“…in the event of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances occurring at the place of destination or its immediate vicinity and which significantly affect — (a) the performance of the package, or(b) the carriage of passengers to the destination, the traveller may terminate the package travel contract before the start of the package without paying any termination fee.”
“83 Appellate courts have been warned repeatedly, including by recent statements at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to evaluation of those facts and to inferences to be drawn from them. The reasons for this approach…include: (i) The expertise of a trial judge is in determining what facts are relevant to the legal issues to be decided, and what those facts are if they are disputed; (ii) The trial is not a dress rehearsal. It is the first and last night of the show; (ii) Duplication of the trial judge’s role on appeal is a disproportionate use of the limited resources of an appellate court, and will seldom lead to a different outcome in an individual case; (iv) In making [her] decisions the trial judge will have regard to the whole of the sea of evidence presented to [her] whereas an appellate court will only be ‘island hopping’; (v) The atmosphere of the courtroom cannot, in any event, be recreated by reference to documents (including transcripts of evidence); (vi) Thus, even if it were possible to duplicate the role of the trial judge, it cannot in practice be done…. 85 In essence the finding of fact must be plainly wrong if it is to be overturned. A simple distillation of the circumstances in which appellate interference may be justified, so far as material for present purposes, can be set out uncontroversially as follows: (i) Where the trial judge fundamentally misunderstood the issue or the evidence, plainly failed to take evidence in account, or arrived at a conclusion which the evidence could not on any view support. (ii) Where the finding is infected by some identifiable error, such as a material error of law. (iii) Where the finding lies outside the bounds within which reasonable disagreement is possible. 86 An evaluation of the facts is often a matter of degree upon which different judges can legitimately differ. Such cases may be closely analogous to exercise of a discretion and appellate courts should approach them in a similar way. [It] does not carry out a balancing task afresh but must ask whether the decision of the judge was wrong by reason of some identifiable flaw in the trial judge’s treatment of the question to be decided, such as a gap in logic, a lack of consistency, or a failure to take account of some material factor, which undermines the cogency of the conclusion. 87 The degree to which appellate restraint should be exercised…may be influenced by the nature of the conclusion and the extent…it depended upon advantage possessed by the trial judge, whether from a thorough immersion in all angles of the case, or from firsthand experience of the testing of the evidence, or because of particular relevant specialist expertise.”
“[O]n a challenge to an evaluative decision of a first instance judge, the appeal court does not carry out a balancing task afresh but must ask whether the decision of the judge was wrong by reason of some identifiable flaw in the judge’s treatment of the question to be decided, such as a gap in logic, a lack of consistency, or a failure to take account of some material factor, which undermines the cogency of the conclusion.”
“Schools and colleges are being advised against all overseas trips for children under 18 until further notice.”
“Our current understanding of the situation regarding school trips is as follows. The Government has advised schools they should not undertake international school trips at this stage, This is due to concerns that the schools would face significant challenges in making arrangements to ensure children’s welfare should adult supervisors be required to self-isolate. Schools will decide how to act upon this advice. If schools do cancel their trips, normal cancellation terms will apply. Schools should contact either their own general insurers or the [DoE] as they may have some financial cover in place for this scenario. This is one of the areas we are seeking clarity on urgently so we will update again as soon as we have more information.”
“All our school trips due to depart between now and 16 April will be cancelled unless the school specifically requests otherwise. In normal circumstances, the Package Travel Regulations require that full refunds should be given to all schools who are affected by this similar travel advice.”
“All trips beyond 16th April are currently scheduled to continue as normal unless or until the Government extends their travel advice, or if the local authorities at your trip destination have in place similar advice against travel. If your trip is due to depart after 16th April [as of course the trip in this case was], we are sorry but for now normal terms and conditions need to apply should you wish to cancel. If your trip is due to depart after 16 April but you wish to cancel, please let us know as soon as possible.”
“Thanks for the information. I have passed it on to my Head. I guess there is nothing we can do at the moment. Not a good time for your business right now. Hopefully not too long before we can start moving around again. We were really looking forward to the trip, as were the kids. I can’t see it going ahead but we will wait and see.”
