LYUBOV ANDREEVNA KIREEVA (as bankruptcy trustee of Georgy Ivanovich Bedzhamov) v GEORGY IVANOVICH BEDZHAMOV [2022] EWCA Civ 35

"476. However, even if [Mr Bedzhamov's] bankruptcy were recognised in this jurisdiction, that would not affect his liability to VPB. On the contrary, upon completion of the Russian bankruptcy proceedings, … [Mr Bedzhamov] would remain liable to VPB under articles 53.1(3) and 1064 of the RCC [i.e. the Russian Civil Code], and would not be discharged from that liability … : (1) The starting point is that by reason of Article 213.28(3) of the Insolvency Law, after completion of the payment of creditors and the sale of property stage of bankruptcy … , a bankrupt is discharged from further satisfying his creditors' claims in the bankruptcy. (2) However, even after completion of that stage of the bankruptcy, certain liabilities will remain undischarged. Pursuant to Art. 213.28(5) and (6) of the Insolvency Law, this includes liabilities under articles 51.3(3) (i.e., controlling person liability) and 1064 (i.e., tort liability) of the RCC. 477. Accordingly, as a matter of Russian law, [Mr Bedzhamov] will not – upon the completion of the relevant stage of his Russian bankruptcy – be released from his liabilities to the Bank under Articles 51.3(3) and/or 1064 of the RCC; and this bankruptcy would not prevent [Mr Bedzhamov] from pursuing such claims against him in these proceedings. 478. Further, the Bank is content to undertake to the Court to inform Ms Kireeva of any relief granted pursuant to this Application, so that she might make any representations she considers appropriate … at the return date."

"Around 27-28 January 2021, it was reported in the news that on 21 January 2021 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow ordered the seizure of the Belgrave Square Property. I have seen the Russian news and have also been informed by my English lawyers that it has been reported in the English-language press …. I have been provided … with a copy of the decision of the Tverskoy District Court … , which found as follows … : ' The investigation has found that during the period 2009 to 2015 G I Bedzhamov acting together with L I Markus….and other persons as part of an organised group committed the theft of funds from Vneshprombank LLC by issuing deliberately bad loans to the bank clients without their knowledge and writing off funds from their accounts…..which caused Vneshprombank LLC damage on an especially large scale for a total amount of over 113 billion roubles '."

"We understand … that a particular point has been raised during the hearing … relating to the treatment of any proceeds recovered by our client in Claim No. BL-2018-002691 [i.e. the UK Proceedings], and that the Court wishes to understand our client's position on this point. Our client's position is that in accordance with Russian law it is obliged to remit any sums recovered following judgment in the above claim to Mr Bedzhamov's trustee in bankruptcy or to distribute the sums amongst the creditors in accordance with the trustee's instructions, and intends to do so."

"(4) The courts having jurisdiction in relation to insolvency law in any part of the United Kingdom shall assist the courts having the corresponding jurisdiction in any other part of the United Kingdom or any relevant country or territory. (5) For the purposes of subsection (4) a request made to a court in any part of the United Kingdom by a court in any other part of the United Kingdom or in a relevant country or territory is authority for the court to which the request is made to apply, in relation to any matters specified in the request, the insolvency law which is applicable by either court in relation to comparable matters falling within its jurisdiction. In exercising its discretion under this subsection, a court shall have regard in particular to the rules of private international law. … (10) In this section ' insolvency law ' means— (a) in relation to England and Wales, provision extending to England and Wales and made by or under this Act or sections 1A, 6 to 10, 12 to 15, 19(c) and 20 (with Schedule 1) of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and sections 1 to 17 of that Act as they apply for the purposes of those provisions of that Act; … (d) in relation to any relevant country or territory, so much of the law of that country or territory as corresponds to provisions falling within any of the foregoing paragraphs; and references in this subsection to any enactment include, in relation to any time before the coming into force of that enactment the corresponding enactment in force at that time."

