‘I intend to pay a lump sum contribution in accordance with Appendix B1 within a period of 12 months or less from the date of the approval of my proposal. If I fail to introduce my lump sum contribution within the specified timetable this will constitute a breach of the arrangement, my Supervisor will issue a notice of breach in accordance with the Standard Conditions.’
‘10. The principles applicable as to costs were not in contention. The court's discretion as to costs is a wide one. The aim always is to “make an order that reflects the overall justice of the case” (Travellers' Casualty v Sun Life[2006] EWHC 2885 (Comm) at paragraph 11 per Clarke J. As Mr. Kealey submitted, the general rule remains that costs should follow the event, i.e. that “the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party”:CPR 44.3 (2). In Kastor Navigation v Axa Global Risks[2004] 2 Lloyd's Rep 119 , the Court of Appeal affirmed the general rule and noted that the question of who is the “successful party” for the purposes of the general rule must be determined by reference to the litigation as a whole; see paragraph 143, per Rix LJ. The court may, of course, depart from the general rule, but it remains appropriate to give “real weight” to the overall success of the winning party: Scholes Windows v Magnet (No 2) [2000] ECDR 266 at 268. As Longmore LJ said in Barnes v Time Talk[2003] BLR 331 at paragraph 28, it is important to identify at the outset who is the “successful party”. Only then is the court likely to approach costs from the right perspective. The question of who is the successful party “is a matter for the exercise of common sense”: BCCI v Ali (No 4) 149 NLJ 1222 , per Lightman J. Success, for the purposes of the CPR, is “not a technical term but a result in real life” (BCCI v Ali (No 4) (supra)). The matter must be looked at “in a realistic … and … commercially sensible way”: Fulham Leisure Holdings v Nicholson Graham & Jones[2006] EWHC 2428 (Ch) at paragraph 3 per Mann J. 11. There is no automatic rule requiring reduction of a successful party's costs if he loses on one or more issues. In any litigation, especially complex litigation such as the present case, any winning party is likely to fail on one or more issues in the case. As Simon Brown LJ said in Budgen v Andrew Gardner Partnership[2002] EWCA Civ 1125 at paragraph 35: “the court can properly have regard to the fact that in almost every case even the winner is likely to fail on some issues”. Likewise in Travellers' Casualty (supra), Clarke J said at paragraph 12: “If the successful Claimant has lost out on a number of issues it may be inappropriate to make separate orders for costs in respect of issues upon which he has failed, unless the points were unreasonably taken. It is a fortunate litigant who wins on every point.”’
‘1. This statement is made in support of the application to dismiss an application by one of the other creditors Jonathan Parkins (JP) to set-aside the IVA entered into by Mr Timothy Hayes (TH). … 24. My firm therefore opposes this application brought against TH and his Supervisor by Mr Parkins.’ b. Hale 2, which was provided after an adjournment, and after I had said that French & Co should apply to me in writing if they wished to participate in the adjourned hearing (see para 45 of my First Judgment), stated: ‘1. … I make this statement in support of the application to dismiss an application by another creditor of Timothy Hayes (TH) to set aside the IVA entered into by TH.’
‘The person who made the decision is not personally liable for costs incurred by any person in relation to an appeal under this rule unless the court makes an order to that effect.’
‘Given [Mr Duffy] admitted [the French & Co Debt] in full with full voting rights based only on [the evidence subsequently exhibited to Hale 1] and despite all contradictory evidence raised by me in concern [sic] of the claim, they must be criticised as falling far short of their duties.’
‘A nominee is (as the name suggests) an individual who is nominated to act as a supervisor of an IVA. Although the proposal is as a matter of law proposed by the individual who wishes to take advantage of the statutory process, this is something of a legal fiction. In practice, the proposal will usually be drawn up by the same IP who will then act as supervisor in the event that requisite majority of creditors agree to the proposal. The nominee is to ensure that the creditors have the necessary information before them in order to form a view and vote on the proposal…if there are aspects of the information that appear to require an explanation, then it is the IP’s duty to ask further questions.’
‘In compiling the report, the nominee is not expected to undertake a full-scale inquiry: it is recognised that they are constrained by limited resources and a tight statutory timetable. Nevertheless, within these limitations, the nominee is expected to carry out a careful review of the material supplied by the debtor; where there are doubts or questions in relation to the information provided by the debtor, the nominee must try to assess the strength and materiality of such concerns and carry out such investigations as may be reasonable as to be able to address them in the report and reject the proposal if necessary. Such concerns need only be addressed explicitly where the nominee considers that reasonable doubts still remain as to the accuracy of the material that has been presented.’