“17. It was left to Mr Robbins to communicate…as he was the organiser …and it appears from his email exchange with Mr Tunstall, it appears that rather than simply following government advice by cancelling straight away, the school was waiting and hoping for better news and presumably only cancelled when they realised the situation was not going to improve. But did they cancel because the defendants were not going to be able to fulfil the contract ? 18. The defendants through Mr Gardiner admit that in the event, come 11 May, that would have been the case and at that date they would have been obliged by virtue of Reg.12(7) to refund the full cost. 19. In paragraphs 11 to 12 of his witness statement Mr Robbins sets out the school’s reasons for cancelling. As he says: ‘[The school Finance Officer] made the decision to cancel the scheduled visit. The decision was made on or around 1 April and was conveyed to the defendants on the same day informing the decision the school considered the likelihood of the visit going ahead, the current UK government advice and the current lockdown and travel restrictions in place in Barcelona at the time. The key concern was of the health and wellbeing of our students and staff as well as the guidance being provided by the UK and Spanish Governments as Covid infection rates were on the increase and there was no reasonable possibility of the current restrictions being lifted by May 2020, we knew the visit could no longer go ahead as planned’.”
‘where are you up to your end’
“I have received the email. I forwarded it to my Head. Not sure what position we are in now. We won’t be going. I don’t think we will be in school then. Spain is in a bit of a mess more so than here. Is it up to us to cancel and claim on our insurance ? I didn’t really see what else to do.”
“12 The claimant argues these circumstances fall squarely within Reg.12(7) essentially because there was a global pandemic at the time and the contract could not have been performed by the defendants because Spain, like the UK, remained in lockdown as at the date the trip was due to take place. 13. The defendants argue that as at the date of cancellation,1st April 2020 , that was not clear-cut. Mr Gardiner gave evidence that Spain’s lockdown was not-open-ended. It was declared for an initial period of two weeks within which it was to be reviewed and although in the event it was continued into May, it was not, as at 1st April, certain that it would be. Mr Gardiner’s evidence was that the flights that the school were due to take had not been cancelled and that the hotel that they were due to stay in remained open on the scheduled dates in May. The defendants had taken the decision on 19 March that all trips after 16 April…were scheduled to continue as normal…. 15. Mr Kennedy [then as now] on behalf of the claimants has argued that it is self-evident that in the circumstances of the pandemic being global and affecting Spain just as it affected the UK, that the circumstances occurred at the destination of Barcelona. The claimants have produced various newspaper articles commenting upon the situation in Spain in the Spring of 2020, however they have not produced or exhibited any detail of [Spanish] Government guidance with regard to travel to or within Catalonia, or the dates or specifics of lockdowns in that area. 16. Mr Riley [then as now Counsel for the Defendants] highlighted this deficiency in the claimant’s evidence. It is indeed a deficiency in a case where the claimants rely upon the wording in the regulation. In addition to arguing that as at 1 April the status of the future of the lockdown in Spain come May 2020 was unclear, the defendants further contend that the claimant’s decision to cancel was due to the Government guidance here…. 20. Is it fatal to the claim that the claimants have not produced evidence of the travel restrictions in Barcelona at the time or the guidance being provided by the Spanish Government ? We are all aware now, of course, that restrictions continued for months, not weeks, both here and in the rest of Europe, but the issue must be what were the circumstances as at cancellation on 1st April ? What was known at that point in time ?”
“[A] Guardian article dated25th March 2020 …states…on the evening of 12th March, the Catalan Government ordered a lockdown for 14 days, i.e. it would appear until 26 March…[T]here is no indication whether these restrictions would continue in place and if so on what terms and for what further duration. Certainly, there is nothing here [on] what circumstances would likely prevail in mid-May… Taken at their very highest, [all] the articles suggested that in Catalonia a lockdown had been ordered on12 March 2020 that would end at or around26 March 2020 and that, alongside this, the Spanish Government had declared a State of Emergency of 14 or 15 days duration that would end at or around30 March 2020 , some six weeks before…the Trip. The Appellant put before the court no material at all to show with any certainty, from the vantage point of the date of cancellation, that circumstances would exist as at the date of…performance that would significantly affect the Trip.”