"The London Bankruptcy Court, the local Bankruptcy Court, the Courts having jurisdiction in bankruptcy in Scotland and Ireland, and every British Court elsewhere having jurisdiction in bankruptcy or insolvency, and the officers of such Courts respectively, shall severally act in aid of and be auxiliary to each other in all matters of bankruptcy, and an order of the Court seeking aid, together with a request to another of the said Courts, shall be deemed sufficient to enable the latter Court to exercise, in regard to the matters directed by such order, the like jurisdiction which the Court which made the request, as well as the court to which the request is made, could exercise in regard to similar matters within their respective jurisdiction."

"In the present case it is common ground that Mr Bedzhamov has neither his COMI nor any form of 'establishment' in Russia (to the extent that latter concept is meaningful as applied to an individual). This is because Mr Bedzhamov left Russia in December 2015 to live in Monaco and then settled in London (where he continues to live today). Recognition and assistance under the CBIR is therefore not available to the Trustee."

"165. I do not accept that Mr Bedzhamov's evidence is sufficiently strong to demonstrate that any of the bars to common law recognition apply. I also do not accept that the question of recognition should be adjourned to await the outcome of the trial in the UK Proceedings at which (it was asserted by Mr Fenwick QC) these issues would be ventilated in evidence. This is for the following reasons. 166. First, as matters stand today, there is an unsatisfied judgment debt against Mr Bedzhamov which has not been overturned on appeal. The VTB 24 Judgment debt is the basis of the orders made against Mr Bedzhamov in the Russian bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy petition of VTB 24 based upon that debt was accepted as reasonable by the Arbitrazh Court and that decision has not been overturned on appeal. 167. I accept that the fact that Mr Bedzhamov has been unable to establish fraud or breach of natural justice in Russia is not dispositive in this jurisdiction. However, I have no reason to conclude that the conduct of proceedings in Russia is per se contrary to natural justice, or that decisions of Russian courts are inherently unreliable. Indeed, that argument was not made by the parties in these proceedings. Accordingly, although foreign judgments are not afforded the same finality as domestic judgments, it seems to me that the various unsuccessful challenges made by Mr Bedzhamov in Russia are at least an appropriate starting point, and a relevant factor, when assessing the allegations he now makes about the VTB 24 judgment debt. 168. Second, and equally importantly, I consider that the evidence which was adduced before me to impeach the VTB 24 Judgment debt is insufficient to establish fraud on the balance of probabilities. It will be recalled that Mr Bedzhamov does not deny that he mortgaged three properties to secure his sister's loan agreement with VTB 24. Although I accept that a mortgage and a personal guarantee are different legal documents giving rise to different legal relationships, there is nothing inherently unusual in a person who charges property to support a loan to a third party borrower also providing a personal guarantee. Nor does Mr Bedzhamov explain why he would not have been willing to provide such guarantee in addition to providing mortgage security for the loan to his sister. 169. Mr Bedzhamov also does not offer any real explanation as to why or how his signature on the guarantee might have been forged (presumably with the connivance of VTB 24) other than to assert that it is part of the campaign against him and his family by the DIA, and to suggest that it was used by the DIA as a back-up to the Bank's petition since the Bank's Unjust Enrichment Claim was under appeal. 170. Third, although Mr Bedzhamov contends that it is 'clear on its face' that the signature on the personal guarantee is 'markedly different' from his authentic signatures from the time, I do not agree. Mr Bedzhamov has produced two personal guarantees executed at about the same time as the alleged personal guarantee in favour of VTB24. My (inexpert) eye cannot detect that the short-hand/initials on those documents are obviously in different hands. 171. In that regard, Mr Bedzhamov also contends that I should place no weight on the fact that he has been unable to produce an expert report opining on the validity of his signature. He attributes the lack of such a report to a lack of funds, but gives no explanation for that. That is surprising, since the VTB 24 Judgment was given in December 2016, almost two and a half years before the WFO. At that time it must have been apparent to Mr Bedzhamov (or his advisers), that if he had not signed the personal guarantee, he needed to obtain expert evidence to support that contention. This was also a time at which, as described in the Court of Appeal judgment to which I have referred, Mr Bedzhamov had no restrictions on his expenditure and, by all accounts lived a lavish lifestyle, spending sums which would have been more than adequate to pay for a report from a handwriting expert. 172. Mr Belchich's evidence is that the Russian court hearing VTB 24's claim in 2016 required Mr Bedzhamov to attend in person to have his signature examined. Mr Belchich and Mr Bedzhamov say that Mr Bedzhamov was (and is) unable to do so for fear of detention and imprisonment (and the consequences for his health) if he returned to Russia. Whether Mr Bedzhamov's fears of the consequences of returning to Russia are well founded, and indeed whether the criminal proceedings against him which give rise to such fear are, or are not, well-founded, are matters which I cannot possibly determine on this application. But whatever the position in that regard, it does not explain why no expert evidence has been provided to this court to support Mr Bedzhamov's contentions, especially given the extensive other evidence produced in the UK Proceedings."

