have seen to date carries on and she is exposed to it.”