“Mr Kennedy (Counsel for the then-Claimant):..[Y]ou were aware that there was a lockdown in Spain in March 2020 [?]… Mr Gardiner: Yes, we were aware that the Government announced a lockdown with a definite duration….not an indefinite duration and not a duration which spanned the date it was initiated and the departure date of the trip….We were aware that Spain introduced a lockdown and advised that they would review that decision within two weeks… Mr Kennedy: You are aware that the lockdown in Spain continued…from March 2020…And as part of that lockdown people who lived in Spain were allowed to leave their homes to get food and medicine, but all non-essential businesses were closed ? Mr Gardiner..Lockdown announced in March, yes….They were… Mr Kennedy: That was in place. That was announced in March and continued throughout May. Mr Gardiner: I think it is important that they were closed, or they were not available during the definite period of the government-announced lockdown. …In March there was no indication…that the businesses……… So, the [Spanish] Government announced a 14-day, 15-day – I cannot remember now – review period. They locked down along the lines that you just mentioned, but they said they would review that within two weeks, within 14 days or 15 days. There was no advice at that point regarding the operations of businesses beyond that review point. Mr Kennedy: But in fact, I think the question that I had asked, and you have already answered this but just so that judge has it, in fact you accepted that lockdown did continue throughout May 2020. Mr Gardiner… I do not think there was an official announcement by the Spanish Government, but after 1 April, it would have been 3 or 4 April, or something like that, the..Spanish Government did not change its advice. Mr Kennedy The question was that lockdown continued through May 2020? Mr Gardiner: Yes it did, but again you know, I say there is no scope for hindsight in the package travel regulations….”
“Mr Gardiner gave evidence that Spain’s lockdown was not-open-ended. It was declared for an initial period of two weeks within which it was to be reviewed and although in the event it was continued into May, it was not, as at 1st April, certain that it would be.”
“…in the event of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances occurring at the place of destination or its immediate vicinity and which significantly affect — (a) the performance of the package, or(b) the carriage of passengers to the destination, the traveller may terminate the package travel contract before the start of the package without paying any termination fee.”
“14. It is clear that in order to rely on Reg.12(7) the claimants must satisfy the court that the event of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances occurred at the place of destination or its immediate vicinity: that is, Barcelona; and that it significantly affected the performance of the package for [sic] the carriage of passengers to the destination and only in those circumstances is a termination fee not payable…. 20. Is it fatal to the claim that the claimants have not produced evidence of the travel restrictions in Barcelona at the time or the guidance being provided by the Spanish Government ? We are all aware now, of course, that restrictions continued for months, not weeks, both here and in the rest of Europe, but the issue must be what were the circumstances as at cancellation on 1st April ? What was known at that point in time ? 21. The defendants argue this is the basis of Reg.12(7) because of striking the balance between fairness to the consumer and to the commercial business, hence the reason when the Regulation was drafted it was determined that the extraordinary circumstances must occur at the destination rather than [including] the place of departure… 22. [The DDJ repeated the parties’ email exchange on1st April 2020 ] 23. It is reasonably clear….that it was a combination of factors that led the school to the decision to cancel the contract….It was partially the guidance being given by the Government and by ABTA, it was partially the fact that [the children] were not in school; and it was partially because the Pandemic was simply not subsiding as it had been hoped it might have done. 24. Having considered the wording of the regulation and the background to it, it is clear it is a protection for consumers in circumstances where a package provider is unable to provide the package solely because of something arising at the destination, not where circumstances at home prevent the travel. I have taken this into account as it seems unlikely when these regulations were drafted a global pandemic was in contemplation. 25. My conclusion is that the claimant’s evidence falls short of satisfying the court on the balance of probabilities that Reg.12(7) could be relied upon as at the date of cancellation of the contract; and that common knowledge, particularly that gained with hindsight, are in the absence of detail applicable to the particular destination, insufficient to support the claim. In all the circumstances therefore and taking into account all the evidence that I have read and heard today, the claim must be dismissed.”
“The Claimant failed to satisfy the Court that Reg.12(7) [2018 Regs] applies as they failed to produce evidence that the ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ occurred at the ‘place of destination’. Although this was a global pandemic, the restrictions pertaining in the destination in Spain were not evidenced and the Court concluded that the decision to cancel the trip was a consequence of government advice in the UK and pessimism as to whether the trip could proceed. The Defendants contended that at the time of the cancellation the booked flights remained scheduled and the hotel would be open and the Claimants did not challenge this.”
“A national court must interpret domestic legislation, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the Directive it seeks to implement.”