"I therefore conclude that the Bankruptcy Order made in Russia against Mr Bedzhamov should be recognised in this jurisdiction – at least to the extent that the English court should acknowledge its existence and the status of the Trustee."

"it's a two-stage process. Does [Mr Bedzhamov's evidence] have any weight at all? If it does, does it satisfy the test which [the Judge] sets out in his judgment?"

"it is well-settled practice that if a court finds itself faced with conflicting statements on affidavit evidence, it is usually in no position to resolve them, and to make findings as to the disputed facts, without first having the benefit of the cross-examination of the witnesses. Nor will it ordinarily attempt to do so. The basic principle is that, until there has been such cross-examination, it is ordinarily not possible for the court to disbelieve the word of the witness in his affidavit and it will not do so. This is not an inflexible principle: it may in certain circumstances be open to the court to reject an untested piece of such evidence on the basis that it is manifestly incredible, either because it is inherently so or because it is shown to be so by other facts that are admitted or by reliable documents …. [Counsel] said that these principles apply equally to the case in which the evidence is given by witness statement rather than by affidavit, and I agree. I said as much in my summary of the principles in Long v. Farrer & Co and Farrer [2004] EWHC 1774 (Ch); [2004] BPIR 1218, at paragraphs 57 to 61."

"7. The Purported Guarantee is relied on by Bank VTB24 and now by Ms Kireeva in order to state that I owe a debt to VTB24 which is more than the security that I pledged in respect of my sister's loan agreement with VTB24 dated 23 October 2015. 8. However, the signature on the Purported Guarantee … is not mine and I was unaware of the existence of the Purported Guarantee until VTB24's claim against me. As explained in his third witness statement in these proceedings, on my instructions, Mr Belchich sought to have the signature examined by a Russian court appointed expert but this was made impossible by the Russian court's requirement that I return to Russia, where I would be immediately detained pending a trial. I suffer from ischemic heart disease and have had bypass surgery in February 2016, a coronary artery bypass graft, and a stent inserted in May 2018, and have been diagnosed with Dressler's Syndrome which involves recurrent episodes of inflammation around my heart. Given my serious medical condition, I do not believe I would survive if returned to and imprisoned in Russia. 9. Due to lack of funds, I am not currently able to seek an expert report on the signature …. However, it is clear on its face that the signature is markedly different from my own …. 10. In addition, I note that I was flying to Italy in the afternoon of the day that the Purported Guarantee was allegedly signed, as demonstrated by the FSB Report exhibited to Mr Belchich's second witness statement dated 12 April 2021 …. In Russia, the signature of such documents must take place at the relevant bank's offices. While this does not definitively rule out the possibility that I could have attended VTB24's offices in the morning, I suggest that it is inherently unlikely I would have done so when preparing for an international flight."