‘The judge in that case … found that the nominee had failed in his duties to provide independent professional scrutiny of the proposal. The prospects for the approval of the proposed IVA depended on the validity of family claims which: (a) had not been properly investigated; (b) were in the nature of things vulnerable to manipulation in order to rescue the debtor; (c) had been subject to substantial variation; and (d) were being challenged by the principal dissenting creditor. The judge also referred to Lindsay J’s list of variables Set out in Re a Debtor (No 140 IO of 1995) (Greystoke v Hamilton-Smith)[1996] 2 BCLC 429 at 434a-436b. which were relevant to deciding what steps it was reasonable for a nominee to satisfy themselves as to the following minima: (1) The strength of the grounds for questions or doubts; (2) The materiality of such questions and doubts to the propriety or feasibility of the debtor’s proposals; (3) The quality of the debtor’s answers to the nominee’s questions; and, (4) The ease or difficulty of independent inquiry by the nominee, the expense of such inquiry and the availability of funds.’
‘The debtor supplied a list of creditors to us with various statements going back a number of years. He then compiled a list of what he believed that he owed at this time which formed the basis of his statement of affairs. He has spoken with creditors to ascertain the level of their debts and we have no reason again to disbelieve his figures. Some creditors have voted and supplied substantiating documentation and the Chairman of the Meeting has no reason to question such claims especially when they come from a firm of solicitors, a barrister or a bank. … The costs in bankruptcy are higher than in an IVA which would deplete the estate for the benefit of unsecured creditors. The figure of£120,000 costs is an estimate based on the complexity of the case and also taking into account that the fees and costs of the Carol Hayes bankruptcy are already around or even in excess of this figure. A Trustee in Bankruptcy would be obliged to take over the bankruptcy claim plus any of the attendant costs so the£120,000 estimate is not unreasonable. … The£100,000 is what the debtor has requested to retain to use in retirement and it is up to creditors to decide whether they believe this to be fair or not. He has pursued this case for many years and has advised us that an element of the award is for 'pain and suffering' but in addition, it would be incumbent on the debtor to continue to assist the legal advisors and Trustee in Bankruptcy so that the return to creditors is maximised. There is clearly a dispute in relation to the debt allegedly owed to Marckita. However, as this company is apparently insolvent and likely to be liquidated, this would be a matter for the liquidator to investigate and not for the Nominee. The debtor insists that the sum is not owed and ultimately it his proposal which we put to creditors. The debtor will be resigning from Marckita Limited should the IVA be approved so you can then take steps to appoint a liquidator should you feel that this is the most appropriate action to take. The Nominee has no knowledge of how any CFA has been operating but ultimately French & Co need to be paid for their work. They may be acting as an agent for the Legal Aid Authority but regardless the funds are owed and we have no reason to deny French & Co's claim. I cannot comment on why French & Co extended credit to the debtor as that is a matter for them as it would be for any creditor extending terms. We have received their proxy form and proof of debt together with their substantiating documentation and their claim appears to be entirely valid. We also have no reason to disbelieve [counsel previously instructed by Mr Hayes] or the debtor in relation to the work carried out or the amount owed to him as his actions elsewhere would not be relevant to this case.’
‘13. Such cases are rare. Logic and principle suggests that some element of personal misconduct is needed to justify a costs Order against a nominee, and even that may not be enough. The possibility of a costs order against a nominee was noted by Hoffmann J in Re Naeem (A Bankrupt) (No. 18 of 1988)[1990] 1 WLR 48 at p, 51, but he did not make any such Order. Harman J did make one in Re a Debtor (No. 222 of 1990) ex parte Bank of Ireland (No. 2)[1993] 1 BCLC 233 , but the case was exceptional and the conduct of the nominee had fallen very far below the proper standard of duty required of a professional licensed insolvency practitioner. In Carraway Guildford (Nominee A Limited) & Ors v. Regis UK Limited & Ors[2021] EWHC 2064 (Ch) , Zacaroli J. declined to make an order against a nominee under a CVA even though his conduct had (in one respect at least) fallen below the standard required, because in the context of the case as a whole the conduct was not so egregious as to attract a costs order against him (see at [11]).’
‘… the court has an unfettered discretion as to who should pay the expenses incurred by Mr Duffy in respect of the application, including requiring Mr Hayes to meet those costs (even though he may, or may not, be thought to be ‘innocent’ in relation to the lack of proof of French & Co’s impugned debt; as the court commented, Mr Hayes did seek to maintain the legitimacy of the debt).’