“110. [ss.6(1)-(2)] mean domestic courts and tribunals are able to have regard to actions of the EU taken post-exit, including CJEU decisions, where…relevant to any matter the court or tribunal is considering ….[However], it cannot have regard to such an extent it considers itself bound by them (as this is ruled out by subsection (1)). 111. Subsection (3) provides that any question as to the meaning of unmodified retained EU law will be determined in UK courts in accordance with relevant pre-exit CJEU case law and general principles. This means, for example, taking a purposive approach to interpretation where the meaning of the measure is unclear (i.e. considering the purpose of the law from looking at other relevant materials such as the treaty legal base for a measure, its recitals and preambles and the travaux preparatoires - working papers - leading to the adoption of the measure). It also means applying an interpretation that renders the provision of EU law compatible with the treaties and general principles of EU law. Non-binding instruments, such as recommendations and opinions, would still be available to a court to assist with interpretation of retained EU law after exit. 112. UK courts will also be required to interpret retained EU law by reference to (among other things) the limits of EU competence, as it exists on the day the UK leaves the EU…. 114. Subsection (2) is subject to the rest of section 6. This means that, although all courts can have regard to post-exit CJEU decisions, unless and until the [UK Supreme Court or Court of Appeal]…have departed from pre-exit CJEU case law, the latter remains binding on lower courts even if the CJEU has departed from it after exit day.”
“[A court] decision binds [the same] court unless there is a later decision of a judge of equal rank in conflict with it. Where there are two conflicting decisions of [equal] courts… the later decision is to be preferred, provided it was reached after consideration of the earlier decision, unless the third judge is convinced that the second was wrong in not following the first…[I]t is not enough for third judge to conclude that the second judge was wrong in some unimportant particular; the third judge must be convinced that the second was wrong in not following the first.”
“It is necessary to consider not only [the directive’s] wording but also its context and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part.”
“…[I]t is not always easy to distinguish between consumers and representatives of small businesses or professionals who book trips related to their business or profession through the same booking channels as consumers. Such travellers often require a similar level of protection…. In order to avoid confusion with the definition of the term ‘consumer’ used in other Union legislation, persons protected under this Directive should be referred to as ‘travellers’.”
“1. The purpose of this Directive is to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market and to the achievement of a high and as uniform as possible level of consumer protection by approximating certain aspects of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States in respect of contracts between travellers and traders relating to package travel ..3…..the following definitions apply: (12) ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ means a situation beyond the control of the party who invokes such a situation and the consequences of which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken’…. 12(1) Member States shall ensure that the traveller may terminate the package travel contract at any time before the start of the package. Where the traveller terminates the package travel contract under this paragraph, the traveller may be required to pay an appropriate and justifiable termination fee to the organiser. The package travel contract may specify reasonable standardised termination fees based on the time of the termination of the contract before the start of the package and the expected cost savings and income from alternative deployment of the travel services. In the absence of standardised termination fees, the amount of the termination fee shall correspond to the price of the package minus the cost savings and income from alternative deployment of the travel services. At the traveller's request the organiser shall provide a justification for the amount of termination fees. (2) Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the traveller shall have the right to terminate the package travel contract before the start of the package without paying any termination fee in the event of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances occurring at the place of destination or its immediate vicinity and significantly affecting the performance of the package, or which significantly affect the carriage of passengers to the destination. In the event of termination of the package travel contract under this paragraph, the traveller shall be entitled to a full refund of any payments made for the package, but shall not be entitled to additional compensation. (3) The organiser may terminate the package travel contract and provide the traveller with a full refund of any payments made for the package, but shall not be liable for additional compensation, if…(b) the organiser is prevented from performing the contract because of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances and notifies the traveller of the termination of the contract without undue delay before the start of the package. (4) The organiser shall provide any refunds required under paras. 2 and 3 or with respect to para.1, reimburse any payments made by or on behalf of the traveller….minus the appropriate termination fee. Such refunds or reimbursements shall be made to the traveller without undue delay and in any event not later than 14 days after the…contract is terminated….”
“It follows from the text of Art.12(2) that personal circumstances not related to events at the travel destination should not give a termination right with a full refund, so there seems no need to specify this further. If further text is added, this would have to be drafted carefully to avoid conflicts with the Directive, given that certain personal circumstances might be relevant when assessing the impact of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances occurring at the travel destination on the performance of the package, e.g. the fact that pregnant women may be seriously affected by..the Zika Virus.”