"14. During the preparation for a hearing on 18 April 2016 regarding VTB24's claim in respect of the VTB24 Loan Agreement … , [Mr Bedzhamov's] instructions were that he did not sign the guarantee and that he was unaware of its existence until the preparation for the August 2016 Hearing. Those instructions have remained consistent to date. As can be seen from the case history obtained from the Moscow City Court website … , at the August 2016 Hearing, I made submissions in accordance with [Mr Bedzhamov's] instructions and requested that a court appointed handwriting expert be instructed to examine the guarantee. This is the standard procedure in Russia for dealing with allegedly forged documents, rather than the production of any form of witness evidence. In Russia, parties to proceedings may only make statements to the Court orally, or through a legal representative with a power of attorney (as in this case). The application was successful and the matter was adjourned until an examination of the signature had taken place. 15. However, in order for the examination to take place, the Russian court required [Mr Bedzhamov] to provide sample signatures in person at the court, as can be seen from the text of the judgment from the further hearing of the matter on 22 December 2016. That judgment (granting VTB24's claim) … states that ' G.I. Bedzhamov's statement about him not being a signatory to the guarantee agreement does not correspond to the factual circumstances of the case. In addition, G.I. Bedzhamov did not show up at the court hearing to take his specimen of handwriting for forensic handwriting exam without a valid excuse '. 16. Clearly, the requirement that [Mr Bedzhamov] attend the Russian court in person could not have been complied with in circumstances where [Mr Bedzhamov] would have been immediately detained on his return to Russia …."

"it appears clear to me that there is no general power in the court at common law to make an order vesting the Belgrave Square Property in the Trustee, or ordering it to be transferred to the Trustee, or in some way conferring possession and control of the property on the Trustee. If and to the extent that Re Kooperman [(1928) 13 B&CR 49] might be thought to support a wider proposition, I do not regard it as a persuasive authority and I decline to follow it."

"As to the assignment under the statute of Connecticut, it is very clear, that [the debtor's] title to real estate within this Commonwealth could not pass thereby. The title and disposition of real estate is exclusively subject to the laws of the country where it is situated, which alone can prescribe the mode by which a title to it can pass. M'Cormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheaton, 202. This statutory assignment, therefore, in regard to real estate situated in this Commonwealth, is merely void. It can neither pass a title, nor aid one otherwise defective."

"the principle is too well established to be now questioned, that real estate is exclusively subject to the laws of the government within whose territory it is situate. Mr. Story says, so firmly is this principle established, that in cases of bankruptcy, the real estate of a bankrupt, situate in a foreign country, is universally admitted not to pass under the assignment …. In sec. 425, after stating the principle as laid down by foreign Jurists, Story says:— The universal consent of the tribunals, acting under the common law, both in England and in America, is, in a practical sense, absolutely uniform on the same subject. All the authorities in both countries, so far as they go, recognize the principle in its fullest import, that real estate or immoveable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the Government within whose territory it is situate."

"In the Bahamas there are no statutory provisions for cross-border assistance in insolvency with an international element involving the United States. Under general principles of private international law one country will usually recognise the status of a trustee in bankruptcy (or similar officer) appointed by another country, and will also recognise his title to moveable (but not immoveable) property situated in the recognising country. Mr Walker's interest in the property was immoveable property. Even if under Florida bankruptcy law Mr Walker's world-wide estate, moveable and immoveable, vested in his trustee, courts in the Bahamas would not recognise the trustee's title to immoveable property within its jurisdiction."

"The order of the Belgian Court cannot affect immovable property … situate in England … , but the English Court will assist the foreign trustee in a proper case by appointing a receiver to the English property."

"I make an order that Maitre Donnet be appointed without security receiver of the leasehold property in question with authority to sell and retain the proceeds as trustee."

"A foreign trustee who would otherwise be met by the obstacle contained in this Rule may be able to mitigate its effect if the English court, in a proper case, is prepared to appoint a receiver of the rents and profits of the immovables."

"in practice the English courts are likely to afford a foreign trustee a considerable degree of assistance in taking steps to obtain a vesting order in his favour, or to procure the formal conveyance to himself of the bankrupt's English immovable property. Indeed, the English court may empower the trustee to effect a sale of such property by formally appointing him a receiver of the bankrupt's property here, clothed with a power to sell the same and to deal with the proceeds in accordance with the provisions of the lex concursus."