‘[23] A nominee/chairman knows well that a dissatisfied creditor may challenge a decision made at a meeting of creditors. He or she is likely to have regard, when negotiating a fee with the debtor, to the possibility of providing evidence to the court and complying with any legal obligations resulting from his or her position as chairperson if a challenge is initiated.’
‘20. It is correctly conceded that the First Respondent is unable to demonstrate in any meaningful way that it is the successful party vis-à-vis the Second and Fifth Respondents. The CPR provides a wide discretion to permit the court to do justice between the parties in respect of costs. It does not contemplate an award of costs such that the First Respondent be entitled to a "different order" from the "general order" as against the Second and Fifth Respondents. These parties were all respondents to the application made by the Applicant. There was no dispute between them. 21. As regards discretion, if there is a discretion to exercise, contrary to my finding above, the First Respondent claims it would be "grossly" unfair not to be able to recover the costs of preparing and attending court where the First Respondent was neutral as to the outcome. It is true that the First Respondent was neutral. There was no dispute between him and the other Respondents. In these circumstances, my judgment, it would be unfair to visit the First Respondent's costs of attending court on these Respondents. 22. To award costs in favour of the First Respondent would be contrary to the underlying principle to: "make an order that reflects the overall justice of the case." For this reason, if I have discretion, I exercise it against making an order as an injustice would be visited upon the Second and Fifth Respondent if an order was made in favour of the First Respondent.’
‘Unless there has been some personal conduct on the part of the nominee which would justify an order for costs against him, the costs of a successful application under section 262 should ordinarily be paid out of the bankrupt's estate.’ submitting that while this principle usually concerns an applicant’s costs ‘the principle cuts both ways’
‘So far as the Official Receiver and the trustee are concerned, the bankruptcy orders were regularly made, they have on the face of it no personal interest in the matter and there is no ground to mulct them of their costs unless and until the Orakis have established that they have acted improperly.’
‘[The]Insolvency Rules 2016 [create] parity between bankruptcy and IVAs in relation to the fees and expenses which may be incurred for the purposes of the IVA: see rr.8.30(c)(ii); 10.148; and 10.149. [T]herefore, the situation in the present case should be treated as equally analogous: the court has an unfettered discretion as to who should pay the expenses incurred by Mr Duffy in respect of the application, including requiring Mr Hayes to meet those costs … In the circumstances of the present case, given the fact of the funds which McCambridge Duffy has received from Mr Hayes and which that firm is presently holding, the order should permit Mr Duffy to be paid from those funds (rather than simply ordering Mr Hayes to make the payment but not authorising the use of those funds).’
‘A second material difference, related, is the commercial reality of an IVA proposal, contrasted with appointment of civil servants - official receiver and potentially trustee after a bankruptcy Order of the court. That this commercial enterprise has an inherent risk should the IVA have been found to be improper is an obvious reality, however it is implicitly noted in Subsection 6 of the IVA (Nominee and Supervisor Remuneration including Creditors Guide to fees), where it states “The supervisor considers that the percentage they are seeking approval for reflect the risk that they are taking, the nature of the assets involved, and the complexity of the case.” This acknowledges there is a risk. It must include the risk of not recovering monies in the circumstances we find ourselves. This reflects the position in Elser v Sands[2022] EWHC 1419 (Ch) ].’
‘It is, perhaps, significant in this context that the recommendations of the Cork Committee (1982) (Cmnd. 8558) which led to the introduction of individual voluntary arrangements were based on the need to provide an alternative to bankruptcy proceedings, a need not then met in practice by consensual deeds of arrangement; see, in particular, at paragraph 359: “a satisfactory form of proceedings for dealing with the insolvent debtor otherwise than directly through the machinery of the bankruptcy court . . . would fulfil an important social need.”’ and at p.138 ‘Unlike the earlier legislation, section 260(2) of the Act of 1986 does not purport, directly, to impose the arrangement on a dissenting creditor whether or not he has agreed to its terms; rather, he is bound by the arrangement as the result of a statutory hypothesis. The statutory hypothesis requires him to be treated as if he had consented to the arrangement. The consequence, as it seems to me, is that the legislature must be taken to have intended that both the question whether the debtor is discharged by the arrangement and the question whether co-debtors and sureties are discharged by the arrangement were to be answered by treating the arrangement as consensual; that is to say, by construing its terms as if they were the terms of a consensual agreement between the debtor and all those creditors who, under the statutory hypothesis, must be treated as being consenting parties.’