“While, for the purposes of the termination of a package travel contract, the classification of a given event as a situation falling within the concept of ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’, within the meaning of that directive, necessarily depends on the specific circumstances of the particular case and, in particular, on the travel services specifically agreed upon and the consequences of that event at the intended destination, the fact remains that a global health crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic must, as such, be regarded as capable of falling within the scope of that concept.”
“[69] …[I]n accordance with the objective nature of those effects…it is not sufficient for the traveller concerned, when he or she wishes to exercise his or her right to terminate his or her package travel contract without paying a termination fee, to rely on purely subjective assessments or fears…. [71]….[I]t is necessary to take the perspective of an average traveller who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, following,....other areas of EU law relating to consumer protection…”
“[31] [T]hat assessment must be based on a prediction as regards the likelihood the [destination UEC] relied on by the traveller concerned will have consequences significantly affecting the performance of the package. ..[32] [T]o assess the probability and significance of those consequences, it is appropriate to view matters from the perspective of the average traveller who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, in the sense that such a traveller could reasonably take the view the [destination UEC] relied on by the traveller concerned would probably have consequences significantly affecting the performance of his or her package or for the transfer of passengers to the travel destination.”
“[The 14-day period in Art.12(4)] suggests the organiser should, in principle, be in a position to determine, immediately after the termination.. without waiting for subsequent developments…whether or not reliance by that traveller on the right to terminate his or her package travel contract without paying termination fees is justified and, if so, to…refund.”
“[52]….the simple fact the traveller declared that he still wished to proceed with that trip despite the risks identified is irrelevant...whether the organiser was prevented from performing the contract must be examined objectively.. [55]In that context, it is ultimately irrelevant whether or not the situation prevailing on the date of a planned trip would have allowed performance..”
‘provided the conditions precedent are made out, a right to terminate exists’ as HHJ Salmon put it at [24]. Indeed, the CJEU in QM at [27] referred to ‘destination UEC’ and ‘significant effect’ as a ’condition’
“…[T]he traveller shall have the right to terminate the…contract…without paying any termination fee in the event of [i] unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances occurring at the place of destination...and [ii] significantly affecting the performance of the package, or…. carriage of passengers to the destination. In the event of termination of the package travel contract under this paragraph, the traveller shall be entitled to a full refund…”
“2.1 [The purpose of] this instrument [is to] implement the EU’s 2015 Package Travel Directive and replace..the existing Package Travel Regulations…derived from the 1990 Package Travel Directive…. 7.7 Our approach to implementation is light-touch in order to impose minimal additional burdens on business, whilst enabling the UK to comply with the requirements of the Directive. Where possible [its] provisions have been transposed using a copy-out approach. This means that in general provisions appear in this instrument as they were set out in the Directive.”
“(1) The provisions of this regulation are implied as a term in every package travel contract. (2) A traveller may terminate the package travel contract at any time before the start of the package. (3) Where the traveller terminates the package travel contract under paragraph (2), the traveller may be required to pay an appropriate and justifiable termination fee to the organiser. (4) The package travel contract may specify reasonable standard termination fees based on: (a) the time of the termination of the contract before the start of the package; and(b) the expected cost savings and income from alternative deployment of the travel services. (5) In the absence of standardised termination fees, the amount of the termination fee must correspond to the price of the package minus the cost savings and income from alternative deployment of the travel services. (6) The organiser must provide a justification for the amount of the termination fee if the traveller so requests. (7) Notwithstanding paragraphs (2) to (6), in the event of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances occurring at the place of destination or its immediate vicinity and which significantly affect— (a) the performance of the package, or (b) the carriage of passengers to the destination, the traveller may terminate the package travel contract before the start of the package without paying any termination fee. (8) Where the package travel contract is terminated under paragraph (7), the traveller is entitled to a full refund of any payments made for the package but is not entitled to additional compensation.”
“’unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ means a situation: (a) beyond the control of the party who seeks to rely on such a situation for the purposes of regulation 12(7), 13(2)(b) 15(14)/(16), 16(4)(c) or 28(3)(b); and (b) the consequences of which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken…”
“[If it] is prevented from performing the contract because of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances and notifies the traveller of the termination of the contract without undue delay before the start of the package.”