"The words 'wheresoever the same may be known or found' are wide enough to include the life interest in real estate in England , but it is quite obvious that the Act of the colonial Parliament does not vest real estate in England or real estate elsewhere than in the colony in the Chief Commissioner, or whoever occupies there the place of assignee in bankruptcy in this country. The English Act of Parliament which at that time applied to the case was the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, which contains a clause:—[His Lordship read sect. 74, and continued:—] From the facts before me I am bound to infer that if the Chief Commissioner, or the person who exercises the functions of what used to be called the official assignee in England , had applied to the Court of Bankruptcy in England for an order in aid of the bankruptcy in the colony, to enable the assignee to receive the rents and profits of the property of which Samuel Levy is tenant for life during the rest of the life of Samuel Levy , that order would have been made as a matter of course. Therefore, on his becoming bankrupt in New South Wales , the real estate in this country became liable at once, or rather would have so become liable if it had belonged to him indefeasibly for his life, to be attached and taken possession of by the proper authority in New South Wales for the purposes of his bankruptcy there."

"The question of making either a vesting order or a declaration that the property in this country has vested in the trustee in bankruptcy in the Isle of Man, seems to me to be one of considerable difficulty. In my judgment, it is not possible for me to make a declaration that 'all the rights and interests of the above-mentioned bankrupt in the following property,' which includes freehold property, 'has vested in the trustee,' because I do not think it has. In my judgment, the effect of the order made in the Isle of Man does not ipso facto vest the assets in this country in the trustee, but if the trustee desires to get those assets vested in him, or to get control over them, his only course is the course which has been adopted in this case of coming to this Court and obtaining the aid of this Court to enable him to get the control and possession of the assets. With regard to making the vesting order, which seems to have been the course adopted in Ireland, the difficulty I feel as to that is, that so far as I know I have no jurisdiction to make an order of that sort at all under the Bankruptcy Act. Of course, I have jurisdiction in a proper case under the Trustee Act to make a vesting order, but what jurisdiction in bankruptcy I have to vest property in a trustee in bankruptcy in another country I do not know. The effect of an order of adjudication in this country is to vest ipso facto the property of the bankrupt in the trustee, but that does not give me any power to vest the property of the bankrupt in a trustee in a bankruptcy in another country, although it be a country which is part of the Empire. Therefore, there seems to me to be a grave difficulty, if not an impossibility, in my making a vesting order."

"That I have jurisdiction to appoint a receiver in bankruptcy there can be no doubt, and, fortified by the course which has been adopted by my predecessor, I think I am justified in adopting the same course."

"It is well established that the assignment of all the bankrupt's property, real and personal and wherever situate, to the representative of his creditors which is effected by the foreign law upon the making of an adjudication by a foreign court having jurisdiction over the bankrupt's person will never be recognised in Australia as operating as an assignment of the bankrupt's Australian lands. AMP Society v Gregory (1908) 5 CLR 615 at 623 and 625 and 628 and 630; Dicey and Morris, above, 1121. Notwithstanding this, English and Australian bankruptcy courts, while not recognising the foreign trustee's title to recover in his own name the bankrupt's lands locally situate, have long acted under provisions such as s 29 the Bankruptcy Act 1966 to make available those lands to the foreign trustee, so that they can be realised for the benefit of the creditors in the foreign bankruptcy (always provided, of course, that the foreign sequestration order claims to reach the local lands)."

"The earlier statutory provisions referred to the request of the other court as being 'sufficient to enable [the English] Court to exercise . . . such jurisdiction as [it] could exercise in regard to similar matters within [its] jurisdiction'. The earlier references to 'jurisdiction in bankruptcy' and 'jurisdiction in bankruptcy and insolvency' were used to identify the courts to which reference was being made. But the jurisdiction which might be exercised was not so limited. Thus a request to the High Court in England for assistance in a form it could not give did not inhibit it from exercising its general equitable jurisdiction to appoint a receiver. The fact that the jurisdiction to do so did not arise under the Bankruptcy Act for the time being in force was immaterial. In my view the position is the same under s 426. The reference to 'insolvency law' in sub-s (4) serves to identify the courts in any part of the United Kingdom on which the obligation to assist is cast. Those courts have their usual jurisdiction and powers as such courts; in England they are the High Court and certain county courts. There is nothing in s 426 to exclude the general jurisdiction and powers vested in those courts as such under the laws of England and Wales. The purpose of sub-s (5) is not to reduce that jurisdiction or those powers but for the purposes of sub-s (4) only to extend them. Thus the court in England, faced with a request from a relevant country may in respect of the matters specified in the request apply either the insolvency law of the relevant country concerned or its own insolvency law. By itself this would not be of much help for the courts of the relevant country would not normally see much point in making a request to the courts of England in preference to applying its own insolvency law; and if it could not do so it would be unlikely that the court in England could. Moreover the court in England would not require the further authority of sub-s (5) to apply all the provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 in accordance with their terms. Consequently the concluding words of sub-s (5) introduce the hypothesis that the matters specified in the request fall within the jurisdiction of the court applying the insolvency law under consideration in so far as 'comparable matters' would do so …. Thus there is available to the court in England when asked for assistance by the court of a relevant country under s 426 (a) its own general jurisdiction and powers and either (b) the insolvency law of England and Wales as provided for in the Insolvency Act 1986, the specified sections of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and the subordinate legislation made under any of those provisions or (c) so much of the law of the relevant country as corresponds to that comprised in (b). In the case of (b) and (c) but not (a) the court in England is entitled to apply such law on the hypothesis as to jurisdiction concerning the matters specified in the request to which I have referred."