‘Under section 260(2) of the 1986 Act, the approved arrangement: “binds every person who in accordance with the rules had notice of, and was entitled to vote at, the meeting … as if he were a party to the arrangement.” The arrangement is therefore contractually based, with the statute providing the consent or deemed consent of the otherwise dissenting parties.’
‘50. In my judgment, in the ordinary case an IVA is not an unconditional composition by creditors with their debtor. The creditors are willing to make a composition with their debtor, on the basis that their debtor will perform the obligations under the IVA. If those obligations are performed, and a certificate of completion is given by the supervisor, the debtor is released from his debts falling within the IVA. If on the other hand, there is no compliance, and no certificate of completion, but instead the supervisor issues a certificate of termination before the effluxion of the IVA by time, it is clear that the creditors are no longer bound by the moratorium contained in condition 4(3) of the standard conditions, and (subject only to ordinary defences, such as limitation) they can thereafter take action against the debtor in the usual way. 51 … Does it make any difference if the termination occurs because the term of the IVA simply expires? In my judgment it does not. The completion certificate has not been issued, and therefore the event upon which the debtor is released from his debts in the arrangement has not occurred. Accordingly, in the ordinary case, there is no release.’
‘It is disappointing that the IVA legislation does not address the scenario where an IVA established under Pt VIII of IA 1986 fails and the debtor is declared bankrupt. We are told by s.264(1)(c) that a supervisor may present a bankruptcy petition but bankruptcy may occur in other circumstances—e.g. by default towards post-IVA creditors. What is the impact of bankruptcy upon the earlier IVA? More importantly, what happens to the funds collected by the IVA supervisor—are they reserved exclusively for the IVA participants or can they be claimed by the trustee in bankruptcy for the benefit of the creditors at large? The case law here is voluminous: Re McKeen [1995] B.C.C. 412 (Morritt J); Re Bradley-Hole [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1097 (Rimer J); Davis v Martin-Sklan [1995] 2 B.C.L.C. 483 (Blackburne J); Kings v Cleghorn [1998] B.P.I.R. 463 (HHJ Behrens); and Re Coath [2000] B.P.I.R. 981 (DJ Field). … Some clarity in the law has now been introduced by the Court of Appeal ruling in Re N.T. Gallagher & Son Ltd[2002] EWCA Civ 404 . Although this case is concerned with CVAs the principles developed in that case were expressly intended to apply mutatis mutandis to IVAs. In short it is clear that an IVA may survive subsequent bankruptcy and that funds collected by the supervisor may be retained and kept out of the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy. The IVA documentation will be important here.’
‘[42] In a number of the cases unease had been expressed at the fine distinctions drawn in the authorities. Neither Counsel before us sought to derive much assistance from the authorities, both Counsel being agreed that the cases display a misplaced concentration on the form of liquidation (in CVA cases) and the identity of the petitioner in IVA as well as CVA cases. [43] We agree. Those distinctions and that concentration on the form of liquidation and the identity of the petitioner are at least in part based on the terms of r. 4. 21A and s. 276 (2). Mr. Zacaroli does not suggest that in themselves those provisions establish that trusts created by a CVA or IVA must come to an end on liquidation or bankruptcy. He only says that they are consistent with that result. For our part we agree with the comments of Judge Maddocks in Halson and of Mr. McCombe in Kudos on the effect of those provisions. It makes little sense for the form of the liquidation to affect the question of the effect of liquidation on trusts created by a CVA. A creditors’ voluntary liquidation is often preferred to a compulsory winding up on practical grounds related to expense and delay, as in this case. We would question whether the mere fact that a supervisor presents a petition entails that the CVA or IVA creditors have elected to terminate the CVA or IVA trust in their favour. Even if there is evidence that all the CVA or IVA creditors supported the presentation of a petition, it does not follow that they were thereby evincing an intention that the trust should come to an end and that the trust assets should revert to the company or debtor.’
‘(1) Where a CVA or IVA provides for moneys or other assets to be paid to or transferred or held for the benefit of CVA or IVA creditors, this will create a trust of those moneys or assets for those creditors. (2) The effect of the liquidation of the company or the bankruptcy of the debtor on a trust created by the CVA or IVA will depend on the provisions of the CVA or IVA relating thereto. (3) If the CVA or IVA provides what is to happen on liquidation or bankruptcy (or a failure of the CVA or IVA), effect must be given thereto. (4) If the CVA or IVA does not so provide, the trust will continue notwithstanding the liquidation, bankruptcy or failure and must take effect according to its terms. (5) The CVA or IVA creditors can prove in the liquidation or bankruptcy for so much of their debt as remains after payment of what has been or will be recovered under the trust.’