“If there comes a stage either eight weeks, ten weeks or longer before departure when a reasonably intelligent individual with common sense concludes that there is no reasonable prospect of the trip going ahead, or if it does, it will be significantly different to that contemplated or contracted for, a traveller should not be expected to wait two days before travel to exercise their right to terminate just in case something changes.”
“If…the court was required to delve into the [cause or] subjective reasons for cancellation attributable to the traveller, that would serve only to add: (a) an additional hurdle before s/he could enforce his/her rights, (b) an additional gloss to the statutory wording and (c) complexity and length to any proceedings which required the determination of claims under Reg.12.”
“(3) Any….(b) refund required pursuant to (i) regulation 12(8)…must be made to the traveller without undue delay and in any event not later than 14 days after the package travel contract is terminated.”
“[28] How does the organiser know that the terminating party is terminating because they believe that the conditions precedent to allow termination are in existence, in other words, that it is expressly or impliedly, by how the contract is terminated indicating they are seeking to rely upon Reg.12(7) ? [29]..Regulation 14, which itself becomes an implied term in the contract, means it is necessary for those cancelling the contract to communicate they are seeking to rely expressly or impliedly on Regulation 12(7).”
“It is a fundamental tenet of English contract law that one does not normally deal with parties’ subjective intentions but rather looks at matters objectively. This provides an element of certainty. The decision to terminate a contract can be multifaceted, with a variety of competing concerns. To effectively require a court to delve into the complex web of the subjective intention of the person terminating the contract is time-consuming and would lead to substantial litigation.”
“[A]cceptance of repudiation requires no particular form: a communication does not have to be couched in the language of acceptance, it is sufficient that the communication or conduct clearly and unequivocally conveys to the repudiating party the aggrieved party is treating the contract as an end.”
“14. It is clear that in order to rely on Reg.12(7) the claimants must satisfy the court that the event of unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances occurred at the place of destination or its immediate vicinity: that is, Barcelona; and that it significantly affected the performance of the package for [sic] the carriage of passengers to the destination and only in those circumstances is a termination fee not payable…. 20. Is it fatal to the claim that the claimants have not produced evidence of the travel restrictions in Barcelona at the time or the guidance being provided by the Spanish Government ? We are all aware now, of course, that restrictions continued for months, not weeks, both here and in the rest of Europe, but the issue must be what were the circumstances as at cancellation on 1st April ? What was known at that point in time ? 21. The defendants argue this is the basis of Reg.12(7) because of striking the balance between fairness to the consumer and to the commercial business, hence the reason when the Regulation was drafted it was determined that the extraordinary circumstances must occur at the destination rather than [including] the place of departure… 23. It is reasonably clear….that it was a combination of factors that led the school to the decision to cancel the contract….It was partially the guidance being given by the Government and by ABTA. It was partially the fact that [the children] were not in school; and it was partially because the Pandemic was simply not subsiding as it had been hoped it might have done. 24. Having considered the wording of the regulation and the background to it, it is clear it is a protection for consumers in circumstances where a package provider is unable to provide the package solely because of something arising at the destination, not where circumstances at home prevent the travel. I have taken this into account as it seems unlikely when these regulations were drafted a global pandemic was in contemplation. 25. My conclusion is that the claimant’s evidence falls short of satisfying the court on the balance of probabilities that Reg.12(7) could be relied upon as at the date of cancellation of the contract; and that common knowledge, particularly that gained with hindsight, are in the absence of detail applicable to the particular destination, insufficient to support the claim. In all the circumstances therefore and taking into account all the evidence that I have read and heard today, the claim must be dismissed.”
“The Claimant failed to satisfy the Court that Reg.12(7) [2018 Regs] applies as they failed to produce evidence that the ‘unavoidable and extraordinary circumstances’ occurred at the ‘place of destination’. Although this was a global pandemic, the restrictions pertaining in the destination in Spain were not evidenced and the Court concluded that the decision to cancel the trip was a consequence of government advice in the UK and pessimism as to whether the trip could proceed. The Defendants contended that at the time of the cancellation the booked flights remained scheduled and the hotel would be open and the Claimants did not challenge this.”
“We won’t be going. I don’t think we will be in school then [on 11th May]. Spain is in a bit of a mess, more so than here.”
‘significant effect’
“We won’t be going. I don’t think we will be in school then [on 11th May]. Spain is in a bit of a mess, more so than here.”