"The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so."

"The first and, in my opinion, the only really correct sense of the expression that the Court has no jurisdiction is that it has no power to deal with and decide the dispute as to the subject-matter before it, no matter in what form or by whom it is raised. But there is another sense in which it is often used, i.e., that although the Court has power to decide the question it will not according to its settled practice do so except in a certain way and under certain circumstances."

"So also this court was asked in Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd v International Tin Council (No 2) [1989] Ch 286 to order an affidavit of assets, as an ancillary order, in order to support a judgment of the court, even though the court itself could grant no orders to enforce its judgment (because of the international position of the ITC). The court confirmed, at p 302, that the demands of justice must always be the overriding consideration in considering the scope of the jurisdiction under section 37(1) , in particular to make orders to render any other order of the court effective: p 306."

"(1) the demands of justice are the overriding consideration in considering the scope of the jurisdiction under section 37(1); (2) the court has power to grant injunctions and appoint receivers in circumstances where no injunction would have been granted or receiver appointed before 1873; (3) a receiver by way of equitable execution may be appointed over an asset whether or not the asset is presently amenable to execution at law; and (4) the jurisdiction to appoint receivers by way of equitable execution can be developed incrementally to apply old principles to new situations"

"There can be no objection to this proposition in so far as it signifies the need to identify an interest of the claimant which merits protection and a legal or equitable principle which justifies exercising the power to grant an injunction to protect that interest by ordering the defendant to do or refrain from doing something."

"Professor Cheshire … said that although English law 'neglects the doctrine of unity it recognizes the doctrine of universality'. What he meant was that English law was committed to separate independent bankruptcies in countries where the assets were situate, rather than one bankruptcy in the country of the domicile (the doctrine of unity), but also accepted the title of the foreign trustee to English movables provided that no bankruptcy proceedings had begun within England (universality)."

"The underdeveloped state of the common law means that unifying principles which apply to both personal and corporate insolvency have not been fully worked out. For example, the rule that English moveables vest automatically in a foreign trustee or assignee has so far been limited to cases in which he was appointed by the court of the country in which the bankrupt was domiciled (in the English sense of that term), as in Solomons v Ross , or in which he submitted to the jurisdiction: In re Davidson's Settlement Trusts (1873) LR 15 Eq 383. It may be that the criteria for recognition should be wider, but that question does not arise in this case. Submission to the jurisdiction is enough. In the case of immovable property belonging to a foreign bankrupt, there is no automatic vesting but the English court has a discretion to assist the foreign trustee by enabling him to obtain title to or otherwise deal with the property."

"In cases in which there is statutory authority for providing assistance, the statute specifies what the court may do. For example, section 426(5) of the Insolvency Act 1986 provides that a request from a foreign court shall be authority for an English court to apply 'the insolvency law which is applicable by either court in relation to comparable matters falling within its jurisdiction'. At common law, their Lordships think it is doubtful whether assistance could take the form of applying provisions of the foreign insolvency law which form no part of the domestic system. But the domestic court must at least be able to provide assistance by doing whatever it could have done in the case of a domestic insolvency. The purpose of recognition is to enable the foreign office holder or the creditors to avoid having to start parallel insolvency proceedings and to give them the remedies to which they would have been entitled if the equivalent proceedings had taken place in the domestic forum."

"We do live in a world of increasing world trade and globalisation as mentioned by Lord Hoffmann. Whether one is talking of companies trading internationally or of individuals who have establishments in more than one jurisdiction, the fact of the matter is that businesses and individuals are infinitely more mobile than was the case in 1770. I can see no reason of public policy for refusing to assist the trustee in bankruptcy in this case in the manner sought. On the contrary, it seems to me that it is to the benefit of the creditors of the bankrupt to facilitate the trustee in this case."

"A change in the settled law of the recognition and enforcement of judgments, and in particular the formulation of a rule for the identification of those courts which are to be regarded as courts of competent jurisdiction (such as the country where the insolvent entity has its centre of interests and the country with which the judgment debtor has a sufficient or substantial connection), has all the hallmarks of legislation, and is a matter for the legislature and not for judicial innovation. The law relating to the enforcement of foreign judgments and the law relating to international insolvency are not areas of law which have in recent times been left to be developed by judge-made law. As Lord Bridge of Harwich put it in relation to a proposed change in the common law rule relating to fraud as a defence to the enforcement of a foreign judgment, 'if the law is now in need of reform, it is for the legislature, not the judiciary, to effect it': Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443, 489."

"A domestic court does not have power to assist a foreign court by doing anything which it could properly have done in a domestic insolvency; and it cannot acquire jurisdiction by virtue of any such power."

"In the Board's opinion, the principle of modified universalism is part of the common law, but it is necessary to bear in mind, first, that it is subject to local law and local public policy and, secondly, that the court can only ever act within the limits of its own statutory and common law powers. What are those limits? In the absence of a relevant statutory power, they must depend on the common law, including any proper development of the common law. The question how far it is appropriate to develop the common law so as to recognise an equivalent power does not admit of a single, universal answer. It depends on the nature of the power that the court is being asked to exercise."

"it has been held that the common law power to recognise and assist with the conduct of foreign proceedings is not to be equated with a power to do whatever the court could do in a domestic insolvency, or with the ability to apply legislation 'by analogy' or 'as if' domestic proceedings had been opened. Instead, in each case in which the court is asked to assist at common law by doing something it would be empowered to do by statute in a domestic insolvency, the appropriateness of developing the common law in this way must be tested. The Privy Council decision in Singularis suggests that the basic method is to reason by analogy with other cases in which powers to assist at common law in this way have been recognised, having regard to the underlying purpose(s) of the procedure in respect of which assistance is sought."

"Subject to the effect of the Insolvency Regulation, the jurisdiction of the English courts to adjudge bankrupt a debtor on the petition of a creditor, or on the petition of the debtor, is not excluded by the fact that the debtor has already been adjudged bankrupt by the court of a foreign country."

"It is based on obvious considerations of convenience and expediency. Any other rule would be ineffective, because in the last resort land can only be dealt with in a manner which the lex situs allows."

"Indirectly, of course, a foreign immovable may be affected by the judgment of an English court in personam ordering some person subject to the control of the court to execute a conveyance or mortgage."

"25. … The power of a judge sitting in the High Court to grant an injunction against a party to proceedings properly served is confirmed by, but does not derive from, section 37 of the Supreme Court [now Senior Courts] Act 1981 and its statutory predecessors. It derives from the pre-Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict c 66) powers of the Chancery courts, and other courts, to grant injunctions: … 30. … provided the court has in personam jurisdiction over the person against whom an injunction, whether interlocutory or final, is sought, the court has jurisdiction, in the strict sense, to grant it."

"Website blocking orders clearly require more than the mere disclosure of information. But I think that it is clear from the authorities and correct in principle that orders for the disclosure of information [pursuant to Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133 ] are only one, admittedly common, category of order which a court may make against a third party to prevent the use of his facilities to commit or facilitate a wrong. I therefore agree … that the website blocking order made in this case could have been made ... on ordinary principles of equity."

"in a proper case the English court may authorise the appointment of a receiver of the rents and profits of such immovables"